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1. INTRODUCTION 
"The times can call forth the man." That phrase has often been 
suggested by historians in pondering questions of the rise and the role 
of a national leader. Something like this seems to have happened in 
Indonesia in the mid-1960s. Soeharto, a military man, was proved able to 
pull up Indonesia from the situation of near collapse into what many 
Western observers have pronounced "a prospect of sustained growth." 
The time came in September 1965 when a group of communist army 
officers aided and financed by the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) 
attempted a political coup.^ About this coup, Bunton [1983] wrote: 
this coup has placed the generally patient 
Indonesian, placid and even-tempered people, not 
given to displays of violence, something that is 
alien to their religious beliefs and cultures, in the 
most bloody and frightening "blitzkrieg" wars in 
recent Southeast Asian history. The Indonesians' 
reaction was extremely sudden, swift and violent. 
The whole episode lasted only a few days—most of the 
killing took place in the first forty-eight hours— 
but at the end of the day the Indonesian communist 
was "dead and buried".... 
Indonesia is the only country in the world, which was able to crush the 
communists, the most powerful political force in Indonesia at that time, 
within only a few days. Support for Soeharto came from all Indonesians, 
not only because he consented to the Indonesian demands for political as 
well as economic relief,^ but he, like many other Indonesians, knew what 
must be done for the future of Indonesia: the only way to conquer 
communism is to fight poverty, hunger, malnutrition, disease, etc. 
Fighting communism is not a matter of Democracy or freedom, it is a 
matter of economic development with long-term dimensions and multi-
faceted measures-
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The nature of the economic crisis of 1965/66 was described by 
Palmer^ as a foreign exchange problem: 
. . . the total debt of about US $2,300 million. 
. . . The immediate forecast for 1966 was of foreign 
exchange earnings of US $430 million and minimum 
import requirements of US $560 million; not to 
mention a debt servicing of US $530 million. . . . 
and a food supply problem: 
Rice import requirements were conservatively put at 
US $30 million. . . . Lack of inter-island shipping 
was seriously affecting the movement of food such 
that while hunger oedema was spreading in Java stocks 
of maize were rotting elsewhere in the Archipelago, 
or being considered for export as "surplus 
stock". . . . Even where shipping was available bank 
credit sometimes could not be obtained for the 
transportation of food. . . . 
and a production problem: 
. . . imports [requirements] for equipment, new 
materials and spare parts [amounted to] another US 
$350 million. . . . The shortage of imported raw 
materials had reputedly brought industrial production 
to less than 20 percent of its capacity. Transport 
and communications were in some disarray . . . that 
US $140 million were required to restore the railway 
system to its 1939 capacity. . . . 
and a fiscal and monetary problem: 
. . . the [government] deficit was increasing as a 
proportion of gross receipts. . . . [Even if] all 
development expenditure been immediately halted, the 
narrowing of the gap between revenue and expenditure 
would have depended on some rationalization of 
production incentives. . . . The Rupiah was many 
times over-valued . . . [when] inflation was running 
at about 500 percent. There were no reserves left. 
In fact, the only thing left in the national till 
were some bureaucratic fingers groping for any 
remaining dollars. 
After the achievement of independence in August 1945, Soekarno's 
first order of the day was reconstruction, unification, organization of 
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basic government services, and political and economic stabilization. The 
degree of economic instability in the years following 1950 was so great 
that the government had no choice but to give priority to short-run sta­
bilization measures.^ Indonesia's dependence for money income on a 
narrow range of raw material exports made her economy unstable. The eco­
nomic instability generated from the export side and by inadequate fiscal 
policy had soon been reinforced by internal political unrest. 
Seventeen cabinets had been appointed within 12 years before a 
government strong on the economic side was finally formed. It launched 
its first economic development plan by the end of 1956. The government's 
first move in the monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange field, and 
public statements on foreign investment mining and petroleum laws were 
very promising [Higglns, 1957, pp. 40-47]. However, rebellion of 
military and political leaders between 1957 and 1961 gave no opportunity 
to the government to continue its attack on Indonesia's development 
problem. 
The second plan, the Eight-Year Over-all Development Plan, started 
in 1961, was more comprehensive and possessed some strong points. 
However, it ignored the whole problem of estimating total resources 
available to execute the plan and allocating them to produce maximum 
development progress. It was also striking that the members of the 
planning council were selected on the basis of political consideration 
and contained no professional economist or representatives from the 
previous planning agency. The Indonesian economy had never been 
rehabilitated but kept deteriorating until it reached its critical point 
in 1965 when the PKI, for the third and last time, launched an abortive 
4 
coup. 
The situation of Indonesia could be best described by saying that 
the economy was locked into a downward spiral. Soekarno had failed in 
handling Indonesia's economy. The Soeharto regime, on the other hand, 
started it on a drastically different path. The new order government of 
General Soeharto which took effective control in March 1966 gave first 
priority to the restoration of the economy. Although in no sense a 
professional economist, Soeharto clearly saw the need to give economists 
a key role if his government was to fulfill its mission. A number of 
academic economists with Western training from the University of 
Indonesia were recruited as economic advisers, several of whom were later 
given key cabinet positions. Soeharto brought in a highly knowledgeable 
team of economists including Widjojo Nitisastro, who became chairman of 
the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) in 1967. By 1969, a 
measure of monetary stability had been achieved and in April of the same 
year the First Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita I) of the New Order 
came into effect, as a part of a long-term development plan. The long-
term plan consisted of six terms of a Repelita to the target year 1998. 
The plan involved a careful appraisal of resources and needs, and the 
development of short and long-term goals was designed to accomplish 
specific objectives in overall economic advancement. 
Repelita I, for the most part, was a stabilization plan aimed at 
curbing inflation, raising production of food and consumer goods, 
increasing primary exports, and rehabilitating of the infrastructure 
which included transportation, public utilities, and irrigation. The 
plan was not intended to introduce fundamental changes in the economy. 
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Following food production, Repelita I placed its emphasis on production 
of clothing and the development of industries linked to agriculture. In 
other words, to achieve its objectives, there would be interdependent 
activity in agriculture, industry, and infrastructure. 
Repelita II covering the fiscal years 1974/75-1978/79 was described 
as a continuation and enhancement of the first plan which had to deal 
with urgent needs of national stabilization, rehabilitation, and the 
early stage of development. Repelita II was built based on the achieve­
ments of the first plan, namely economic recovery, restoration of in­
frastructure, expansion of the private sector, mobilization of public and 
private financial resources, and strengthening of the balance of 
payments. The overriding goals of the plan were to improve the level of 
development. 
During Repelita I, it was recognized that constraints to available 
resources meant that certain urgent problems, mainly of a social nature, 
had to be shelved temporarily. These include unemployment, equitable 
distribution of the fruits of development, education, and regional 
growth. Consequently, while Repelita II was essentially an exercise in 
economic planning, it was also one with considerable overtones. Not only 
was economic development only one facet of total national development, 
but national development had to be seen as a balance between material 
progress and spiritual development. In the words of Soeharto, the 
targets of Repelita II were: (1) to supply sufficient food and clothing 
of good quality, within the purchasing power of the common people; (2) to 
supply housing materials and other necessary facilities, particularly for 
the benefit of the common people; (3) more extensive and better in­
6 
frastructure; (4) greater and more equal distribution of public 
assistance; and (5) expanding employment opportunities. 
Specifically, the administration said that industrial development 
under the plan would be directed toward processing of raw material into 
basic materials, expansion of small-scale industry, and preparation for 
industrial development under the following five-year plans. 
The three fundamental objectives of the Third Five-Year Development 
Plan covering the period 1979/80-1983/84 were the equitable distribution 
of development gains, economic growth, and the maintenance of political 
and economic stability. The government particularly emphasized equity, 
and both agricultural and industrial development were seen as important 
means of achieving it. In the agricultural sector, the plan stressed the 
importance of integrated rural development, outlined plans for further 
increases in rice production, and encouraged diversification into other 
food crops. In the industrial sector, the government was seeking to 
encourage industries that created employment opportunities for 
Indonesia's growing labor force or that fulfilled basic domestic needs-
Capital-intensive industries were expected to rely mainly on private 
domestic and foreign sources for the financing of their development, and 
state enterprises involved in such industries were encouraged to form 
joint ventures with foreign partners for this purpose. Consistent with 
the objective of a more equitable distribution of development gains, 
Repelita III gave a high priority to the expansion of education and 
health facilities, especially in the less developed regions of the 
country. 
The goal for real GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth during the 
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third planning period was set at an average annual rate of 6.5 percent.^ 
The slight reduction in the overall growth target from Repelita II 
resulted from the government decision to allocate more resources toward 
social development and more equitable distribution of income as well as 
from expected slower growth in agricultural and mining sectors. 
By the end of Repelita I, the economy was only able to reach its per 
capita income level of 1957. However, it was a great success when 
average annual GDP increase was targeted at 5.0 percent but in fact 7.7 
percent was achieved. Per capita GDP rose by 27.2 percent annually at 
current prices. Imports averaged 30.9 percent annual growth and exports 
46.6 percent. The inflation was reduced in successive years until it was 
only 4.5 percent in 1971 and 7.5 percent in 1972 even though it re­
asserted itself in the succeeding years. The overall objectives of 
Repelita II were largely achieved although the average annual rates of 
growth of real GDP and real per capita GDP at 6.8 percent and 
4.7 percent, respectively, were slightly lower than the targeted rates of 
7.5 and 5.2 percent. Value of imports started leveling off with annual 
growth at 17.4 percent and so did exports with annual growth at 17.5 
percent. The decline in export growth was one of the reasons for a 
devaluation of the Rupiah in November 1978 against the US dollar from Rp 
415 to Rp 625. 
In late 1980, most economic indicators suggested that the Indonesian 
economy was in a healthy condition. In his State Address in August 1981, 
President Soeharto gave revised estimates of the growth performance of 
the Indonesian economy in the first year of Repelita III. The GDP was 
estimated to increase in real terms by 9.6 percent, with growth of the 
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manufacturing sector put at 21 percent, of construction, trade and 
transport at around 10 percent, service at 14 percent, and the whole 
agricultural sector at 5.5 percent [Arndt, 1981]. In the following 
years, however, the magnitude of the impact on exports and government 
revenues from the oil production cutback due to the world oil glut 
required a downward revision of domestic production. A further sharp 
drop in Indonesia's oil expoirt earnings was imminent and the Rupiah was 
finally devalued in March 1983 and the rate to the US dollar was fixed at 
Rp 970. Various policy decisions were taken to limit the inflationary 
effects: four large public sector projects, estimated to cost US $5 
billion, were deferred and further rephasing of projects would follow. 
The prospect for Indonesia's economy in the coming years will be 
determined not only by the future of oil production but by foreign 
borrowing as well. 
The growth and progress of the Indonesia's economy since 1966 has 
been accompanied by rapidly increasing external indebtedness. The 
existing development policy of Indonesia requires a high rate of economic 
growth with particular emphasis on the rapid expansion of both non-
agricultural output and rice. Since Indonesia lacks capital resources, 
it has to rely on foreign loans, grants, and private direct investment to 
finance the import of capital goods, raw materials, and other resources 
and to finance infrastructure development which is necessary to support 
the process of industrialization. It was estimated that Indonesian 
foreign debt reached over US $25 billion by the end of 1983. Besides the 
government development expenditure, private domestic investment and 
direct foreign investment have also become the source of growth of the 
9 
economy, especially after the enactment of the domestic and foreign 
investment law in 1967/68. 
With real output growth at an average annual rate of 6.6 percent 
during 1966-1980, employment in Indonesia increased as well. In 1980, 
Indonesian population was recorded at 146.8 million persons, of those 
49.9 percent were classified as labor force. When the population 
increased at an average annual rate of 2.34 percent between the intercen-
sal period 1971-1980, the Indonesia labor force increased at 4.75 percent 
per year. Despite the increase in the number of employed persons, with a 
1.8 percent rate of open unemployment in 1980, the problem of under­
employment was still persistent. Around 37 percent of the labor force 
worked less than 35 hours per week in 1980. 
There was no doubt that major economic changes had taken place in 
many areas. Income per capita has almost doubled at 1973 constant price-
l-5going from around 36,900 Rupiah per year in 1966 to 70,800 Rupiah in 
1980. What was far less clear was the extent to which all of these 
changes had been desirable. Critics claimed that economic growth which 
had taken place had benefited only a minority of privileged people with 
access to political and economic power. The majority of the people had 
been ignored, either untouched by the development process or even harmed 
by it. As an example, 30.7 percent of total real GDP in 1980 was con­
tributed by the agricultural sector which absorbed 54 percent of the 
total labor force. In 1971, however, the picture was better when 66 
percent of the total labor force contributed 44.0 percent of total real 
GDP. This meant that each worker in the agricultural sector earned 
relatively less than the amount received in 1971. Following this, the 
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opening of Repelita III was earmarked by Mubyarto as critical, based on 
the facts, figures and objectives contained in the third plan.^ Mubyarto 
pointed out that the economic growth projections were not consistent with 
the objective of equitable distribution of income, since the overwhelming 
majority of the population earned their living from agriculture, which 
was projected to grow at the lowest rate. He did not mention, however, 
the future impact of various government redistribution programs to reduce 
imbalances in sectoral growth. Such programs actually have been started 
since Repelita II. Mubyarto also observed several undesirable effects 
prevailing for the majority of the population, which included the 
increasing rate of under employment and the widening income disparity 
between the rich and the poor. 
Djojohadikusumo concluded that in 1973/75 Indonesia belonged to the 
group of countries with "moderate inequality" based on his estimation 
that the lowest 40 percent income group received more than 15 percent of 
total national income, while the top 20 percent income group of the 
population received 53 percent of total income.^ Others confirmed that 
the growth of income inequality had been worsening since 1967.® The 
income inequality problem in Indonesia was discussed not only in 
terms of how income was distributed among the population, but also among 
regions.^ 
It is the purpose of this study to model the Indonesian economy in 
order to evaluate its overall development performance since 1966. The 
model of the Indonesian economy is constructed based on data available 
between 1966 and 1980, with the primary objective to explore the growth 
potential of the economy as well as its effect on employment and income 
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distribution, and other consequences of adopting alternative development 
strategies. Specifically, the study has the following purposes: 
(1) The study is to analyze Indonesia's overall economic develop­
ment performance, the development policy, and other economic aspects that 
may influence the economic development performance. 
(a) This analysis is concerned with the performance of the agricul­
tural sector as well as the industrial and service sectors, in terms 
of sectoral growth. 
(b) The analysis is also concerned with the government policy 
towards investment, with public finance policy, foreign trade, and 
monetary policy. 
(c) Since the Indonesian labor force is an important factor—not 
only a source of economic growth but possibly, with this growth of 
labor force and population, a negative influence on the development 
performance—the Indonesian population growth becomes the concern of 
this study too. 
(d) While external loans have become necessary to finance 
Indonesia's development program, it is the concern of this study to 
analyze uses and determinants of the growth of Indonesia's external 
public debt, to evaluate the country's debt servicing capacity, to 
present the external debt profile, and the level of external 
indebtedness of Indonesia. 
(2) Besides growth, as empirical evidence shows that although 
growth is necessary but it alone is not sufficient, this study is also 
concerned with the development policy and performance in employment. 
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poverty, and income distribution. 
(3) Based on the analysis of the above important aspects of 
development, the purpose of this study is also to reconstruct a useful 
model of the Indonesian economy to analyze and explain the observed 
process of growth of the economy. 
(4) Using the model so constructed, it is also the purpose of this 
study to explore the effects on income distribution, employment, poverty, 
and other consequences of adopting alternative growth policies, as well 
as the impact of income distribution policy on growth. 
As mentioned before, this study is based on data and information 
that are available for the period 1966-1980. The model of the Indonesian 
economy is simulated for the above period and is extended until 1985. 
Data and information used for this study are derived mainly from official 
sources such as Bank Indonesia (BI) which is the central bank, and Biro 
Pusat Statistik (BPS) or the Central Bureau of Statistics. 
The study is organized into six chapters. The theoretical survey of 
economic growth including its relationships with income distribution, 
poverty, and employment is presented in the next chapter. Chapter 2. In 
this chapter, special emphasis is given to the description of the model 
of the Indonesian economy. Chapter 3 analyzes the growth of the 
Indonesian labor force as well as population and the development of 
foreign public debt as the major source of financing Indonesian economic 
development. It also analyzes the sectoral growth performance and the 
government policy towards private investment. At the end of this 
chapter, a submodel of production and investment is presented as a part 
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of the whole model. Chapter 4 analyzes three sectors of the government 
policies: foreign trade, public finance, and monetary policies. It also 
discusses the economic development performance in each of those three 
economic sectors. At the end of this chapter, a submodel of the 
Indonesian economy that includes foreign trade, public finance, and 
monetary sectors is presented as a part of the entire model. Chapter 5 
analyzes aspects of employment, poverty, and income distribution. A 
method of calculating the level of unemployment and income inequality is 
also presented. This chapter also presents a method of price aggregation 
to arrive at prices for consumers, an element which is important for 
modeling the Indonesian economy. All types of accounting equations in 
this chapter are considered as another submodel. Finally, Chapter 6 
presents the results of the simulation of the Indonesian model along with 
the method to solve the set of equations which construct the whole model. 
Several alternatives of computer simulation are performed and the results 
are summarized. This chapter also contains an analysis of the validation 
of the model. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 1 
^Most Indonesian and many foreign observers believe that the coup 
was inspired and supported by Peking. 
O 
The Indonesian demand was organized by the KAMI (Action Front of 
Indonesian University Students) and KAPPI (Action Front of Indonesian 
High School Students and Youth) within the Tritura (Three of the People's 
demand): (1) ban the PKI, (2) fight the inflation and restore the 
economy, and (3) reform the administration. 
^Ingrid Palmer, 1978, pp. 6-9. 
^For stabilization measures between 1952 and 1956 see Higgins, 1957. 
^Repelita III projected the average annual real growth rate of the 
agricultural sector at 3.5 percent, mining at 4.0 percent, manufacturing 
at 11.0 percent, construction at 9.0 percent, transportation and com­
munication at 10.0 percent and other sectors at 8.1 percent. This brings 
an overall annual average growth rate of 6.5 percent. 
^MubyartOj, 1979. 
jojohadikusumo, 1977. 
^Soelistyo et al., 1979. 
^Esmara, 1975; and Mandagi, 1980. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MODELLING THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY 
This chapter deals with the theoretical survey of economic growth, 
planning and policy. A special emphasis is given to the relationships 
between growth and income distribution, poverty, and employment. The 
second part of this chapter deals with the modelling of the Indonesian 
economy, its objectives, characteristics, and the structure of the model. 
2.1. Economic Growth, Planning, and Policy 
Two strategies of growth are discussed in this section, the 
conventional growth-oriented approach and the growth with equity 
approach. Since the relationship between growth and equity is one of the 
objectives of designing the model, this subject is also discussed. One 
of the important topics in designing the economy-wide model is to involve 
policy analysis within the model. Two approaches of Tinbergen and Theil 
are discussed briefly. 
2.1.1. The conventional growth-oriented approach 
The most popular idea about economic development during the 1950s and 
the 1960s was the growth-oriented approach. According to this approach, 
economic growth is viewed as a prime mover for development. On the other 
hand, development is viewed as a matter of securing social changes 
associated with economic growth. This approach measures the degree of 
success or failure with respect to development in terms of the growth 
rate of gross national product (GNP) and the level of per capita income. 
The basic argument for this approach is that due to underdevelopment many 
less developed countries (LDCs) are caught in a vicious circle: Lack, of 
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capital, technology, and skill leads to low productivity and low real 
income, thereby causing low savings and thus investment. 
The growth-oriented approach to development proposes that LDCs can 
break such bottlenecks in order to attain a higher level of development 
by importing foreign capital via foreign assistance, external borrowing, 
foreign trade, and foreign investment. Moreover, in this approach 
industrialization is emphasized to boost the development process with the 
help of foreign capital and the embodied technology. This approach 
regards foreign capital and technology as the key to the development. In 
the initial process of development, LDCs need to be highly dependent on 
developed industrialized countries, but the degree of such dependence is 
gradually reduced as development gets underway. The LDCs will reach the 
so called stage of "self-sustaining growth" at which no more assistance 
is required. The development of the growth-oriented approach was greatly 
influenced by Rostov's Doctrine that viewed development as proceeding 
through a number of stages along a straight path. As the developed 
countries had all passed through specific stages, the proponent to this 
doctrine believes that LDCs ought to follow this path through the same 
fashion [Rostow, I960]. 
Basic to Rostow's original analysis in his 'stages of economic 
growth' was his sketch of a dynamic theory of production which emphasizes 
the composition of investment and the growth of particular sectors in the 
economy. This theory of production allowed Rostow to identify certain 
'leading sectors,' the growth of which is thought to be instrumental in 
propelling the economy forward. As Rostow's analysis of economic growth 
has continued to command attention, it has also received substantial 
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criticism, some of which deserve equal attention for their concern with 
those historical factors neglected by Rostow.^ 
Implicitly in the growth-oriented approach defined above is a 
development strategy which later is called the "two-gap" approach. This 
approach focuses on two scarce resources, namely capital and foreign 
exchange, the shortages which are seen as imposing effective 
constraints on economic development. Capital and foreign exchange are 
considered as if they are Independent of each other as the two-gap approach 
operates in two dimensions: (1) the saving-investment gap in which such 
investment, which requires domestic savings, is not sufficient to ensure 
that development takes place; and (2) the foreign-exchange gap in which 
import requirements for achieving the target rate of growth exceed the 
demand for exports and other sources of foreign exchange. The two-gap 
approach was originally developed and applied by AID [Hawkins, 1968] to 
forecast the magnitude of foreign assistance that would be required to 
achieve different target rates of growth, and also to plan an efficient 
allocation of foreign assistance among recipients. Critics to the two-
gap approach argue that even if growth is constrained by foreign exchange 
or import, one need not adhere to the further assumption that domestic 
2 tax and other allocation policies are powerless to bring about change. 
A systematic support to the growth-oriented approach is also given to 
industrialization which is considered to offer substantial dynamic 
benefits that are important for changing the traditional structure of the 
less developed economy. In this theory of "big push," Rosenstein-Rodan 
[1943, 1961] emphasized the importance of a high minimum amount of 
industrial investment in order to jump over the economic obstacles to 
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development. Related to the theory of big push is the "balanced growth" 
doctrine which does not need to be dependent upon a large amount of 
public investment or dominance of the public sector. According to the 
balance-growth strategy, the inducement to invest in LDCs is limited by 
the small size of market with Inelastic demand. Hence, to remedy the 
inadequate market structure of LDCs, simultaneous investment in as many 
sectors of the economy as possible must take place in order for one 
industry to provide a market and sources of supply for another. Nurkse 
[1953] also supports the idea of the balanced-growth strategy. The 
strategy argues that synchronized investment leads to an increase in 
income and demand. Industries can increase the demand for each other's 
products and consequently factor input costs of these industries can be 
reduced. Moreover, when the investment is piecemeal, adequate income can 
not be generated to increase demand. Therefore, the doctrine calls for 
an enormous amount of capital to achieve the goal of balanced 
development. The balanced growth theory also implies that industry must 
not go too far ahead of agriculture. Infrastructure, such as 
transportation and communication, utilities, etc., must be built up 
substantially to aid and stimulate industrial expansion. 
Hirschman's unbalanced growth doctrine [Hirschman, 1958] is in 
opposition to the balanced growth theory. Hirschman argues that the 
inability to invest presents a serious bottleneck for growth in LDCs. 
Therefore, development should take place through shortages and excesses 
to minimize wastes or external economies. On one hand, the balanced 
growth strategy is undesirable because it reduces induced investment, on 
the other hand the deliberately unbalanced growth generates its own 
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response known as "backward and forward linkage effects." Moreover, 
unbalanced growth creates the trickle-down and polarization effects. The 
trickle-down effects are favorable as the progress of the 
industrial/urban sector trickles down to the agricultural/rural sector. 
On the other hand, the economy will be adversely affected as the 
agricultural/rural sector and the industrial/urban sector will be 
polarized due to the shifting of the tax burden on service payments to 
the rural people. However, Hirschman concludes that the favorable 
effects will ultimately outweigh the adverse effects. The unbalance 
growth strategy argues that infrastructural development should take place 
in urban centers where industrial activities are concentrated. 
As a summary, among growth oriented strategies there are two major 
theoretical variants. The first calls for massive capital investment on 
all fronts simultaneously in order to reach the stage when an increased 
rate of aggregate growth can be generated. This implies the need to 
overcome obstacles to rapid growth of output and often produces a bias 
towards capital-intensive projects and a desire for rapid industrializa­
tion. The second places similar reliance on the forward and backward 
linkage effects between industries at different stages of production to 
provide the impetus for growth. The proponents of this theory recommend 
a selective approach concentrating on key sectors or industries where 
complementaries or linkage effects are supposed to be the strongest. 
2.1.2. The growth with equity approach 
The inadequacy of GNP growth as the sole objective of development can 
be illustrated by the trend in some LDCs where in recent years 
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significant growth rates have actually resulted in a decrease in the 
share of income accruing to the poorest groups. This proves the fallacy 
of the argument that improvements in the living standards of a developing 
country's population will follow automatically from high rates of GNP 
growth. The fact is that significant improvements in overall standards 
of living and social welfare cannot be achieved within an acceptable 
period solely by increasing the rate of physical capital formation. The 
limited contribution made to development by growth-oriented strategies 
explains their failure to cope with the problems of unemployment and 
poverty in the LDCs. 
The unconventional approaches to development that have arisen since 
the beginning of the 1970s are commonly referred to as employment 
oriented, anti-poverty oriented, and the basic needs approaches. These 
approaches are called growth with equity approaches as opposed to the 
growth-oriented approaches. Conflicts between output and employment 
objectives in LDCs was raised for the first time by Steward and Streeten 
[1971]. The objectives of employment-oriented strategies reflect a wider 
definition of development that includes improvement in the living 
conditions of individuals in addition to economic growth. Employment 
promotion is viewed as the principal means of spreading the benefits of 
economic growth more evenly throughout the economy. Accordingly, the 
growth objective is modified so as to maximize not only output but the 
rate of labor absorption. Implicit in this change in the pattern of 
growth is the need for reallocation of resources in favor of 
disadvantaged sectors and groups. Thus, redistribution of incomes and 
productive assets receives some attention through emphasis on the central 
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objective of reducing unemployment and under-employment. Moreover, the 
employment oriented strategies stress that simultaneous increases in 
output and employment can be achieved through direct substitution of 
labor for capital in the production. Generally speaking, the employment 
oriented approach reflects the desire to reconcile economic growth with 
the broader distribution of incomes through increases in the level of 
productive employment. As one of the proponents to the employment 
oriented approach, the ILOs world employment program has produced several 
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mission reports that merit attention. 
Fairly recently, the realization that efforts to affect redistribu­
tion of income through greater access to productive employment still 
exclude the principal poverty groups in most developing countries. 
Accordingly, the main objective of anti-poverty oriented development 
strategies is to raise per capita incomes above a predetermined "poverty 
line" as quickly as possible, with the related aim of reducing income and 
social inequalities. Though growth of GNP is not left out of account, it 
no longer receives top priority. Anti-poverty oriented policies are 
aimed at the redistribution of wealth, assets, and output through the 
reallocation of productive resources in favor of explicitly defined 
poverty groups and consumption transfer to them. Following the identifi­
cation of target groups, it is common practice to design separate action 
programs for each. Each program is made up of a "policy package" 
designed to remedy specific causes of poverty. These policy packages 
include measures designed to change the pattern of land ownership and 
tenure, to improve access to basic education, vocational training, health 
facilities, etc. 
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Similar to the anti-poverty oriented strategy is the basic-needs 
approach. There are important conceptual differences, however: (1) 
anti-poverty programs are directed at target poverty groups, whereas the 
basic-needs approach is founded on the premise that poverty in most 
developing countries is widespread and, therefore, action should be 
directed at the population as a whole; (2) the basic-needs approach is 
concerned both with significantly raising the level of aggregate demand 
and with increasing the supply of basic goods and services as opposed to 
merely raising the incomes of the poor to a minimum subsistence level. 
From what has been discussed above, those three approaches are 
complementary one to another, and each of them may be effective in 
different situations and different target groups. Each of the approaches 
can be considered as one policy package under what is called the growth 
with equity approach to development, and that is precisely what Chenery 
and others meant when they introduced this approach in 1974.^ Since 
then, contributions to this approach have been increasing; among others 
the World Bank and the International Labour Organization have made 
contributions. 
Most of the critics to the growth with equity approach believe that 
shifting of relative incomes and resources in favor of the poor slow down 
the rate of growth. The possibilities of conflict between the objective 
of equity and the growth that is seen as an essential means of equity 
arise in areas related to the quantity of saving and investment, and to 
productivity of factors of production. Relative to national income and 
absolutely because of redistribution following progressive taxes the rich 
will have smaller incomes to save. It is feared that the total amount of 
domestic saving will be smaller too, hence, other things being equal, the 
amount of investment and the expansion rate of the economy will be 
reduced. Shifting resources into labor intensive activities is, due to 
the relative backwardness of the poor, likely to produce lower rates of 
return at least in the medium term. Similarly, the introduction of land 
reforms must generally be expected to result in an initial fall in 
output. The same thing happens to productivity of labor which has 
negative relationships with employment elasticity. Concentrating on the 
sectors with the highest employment elasticities could hamper the 
expansion of total output and even the long-run growth of employment 
itself. 
The counter arguments, however, believe that equality is a condition 
for self-sustaining economic growth, because: (1) the rich have no 
desire to save and invest a substantial proportion of their income in the 
economy, (2) rising income of the poor will stimulate investment through 
increase in demand for locally produced necessity products, and (3) 
reduction of inequality leads to mass participation and economic 
expansion. 
2.1.3. The relationship between growth and inequality 
There are many factors which affect the distribution of income and 
many conceivable policies which could alter income distribution. It is 
impossible, however, for a theory to provide a model for analyzing all of 
these factors and policies. The usual model chosen for use in analyzing 
the relationship between income and growth is a dualistic model which has 
two main sectors, modern and traditional. In this model, workers in the 
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traditional sector have much lower average levels of productivity and 
also lower wages than those in the modern sector. Capital accumulation 
in the modern sector is more rapid than that in the traditional sector. 
Workers are transferred from the traditional sector into the modern 
sector as development proceeds. As in Lewis [1954], the supply of labor 
from the traditional sector to the modern sector is unlimited. 
The relationship between growth and inequality was observed for the 
first time by Kuznets [1955]. Measures of GNP per capita and inequality 
compiled by Kuznets fell into a pattern that is now commonly referred to 
as the U-shaped hypothesis; Inequality first rises and later falls as an 
economy progresses from very low to high levels of development. This 
pattern was borne out by both the cross-section and the time-series data 
examined by Kuznets, who outlines various mechanisms to explain this 
pattern, particularly the earlier trend of increasing inequality. His 
explanations are plausible but, to the extent that they go beyond the 
mechanics of the labor-surplus model, they are more suggestive than 
rigorous. Other studies which support the U-shaped hypothesis include 
those of Adelman and Morris [1973, Ch. 5], Weiskoff [1970], Pauckert 
[1973], and Ahluwalia [1974a, 1976]. Figure 2.1. illustrates the typical 
U-shaped curves derived from regression analysis [Ahluwalia, 1976]. 
A number of forces at work in the early stages of development are 
pushing in the direction of greater inequalities: (1) urbanization 
commences with a migration of young men from the countryside. A 
dualistic economic structure is created by the fact that urban wages are 
typically several times higher than the value of average incomes in the 
rural area. (2) Urban industrialization and other modern activities 
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associated with high technology require large inputs of capital that 
create little employment for unskilled migrants. These urban activities 
reflect the concentration of ownership in a relatively small number 
entrepreneur. (3) The growing population, especially in the rural areas, 
brings more pressure towards increasing inequalities. 
In addition, the above pessimistic conclusion is reinforced by the 
usual presumption that it is the rich households that save and the poor 
households that consume. Therefore, any attempt co redistribute income 
from the rich to the poor will reduce total savings and investment and 
thus reduce the rate of growth. The validity of these arguments, 
however, depends on fairly large differences in marginal savings rates 
between the rich and the poor. It is possible that such large 
differences do not exist. 
2.1.4. Economic planning and policies 
The pursuit of economic development among LDCs has been followed by 
the almost universal acceptance of development planning as the surest 
and most direct route to economic progress. It is also widely believed 
that centralized national planfiing is the only institutional and organi­
zational mechanism for overcoming the major obstacles to development and 
for ensuring a sustained high rate of economic growth. In this perspec­
tive, economic planning may be described as a deliberate governmental 
attempt to coordinate economic decision making over the long run and to 
influence, direct, and in some cases, even control the level of growth of 
a nation's principal economic variables in order to achieve a predeter­
mined set of development objectives. An economic plan is, therefore, 
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simply a specific set of quantitative economic targets to cover all major 
aspects of the national economy. The planning process itself can be 
described as an exercise in which a government first chooses social 
objectives, then sets various targets, and finally organizes a framework 
for implementing, coordinating, and monitoring a development plan.^ 
In the words of Tinbergen, planning is nothing but preparation for 
policy [Tinbergen, 1967, Ch. 2]. Economic policy is concerned with the 
analysis of decision situations and policy problems, using that part of 
general economic theory which can be quantitatively applied to economic 
data in some operational sense. As economic policy contains two impor­
tant elements, namely objective and instrument, Tinbergen [1952, 1957] 
places all relevant economic variables into two categories, target 
variables (T-variables) and instrument or policy variables (P-variables). 
Target variables relate to such items as the level of employment, infla­
tion rate, output growth, income distribution, etc., - variables the 
government is likely to be interested in but has no direct control over. 
What the government can do is to set target values for these variables, 
and therefore values of these variables are determined exogenously, such 
as to maximize an objective function. Instrument or policy variables 
refer to items such as taxes, government expenditure, credit controls, 
etc. - variables whose values are unknown and determined endogenously 
within the system, because the values that are placed upon them will 
depend upon the values of the target variables. 
On the basis of certain simplifying assumptions. Tinbergen's approach 
to the theory of economic policy is applied to a policy model of 
simultaneous linear equations to repreoent the behavior of the economy; 
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where F is expressing the relationships between the target variable, T, 
and policy variables, Ps. The mathematical rule for the solution of a 
system of equations is that there should be as many dependent 
(endogenous) variables as there are equations (equation consistency). In 
general, for the above system to be soluble, the number of policy P-
variables must be at least equal to the number of target T-variables. 
For there to be one unique solution, then I = J (policy consistency). 
The key conclusion of the simplified Tlnbergen approach is, therefore, 
that for a government to achieve multiple policy objectives, it must use 
at least as many policy instruments as the number of its objectives.^ 
Even though the Tlnbergen approach has been pioneering models 
primarily designed to shed light on the probable effects of economic 
policies and can be generalized for theoretical and practical purposes 
[Fox et al., 1973], this approach is subject to criticism [Killick, 1983, 
pp. 41-42]: (1) The simplified system assumes that the operation of the 
economy can be expressed in the form of linear equations and that there 
are no time-lags, whereas complex non-linear relationships and time 
delays are major aspects of the real world; (2) the system assumes that 
the structural relationship in the economy (Fs) will not be altered by 
value of Ps, and that the Fs are determined perfectly; (3) the system 
makes a sharp distinction between objectives and policy instruments whose 
relationships in reality are more complex; and (4) the system assumes 
that government action is costless and therefore no comparison of cost 
among alternative solutions is needed. 
Critics to the Tinbergen's approach came from Theil who proposed his 
own approach to economic policy [Theil, 1956 and Theil, 1961]. Theil 
called the Tinbergen's system of equations above a system of an "inverted 
reduced form."^ 
The problem with the Tinbergen's approach lies in the fact that if 
the system contains such exogenous variables that must be predicted, the 
forecasting procedure so involved implies the introduction of an element 
of uncertainty. Moreover, the choice criterion of target values does not 
imply that policy-makers try to reach the maximum utility under the 
restrictions imposed by the structure of the economy. Contrary to the 
Tinbergen's approach, Theil's choice of target variables is based on 
optimization and Theil's approach does not have equality of the numbers 
of target variables and of controlled variables. 
The policy problem is viewed by Theil as analogous to the theory of 
rational consumer choice, in which the consumer is assumed to maximize 
his utility, subject to the budget constraint given by his income and the 
prices of goods and services. To solve the policy problem, it is 
necessary to specify (1) a preference function for the decision-maker; 
(2) a model of the economy setting for the constraints facing the 
decision-maker; and (3) a conditional maximization procedure. The model 
of the economy describes the quantitative relationships estimated to 
exist between the economic variables under the control of the decision­
maker and the non-controlled variables which he is interested in affect-
g 
ing by policy actions. 
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2.2. Modelling of the Indonesian Economy 
This section deals with the objectives and characteristics of the 
model of the Indonesian economy, a model in which the relation between 
growth and income distribution dominates the idea of the model. The 
structure of the model is also briefly described with an introduction 
about the problems with the Indonesian data faced by many model builders, 
and followed by an explanation of the mechanics of the model. 
2.2.1. Objectives and characteristics of the model 
It became clear that the hope about the trickle-down effects of 
growth, that rapid growth would naturally lead to improved conditions for 
everyone, has been misplaced. There is extensive support, however, for 
the Kuznets U-hypothesis that the relative distribution of income first 
becomes more unequal in the course of economic development and only at 
the later stages become more equal. Though this view is still somewhat 
controversial, there is no question that distribution of income, employ­
ment, and poverty have become a major policy issue especially within the 
less-developed countries. The major question for policy analysis has 
been whether or not there is a basic conflict between the goal of faster 
growth and the goal of greater distributional equality. 
In accordance with the above issues, the objectives of the Indonesian 
model of the economy can be briefly stated as follows: 
1. The model of the Indonesian economy is designed to be capable of 
analyzing and explaining the observed process of growth of the 
economy. 
2. The model is designed to explore the effects on income distribu­
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tion, employment, poverty, and other consequences of adopting 
alternative growth policies, as well as the impact of income 
distribution policy on growth. 
Related to the second point above, several hypotheses can be tested within 
the model, (1) that the relationship between growth and equity depends on 
the policy instruments used for attaining any growth rate; (2) that the 
relationship between growth and equity depends on the stage or level of 
development In relation to equity (that is, whether growth means more 
equitable distribution of income, or whether the growth rate should be 
sacrificed for Income distribution policy); and (3) that the relationship 
between growth and employment Is generally direct in nature, that is, 
greater growth means an increase in employment. Moreover, with increased 
employment the unemployed labor force living below the poverty line will 
decrease, hence, an Increase in growth means a reduction in poverty. 
The present model of the Indonesian economy consists of a model of 
economic growth, and a kind of policy model. The objective of formulat­
ing this type of model Is basically operational In character which means: 
(1) that the process of growth can be analyzed and explained by means of 
quantitative variables, and (2) that the process of growth may be favor­
ably influenced by a set of policy variables. The limitation of the 
model Is, however, that It is not designed to Involve a broad set-up of 
target variables nor optimization procedures unless it is given certain 
modification. 
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2.2.2. Structure and mechanics of the model 
Before going into the model, it may be useful to have a brief 
overview of the general problems related to Indonesian data, which in 
many respects have influenced the character of this model and other 
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Indonesian economy-wide models. An economy-wide model can be objective 
or subjective. Subjective factors may enter models in three ways: (1) 
through the basic causal relationship among variables, such relationship 
being much influenced by the objective to carry what the model is 
designed for by its builder; (2) through the equations specification, 
something that is dependent on the behavior of the economy; and (3) 
through parameter specification. Parameter specification is considered 
as the most Influential factor in modelling the Indonesian economy 
because it is directly related to the situation of the Indonesian data, 
both in terms of quantity and quality. A model is an "objective" model 
when its parameters are derived from abundant statistical data through 
statistical estimation. In this case, we have a conventional econometric 
model. On the other hand, if such a model is created based on limited 
statistical data and, therefore, its parameters are not derived through 
formal statistical estimation, we have a "subjective" model. Based on 
this view, a simulation model is, in many respects, a subjective model. 
At present, most of the Indonesian data are supplied through the 
efforts of two major sources of official statistics, the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (BPS) and the Bank of Indonesia (BI). However, the current 
data are statistically Inadequate for a comprehensive economy-wide model, 
especially for an econometric type of model. Some of the problems with 
the Indonesian data are as follows: (1) some series are too short to be 
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used; (2) some key series are compiled and presented in different time 
period units and with different classification making them difficult or 
impossible to use; (3) in other cases we are confronted with the problem 
of "too many" statistics, where one statistic is presented in two 
different series which come from two different sources; (4) only a few of 
the statistics are presented in a quarterly series making it impossible 
to create a fairly comprehensive model; and (5) the reliability of the 
data is somewhat questionable. 
The present model of the Indonesian economy therefore designed 
considering above limitations. Based on the subjective factors discussed 
above, this model is a kind of simulation model, even though many of the 
macro-equations are specified statistically. Besides, there are some 
other uses of the word "simulation." Sometimes it is used to describe 
the process of making a number of solutions of a model (even in an 
econometric model) in order to find out how it responds to variations in 
parameters and other changes in specification. Another use of the word 
is to describe the numerical solution of dynamic models made up of 
differential (or difference) equations which are too complex for 
analytical solutions or simple qualitative analysis. In other occasions, 
simulation simply means an analog or idealization of the more complex 
system, the essential properties of which are retained in the analog. 
All of the above definitions or descriptions about simulation are 
applicable to this present model. The simulation process involves the 
solution of a simultaneous set of difference equations. This includes 
the specification of initial values for endogenous variables and time 
paths for the exogenous variables. 
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The model consists of a set of non-linear equations each of them 
simulating activity from year to year. Each year's solution is dependent 
on current and preceding values of variables. The preceding values are 
either initialized or predetermined from the solution in the previous 
year. To complete the simulation process, an attempt has been made to 
incorporate the future by forming expectations from past changes and 
future values of certain exogenous variables. The functional relation­
ships between variables are either technical, behavioral, legal, or just 
an accounting identity. The behavioral and technical relations between 
variables are estimated from time series or cross-section analysis from 
country data, or borrowed, in the light of explicit or implicit parame­
ters, from economic documents or previous studies. 
The model has eleven functions of relations; (1) production, (2) in­
vestment, (3) international trade, (4) public finance, (5) monetary, 
(6) saving-consumption, (7) price, (8) employment, and (9) income distri­
bution function. In addition to this, (10) the population and labor 
force function and (11) the foreign financing function can be included as 
exogenous to the model. 
There are eight sectors of activities considered in the production 
function. These sectors are identical with the GDP originating sectors 
used in the national income account. In this production function, output 
of each sector is derived in terms of sectoral real value added. In the 
investment function, total investable funds are determined as the sum of 
total domestic savings and foreign savings. The required investment in 
each sector, on the other hand, is determined on the basis of marginal 
capital-output ratio (IGOR). The residual funds are allocated in the 
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manufacturing sector. 
Within the international trade function, the main purpose is to 
derive the export and import function in a fairly disaggregated manner. 
It is worthwhile to note that throughout the analysis, oil is always 
treated as exogenous in the model, as well as international prices and 
exchange rates. In the public finance function, each element of 
government revenues is estimated while government expenditure is taken 
exogenously. It is also the purpose of this function to determine the 
government savings. In the monetary sector, the attempt is to formulate 
the demand and supply of money. GDP deflator, which is assumed to 
equalize aggregate demand and supply is determined from the money demand 
and money supply equations. 
The saving-consumption function is not really exposed exclusively in 
the model. An attempt is made to determine the average propensity to 
save for each class of income from a cross-section analysis. Another 
purpose is to find total household expenditure and, hence, total 
household saving. Sectoral prices are predicted using the input-output 
relationship. Sectoral prices are also assumed to be influenced by 
nominal wage, labor productivity and by excess or insufficient demand 
relative to available supply. A final attempt is to estimate the 
consumer's cost of living. 
Labor requirement is estimated for each sector of the economy based 
on labor productivity and employment elasticity. As the total labor 
force can be predicted exogenously, the unemployment rate can be deter­
mined. In the income distribution function, four Income classes are 
selected. The main purpose of which is to measure changes in income 
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inequality over time. 
The analysis of the population and labor force supplies information 
about the availability of the labor force needed by the model. Also 
important is the analysis of foreign financing that provides some infor­
mation about foreign savings in the public sector. 
Finally, the working of the model can be seen from a condensed causal 
relationship depicted in the flow chart of Figure 2.2. Only some impor­
tant main variables are brought in the flow chart. Variables inside the 
square blocks are supposed to be exogenous variables while those inside 
the oval are endogenous variables. There are also parameters and other 
variables such as incremental capital-output ratios (ICORs), average pro­
pensity to save (APS), employment elasticities (EEs, within the popula­
tion and labor force block), and the foreign exchange rate, all of which 
are predetermined exogenously. There are several aspects that may 
explain the work of the chart: (1) The flow chart explains the 
determination of one endogenous variable from other variables. The new, 
just determined variable next becomes one of the (endogenous) variables 
that will influence the others. In other words, ideally, all endogenous 
variables are determined simultaneously. For example, real income is 
calculated from sectoral value added. With the price ratio between 
foreign prices and the domestic price level, real income determines the 
level of exports and imports. On the other hand, the level of imports 
(on capital and intermediate goods) influences industrial production and 
thus sectoral value added. In addition to this, the growth of each 
sector depends also on the availability of natural resources, 
governments's fiscal and monetary policy, and the government policy 
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towards Investment. (2) Another aspect that can be excerpted from the 
chart Is the effect of a change in one variable (or several), say an 
exogenous change, on other variables. A. change in one variable requires 
an adjustment of virtually every other endogenous variable in order to 
bring the economy into a new equilibrium. As an illustration, an 
increase in government domestic expenditure by injecting foreign exchange 
reserve will eventually increase the supply of money and the domestic 
price level, the level of investment, and so the future real income. The 
development of a price increase, on the other hand may increase imports 
and decrease exports at the same time, which in turn affect the level of 
real income and finally government domestic revenues. Whether the 
government domestic revenue finally will increase or decrease is not yet 
known. (3) The change in the equilibrium of the system may come from the 
change in government policy. A policy to increase government domestic 
revenues for public investment will not have just a short run impact on 
the domestic price level. In the long run, if the public investment 
actually increases real income and, thus, demand for real balance, the 
domestic price level will increase. On the other hand, however, the 
increase in labor productivity may outweigh the growth of value added and 
therefore may increase the unemployment rate and thus slow down the price 
increase. An increase of government domestic revenue by means of taxes 
may also discourage saving and domestic investment. If this is the case, 
the growth of real income will decrease. A change in some policy 
directed toward better household income distribution by developing a 
system that increases the relative income of the poor class may also end 
up with a decrease in real income growth. (4) The system's relation­
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ship depicted in Figure 2.2 even though it is ideal, in the sense that it 
can be solved simultaneously, is much simpler than the actual model. For 
example, the present model is sectoral, therefore value added is 
presented in more than just one variable. Household Income in each 
sector of the economy is also divided into four classes of income. The 
export side is also distinguished from the import side, and each of them 
is represented by several commodities. In addition, the government 
revenues are also classified into several types of tax receipts. 
To conclude the discussion, especially after points (2) and (3) 
above, the working of the Indonesian economy model is attempted in a 
simulation process. The simulation is provided with exogenous changes 
that include exogenous variables and other parameters. The simulation 
of the model results effects of the exogenous changes upon endogenous 
variables. These effects, that become the concern of this model. Include 
the growth effects and the equity effects. An illustration of simulation 
relationships between exogenous changes and endogenous variables can be 
seen in Figure 2.3. 
More in the working of the model is discussed in the next four 
chapters. To bring a greater understanding about the relationship 
between variables, the model is divided into three submodels presented in 
three different chapters. The relationship between submodels Is retained 
as they construct one model. 
Exogenous Exogenous Variables Parameters/Coefficients 
Changes — 
Gov. Exch, Fertll. Gov, Prop, Employ. 
Endogenous Expend. Rate Supply ... Subsidy to Save Elast. ... Others 
Variables (GOVEXP) (XCHEF) (PERT) (GOVSUB) (APS) (EE) 
Growth/ Macro 
variables: 
Real Income 
Gov. revenue 
Export/import 
Price level 
Money supply/ 
demand 
Other variables 
Equity 
variables : 
Employment 
Inc. distrib. 
Poverty 
Other variables 
Figure 2.3. Matrix of relationships between exogenous changes and endogenous variables 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 2 
^The Pearson Report [Pearson, 1969] on International Development 
submitted to the World Bank, was dominated by Rostow's Doctrine. The 
report not only requested developed countries to provide aid to LDCs, but 
it recommended that LDCs follow the Western models of development. Among 
others, criticism of Rostow came from Gerschenkorn [1962], Fishlow 
[1965], and Streeten [1967]. 
2 
Critics to the two-gap approach came from Fei and Ranis [1968], 
Brutton [1969], and Behrman [1971]. 
^See Thorbecke, 1973. 
^Chenery et al., 1974. 
^For more about development planning process and organization, see 
Waterston, 1979. 
^A detailed explanation of the Tinbergen approach can be seen in Fox, 
Thorbecke, and Sengupta [1973] and Fox and Thorbecke [1965]. 
^The "inverted reduced form" is determined by eliminating all 
irrelevant exogenous variables using algebraic manipulation until a set 
of equations equal in number to target (non-controlled) variables is 
left. Each equation contains only one target variable and all other 
variables are, therefore, either instruments (controlled variables) or 
data. In Theil's view, the inverted reduced form regards the endogenous 
variables as given and describes the values of exogenous variables as 
dependent on these. If the values of endogenous variables are fixed at 
predetermined target values, then the inverted, reduced form shows which 
set of exogenous values (if any) corresponds to these targets. If such a 
set exists and if, at the same time all exogenous variables are 
controlled by the policy maker, this set describes the measures that 
should be taken by him in order to reach the targets. If there is none, 
the targets are "inconsistent" in the given situation and must be 
replaced by less ambitious ones. 
g 
For more of Theil's operational procedure, see Theil, 1965. 
9 
Comments and brief descriptions on some previous economy-wide models 
of the Indonesian economy can be seen in Boediono, 1979, pp. 21-38. 
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3. INDONESIAN LABOR FORCE, EXTERNAL BORROWINGS, ODTPUT 
GROWTH, AND INVESTMENT 
Indonesia is one of the most populous countries in the world after 
the Peoples Republic of China, India, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States. This chapter, first, discusses Indonesia's population and labor 
force. Next, this chapter deals with Indonesia's external borrowings to 
finance its economic development and analyzes Indonesia's external debt 
situation. This chapter also presents Indonesia's development perform­
ance during the economic development period from 1966 to 1980. It 
discusses the production performance in each sector of the economy and 
the investment performance as a result of the implementation of economic 
planning. Finally, this chapter presents a submodel of production-
investment for the Indonesian economy. 
3.1. Population and Labor Force 
The discussion on Indonesia's population and labor force is based on 
five sources of information: the Population Census of 1961, the Popula­
tion Census of 1971, the Intercensal Population Survey of March 1976 
(SUPAS), the National Labor Force Survey of September-December 1976 
(SAKERNAS), and the Population Census of October 1980. All of these 
surveys were developed by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Biro Pusat 
Statistics, Jakarta), and the results appeared in many publications.^ 
Besides its population trend, this section also deals with popula­
tion distribution. The main concern is that most Indonesians, over 
60 percent, live on the smallest island of the five main islands, Java, 
that has an area of only about 7 percent of the whole mainland area of 
Indonesia. 
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3.1.1. Population trend and distribution 
Based on the results of the March 1976 Intercensal Population 
Survey, the estimated population of Indonesia was put at 130 million, of 
which 82 million (or about 63 percent) were living on Java (and Madura). 
During the intercensal decade 1961-1971, the annual rate of population 
growth had increased to almost 2.1 percent compared to a prewar figure of 
about 1.5 percent. The March 1976 Intercensal Survey results indicated 
that a slight decline in the rate of population increase had occurred at 
a level of almost 2.0 percent during the 4.5 years after the September 
1971 census, while the 1980 census gave an increase of annual growth rate 
at 3.1 percent during 1976 to 1980. 
Indonesia does not have a national system for the recording of 
births and deaths occurring in the country, and it is therefore not 
possible to obtain information on levels or trends in birth and death 
rates from routine official records. In the absence of these statistics, 
an artifice is resorted to determine the levels of mortality and fertil­
ity during an intercensal period (or shorter intervals within it), which 
can explain changes in population size and age structure from one census 
to the next. With this technique, the whole Indonesian population was 
projected. The data from the 1961 and the 1971 census confirmed the 
credibility of this technique.^ 
Several projections of Indonesia's population had placed the rate of 
population growth for the period 1971-1976 at a much higher level than 
the one indicated by the survey of 1976. Most of these projections had 
relied on mortality and fertility estimates of questionable accuracy for 
the base period.^ 
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Table 3.1 shows the population of Indonesia by age group and sex 
based on the results of the population surveys of 1961, 1971, and 1976. 
The total population of 96,319,000 in 1961 should be combined with the 
population of West Irian which was estimated at 700,000. The 1971 popu­
lation census also excluded the rural West Irian of 772,654, the homeless 
persons numbering 67,725, and the incorrectly counted of 24,270.^ These 
figures made up a total population of 119,232,000. The 1976 survey did 
not cover the population of East Nusatenggara, Maluku, and West Irian, 
which was estimated to be 4,148,000. These figures were added to bring a 
total of 130,284,000. The 1980 census, on the other hand, totalled a 
population of 147,490,000. 
From Table 3.1, it is seen that Indonesia's population is marked by 
a high proportion of persons in the younger age group. This indicates a 
high level of child-bearing and a relatively low to moderate expectation 
of life at birth. In 1976, 43.1 percent of the population was in the age 
group 0-14 years, 55.1 percent in the age group 15-64 years, and 
2.7 percent in the age group 65 years and over. By comparing the 1976 
age distribution with that given by the 1971 census, there was a decline 
in the percentage of persons age 1-14 years from 44.0 percent to 
42.1 percent. This decline largely came from the 0-4 age group which 
indicated that the decline was due to a decrease in fertility during the 
period 1971-1976. 
Indonesia consistently has proportionally less males than females. 
This suggests the existence of a life style which tends to reduce the 
life span of men compared to women. The censuses of 1961 and 1971 gave a 
sex ratio of 0.973 and 0.972, respectively. According to the 1976 
Table 3.1. Indonesia's population by age group and sex* (thousands) 
1961^ 1971^ 1976^ 
Age group 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
0-4 8,462 8,580 17,042 9,606 9,493 19,099 9,330 9,045 18,375 
5-9 7,684 7,639 15,323 9,525 9,237 18,762 9,522 9,175 18,697 
10-14 4,319 3,861 8,179 7,353 6,826 14,179 8,230 7,611 15,841 
15-19 3,834 3,874 7,708 5,588 5,738 11,326 6,576 6,870 13,446 
20-24 3,452 4,339 7,791 3,602 4,429 8,031 4,564 5,242 9,806 
25-29 3,821 4,852 8,673 3,978 4,947 8,925 3,922 4,653 8,574 
30-34 3,513 3,690 7,203 3,690 4,214 7,904 3,563 4,089 7,652 
35-39 3,298 2,956 6,254 3,948 4,031 7,979 4,021 4,267 8,288 
40-44 2,422 2,408 4,830 3,064 3,038 6,102 3,198 3,323 6,521 
45-49 1,913 1,759 3,672 2,427 2,223 4,650 2,824 2,643 5,467 
50-54 1,646 1,725 3,371 1,903 1,961 3,864 2,084 2,018 4,102 
55-59 (1,898) (1,851) (3,749) 1,126 1,100 2,226 1,445 1,388 2,833 
60-64 (1,898) (1,851) (3,749) 1,082 1,256 2,338 1,156 1,272 2,428 
65-over 1,173 1,236 2,409 1,440 1,529 2,969 1,575 1,815 3,390 
Not stated 60 57 117 7 8 15 69 67 136 
Total 47,494 48,825 96,319 53,339 60,029 118,368 62,078 63,478 125,556 
^Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (various Issues). 
^Leiserson, 1979. Excludes West Irian. 
"^Central Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1971. Excludes rural West Irian, homeless 
persons, and incorrectly counted. 
'^Central Bureau of Statistics, Intercensal Survey 1976. Excludes East Nusatenggara, Maluku, 
and West Irian. 
Table 3.1. (continued) 
Age group 
Male 
1980® 
Female Total 
0-4 10,761 10,289 21,050 
5-9 10,838 10,429 21,267 
10-14 9,180 8,508 17,689 
15-19 7,600 7,828 15,428 
20-24 5,937 6,966 12,903 
25-29 5,576 5,658 11,235 
30-34 3,964 4,126 8,090 
35-39 4,130 4,336 8,467 
40-44 3,678 3,744 7,422 
45-49 3,015 3,150 6,165 
50-54 2,700 2,726 5,426 
55-59 1,728 1,685 3,413 
60-64 1,568 1,710 3,278 
65-over 2,259 2,654 4,913 
Not stated 17 13 31 
Total 72,952 73,825 146,776 
^Central Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1980. 
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survey, the ratio was 978 males per 1,000 females, and the 1980 census 
gave a ratio of 0.988. 
The 1976 survey indicated the population density to be 69 persons 
per square kilometer, rather more moderate and lower than that of Asia 
(78) or India (172). however, 63 percent of the Indonesians lived in 
Java (and Madura), which accounts for less than 7 percent of the land 
area. The density of Java was 621 persons per square kilometer in 1976, 
higher than of Bangladesh (510) considered the most densely populated 
area in the world. The other 22 provinces of Indonesia, excluding Java 
and Madura (5 provinces) have a much lower density with large differences 
among them. Bali had a density closest to Java's in 1976, while 
Kalimantan and West Irian had only 10 and 2 persons per square kilometer, 
respectively. In 1980, Java had a density of 690 persons per square 
kilometer while Indonesia, as a whole, had 77 persons per square 
kilometer (Table 3.2). 
The excess population of Java had become the major concern of the 
Dutch East Indies government since 1902. In 1905, the Dutch government 
began its colonization program by resettling 155 families from Java to 
Lampung in Sumatra. Since then, the Lampung settlements have become the 
major recipients of settlers, but Bengkulu, S. Sumatra, Kalimantan, and 
Sulawesi had also been opened for colonization programs. 
The program was continued by the Indonesian government and is known 
as the Transmigration Project. Under the Eight-Year Plan (1961-1969), 
thousands of families were moved to Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and 
other islands. The objectives of the program were broadened to include 
the exploitation of natural resources and the development of sparsely 
Table 3.2. Population distribution and density by region* 
Population (persons) Density (persons/sq. km) 
Region Census Survey Census 1971 1976 1980 
1971 1976 1980 
Java 76,086 82,107 91.270 576 621 690 
Jakarta 4,579 5,367 6,503 7,761 9,097 11,023 
W. Java 21,624 23,454 27,454 467 507 593 
C. Java 21,877 23,558 25,373 639 687 742 
Yogyalcarta 2,489 2,625 2,751 785 828 868 
E. Java 25,517 27,103 29,189 532 566 609 
Sumatra 20,808 23,510 28.016 44 50 59 
Aceh 2,009 2,226 2,611 36 40 47 
N. Sumatra 6,622 7,467 8,361 94 105 118 
W. Sumatra 2,793 2,994 3,407 56 60 68 
Riau 1,642 1,843 2,169 17 19 23 
Jambi 1,006 1,103 1,446 22 25 32 
Bengkulu 3,441 567 4,630 24 27 36 
Lampung 519 3,439 768 83 103 139 
S. Sumatra 2,777 3,871 4,625 33 37 45 
Kalimantan 5,155 5,866 6,723 9 11 12 
W. Kalimantan 2,020 2,281 2,486 14 16 17 
C. Kalimantan 702 812 954 5 5 6 
S. Kalimantan 1,699 1,846 2,065 45 49 55 
E. Kalimantan 734 927 1,218 4 5 6 
^Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (various issues), 
and Leiserson, 1979, Annex 1, Table 1. 
Table 3.2. (continued) 
Population (persons) Density (persons/sq . km) 
Region Census Survey Census 1971 1976 1980 
1971 1976 1980 
Sulawesi 8.527 9,379 10,410 45 50 55 
N. Sulawesi 1,719 1,899 2,115 90 100 111 
C. Sulawesi 914 1,014 1,290 13 15 18 
S. Sulawesi 5,181 5,681 6,062 71 78 83 
S.E. Sulawesi 714 785 942 26 28 34 
Nusatenggara 6,619 7,156 8.487 75 81 96 
Bali 2,120 2,293 2,470 381 412 444 
W. Nusatenggara 2,203 2,401 2,725 109 119 135 
E. Nusatenggara 2,295 2,462 2,737 48 51 57 
E. Timor — — 555 41 — 37 
Maluku & Irian 2,013 2.266 2,585 4 5 5 
Maluku 1,090 1,258 1,411 15 17 19 
Irian Jaya 923 1,008 1,174 2 2 3 
Indonesia 119,233 130,284 147,490 62 68 77 
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Inhabited regions. As in the colonization program, rice cultivation 
remained the primary concern of the new settlements. However, the trans 
migration program was no more successful than the colonization in dealing 
with Java's population increase. Over a period of more than four decades 
between 1932-1974, tHe colonization and the transmigration programs had 
saved Java a population increase of some 991 thousand while Java's popu­
lation had increased by some 39 million [Suratman and Patrick Guiness, 
1977, p. 84]. 
Under the new administration, transmigration again became the target 
of the development program. Several categories of migrants were intro­
duced.^ During the Repelita I (1969/70-1973/74), some 180,749 person (or 
39,436 households) were sent to Outer Java Islands. During the 
Repelita II (1974/75-1978/79), the number of migrants increased to some 
272,350 persons (or 61,918 households). Table 3.3 shows the number of 
households and persons that were resettled to the new areas under the 
transmigration program. Under this program, not only people from Java 
were moved out but also people from other densely population areas such 
as Bali and W. Nusatenggara. 
More than 22 percent of the Indonesia's population resided in areas 
designated as urban in 1980. The urban growth during the period 1961-
1971 had averaged less than 4 percent annually and increased to over 
5 percent during the period 1971-1980 (Table 3.4). Urbanization in the 
period 1961-1971 was higher in outside Java (4.5 percent) than in Java 
(less than 3.5 percent). However, in the period 1971-1980 urbanization 
increased significantly in Java (over 5 percent) and decreased slightly 
in Outside Java (over 4 percent). Moreover, the figures from the 
Table 3.3. Planned and realization of transmigration under Repelita* 
Year 
Planned Realization 
Realization 
(% families) Families Persons Families Persons 
Repelita I 38.141 190,705 39.436 180.749 103.4 
1969/70 4,489 22,445 3,933 17,848 87.5 
1970/71 3,865 19,325 4,438 19,995 114.0 
1971/72 4,600 23,000 4,171 18,870 90.7 
1972/73 9,300 46,500 11,314 52,018 121.6 
1973/74 15,887 79,435 15,580 72,018 58.1 
Repelita II 82,959 414.795 61.918 272.350 74.6 
1974/75 11,000 55,000 9,334 39,618 84.9 
1975/76 8,100 40,500 8,641 35,943 106.7 
1976/77 13,910 69,550 16,697 75,575 116.8 
1977/78 22,949 114,745 13,271 59,920 62.9 
1978/79 27,000 135,000 14,421 63,812 53.4 
Repelita III NA NA NA NA NA 
1979/80 50,000 NA 22,464 NA 44.9 
1980/81 80,000 NA 73,435 NA 91.8 
1981/82 31,526 NA 88,066 NA 279.3 
Source: Ministry of Information, Presidential Address (several issues). Beginning with 
Repelita II, the figures include resettlement of households within the transmigration areas. 
NA=not available. 
Table 3.4. Population distribution; urban and rural, Java and Outside Java^ (percent) 
Population distribution Average annual rate of growth 
Census 
1961 
Census 
1971 
Survey 
1976 
Census 
1980 
1961/71 1971/76 1971/80 
Java 64.9 63.8 63.0 63.9 1.9 1.7 2.0 
Urban 15.6 18.0 18.1 24.2 3.4 1.8 5.7 
Rural 84.4 82.0 81.9 75.8 1.6 1.7 1.4 
Outside Java 35.1 36.2 37.0 36.1 2.4 2.5 3.0 
Urban 13.4 16.3 17.5 19.1 4.5 4.1 4.1 
Rural 86.6 83.7 82.5 80.9 2.0 2.1 1.9 
Indonesia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.1 2.0 2.4 
Urban 14.8 17.4 17.9 22.4 3.8 2.6 5.2 
Rural 85.2 82.6 82.1 77.6 1.8 1.8 1.6 
^Source: Leiserson, 1979, and Central Bureau of Statistics. Population Census 1971; 
Intercensal Survey 1976 ; Population Census 1980. 
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Intercensal Survey show a marked decline in the rate of urbanization, 
particularly on Java, between 1971 and 1976. There are several reasons 
to believe that these figures may underestimate the actual rate of 
urbanization.^ 
3.1.2. Labor force growth and participation 
In addition to the 1961 and 1971 censuses, the Intercensal Survey 
(SUPAS) in March 1976 generated a substantial amount of data on the labor 
force (and employment). This was followed by the National Labor Survey 
(SAKERNAS) carried out in September-December 1976 as the initial stage of 
a continuing quarterly survey of labor market conditions all over the 
country. The 1980 census brought additional findings. This paragraph 
discusses some of those findings, labor force growth, and participation. 
The definition of labor force includes those aged 10 and over, who 
have a job or seek one. In contrast to the 1961 census where only those 
who had worked for two months during the preceding six months were 
counted as employed, in the 1971 census all those who had worked at least 
one hour in two days during the preceding week were classified as 
employed. This definition was modified slightly for the 1976 intercensal 
and labor force surveys to include as employed anyone who had worked at 
least one hour during the preceding week. This definition was also used 
in the 1980 census. While these definitional changes reduce the compara­
bility between labor force and employment figures of the 1961 census and 
those of the 1971 census, the 1976 survey, the labor force surveys and 
the 1980 census, they do not substantially affect the conceptual compara­
bility of the figures. However, the extent and variety of labor attach­
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ments and economic activities captured in these measures make the inter­
pretation of changes in labor force and employment complicated.^ 
Therefore, simple comparisons between censuses and/or surveys can not be 
regarded as reliable and precise estimates of labor force growth. 
Table 3.5 shows the Indonesia's labor force situation and growth. 
In both Java and Outside Java, the annual growth rate of the labor 
force in the urban area was always higher than the growth rate in the 
rural area. During the period 1971-1976, the growth rate of the labor 
force had increased to over 3.2 percent, almost twice the rate in the 
period 1961-1971, which was 1.7 percent between those two periods. The 
growth rate of the labor force in the urban area increased from over 
1.5 percent to 4 percent and that in the rural area increased from over 
1.5 percent to over 3.1 percent. In the period 1976-1980, however, the 
rate of growth had slowed down to bring an average of over 2.6 percent 
between the period 1971 and 1980 (still higher than the 1.7 percent rate 
in the period between 1961-1971). 
On the other hand, the population aged 10 and over had been growing 
at over 1.8 percent annually in the period 1971-1976, less than the rate 
of growth in the period 1961-1971, which was about 2.3 percent. The rate 
of growth increased again in the period 1976-1980 to bring an average of 
almost 3 percent in the period between 1971 and 1980. 
The most important factor affecting the apparent fluctuations in 
rates of labor force growth, however, were variations in labor force par­
ticipation rates. The 1971 census recorded substantial declines in labor 
force participation for both overall and males but a slight increase for 
females. These changes are observable in both Java and Outside Java as 
Table 3,5. Labor force and growth: urban and rural 1961-1980* 
Labor force Census Survey Labor force surveys^ Census 
and growth March October 
Sept. Sept. 1976 Sept.-Dec. Feb.-Nov. Feb. —Nov. 1980 
1961 1971 1976 1977 1978 
Labor force (thousands) 
Java 
Urban 3,380 4,218 4,952 4,774 4,836 5,434 NA 
Rural 19,347 22,715 31,996 27,755 28,540 29,651 NA 
Total 22,727 26,932 36,949 32.529 32.375 35.085 33,463 
Population (age 10+) 42,264 52.254 58,673 58.042 60,478 60.764 66.131 
Outside Java 
Urban 1,319 1,834 2,690 2,591 2,679 2,737 NA 
Rural 10,787 12,495 16,743 13,310 13,389 15,275 NA 
Total 12,107 14,329 19.432 15.902 16.068 18.012 18.647 
Population (age 10+) 22,150 28,238 33,103 30.182 31.519 32.962 38.322 
Indonesia 
Urban 4,699 6,051 7,642 7,365 7,515 8,171 NA 
Rural 30,134 35,210 48,739 41,066 41,929 44,926 NA 
Total 34,834 41,261 56,381 48.431 49.443 53.097 52.110 
Population (age 10+) 64,414 80,492 91,776 88.224 91.997 93.726 104.459 
^Source: Lelserson, 1979, and Central Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1971; Intercensal 
Survey 1976 ; Population Census 1980; Labor Force Surveys 1976,1977, 1978. NA = not available. 
^Figures are averaged. 
Table 3.5. (continued) 
Labor force Census Survey Labor force surveys Census 
and growth March October 
Sept. Sept. 1976 Sept.-Dec. Feb.-Nov. Feb.-Nov. 1980 
1961 1971 1976 1977 1978 
Annual growth 
rate (percent) 1961-1971 
Indonesia 
Urban 2.56 
Rural 1.57 
Total 1.70 
Population (age 10+) 2.25 
1971-1976^ 1961-1976^ 1971-1980 
4.00 3.04 NA 
3.12 2.08 NA 
3.26 2.22 2.63 
1.85 2.12 2.94 
^1976 indicates the labor force survey of Sept.-Dec. 1976. 
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can be seen from Table 3.6. In 1976 and thereafter, the overall par­
ticipation rate had reached the level recorded in the 1961 census. A 
substantial increase is observable in the proportion of working women. 
From Table 3.6 it is also shown that in any period of time the 
participation rate of the labor force in Java is always higher than the 
rate in Outside Java. It is also observable that the labor force 
participation in the rural area is always higher than that in the urban 
area both for Java and for Outside Java. The overall labor force 
participation rate for Indonesia was observed at the level of around 
55 percent and there was an indication that it was increasing. 
3.1.3. Population determinants and labor force projection 
There are certain components of population growth that should be 
estimated, and a set of assumptions must be built in making population, 
as well as labor force, projections. Two important components of popula­
tion growth are fertility and mortality. 
The pattern of Indonesian fertility during the late sixties was 
characterized with an early marriage and a high fertility pattern. 
Fertility rates were quite high at ages 15-19 and 35-39. The total 
fertility rate^ for Java in the late 1960s was about 5.2 while that of 
Indonesia was about 5.5, indicating a higher rate for Outside Java. 
Within Java, the rate differed between provinces with estimated total 
fertility rate between 4.4 to 6.1. 
There exist urban-rural differentials in Indonesian fertility. In 
the period 1967-1970, rural Java-Madura had a total fertility rate of 5.3 
compared to 4.7 in the urban areas. Differences of this order were also 
Table 3.6. Labor force participation rate^ (percent) 
Java 0. Java Indonesia 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Sep. 1961 
Urban 71-35 27.26 48.97 68.90 15.65 42.85 70.58 23.77 47.08 
Rural 81.77 29.40 54.71 81.05 32.21 56.56 81.51 30.36 55.36 
Total 80.04 29.05 53.77 79.33 29.96 54.66 79.79 29.36 54.08 
Sep. 1971 
Urban 61.78 24.90 42.81 60.18 17.17 39.36 61.23 22.45 41.67 
Rural 71.05 34.67 52.14 69.32 33.20 50.86 70.42 34.15 51.68 
Total 69.30 32.86 50.39 67.70 30.61 48.92 68.73 32.08 49.87 
Mar. 1976 
Urban 65.17 26.45 45.49 
Rural NA NA NA NA NA NA 79.15 50.95 65.01 
Total 77.07 46.50 61.43 
Sep.-Dec. 1976 
Urban 44.13 43.12 43.77 
Rural NA NA 58.82 NA NA 55.06 NA NA 57.52 
Total 56.04 52.69 54.90 
Feb.-Nov. 1977 
Urban 42.99 42.67 42.88 
Rural NA NA 57.97 NA NA 53.04 NA NA 56.30 
Total 55.19 50.98 53.74 
^Source: Leiserson, 1979, and Central Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1971; 
Intercensal Survey 1976; Population Census 1980; Labor Force Surveys 1976, 1977, 1978. 
NA=not available. 
Table 3.6. (continued) 
Feb. Nov. 1978 
Urban 
Rural 
Total 
Oct. 1980 
Urban 
Rural 
Total 
Java 0. Java Indonesia 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
NA NA 
47.58 
60.09 
57.74 
NA NA 
42.29 
57.67 
54.65 
NA NA 
45.67 
59.24 
56.65 
60.05 
70.47 
60.16 
26.41 
34.27 
32.27 
42.92 
52.14 
49.78 
54.10 
68.15 
65.46 
15.24 
33.32 
30.02 
35.07 
50.57 
47.68 
58.24 
69.87 
67.16 
23.18 
33.91 
31.46 
40.59 
51.53 
49.01 
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found among women living Outside Java. For Indonesia as a whole, the 
total fertility rate was 5.7 for rural areas and 5.1 for urban areas 
[Leiserson, 1979, Annex 1, pp. 19-21]. 
Mother's education also affects the level of fertility. In the 
whole of Indonesia, women with university education had on the average 
2.6 fewer children on completion of their reproductive life than those 
with elementary school education. Women with high school education had 
0.7 children fewer than women with elementary education [Leiserson, 1979, 
Annex 1, pp. 19-22]. 
According to the findings of the 1973 fertility-mortality survey, 
the fertility rate at ages 15-19, indicated by age specific rate, 
appeared to have declined (that linked with a rise in the average age at 
marriage), as well as that at ages 35-39. The total fertility rate for 
Java-Bali during 1971-1975 was 4.9, a decrease of 7.5 percent from the 
level 5.3 during 1967-1970. As also can be seen from Table 3.7, the 
decline for the whole of Indonesia during this period was 5.4 percent, 
indicating only a slight decline outside Java-Bali. 
The decline in fertility which occurred between 1967-1970 and 1971-
1975 should be accounted for by two factors: (1) changes in the propor­
tion of currently married women, and (2) changes in marital fertility. 
The decline in marital fertility observed between 1971 and 1975 in Java-
Bali should be attributed largely to the operation of the National Family 
Planning Program (BKKBN = Badan Kesejahteraan Keluarga Berencana 
Nasional). In 1974-1975, the national program was extended to provinces 
in Outside Java. The long-term aim of the family planning program to 
reduce Indonesian fertility by 50 percent, implies a total fertility rate 
Table 3.7. Age specific and total fertility rate 1967-1970 and 1971-1975* 
Region 
Age groups 
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 TFR 
Indonesia 
67-70 155 286 273 211 124 55 17 5.5 
71-75 127 265 256 199 118 57 18 5.2 
Java & Ball 
67-70 162 275 256 192 110 48 14 5.3 
71-75 130 254 240 183 106 51 16 4.9 
Outer Islands^ 
67-70 148 309 311 250 150 70 22 6.2 
71-75 121 291 295 239 148 74 25 6.0 
Sumatra 
67-70 154 324 324 260 157 69 20 6.4 
71-75 123 305 298 246 149 73 25 6.1 
Kalimantan 
67-70 158 288 286 223 131 69 23 5.8 
71-75 129 269 278 215 134 71 26 5.6 
Sulawesi 
67-70 129 289 298 244 148 71 25 5.9 
71-75 112 274 299 239 156 78 25 5.9 
^Source; Leiserson, 1979, Annex 1, Table 12. 
^Based on data for Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi weighted by corresponding age of female 
population of 1971. 
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of 3.2 by the year 2000. 
The reported survivorship of children born to women in reproductive 
ages provides a method for estimating survival ratios of children born up 
to the second, third, fourth, etc., year of life. Given the broad 
relationships between mortality rates for different age groups, data on 
survivorship of children gives a method for estimating death rates at 
O 
different ages by using a set of Model Life Tables. 
The 1973 fertility-mortality survey provided estimates of the 
proportion of children dying before age 5, for cohorts of children born 
during the 5 year periods extending from 1945-1949 to 1965-1967 as can be 
seen in Table 3.6. The trends are shown for the urban and rural areas of 
the provinces in Indonesia. The infant mortality rate was lower in urban 
than in rural areas. A continuous decline in childhood mortality appears 
to have occurred both in urban and rural areas during the 30 years 
preceding the survey. The 1971 census data brought the infant mortality 
rate to 114 for urban areas and 149 for rural areas [Leiserson, 1979, 
Annex 1, p. 14]. 
The infant mortality rate differed between the provinces. As can be 
seen in Table 3.9, the 1971 census gave the estimated rate for Java-
Madura at 144, Sumatra 132, Kalimantan 137, Sulawesi 144, and other 
islands 145; the average rate for Outside Java was 137 and for Indonesia 
as a whole was 141. Since then, the infant mortality rate has declined 
as estimated by the 1976 Intercensal Survey. The rate for Java-Madura 
was 110, Outside Java 113, and Indonesia 111. 
Judged by the educational attainment of the mother, children of 
mothers with no educational background had the highest rate of mortality 
Table 3.8. Proportion of children dying before age five from 1000 live births* 
Child birth year 
Region 
1945-49 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1966-67 
Urban 
West Java 269 216 180 161 136 
Central Java 253 171 161 126 117 
East Java 228 168 137 120 108 
Sumatra 263 154 137 131 117 
Sulawesi 212 184 178 138 152 
Rural 
West Java 282 271 245 217 188 
Central Java 301 218 178 164 152 
East Java 261 231 192 143 117 
Sumatra 383 251 192 180 175 
Sulawesi 263 244 236 208 177 
Ball 245 239 212 194 185 
^Source: McDonald, Yasln, Jones, "Levels and Trends in Fertility and Childhood 
Mortality In Indonesia," as quoted by Lelserson, 1979, Annex 1, p. 13. 
Table 3.9. Infant mortality, 1971-1976® (per 1000 birth) 
1971^ 1976^ 
Region 
Male Female Overall Male Female Overall 
Indonesia 152.2 128.9 140.6 119.2 100.3 111.2 
Java & Madurg 
Outside Java 
155.4 131.7 143.6 119.5 100.6 110.1 
148.7 125.8 137.4 122.7 103.2 113.0 
Sumatra 143.0 120.8 132.0 107.7 89.6 98.8 
Kalimantan 147.6 124.8 136.2 126.5 106.9 116.7 
Sulawesi 155.4 131.7 143.7 132.4 112.1 122.4 
Others 157.0 133.1 145.1 148.6 126.2 137.5 
^Source: Leiserson, 1979. 
^Population census. 
"^Intercensal survey. 
*^Based on regional data weighted by corresponding population age 0-4 of 1971. 
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of 160 based on 1971 census. Those with mothers who had high-school or 
college education had the lowest rate of 63; and those with mothers who 
had primary school education had a rate of 128 [Leiserson, 1979, Annex, 
p. 14]. 
Based on the 1961 and 1971 censuses, the demographic model of the 
West Model Life Table gave an expectation of life at birth of 42.5 years 
for females and 39.7 years for males for the period 1961-1971. The 
survey of infant mortality for the period between 1971 and 1975, on the 
other hand, indicated an increase of expectation of life at birth for 
both males and females by 5 years. With the help of a model similar to 
the West Model Life Table, expectation of life at birth could also be 
estimated based on data on adult mortality provided by the intercensal 
survey or other surveys on adult mortality. It is possible, however, 
that the two different series on mortalities would bring different 
expectations of life at birth.^ 
It is possible to design a simulation model to be used in making a 
projection of Indonesia's population by using the available data and with 
the help of a Model Life Table. To account for increases and decreases 
in population, it is necessary to consider birth rates, death rates, and 
migration. Population increases are caused by births and immigration, 
and population decreases are caused by deaths and emigration. The effect 
of these variables vary greatly with age. Therefore, it is desirable to 
divide the population into age groups that are relatively homogeneous 
with respect to birth, death, and migration rates. This analysis of age 
groups is also important in making a labor force projection. A birth 
rate can be assumed for Indonesia, while a death rate for each age group 
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can be selected from a Model Life Table once an expectation of life at 
birth is fixed. For Indonesia, the use of such a model could distinguish 
variations between Java and Outside Java. The population and labor force 
projection between 1966 and 1985 used in this model, however, is derived 
simply by interpolating and extrapolating the available data on popula­
tion censuses and surveys. The result of the annual projection is 
depicted in Table 3.10. 
3.2. External Borrowings and Financing 
Indonesia's Economic Development 
This section discusses the way Indonesia finances its development 
programs through public foreign borrowings. This section begins with the 
history of Indonesia's external debt before the new administration took 
over in 1965. Next, it discusses determinants of Indonesia's foreign 
borrowing, the source, and type of foreign financial resources; the net 
transfers, the level of indebtedness of Indonesia, and the debt servicing 
capacity; and finally factors that may influence Indonesian future 
external borrowing needs. 
3.2.1. Financing economic planning of 1945-1965 and organizing new aid 
Immediately after Indonesia's independence, many of Indonesia's 
leaders, including former president Soekarno, believed that the need for 
foreign aid creates the basis for foreign domination and perpetual 
dependency on foreign aid. However, many proponents for aid had justi­
fied it on the ground that it would also contribute to the achievement of 
genuine independence in the long run by providing the capital and tech­
nology that could enable Indonesia to transform its economy to a self-
Table 3.10. Indonesian population and labor force projection 
Population (thousands) Labor Dependency 
force ratio 
Year Java U. Java Indonesia (thousands) (%) 
1966 69,345.0 38,300.0 107,645.0 36,205.8 33.6 
1967 70,840.9 39,196.4 110,037.3 37,148.9 33.8 
1968 72,369.1 40,113.7 112,482.8 38,131.0 33.9 
1969 73,930.2 41,052.4 114,982.6 39,149.1 34.0 
1970 75,525.0 42,013.0 117,538.0 40,200.1 34.2 
1971 77,154.2 42,996.0 120,150.2 42,052.6 35.0 
1972 78,402.3 43,900.2 122,302.5 42,928.2 35.1 
1973 79,670.6 44,822.8 124,493.4 43,821.7 35.2 
1974 80,959.5 45,764.0 126,723.5 44,860.2 35.4 
1975 82,269.1 46,724.5 128,993.6 45,792.7 35.5 
1976 83,600.0 47,750.4 131,304.3 46,744.3 35.6 
1977 85,442.4 49,569.9 135,012.3 48,199.4 35.7 
1978 87,325.5 51,499.5 138,825.0 49,699.4 35.9 
1979 89,250.0 53,495.4 142,745.4 51,245.6 36.0 
1980 91,217.0 55,559.5 146,776.5 52,839.5 36.0 
1981 93,041.3 57,698.2 150,739.5 54,266.2 36.0 
1982 94,902.2 59,907.2 154,809.4 55,731.4 36.0 
1983 96,800.2 62,189.1 158,989.3 57,236.1 36.0 
1984 98,736.2 64,545.8 163,282.0 58,781.5 36.0 
1985 100,710.9 66,979.7 167,690.6 60,368.6 36.0 
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sustaining economic unit. The first thought about aid came as early as 
November 1945 when the Indonesian government talked of "a great plan for 
prosperity" requiring large credits from abroad, especially from the 
United States [Weinstein, 1976, pp. 206-8]. 
It was not until 1951 that an official development plan, the Eco­
nomic Urgency Plan,^® was announced following the promise of the United 
States of a US $100 million loan from the export-import bank [Higgins, 
1957, p. 94]. By 1953, only modest foreign credits and relatively little 
new investment had come to Indonesia. During this period, Indonesia 
received a grant in the form of technical assistance amounting Rp 31 
million, and an increase in Japanese debt of Rp 78 million.^^ However, 
the Economic Urgency Plan finally came to failure for lack of experience 
and managerial skill to manage the plan's projects. 
With help from a group of foreign experts provided by the United 
Nations, and the assistance of a sizable team of American engineers 
provided under certain contract, in May 1956 the Planning Bureau (Biro 
Perancang Nasional) completed a Five-Year Plan for 1956-1961.^^ It was 
only after the announcement of the plan that Indonesia began to receive 
truly substantial aid. Hoping to increase the amount of aid while 
reducing dependence on the West, the government sought and received 
considerable aid from the Soviet Union and East European countries, as 
well as from the West. Credits for capital equipment amounting to nearly 
Rp 1 billion came from France, the Netherlands, and West Germany. Other 
trade credits came from Japan, Italy, and Great Britain. American 
agricultural products sold at low prices (under PL-480 Program) provided 
a second major component of aid. Indonesia received aid in the form of 
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cheap long term loans from the Soviet Union, several East European 
countries, and China.In addition to other aid from Japan, negotiation 
with the Japanese resulted in war reparations.^^ Soon after the 
announcement of the plan, Indonesia withdrew US $55 million from IMF in 
July 1956. 
However, due to political factors that affected the operation of the 
National Planning Bureau, and the deterioration of the security situa­
tion,15 by early 1959 the first Five-Year Plan was virtually abandoned, 
although a number of already initiated projects were continued. Govern­
ment interest began to focus instead on the appointment of a National 
Planning Council (Dewan Perancang Nasional) and the drafting of an alter­
native plan: The Eight-Year Over-all Development Plan. That plan was 
started in January 1961. The heart of the plan consisted of 335 projects 
at a total cost of Rp 240 billion spread over the eight-year period 1961-
1969. 
The plan emerged without a sound program to provide financing for 
the development projects. However, Indonesian leaders had actively 
sought foreign assistance, and had definitely accelerated the flow of 
intergovernmental loans and grants. To mention a few, these loans and 
grants came from the US, the Soviet Union and several Eastern European 
block countries, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The total value 
of this aid was extremely difficult to calculate, partly because the term 
"aid" includes such a wide range of relationships. 
Japanese aid, including the World War II reparation continued to be 
another source of capital. Aid also received from the Soviet Union 
amounted Rp 58 million in 1962. The greater part of the Rupiah currency 
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obtained as the result of the sale of PL-480 commodities continued to be 
a Rupiah loan from the US government. A series of drawings from IMF were 
effected involving an amount of US $102.5 million. An aid agreement with 
China was also concluded by the end of 1964. 
Despite the inflow of aid to Indonesia, the past years medium and 
long-term loans had produced a huge amount of repayment abroad. The 
biggest net loan ever received was in 1961 amounting to almost Rp 16 
billion compared to a net loan of less than Rp 3 billion in 1964. 
Political differences between Indonesia and the West that erupted in 
196416 led to the cessation of US and its European allies' aid to 
Indonesia. After that the inflow of new aid decreased dramatically. 
When it became clear that Western aid had always been tied to 
influencing Indonesia's political stance, Indonesia withdrew its member­
ship from the United Nations and followed that by its withdrawal from the 
World Bank and IMF as of August 17, 1965. By the end of 1965, Indonesia 
had accumulated a foreign debt, including economic and military aid, of 
US $2.4 billion, of which US $1.4 billion was owed to communist 
countries. 
The new government of Indonesia under Soeharto approved of the 
reinstatement of the Republic as a member of the IMF with the conditions 
as stated within the membership resolution No. 21-12. The resolution 
contained, among other things, the rescheduling of the total debt to the 
IMF which amounted to US $63.5 million. With this approval, Indonesia 
once again became a member of IMF on April 13, 1967. 
The government also approved of Indonesia again becoming a member 
of IBRD on April 13, 1967, with a capital subscription of US $220 
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million. There was no need for the rescheduling of a debt agreement 
between Indonesia and IBRD because so far Indonesia had never borrowed 
from the Bank. 
Indonesia officially joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for the 
first time on November 24, 1966, with a capital subscription of US $25 
million. Later on April 23, 1968, Indonesia rejoined the International 
Finance Corporation (IPC) with a capital subscription of US $1.21 
million, after having resigned from membership in the corporation in 
1961. In August 1968, Indonesia also joined the International Develop­
ment Assistance with a capital subscription of US $11.1 million. 
The new administration also set up a series of meetings with 
creditors in order to reschedule Indonesia's foreign debts and to assess 
the Indonesian request for additional assistance. Conferences between 
Indonesia and her main Western creditors had been successively held since 
September 1966 in Tokyo, Paris, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Scheveningen 
(the Tokyo Meeting). These conferences, also attended by representatives 
of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Australia, and 
Switzerland, were supported by the IMF and the World Bank. ADB, OECD, 
and UNDP were also represented at the conference. The meetings resulted 
in the consolidation and rescheduling of Indonesia's foreign debts to 
Japan and the Western countries (known as the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia, or IGGI). 
At the Tokyo meeting, Indonesia proposed the suspension of all 
payments on its debt except cash obligations, a spread out over 4 years 
of the short-term debt, and a suspension of payment on the long-term debt 
until 1970. The IGGI was also organized to conduct meetings to discuss 
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and evaluate the development and the prospect for the Indonesian economy, 
and to make a decision accordingly as whether or not to approve 
Indonesia's request for aid. 
Finally, after a series of meetings held in 1967-1970, a multi­
lateral agreement was reached between Indonesia and the creditors joined 
in the IGGI. The final outcome of the agreements was in the minutes of 
the April 24, 1970 meeting in Paris. 
The consolidation applied to US $644.2 million of principal and 
$129.5 million of accrued interest on debt to the participating 
countries. The total debt owed to all countries was US $1,773.5 million 
of principal and $277.1 million of interest. In August 1970, Indonesia 
and the USSR signed an agreement for refunding on terms comparable to 
those agreed at Paris. Agreements with other East European countries, 
with regard to the rescheduling of old debts, were conducted bilaterally. 
The Indonesian outstanding debt, made prior to July 1966, as of January 
1, 1970, can be seen from Table 3.11. 
3.2.2. Determinants, source, and type of foreign financial flow 
Four factors may explain Indonesia's dependence on foreign financial 
resources. The first three related to the development strategy adopted 
by Indonesia; 
(1) To attain a targeted growth rate, a certain amount of 
investment is required. Due to the low level of domestic savings and 
various constraints on mobilizing domestic funds (through the tax system 
and domestic financial intermediaries), foreign borrowings and other 
financial resources were needed to meet the investment requirement. 
Table 3.11. Outstanding liabilities of pre-1967 debt as of January 1, 1970^ (million US $) 
Principal 
(1) 
Original 
interest 
Moratorium 
interest 
Resched- Out-
uled standing 
(2) (3) 
Out-
Accrued standing 
(4) (5) 
Total 
Princi­
pal 
(1+2+4) 
Inter­
est 
(3+5) 
I. 
1. France 77.6 10.1 1.4 3.8 17.8 91.5 19.2 
2. Germany 106.0 9.7 6.6 3.1 17.0 118.8 23.6 
3. Netherlands 26.8 2.2 0.9 0.6 3.9 29.6 4.8 
4. Italy 110.4 8.0 3.1 4.7 23.7 123.1 26.8 
5. Japan 69.4 3.6 2.2 3.4 13.5 76.4 15.7 
6. U.S.A 156.8 20.6 14.2 3.7 19.5 181.1 33.7 
7. U.K. 20.2 2.3 0.2 1.2 5.5 23.7 5.7 
567.2 56.5 28.6 20.5 100.9 644.2 129.5 
Source: Tims, 1970. Subject to rescheduling based on agreed minutes April 1970 of participating 
countries and Protocol of August 1970 between Indonesia and U.S.S.R. All liabilities have been 
converted into US$ based upon exchange rates to which parity change since December 1966 have been 
realized, except CMEA Countries, Mainland China and Yugoslavia. 
Table 3.11. (continued) 
Principal 
Original 
interest 
Moratorium 
interest Total 
Resched­ Out­ Out­ Princi­ Inter­
uled standing Accrued standing pal est 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1+2+4) (3+5) 
II. CMEA countries, Yugoslavia 
and Mainland China 
1. U.S.S.R 675.5 76.8 53.9 752.3 53.9 
2. Hungary 17.1 0.3 1.5 17.4 1.5 
3. Czechoslovakia 64.5 1.3 12.7 65.8 12.7 
4. Germany Democ. Rep. 45.7 0.3 16.6 45.0 16.6 
5. Poland 94.2 0.1 32.4 94.3 32.4 
6. Bulgaria 1.4 - 0.2 1.4 0.2 
7. Rumania 13.1 - 2.6 13.1 2.6 
8. Mainland China 21.0 0.5 0.7 21.5 0.7 
9. Jugoslavia 95.1 0.6 24.5 95.7 24.5 
1,027.6 79.9 145.1 1,107.5 145.1 
III. Other Countries^ 
1. Pakistan 9.5 2.5 - - 1.7 12.0 1.7 
2. India 3.7 - - - — 3.7 
3. United Arab Rep. 3.6 - 0.8 - - 3.6 0.8 
4. Austria 2.5 
— — — 
— 2.5 -
19.3 2.5 0.8 - 1.7 21.8 2.5 
Total 1.614.1 59.0 29.4 100.4 247.7 1,773.5 277.1 
b Excluded non—guaranteed debts. 
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(2) The industrialization policy for economic growth led to an 
increasing demand for the import of capital goods, machinery, and 
intermediate goods. As a result, Indonesia needed foreign financial 
resources in order to support its industrial expansion. Due to the 
increasing demand for imports, coupled with constraints that limited its 
export expansion, Indonesia had to face large deficits in the balance of 
payments that directly affected its international reserves. In order to 
ensure the stability of the exchange rate, it was also necessary to 
maintain a considerable amount of foreign exchange reserves. 
(3) Indonesia also needed foreign financial resources to finance 
deficits in the government budget which was caused by expansion of 
government expenditures. Most of the domestic receipts were spent on 
government routine expenditures. Only a small amount of the domestic 
receipts was left for development expenditures. Expansion of development 
expenditures in the public sector led Indonesia to borrow from external 
sources for the domestic cost of financing development projects and 
programs. 
(4) Indonesia still needed additional food supply for its 
population, especially rice. Even though domestic rice production had 
increased dramatically since the implementation of development plans, the 
imports of rice and other food crops (esp. wheat) had increased at the 
same time. The price stabilization policy for important food commodities 
had also been implemented by the government, therefore the stock of those 
commodities had to be increased and maintained at some level. For this 
reason, Indonesia still relies heavily on foreign loans in the form of 
food aid and the PL-4S0 (rice, bulgur, wheat grains) program. 
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(5) Finally, it has long been known that a country cannot success­
fully borrow to meet a balance of payments deficit over a long period of 
years, since after some time a point is reached at which interest and 
amortization of loans previously contracted will equal (or even exceed) 
the amount of new borrowing. After this point, increased borrowing is 
necessary to cover a deficit of a given amount.Whether Indonesia had 
reached this point or not, it was likely that Indonesia would be forced 
to make new borrowings to cover its obligation to service its debt. 
As soon as the new administration took power in 1966, one of its 
first steps was to establish fresh foreign aid to Indonesia by organizing 
the IGGI. There were three types of loans which came from the IGGI, the 
multilateral loans, the bilateral loans, and private loans. IGGI also 
provided grants to Indonesia. Non-IGGI loans came either from multi­
lateral/ bilateral agreements, or from private institutions. 
(1) Multilateral IGGI loans^O; 
Multilateral IGGI loans came mainly from three international insti­
tutions: the IBRD (the World Bank), the IDA (International Development 
Assistance, the World Bank's counterpart), and the ADB (Asian Development 
Bank). 
As soon as Indonesia regained its membership in the World Bank, the 
bank's team visited Indonesia for observation of Indonesia's economic 
development, and to gather information on current problems. The first 
commitment for a loan was signed on September 9, 1968, with IDA. US $5 
million was designated for rehabilitation of the irrigation systems in 
Java and Sumatra, and US $2 million was for financing technical assis­
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tance in connection with a number of surveys. This commitment of loan 
was increased to US $66 million in fiscal year 1969/70 for the rehabili­
tation of agricultural estates ($16 million), highway ($28 million), and 
state electricity ($15 million). Since then, loan commitments from IDA 
have increased every year to finance the number of projects proposed by 
Indonesia. Only during the fiscal year 1975/76 and 1976/77 Indonesia did 
not receive any commitment of loans from IDA. At that time, Indonesia 
was considered able to contract loans on less soft terms, for example a 
loan from the World Bank. Therefore, IDA credit approvals stayed at US 
$561.8 million until July 1977 when Indonesia became eligible again for 
further IDA credits. In fiscal year 1977/78, IDA approved a US $40 
million loan for a small enterprises development project. By the end of 
fiscal year 1980/81, the total (cumulative) credits approved by IDA 
amounted to US $931.8 million for a total of 47 projects especially in 
the field of agriculture, industry, communication, electricity, trans­
port, and community development. The IDA loans were very soft and were 
not subject to any interest except a service charge of 0.75 percent per 
annum. The repayment extended for 50 years, including the 10 years of 
grace period. 
The World Bank itself, became an Indonesian donor for the first time 
in fiscal year 1974/75 approving US $252.5 million of loans for railway 
($48 million), urban development ($25 million), water supply ($14.5 
million), development finance ($50 million), and fertilizer plant ($115 
million). The amount of loans approved by the Bank have increased ever 
since up to a level of US $3,419 million in 1980/81 fiscal year covering 
54 projects. The IBRD loans were subject to a repayment period of 7 to 
78 
30 years including 3 to 10 years grace period, and at interest rates 
between 7 and 9.6 percent per annum for the disbursed portion of the 
loan, and a commitment charge of 0.75 percent per annum for the 
undisbursed portion. 
Another source of loans to Indonesia that must be mentioned here is 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). For the first time, in fiscal year 
1969/70, the ADB commitment of aid amounted to US $3.4 million for two 
projects, an irrigation project ($1 million), and a palm oil project 
($2.4 million). In addition to it, ADB also provided technical assis­
tance to an amount of US $0.6 million. ADB's loan has also increased 
since then, and reached a level of US $1,231.3 million in 1980/81 consis­
ting of US $1,069 million from the ordinary resources and US $162.3 
million from the special fund. Loans from ordinary resources were 
subject to a repayment period of 10 to 30 years including a 2 to 8 years 
grace period and an interest rate between 8.1 percent and 9 percent per 
annum. Loans originating from the special resources had a repayment 
period of 40 years including a 10 year grace period, and were not subject 
to any interest except a service charge of 1 percent per annum. For the 
period 1980-1982, ADB considered Indonesia not eligible for loans 
originating from the special fund unless a sharp economic deterioration 
occurred. 
Table 3.12 shows the IGGI multilateral loan commitments during the 
1968/69 fiscal year to the 1980/81 fiscal year. A total of almost US 
$5.6 billion had been signed by the end of fiscal year 1980/81. 
Table 3.12. IGGI loan commitment by creditors^ (million US $) 
Fiscal IDA IBRD ADB Multilateral Total IGGI^ 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)=(l)+(2)+(3) (5) 
1968/69 7.0 7.0 325.0 
1969/70 59.0 - 4.1 63.1 500.0 
1970/71 104.9 - 20.8 125.7 600.0 
1971/72 79.3 - 20.5 103.8 640.0 
1972/73 91.3 - 27.8 119.1 823.5 
1973/74 167.8 - 36.9 194.7 876.6 
1974/73 52.5 252.5 92.0 397.0 850.0 
1975/76 - 208.5 67.1 275.6 2,000.0 
1976/77 - 694.5 109.3 803.8 1,137.8 
1977/78 40.0 370.5 136.0 546.5 2,094.0 
1978/79 79.0 377.0 198.7 654.7 2,500.0 
1979/80 221.0 788.0 235.4 1,244.4 2,899.0 
1980/81 30.0 728.0 284.6 1,042.6 2,000.0 
^Source: Bank of Indonesia, Annual Financial Report (various Issues). 
^Includes bilateral loans and other IGGI loans. 
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(2) Bilateral and other IGGI loans: 
The United Kingdom and Switzerland joined IGGI, respectively, in 
1975 and 1977, and became members of participating countries, including 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States. It began 
in 1967 when IGGI participating countries approved for the first time the 
Indonesian request for US $200 million (including US $7 million from IDA) 
for the fiscal year 1967. The bilateral loan commitment to Indonesia 
from each IGGI member had been increasing ever since. Most of the aid 
was in the form of soft term borrowings, and these were signed for 
specific programs or projects. Switzerland and the United Kingdom had 
never entered in this type of loan agreement. Japan and the United 
States were believed to have the biggest share in committing loan 
agreements with Indonesia. 
Other IGGI loans came in the form of suppliers' credits, and loans 
from the international financial market. Although these types of loans 
were originally private loans and therefore commercial, they were 
collected from the IGGI member countries, and the agreement for providing 
these loans was discussed and decided during the IGGI meeting. 
Suppliers' credit to purchase equipment from them was provided by 
manufacturers, exporters, and other suppliers of goods in countries who 
were members of IGGI. 
Most of the private loans came from the international financial 
market. These included single bank loans and syndicated loans (obtained 
from a group of banks). Some of them were publicly-issued bonds and 
privately-placed bonds floated in capital markets around the world. 
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Indonesia has also received loans from IPC (International Finance 
Corporation, a World Bank subsidiary) since Indonesia regained its 
membership in April 1968. Beside loans, IFC was also interested in 
investing its capital in the form of equity. The financial assistance in 
the form of loans bore an interest of 11 percent to 12 percent per annum. 
By the end of fiscal year 1980/81, a total of US $17.7 billion of overall 
IGGI commitment (incl. multilateral) had been signed, of which US $9.8 
billion was disbursed. 
(3) Non-IGGI loans; 
Indonesia also sought loans from non-IGGI member countries. Non-
IGGI loans could be either multilateral, bilateral, or private loans. 
The multilateral loans mostly came from the Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB) when Indonesia became a member in 1975. The loans had a repayment 
period of 20 years, and carried no interest but a small service fee. IDB 
was also involved in equity participation, profit sharing, and leasing as 
efforts to increase its financial assistance to Indonesia. 
Most of the bilateral loans came from the Middle East, especially 
from the OPEC nations. These types of loans were soft ones, bearing no 
interest rate but only a service fee. Other types of borrowing came from 
private loans. Suppliers' credits from countries in Europe (Sweden, 
Yugoslavia), and Asia (India, Korea) also took part in providing 
Indonesia's financial needs. Some of the private loans came from the 
international financial market. These included single bank loans, 
syndicated loans, and bonds floated in capital markets in Western Europe, 
Japan, and United States. 
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(4) Grants: 
Host of the grants to Indonesia came from the IGGI member countries. 
The European Economic Community (.EEC) has supplied grants to Indonesia 
since 1974. Australia had been the biggest supplier of grants since 
1967; Netherlands was the next biggest, followed by Japan. The USA has 
not supplied grants to Indonesia since 1969. Up to fiscal year 1980/61, 
Indonesia had received US $647 million. Table 3.13 shows the amount of 
grants received by Indonesia since 1966. 
3.2.3. External debts, resource transfer, and debt servicing capacity 
Dependent on the capacity utilization of the economy, only a portion 
of commited loans are actually disbursed. This disbursed portion with 
past debts constitute the outstanding debts (COD = Disbursed Outstanding 
Debts). Repayments of principle (amortization) subtracted from gross 
disbursements determine the so called net disbursements. Interest paid 
on outstanding debts subtracted from net disbursements determine the net 
transfers. All payments on principal and interest paid on outstanding 
debts constitute debt services. Since there are charges on the undis­
bursed portion, outstanding debts, including the undisbursed portion 
(TDO = Total Debt Outstanding), are also important figures. 
In the beginning of 1968, Indonesia's debt amounted to US $2,056 
million. It is likely that this amount was the outstanding debt made 
during the Soekarno administration prior to July 1966. After Indonesia 
received the commitment of loans in 1967 (mainly as the result of the 
IGGI meetings), its outstanding debts (TDO) in the beginning of 1968 
became US $2,302 million. As both loan commitments and amount disbursed 
Table 3.13. Official grants to Indonesia* (million US $) 
Country/ 1969^ 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Institution 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Australia _ 6 5 13 18 11 12 17 15 16 3 60 3 10 18 25 
Belgium - - - 1 1 1 1 - 1 3 - - 1 - - -
Canada - - - 3 2 3 2 6 5 - 3 10 - - - -
France - - - 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 3 - 1 2 2 -
F.R. of 
Germany - - - 1 2 1 1 3 3 4 - - - - - -
Italy - - - - - 1 1 1 - - 2 3 1 2 2 -
Japan 15 3 7 5 15 10 9 8 1 8 - - 5 4 9 -
Netherlands - 17 14 13 16 14 22 27 24 16 5 1 - - - -
U.K. - 2 - - - 3 2 - - 1 - - - - - 14 
U.S.A. - - - 9 13 - - - - - - - - - - -
E.E.C. 10 1 1 
TOTAL 15 28 26 47 69 45 51 63 50 62 16 74 12 18 31 40 
^Source: Bank Indonesia, Annual Financial Report (various Issues). 
^Beginning new fiscal year from April 1st to March 31st. 
had been increasing, the amount of outstanding debts, both TDO and DOD, 
had also been increasing during the Repelita I (1969/70 to 1973/74). DOD 
had increased at an annual rate of 14 percent compared to TDO at 
17 percent. During the Repelita II (1974/75 to 1978/79), DOD and TDO had 
increased at annual rate of 28 percent and 26 percent, respectively. 
This means that during the Repelita II the capacity of the Indonesian 
economy to absorb foreign capital had increased more than the foreign 
donors had expected, compared to what happened during the Repelita I. 
However, during the first 3 years of Repelita III, DOD had only increased 
at an annual rate of 9 percent compared to TDO's annual rate of 
14 percent. This decline of the growth rate of the debts was consistent 
with the fact that the outstanding debts were finally piling up and so 
the debt services were also increasing. It seemed that the foreign 
donors were willing to bring more aid to Indonesia than the economy was 
able to absorb. By the end of 1980, the DOD amounted to US $14,960 
million compared to the TDO at US $24,040 million. Table 3.14 shows the 
outstanding debt to Indonesia from the beginning of 1968 to the end of 
1980. The table also shows the transactions (commitments and disburse­
ments) and the service payments during the years from 1968 to 1980. It 
showed that the ratio of disbursement to commitment had always been 
within the range of 50 percent to 75 percent. 
The Indonesia's external public debts at the end of 1980 by sources 
and type of creditors are shown in Table 3.15. The outstanding debts 
from the IGGI comprised 87.5 percent of total DOD; this consisted 42.3 
percent of bilateral IGGI, 12.3 percent of multilateral IGGI, and 32.9 
percent of private IGGI. The non-IGGI outstanding debts were only 12.5 
Table 3.14. Indonesia's external public debt^ (million US $) 
Outstanding debt During period 
at beginning of year 
Year Transaction Service payment Adjugt-
Xncludes ment 
Disbursed undisbursed Commitment Disbursement Principal Interest Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)=(5)+(6) 
1966 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1967 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1968 2,056 2,302 326 269 40 10 49 37(40) 
1969 2,322 2,628 474 228 42 15 57 18(-24) 
1970 2,526 3,036 517 370 60 22 82 102(31) 
1971 2,938 3,524 678 307 85 29 113 239(275) 
1972 3,399 4,392 801 695 91 46 137 -40(-49) 
1973 3,963 5,053 1,530 909 149 63 212 655(730) 
1974 5,250 6,692 2,335 1,120 212 80 292 200(202) 
1975 6,358 9,017 3,277 2,127 348 175 523 -143(-249) 
1976 7,994 11,697 3,133 2,332 434 327 761 110(138) 
1977 10,002 14,534 1,720 1,956 821 441 1,262 521(700) 
1978 11,658 16,133 3,288 2,205 1,548 514 2,062 292(1,073) 
1979 13,107 18,946 4,313 1,865 1,329 771 2,100 -409(-596) 
1980 13,234 21,334 3,753 2,612 953 824 1,776 67(-94) 
1981 14,960 24,040 
^Source: Tims, 1970; Bottelier, 1979; and . Steer, 1982. NA=Not Available. 
^Includes cancellation and adjustment due to changes in exchange rate. 
Table 3.15. External public outstanding debt by country and type of creditor as 
of December 31, 1980^'*^ (million US $) 
Bilateral/ ~ 
Multilateral Other Total 
Country 
Dis- Includes Dis- Includes Dis- Includes 
bursed undis- bursed undis- bursed undis­
bursed bursed bursed 
Australia 9.8 10.7 4.4 4.5 14.2 15.2 
Austria 0.7 0.8 - - 0.7 0.8 
Belgium 69.1 92.9 100.0 142.3 169.1 235.2 
Canada 176.1 315.5 350.0 350.0 526.1 665.5 
Denmark 59.3 68.3 - - 59.3 68.3 
France 241.3 461.1 320.1 649.5 561.4 1,110.6 
Germany 699.0 1,241.3 273.0 817.0 972.0 2,058.3 
Italy 63.7 63.7 6.4 6.4 70.1 70.1 
Japan 2,620.3 4,050.0 1,661.8 1,888.2 4,282.1 5,938.2 
Netherlands 356.8 641.8 511.0 516.7 867.8 1,158.5 
New Zealand 3.3 3.8 - - 3.3 3.8 
Switzerland - - 49.8 188.3 49.8 188.3 
U.K. 14.2 14.2 148.4 177.6 162.6 191.8 
U.S.A. 2,021.4 2,639.5 1,496.1 1,821.2 3,517.5 4,460.7 
^Source: Steer, 1982. 
^Refer to public sector and medium-term debt with an original maturity of one 
year or more. 
'^Supplier's credits, financial institution, bonds, nationalization debts. 
Table 3.15. (continued) 
Country 
Bilateral/ 
Multilateral 
Dis- Includes 
bursed undis­
bursed 
Other 
Dis- Includes 
bursed undis­
bursed 
Total 
Dis- Includes 
bursed undis­
bursed 
Bilateral 
IGGI 6.335.0 9,603.6 4,921.2 6,593.9 11,256.2 16.197.5 
A.D.B. 
IBRD 
IDA 
228.0 
1,039.7 
565.8 
1,179.7 
3,068.6 
940.3 
— -
228.0 
1,039.7 
565.8 
1,179.7 
3,068.6 
940.3 
Multilateral 
IGGI 1.833.5 5,188.6 - - 1,833.5 5,188.6 
Total IGGI 8,168.5 14,792.2 4.921.2 6,593.9 13,089.7 21.386.1 
Non IGGI 1,305.7 1,590.2 564.1 1.036.0 1.869.8 2.626.2 
Total 
external 
public debt 9.474.2 16,382.4 5.485.3 7,629.9 14.959.5 24.012.3 
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percent of total DOD; this consisted of 8.7 percent of bilateral non-
IGGI, 0 percent of multilateral non-IGGI (loans from Islamic Development 
Bank were still committed, not yet disbursed), and 3.8 percent of private 
non-IGGI. 
Among donor countries, Japan had become the biggest supplier of 
loans with debts at 28.6 percent of DOD, or 32.7 percent of IGGI debts 
(which was US $13,090 million), followed by the US with 23.5 percent of 
DOD or 26.9 percent of IGGI debts. There are 17 other countries (non-
IGGI) involved in bilateral agreements with Indonesia with 78.3 percent of 
the bilateral non-IGGI debts (US $1,305 million) from the Soviet group; 
the Soviet hold the greatest portion by nearly 52 percent. Most of these 
debts to the Soviet group were from the old debts prior to July 1966. 
Other countries involved were Iran, India, Arab Emirates, and Egypt. 
Even though both commitments and disbursements (gross) of loans were 
increasing almost every year, the net transfers that actually entered the 
Indonesian economy were not. Net transfers were not only dependent on 
gross disbursements received in a certain year, but were also dependent 
on the debt service payments falling due in that year. Therefore, net 
transfers could be high or low, could be positive or even negative. For 
instance, in 1978, Indonesia received only US $143 million, and in 1979 
received negative US $234 million compared to gross disbursements of 
US $2,205 million and US $1,805 million, respectively. This happened 
because in those years Indonesia had to pay very huge service payments. 
The amount of service payments falling due in a particular year 
depended on the terms and conditions of the loans that Indonesia had 
agreed upon. Based on their terms and conditions, loans to Indonesia 
could be concessional loans (associated with a very low interest rate and 
a long period of maturity) or nonconcessional loans (associated with a 
relatively high interest rate and a short period of maturity). The IDA 
loans, and ADB loans drawn from special funds were categorized as 
concessional loans. Even though the IBRD loans in many respects were 
considered as soft loans, they were categorized as nonconcessional loans. 
It was likely that the concessional loans received every year since the 
beginning accounted for not more than 30 percent of the total gross 
disbursements. The rest were the nonconcessional loans that bore much 
higher service payments. Service payments for nonconcessional loans were 
between 75 and 85 percent of the total annual service payments. Table 
3.16 shows disbursements, service payments and net transfers during the 
year between 1975 and 1980, by those two types of loans. 
The amount of concessional loans were in the range of 50 to 90 
percent of the bilateral/multilateral loans disbursed every year. On the 
other hand, none of the private loans were concessional. Since private 
loans constituted in the range of 40 to 75 percent of the total disbursed 
every year, most of the service payments were directed toward private 
loans. Table 3.17 shows the summary of external public debt by 
bilateral/multilateral and private type of loans. 
An evaluation of the debt servicing capacity of the borrowing 
country can be made based upon two sets of indicators, namely short-run 
indicators and long-run indicators of the debt servicing capacity. These 
indicators relate some statistical ratios of debt service payments to 
other economic variables in the economy. 
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Table 3.16. During the year transaction by type of loans, 1975-1980 ' (million US $) 
Gross Net Net resource 
Year Type of Loans Commitments disbursement Amortization disbursement Interest transfers 
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)-(3) (5) (6)=(4)-(5) 
Concessional 375.9 502.9 57.3 445.6 67.2 378.4 
IGGI 375.9 502.9 26.8 476.1 66.0 410.1 
Non-IGGI - - 30.5 (30.5) 1.2 (1.7) 
Non-concessional 2,901.7 1,624.2 291.0 1,333.2 108.0 1,225.2 
IGGI 2,526.3 1,600.4 231.6 1,368.8 106.8 1,262.0 
Non-IGGI 374.8 23.8 59.4 (35.6) 1.2 (36.8) 
Concessional 502.9 487.7 81.5 406.2 81.7 324.5 
IGGI 432.9 487.7 49.2 438.5 80.4 358.1 
Non-IGGI 70.0 - 32.3 (32.3) 1.3 (33.6) 
Non-concessional 2.630.4 1,844.5 352.2 1,492.3 245.2 1,247.1 
IGGI 2,384.5 1,732.9 257.1 1,475.8 211.6 1,264.2 
Non-IGGI 245.9 111.6 95.1 16.5 33.6 (17.1) 
Concessional 704.2 442.3 93.0 349.3 91.2 258.1 
IGGI 608.8 415.0 60.4 354.6 87.3 267.3 
Non-IGGI 95.4 27.3 32.6 (5.3) 3.9 (9.2) 
Non-concessional 1,016.3 1,513.8 728.0 785.8 349.5 436.3 
IGGI 1,008.5 1,318.6 704.8 613.8 331.5 282.3 
Non-IGGI 7.8 195.2 23.2 172.0 18.0 154.0 
Concessional 915.9 483.7 136.7 347.0 112.5 234.5 
IGGI 891.3 455.1 90.8 364.3 109.0 255.3 
Non-IGGI 24.6 28.6 45.9 (17.3) 3.5 (20.8) 
Non-concessional 2,372.5 1,721.7 1,411.6 310.1 401.3 (91.2) 
IGGI 2,179.4 1,549.0 1,350.3 198.7 370.8 (172.1) 
Non-IGGI 193.1 172.7 61.3 111.4 30.5 80.9 
^Source; Steer, 1982. 
^Long-term and medium-term only. 
Table 3.16. (continued) 
Gross Net Net resource 
Year Type of Loans Commitments disbursement Amortization disbursement Interest transfers 
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)-(3) (5) (6)=(4)-(5) 
1979 Conces s ional 1.380.9 433.5 158.9 275.1 147.3 127.8 
IGGI 1,362.8 428.0 112.1 315.9 143.1 172.8 
Non-IGGI 18.1 5.5 46.3 (40.8) 4.2 (45.0) 
Non-concessional 2.932.7 1,432.0 1.170.2 261.8 623.7 (361.9) 
IGGI 2,640.7 1,186.9 1,048.2 138.7 578.8 (440.1) 
Non-IGGI 292.0 245.1 122.0 123.1 44.9 78.2 
1980 Concessional 1.087.2 731.7 186.6 545.1 136.3 408.8 
IGGI 1,087.2 709.0 128.5 580.5 132.9 447.6 
Non-IGGI - 22.7 58.1 (35.4) 3.4 (38.8) 
Non-concessional 2.665.3 1.880.7 766.1 1.114.6 687.4 427.2 
IGGI 2,074.2 1,608.6 669.0 939.6 625.3 314.3 
Non-IGGI 591.1 272.1 97.1 175.0 62.1 112.9 
Table 3.17. Summary external public debt 1973-i 
Disbursed outstanding 5,250 6,358 
debt (DOD)C 
Bilateral/multilateral 4,238 4,619 
Other 1,012 1,739 
Includes undisbursed 6,693 9,019 
outstanding debt (TDO)^ 
Bilateral/multilateral 5,524 6,268 
Other 1,169 2,751 
Commitment 1,530 2,335 
Bilateral/multilateral 843 850 
Other 687 1,485 
Gross disbursement 909 1,120 
Bilateral/multilateral 520 487 
Other 389 633 
Net disbursement 760 909 
Bilateral/multilateral 459 416 
Other 301 492 
^Source: Bottelier, 1979; and Steer, 1982. 
^Medium and long-term loans only. 
^End of year. 
1*'^ (million U.S $) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
7.994 10,002 11.658 13.107 13.234 14.960 
5,008 5,913 7,075 8,390 8,436 9,474 
2,986 4,889 4,583 4,717 4,798 5,486 
11.697 14.534 16.133 18.946 21.334 24.040 
7,121 
4,576 
8,828 
5,706 
10,588 
5,545 
12,749 
6,197 
14,296 
7,038 
16,409 
7,631 
4.277 
1,071 
2,206 
3.133 
1,697 
1,436 
1,720 
1,336 
385 
3,288 
1,550 
1,738 
4.313 
2,432 
1,882 
3,753 
2,269 
1,484 
2.127 
578 
1,549 
2.332 
920 
1,412 
1,956 
867 
1,089 
2,205 
935 
1,270 
1,865 
740 
1,126 
2.612 
1,160 
1,453 
1.779 
514 
1,265 
1.899 
834 
1,065 
1.135 
750 
385 
657 
730 
(73) 
537 
484 
52 
1.660 
849 
811 
Table 3.17. (continued) 
Debt component 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Net resource transfer 697 829 1.604 1.572 694 143 (234) 836 
Bilateral/multilateral 417 364 442 733 591 505 194 546 
Other 280 465 1,162 838 104 (362) (428) 290 
Debt service 211 292 523 761 1,262 2.062 2,100 1.776 
Bilateral/multilateral 103 124 136 187 277 429 545 611 
Other 108 168 388 574 985 1,632 1,554 1,163 
Amortization 149 212 348 434 821 1,548 1,329 953 
Interest 62 80 175 327 441 514 771 824 
(1) Short-run indicators: 
Two indicators are widely used in the short-run, (a) the ratio of debt 
service (Includes the repayment of principal and the payment of interest) 
to exports of goods and services, and (b) the ratio of debt service to 
GDP. 
(a) The ratio of debt service to exports is known as the debt 
service ratio (DSR). A significant cause of the balance of payment 
vulnerability of many LDCs arises from fluctuation in their export 
earnings. A decline in export earnings would cause an increase in DSR. 
A high DSR implies a considerable short-run rigidity in the borrowing 
country's balance of payments. The higher this ratio, the greater the 
strain which the borrowing country may experience when export earnings 
fall sharply. When there is a long-run tendency for exports to decline, 
a high DSR means a weakening of debt servicing capacity. This also means 
an increasing crisis of foreign exchange, because debt service payments 
form a first priority claim on foreign exchange. Indonesia's DSR had 
increased every year since 1968 from 5.6 to its peak at 18.7 percent in 
1978. It had slowed down afterward and reached a level of 8.2 percent in 
1980. There was no guarantee, however, that DSR would not be up again 
since it accounted for only current debt servicing payment; it could be 
up again, for instance, because of a decrease in Indonesia's oil export. 
DSR is not a good indicator of the debt servicing capacity in the long-
run. The debt service ratio is a cash flow concept that does not include 
any variable indicating the productive power of the borrowing country 
[Avramovic and Gulhati, 1960; and Avramovic, 1964, pp. 42-43]. Table 
3.18 shows Indonesia's DSR during the 1968-1980 period. 
Table 3.18. Debt Indicators*'^ 
Year GDP 
(billion 
Rp) 
(1) 
CDS 
(billion 
Rp) 
(2) 
Ex­
change 
Rate 
(Rp/US $) 
(3) 
Export 
(million 
US $) 
(4) 
Import 
(million 
US $) 
(5) 
Gross 
disburse­
ment 
(million 
US $) 
(6) 
Service 
payments 
(million 
US $) 
(7) 
S—R Indicators 
DSR Service 
GDP 
(7)/(4) (7)*(3)/ 
=(8) (1)=(9) 
1968 2,096.7 85.9 300.1 872 983 269 49 5.6 0.7 
1969 2,718.3 159.9 326.0 995 1,226 228 57 5.7 0.7 
1970 3,340.2 354.4 388 .,6 1,173 1,382 379 82 7.0 1.0 
1971 3,672.0 498.4 397.,3 1,307 1,484 307 113 8.6 1.2 
1972 4,564.0 748.4 428.3 1,757 1,694 695 137 7.8 1.3 
1973 6,753.4 1,246.7 424.9 2,957 2,879 909 212 7.2 1.3 
1974 10,708.0 2,608.4 426.9 6,755 4,335 1,120 292 4.3 1.2 
1975 12,642.5 2,644.3 438.8 6,869 5,897 2,127 523 7.6 1.8 
1976 15,466.7 3,412.4 427.4 8,685 6,946 2,332 761 8.8 2.1 
1977 19,010.7 4,475.0 426.4 10,761 7,639 1,956 1,262 11.7 2.8 
1978 22,746.0 4,902.6 559.1 11,020 9,302 2,205 2,062 18.7 5.1 
1979 32,025.4 8,778.0 563.4 15,145 9,956 1,865 2,100 13.9 3.7 
1980 45,445.7 13,280.7 627.0 21,573 13,137 2,612 1,776 8.2 2.5 
^Source: Calculated from Table 3.14. Indicators are in percent. 
^Import of goods and non-factor services. 
Table 3.18. (continued) 
L-R Indicators Other Indicators^ Other ratios 
Dis­ Trans­ Average Average Average Inter­ Ser­ Amorti­
Year Service bursed Service ferred Average TDO DOD TDO est vice zation 
CDS Import Disbursed Import Export Export GDP GDP Average Average Average 
DOD DOD DOD 
(7)*(3) (6)/(5) (7)/(6) (6-7)/(5) 
/2=(10) = (11) = (12) = (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
1968 17.1 25.3 18.2 20.7 251.0 282.7 31.3 35.3 0.46 2.24 1.62 
1969 11.6 17.4 25.0 13.0 243.6 284.6 29.1 34.0 0.62 2.35 1.48 
1970 9.0 25.1 22.2 19.5 232.9 279.6 31.8 38.2 0.81 3.0 1.83 
1971 9.0 19.2 36.8 12.2 242.5 302.8 34.3 42.8 0.92 3.57 2.15 
1972 7.8 37.4 19.7 30.0 209.5 268.8 34.6 44.4 1.25 3.72 1.93 
1973 7.2 28.5 23.3 21.9 155.8 198.6 29.0 37.0 1.37 4.60 2.54 
1974 4.8 20.2 26.1 14.9 85.9 116.3 23.1 31.3 1.38 5.03 2.70 
1975 8.7 31.2 24.6 23.7 104.5 150.8 24.9 35.9 2.44 7.29 3.36 
1976 9.5 27.3 32.6 18.4 104.4 152.2 24.9 36.2 3.63 8.46 3.31 
1977 12.0 21.2 64.5 7.5 100.6 142.5 24.3 34.4 4.07 11.65 5.35 
1978 23.5 20,2 93.5 1.3 112.4 159.2 30.4 43.1 4.15 16.65 8.83 
1979 13.5 16.1 112.6 (-) 87.0 133.0 23.2 35.4 5.85 15.94 6.60 
1980 8.4 16.8 68.0 5.4 65.3 105.2 19.4 31.3 5.85 12.60 4.20 
^Average outstanding debt of the beginning and the end of year. 
(b) Another short-run indicator is the ratio of debt service to GDP. 
An increase in this ratio means that debt service payments have absorbed 
an increasing share of the GDP. The higher the ratio the more the effort 
involved in making service payments [Avramovic and Gulhati, 1958, pp. 62-
63]. More than one third of Indonesia's GDP was derived from agricul­
tural outputs (steadily decreasing from 55 percent in 1966), and most of 
the agricultural products were exported. Since debt services are paid in 
foreign exchange, the use of the ratio of debt services to GDP is justi­
fiable. This ratio was almost stable at about 1 percent between 1968 to 
1974. It began to increase then to 5.1 percent in 1978, and later fell 
to 2.5 percent in 1980 (see Table 3.18). 
From the above discussion, those two types of ratios seemed to be 
consistent with one and another. It can also be concluded also, that 
1978 could be the hardest year for Indonesia to make service payments. 
(2) Long-run Indicators: 
The ability of an LDC to service its debt in the long-run depends mainly 
on the productivity of its economy. Therefore, the long-run debt 
servicing capacity is concerned with the contribution to productivity of 
external loans to the borrowing country. Such contribution depends on 
the impact of loans on the domestic level of output of the country and on 
the ability of that country to have sufficient savings out of that income 
for servicing the debt and financing development projects [Avramovic, 
1964, pp. 48-55]. An assessment of the debt servicing capacity in the 
long-run is also related to the gradual reduction in the dependence on 
external debt. A higher degree of dependence on external loans means a 
98 
higher amount of debt service and subsequently a lower capacity for 
additional debt service payments. Three ratios are presented in the 
following, (a) the ratio of debt services to gross domestic savings, (b) 
the ratio of disbursements (gross) to imports, and (c) the ratio of debt 
services to disbursements. Table 3.18 also shows these ratios. 
(a) The ratio of debt services to gross domestic savings: the 
higher the ratio, the higher the percentage of savings absorbed by the 
service payments and the lower the level of savings left for investments 
in order to generate additional output for export earnings. For 
Indonesia, during 1968 to 1974, this ratio had been decreasing from its 
level of 17.1 percent to 4.8 percent. It moved up from that level to 
23.5 percent in 1978, then came down to 8.4 percent in 1980. These 
figures as shown from Table 3.17 indicate, that even though gross 
domestic savings had been increasing very fast a considerable amount of 
the savings had been absorbed effectively by total debt service payments. 
(b) The ratio of disbursements to import: this ratio can be an 
indicator of the extent to which the borrowing country is dependent on 
external loans (Dhonte, 1975; Dhonte, 1979). Because a large portion of 
loan funds is used to finance imports, the greater the value of this 
ratio over time, the higher the degree of external debt dependence of the 
country. With respect to Indonesia, between 1968 and 1975 the ratio of 
disbursement to import fluctuated around the 25 percent level with its 
lowest level at 17.4 percent in 1969 and its highest level at 37.4 per­
cent in 1972. In 1975, the ratio reached the level of 31.4 percent and 
then decreased to its level of 16.1 percent in 1979 and 16.8 percent in 
1980. 
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(c) The ratio of debt service to disbursements shows what percent­
age of loan disbursements is used up by scheduled debt service payments 
during a given period. The greater the ratio, the higher the debt ser­
vice and the larger the debt burden. Thus, the portion of disbursement 
that remains for financing development projects is small. A ratio higher 
than one, implies that every dollar of disbursement is used up for debt 
servicing and nothing left for financing projects. In the case of 
Indonesia, Table 3.18 shows an increasing trend, with an average of 
22 percent between 1968 and 1975; its lowest level was 18.2 percent in 
1968 and its highest was 36.8 percent in 1971. The ratio had increased 
sharply since 1975 to 112.6 percent in 1979. This point indicated a 
negative level of net transfer meaning that disbursement received was not 
enough to pay the debt services. In 1980, the ratio was down to the 
68.0 percent level. 
Other ratios are also presented in Table 3.18 to provide information 
on Indonesia's indebtedness and Indonesia's dependence on foreign debts 
along with its capacity to service the debts. To bring a better under­
standing, each ratio must not be seen independently but simultaneously 
with other ratios. 
Factors influence future external borrowing needs 
The prospects of balance of exports and imports, the prospects of 
domestic resource management, and the policy and administration of 
external debts have been the main factors that influence Indonesia's 
external borrowing. 
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(1) The prospects of trade balance: 
Indonesia's external resource prospects are highly sensitive to 
international oil price developments. The depressed international oil 
market in the early eighties may cause difficulties for Indonesia when 
selling its oil at the world price. The prospects for LNG exports remain 
bright, with net earnings from LNG approaching those from oil by the end 
of the decade.^  ^ The Indonesia's export earnings have also depended on 
the ability to diversify the range as well as expand the quantity and 
quality of Indonesia's non-oil exports. Over the longer run, however, 
the outlook remains good and may be expected to grow by about 8 percent a 
year. Import growth will be determined by the rate of growth in invest­
ment and income, and by the nature of structural changes in production 
that take place. Both capital goods and intermediate goods imports are 
expected to rise in real terms. Finally, after taking into account the 
prospects for exports and imports, the resource deficit in the coming 
years is expected to remain. 
(2) The prospects of domestic resource management: 
Indonesia's development over the last decade has been characterized 
by a high rate of economic growth associated with rapid increase in 
public expenditures, overall investment, and domestic savings. The 
growth of the economy depends very much on the way the domestic resource 
is managed. This includes the public investment strategy, and the 
financing of these investment expenditures through domestic resources. 
The objective of the investment strategy in the public sector should 
be to lay the foundations for sustained growth in the future. The public 
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investment should represent an expansion in basic infrastructure, like 
transport and irrigation; in human resource, like education, health, and 
housing; and in programs and projects designed to increase employment. 
The success of the investment program is heavily dependent on project 
planning and implementation which in the past has been affected by 
problems that lead to cost overruns and other inefficiencies of using 
domestic resources. It seems that these problems will continue to exist 
in the future. 
Another important aspect to be addressed is domestic revenue mobi­
lization to finance public investment programs. Again, the public 
finance picture is highly sensitive to oil production, and to both the 
export and the domestic price of oil. Indonesia's non-oil revenues 
have always been low relative to other countries. On the other hand, the 
current financial system, characterized by a controlled interest rate, 
and the absence of long-term financial instruments, tends to discourage 
the overall growth of domestic private savings, and to encourage 
unproductive "leakage" of some of the savings that occur. 
Since foreign financial resource is a perfect substitute for 
domestic resource, the need for foreign borrowing is still expected to be 
substantial as long as no improvement in domestic resource management 
occurs. 
(3) External debt policies and administration; 
While external resources have become necessary to finance develop­
ment projects, it is necessary to keep the burden of external debts 
within a manageable limit in order to avoid the possibility of a future 
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debt-trap and foreign exchange crisis.^  ^ The major objective and func­
tion of external debt administration is to assure the debt service capac­
ity in the long-run and to gradually reduce external dependence. In 
order to be successful, the external debt administration should follow a 
set of policies which (a) limit loan funds to projects that are highly 
efficient in using domestic resources (b) avoid waste and diseconomies of 
the external loan utilization, (c) avoid a rapid increase in the level of 
external debt dependence, and (d) avoid public borrowings from high-cost 
commercial sources. 
Data presented by previous tables indicated that Indonesia had been 
able to maintain the level of concessional borrowings with long maturity 
and low fixed interest rates. However, the data also indicated that 
there has been a declining trend in the relative importance of the 
concessional lending to Indonesia. There was a decline in the share of 
debt from official sources on concessional terms and at low fixed 
interest rates, and an increase in the share of debt from commercial 
sources on nonconcessional terms at higher (and possibly variable) 
interest rates. The data also indicated that the level of external debt 
dependence had increased gradually. 
3.3. Output Groeth and Sectoral Production 
Indonesia's economy is divided into eight sectors: agriculture, 
mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water supply, 
construction, trade and banking, transport and communication, and service 
sector. Because of its importance, the agricultural sector is divided 
further into several subsectors, namely: rice, other food crops, non-
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food farm and estate crops, forestry, and livestock and fisheries. The 
second four sectors (mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, 
gas and water supply, and construction) are classified within the 
industrial sector, while the rest are within the service sector. Table 
3.19 to Table 3.24 are used for reference in the following discussion. 
3.3.1. Agricultural sector 
The agricultural sector has been recognized as the most important 
sector in the Indonesian economy. Its importance not only lies in its 
contribution to total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but its employment 
share in the total labor force and its exports share in total non-oil 
export earnings as well. 
The value of agricultural production increased throughout the period 
1966-1980. In real terms, it was 2,085.0 billion Rupiahs in 1966, 
increased to 3,424.9 billion Rupiahs in 1980 (Table 3.20). On the 
average the agricultural sector contributed 33.8 percent of total GDP. 
This sector's contribution to GDP continuously decreased from 51.7 per­
cent in 1966 to 30.7 percent in 1980 (see Table 3.21). The growth rate 
of the agricultural sector in real terms averaged 3.7 percent per annum 
(Table 3.22). 
The tables also show the relative importance of the subsectoral 
structure within agriculture. Rice constitutes the largest share of the 
total agricultural output. The average share of rice production is 
14.0 percent of the total GDP during 1966-1980, while other food crops, 
non-food farm and estate crops, forestry, and livestock and fishery 
constitute on the average 10.1, 8.4, 3.7, and 4.4 percent, respectively. 
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Hence, food crops production is the most important subsector within 
agriculture. 
Paddy is the most important crop in terms of area planted as well as 
production. A mass rice intensification project was initiated as early 
as 1963. Ever since, there have been several variations of the overall 
intensification program. The goal of the program is to promote the use 
of improved seed, fertilizer, pesticides, proper irrigation practices, 
and modern cultivation methods as means of increasing farm income and 
attaining self-sufficiency in rice production.^  ^ Today, two kinds of 
intensification programs are recognized, the Bimas program and the Inmas 
program. The Inmas program promotes the same input package (each 
consists of seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, tools, intensification 
payments, etc.) as the Bimas program, but the farmers must pay cash for 
their input. It is the government view that the Inmas program should be 
carried out in the areas where the Bimas program had been implemented 
earlier. Even though there are no exact figures, it is believed that the 
total area of rice cultivated in Java is around 4.0 million hectares, of 
which more than 3.00 million hectares have been under the program.^  ^ The 
total area cultivated for rice production in 1980 reached around 9.0 
million hectares. 
During the period 1971-1977, the intensification program brought the 
lowest yield of dry paddy per hectare to 3.95 tons and the highest to 
4.58 tons. During the same period, the non-program had the lowest yield 
of 2.29, and the highest yield of 2.95 tons of dry paddy per hectare.^  ^
In 1980, the total production of milled rice reached over 20 million tons 
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(Table 3.19). 
Intensification under the Bimas and Inmas programs have also been 
applied to non-irrigation types of rice fields. This includes rain fed 
and tidal swamp rice fields. Most of these types of rice fields are 
located in Outside Java. In some areas, the program has indeed given 
significant improvement. The intensification programs are not only ap­
plied to the rice crop, but to non-rice crops (palawija) as well, such as 
corn, cassava, peanuts, sweet potatoes, soya beans, etc.26 in real 
terms, production of rice has increased with an average growth rate of 
6.0 percent per annum, while other food crops increased only at 1.3 per­
cent per annum between 1966 and 1980. Their contribution to real GDP, 
however, has decreased sharply from 15.1 percent for rice and 16.0 per­
cent for other food crops in 1966 to 11.8 and 6.8 percent, respectively, 
in 1980. 
Non-food farm and estate products are the next group in the agricul­
tural sector that has an important share for the GDP. This group 
includes rubber, coffee, tea, copra, palm oil, tobacco, sugar and spices. 
In real terms, production has increased from Rp 449.5 billion (or 11.2 
percent of GDP) in 1966 to Rp 649.3 billion (or 5.8 percent of GDP) in 
1980, or a per annum growth rate of 2.8 percent. Most of the Indonesian 
forests produce timber. Forestry that contributed only Rp 97.6 billion 
in real terms (or 2.4 percent of GDP) in 1966 had increased its produc­
tion to a level of Rp 307.6 billion in 1980 (or 3.7 percent of GDP), an 
increase at a rate of 9.5 percent a year. Like all other agricultural 
subsectors (except forestry between 1966-1973), fishery and livestock 
production has decreased its contribution to real GDP from 7.0 percent in 
Table 3.19. Production of rice and yield, 1966-1980 
Year 
Paddy production 
(million tons) 
Irrigated Non-irrigated 
Rice 
production 
(million tons) 
Harvested 
area 
(thousand of Ha) 
Average 
yield 
(ton/Ha) 
1966 16.60 1.36 9.34 NA NA 
1967 16.08 1.32 9.05 NA NA 
1968 20.08 2.35 11.67 8,020 2.80 
1969 21.47 2.85 12.63 8,014 2.94 
1970 23.15 2.12 13.14 8,135 3.11 
1971 24.31 2.08 13.72 8,324 3.17 
1972 23.40 1.95 13.18 7,898 3.21 
1973 25.90 2.19 14.61 8,403 3.34 
1974 27.53 2.18 15.45 8,509 3.45 
1975 27.27 1.94 15.19 8,495 3.43 
1976 28.58 1.89 15.84 8,369 3.64 
1977 28.52 2.01 15.88 8,359 3.65 
1978 31.61 2.09 17.52 8,929 3.77 
1979 32.34 2.03 17.87 8,803 3.90 
1980 36.67 2.27 20.25 9,018 4.32 
S^ource: Bank of Indonesia, Annual Financial Report (various Issues). NA = not available. 
Y^leld In tons of paddy per hectare. 
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1966 to 3.5 percent in 1980. Its rate of growth averaged 2.3 percent in 
1966-1980. 
3.3.2. Industrial sector 
Within the industrial sector, mining and quarrying has the same 
average contribution to real GDP as manufacturing at 10.3 percent between 
1966 and 1980. But in terms of growth rate, the manufacturing industry 
leads at 12.8 percent a year with mining and quarrying at 10.8 percent. 
The mining industry includes the production of crude oil, tin, nickel, 
and other minerals (bauxite, copper, coal, iron, sand, gold, silver, 
diamonds, etc.). 
To date, mineral production in Indonesia is mostly in the hands of 
large foreign companies. In the mid-1970s, the government introduced a 
number of regulations in the field of mining. Contracts of work and 
production sharing agreements with respect to oil and natural gas were 
renegotiated. Also, in order to enhance the importance of minerals 
(other than oil and natural gas) as far as their level of production and 
foreign exchange earning capacity would permit, the government issued 
regulations to introduce uniformity in the payment of taxes and other 
levies. These regulations were designed to serve as a base for negotia­
tions and agreements in the field of mineral production, and materialized 
in the "third generation contracts work in the field of mining."27 
Indonesia is the ninth largest producer among the 13 major oil 
producing countries associated in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Crude oil is produced by the state enterprises 
Pertamina and Lemigas, and by foreign companies. These foreign 
companies, which produce around 95 percent of the total, operate under 
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contracts of work (around 55 percent of the production is produced under 
the contracts), and under production sharing agreements (which produce 
the other 40 percent). Caltex, a company working under a contract of 
work, has been the biggest crude oil producer with an output of 300 to 
350 million barrels a year since 1976 and has accounted for about 53 per­
cent of the total of Indonesian crude oil production. Around 80 percent 
of the total crude oil production was exported while the rest was used as 
input for domestic refineries. Part of the refinery output is exported 
as refinery products, and the remainder is used to help meat domestic 
demand for fuels (since domestic refinery output can not yet suffice for 
domestic demand, some million barrels of fuel have to be imported). 
Pertamina also started to produce liquefied natural gas (LNG) for export 
in 1977 after the completion of the plant near the Badak field. The 
second plant, near the Arun field, which started operating in 1978, is 
one of the largest LNG plants in the world. Both plants are able to 
produce 8.1 million tons of LNG per year. 
The manufacturing industry became very important after the invest­
ment boom which was encouraged by the new foreign and domestic investment 
laws passed in 1967. Its share of real GDP accounted Rp $1,704.6 billion 
in 1980 (or 15.3 percent of total real GDP). In recent years, the 
rapidly expanding industries include textiles and related products, 
fertilizer, cement, motor vehicles and related products, steel and 
machinery. Most of these industries are categorized as large industries 
with high capital intensity. In terms of value added, large and medium 
categories of establishments dominate with 80 percent of the total value 
added in the manufacturing sector (based on industrial census of 1974-
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1975, [McCawley, 1981, p. 68]), while cottage establishments employ 
80 percent of the total manufacturing workforce.28 jiost of the cottage 
industries are located in rural areas. 
The structure of Indonesia's manufacturing industry basically is 
still heavily dominated by traditional agriculture based activities such 
as food processing, bottling of beverages, manufacturing of tobacco and 
rubber products, and so on. Together with textiles and textile products, 
these goods accounted for over 60 percent of value added by manufacturing 
industry in recent years.^  ^ In per capita terms, manufacturing value 
added in Indonesia is still considered very low, especially in machinery 
and equipment, and in basic metal and metal product subsectors. In 
addition, none of Indonesia's manufacturing industries were oriented to 
the world market. 
In terms of their share in real GDP, electricity (including gas and 
water supply) and the construction industry are quite small. On the 
average, between 1966 and 1980, the electricity industry contributed only 
0.5 percent, while the construction industry contributed 3.7 percent. 
However, in terms of rate of growth, the electricity industry grew at an 
average rate of 14.2 percent per year and the construction industry at an 
average rate of 16.0 percent. Those two industries actually have the 
highest rate of growth among all sectors in the economy. The government 
continued to make efforts to increase the supply of electric power 
because of its importance as in input for production activities and for 
household services. The capacity of electric generating power stations 
increased and its distribution network was extended so as to be able to 
reach rural areas. Along with electric power, gas and water supply were 
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also increased for both economic activities and households. Each of 
these suppliers is owned by three different state enterprises. 
Service sector 
The service sector can be divided into three subsectors; trade, 
dwelling, and banking; transport and communication; and public adminis­
tration and other services. The service sector contribution to real GDP 
on the average, during the period 1966-1980, amounted to 34.6 percent. 
This sector during that period grew at a rate of 9.1 percent per year, 
faster than the rate of growth of the GDP. 
Following the implementation of economic development, especially in 
the agricultural and industrial sector, the demand for trade, dwelling 
and banking activities have expanded very fast. This sector accounted 
for only Rp $646.2 billion (or 16.0 percent of GDP) in real terms in 
1966, but increased to Rp $2,395.5 billion (or 21.4 percent of GDP) in 
1980, or an average increase at a rate of 9.8 percent a year. 
The implementation of government programs is also giving considera­
tion to the increasing demand in transportation services. The develop­
ment in this area resulted through improvement and addition of roads as 
well as railway transportation facilities. With regard to sea transpor­
tation, efforts were made to increase the capacity and capability of 
ports and other facilities as well as the numbers of the ocean fleet, the 
merchant fleet and fleet for inter-regional transportation. Air 
transportation also improved with new airports throughout the country 
(there were 34 airports by 1980, at least one for each province). The 
communication industry also expanded very fast. Long distance calls 
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between provinces and with the rest of the world, as well as other tele­
communications through television, have been made possible by the use of 
the Palapa Domestic Satellite Communication System (started in August 
1976). Besides, the microwave transmission network and other systems 
were improved for developing inter-regional communication. Even though 
the transport and communication sector grew as fast as 9.9 percent per 
annum during 1966-1980, its contribution to GDP was as small as 
4.1 percent in real terms. 
The remaining sector which includes public administration and 
defense and other public services also grew at an average rate of 
7.5 percent a year between 1966 and 1980, with an average contribution to 
real GDP at 11.0 percent. Public services include education, health, 
public entertainment and other businesses providing public services. 
The increasing output of the Indonesian economy has resulted in the 
growth of the income of its population. The Indonesian per capita income 
during the period 1966-1980 can be seen from Table 3.24. The average 
income per year reached Rp 52,000 at the 1973 price or over Rp 80,000 at 
current values. Per capita income at constant price grew at a rate of 
about 5.0 percent a year (or almost 45.0 percent for current income). 
3.4. Investaent 
This section deals with investment in the private sector, discussing 
first the government policy towards domestic as well as foreign invest­
ment. Following that, the performance of the investment, both domestic 
and foreign, is presented. 
Table 3.20. Sectoral value added and national income at constant 1973 price, 1966-1980^  
(billion Rp) 
Sector 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Agricultural sector 2,085.0 2,047.4 2.232.3 2.267.3 2,355.1 2,441.0 
Rice 609.9 588.2 758.7 820.4 853.8 892.7 
Other food crops 645.5 628.7 627.0 554.8 547.9 543.3 
Non-food farm & estate crops 449.5 430.7 435.5 447.0 454.3 456.0 
Forestry 97.6 110.3 145.1 168.6 214.4 258.0 
Livestock and fishery 282.5 289.5 266.0 276.5 284.8 291.0 
Industrial sector 677.3 746.5 836.0 985.8 1.137.9 1.236.7 
Mining and quarrying 260.7 327.2 371.7 441.7 521.8 551.0 
Manufac turing 318.4 328.6 354.7 403.4 441.6 490.0 
Electricity, gas, water supply 12.9 16.7 17.3 19.5 22.5 24.7 
Construction 85.3 74.0 92.3 121.2 152.0 171.0 
Service sector 1.268.9 1.338.5 1.456.3 1,572.1 1.710.2 1,867.0 
Trade dwelling, & banking 646.2 701.2 774.1 876.3 989.5 1,081.0 
Transport & communication 146.6 150.3 152.0 157.1 165.3 210.0 
Services & public administration 476.1 487.0 530.2 538.7 555.4 576.0 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 4.031.2 4.132.4 4.524.8 4.825.2 5.203.2 5,544.7 
Plus: net income from abroad —61.8 -61.8 -66.9 -68.5 -74.9 -79.7 
Gross national product (GNP) 3.969.4 4.070.6 4,457.9 4,756.7 5.128,3 5.465.0 
Less; Indirect taxes 204.6 207.6 222.1 237.5 255.0 271.9 
Capital consumption 
allowance 273.2 275.3 294.1 314.1 338.2 360.3 
National Income 3,491.6  3 ,587.7  4 ,141.8  4 .205.1  4 .535.1  4,832.8 
^Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book (various issues); National 
Income Account (various issues). 
Table 3.20. (continued) 
Sector 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Agricultural sector 2,479.0 
Rice 856.7 
Other food crops 558.3 
Non-food farm & estate crops 489.0 
Forestry 276.0 
Livestock and fishery 299.0 
Industrial sector 1,486.2 
Mining and quarrying 674.0 
Manufacturing 564.0 
Electricity, gas, water supply 26.2 
Construction 222.0 
Service sector 2.012.0 
Trade dwelling, & banking 1,224.0 
Transport & communication 229.0 
Services & public administration 649.0 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 
Plus: net income from abroad 
Gross national product (GNP) 
Less: indirect taxes 
Capital consumption 
allowance 
National Income 
6.067.2 
-171.0 
5,896.2 
294.5 
394.2 
5.207.5 
2,710.0 
950.0 
623.0 
475.0 
355.0 
307.0 
2.811.0 
1,004.8 
676.2 
481.0 
325.0 
324.0 
2.811.2 
988.0 
708.1 
495.4 
273.8 
345.9 
2,943.7 
1,030.0 
725.5 
513.0 
309.8 
365.4 
2.981.3 
1,032.8 
701.4 
593.2 
317.6 
336.3 
1.773.4 
831.0 
650.0 
30.4 
262.0 
1,971.0 
859.0 
755.0 
37.0 
320.0 
2.082.0 
828.1 
847.9 
41.2 
364.8 
2,313.1 
952.3 
930.0 
46.3 
384.5 
2.640.5 
1,070.0 
1,057.7 
49.0 
463.8 
2,270.0 
1,344.0 
257.0 
669.0 
2,487.0 
1,486.0 
288.0 
713.0 
2,737.6 
1,593.8 
302.7 
841.1 
2,899.5 
1,677.2 
342.6 
879.7 
3.249.1 
1,841.6 
427.6 
979.9 
6,753.4 
1245.7 
7,269.0 
-369.0 
7,630.8 
-360.3 
8.156.3 
-366.5 
8.870.9 
-422.7 
6,507.7 
328.0 
6,900.0 
351.7 
7,270.5 
370.6 
7.789.8 
359.1 
8.448.2 
430.8 
439.0 472.5 496.0 530.8 576.6 
5.740.7 6,075.8 6,403.9 6.859.9 7,440.8 
Table 3.20. (continued) 
Sector 1978 1979 1980 
Agricultural sector 3,134.8 3,255.6 3.424.9 
Rice 1,139.4 1,161.9 1,316.8 
Other food crops 696.4 746.9 756.6 
Non-food farm & estate crops 597.7 633.2 649.3 
Forestry 351.6 337.7 307.6 
Livestock and fishery 349.7 375.9 394.6 
Industrial sector 2.870.2 3,073.6 3.456.4 
Mining and quarrying 1,048.8 1,046.9 1,034.6 
Manufacturing 1,235.6 1,395.3 1,704.6 
Electricity, gas, water supply 56.9 68.6 77.9 
Construction 528.9 562.8 639.3 
Service sector 3.537.4 3.835.7 4.287.9 
Trade dwelling, & banking 1,982.5 3,166.8 2,395.5 
Transport & communication 490.1 559.8 609.4 
Services & public administration 1,064.8 1,109.1 1,283.0 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 9.542.4 10,164.9 11,169.2 
Plus: net income from abroad -493.2 -649.2 -779.7 
Gross national product (GNP) 9,073.3 9.515.7 10,389.5 
Less: indirect taxes 466.2 495.7 544.3 
Capital consumption 
allowance 624.0 663.5 728.5 
National income 7.983.1 8.356.5 9.116.7 
Table 3.21. Percentage distribution of gross domestic product at constant 1973 price, 1966-1980^  
Sector 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Agricultural sector 51.7 49.5 49.3 47.0 45.3 44.0 
Rice 15.1 14.2 16.8 17.0 16.4 16.1 
Other food crops 16.0 15.2 13.9 11.5 10.5 9.8 
Non-food farm & estate crops 11.2 10.4 9.6 9.3 8.7 8.2 
Forestry 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.5 4.1 4.7 
Livestock and fishery 7.0 7.0 5.9 5.7 5.5 5.2 
Industrial sector 16.8 18.1 18.5 20.4 21.9 22.3 
Mining and quarrying 6.5 7.9 8.2 10.8 10.0 9.9 
Manufacturing 7.9 8.0 7.8 8.4 8.5 8.8 
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Construction 2.1 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.9 3.0 
Service sector 31.5 32.4 32.2 32.6 32.9 33.7 
Trade dwelling, & banking 16.0 17.0 17.1 18.2 19.0 19.5 
Transport & communication 3.6 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.8 
Services & public administration 11.8 11.8 11.7 11.2 10.7 10.4 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
S^ource: Calculated from Table 3.20. 
Table 3.21. (continued) 
Sector 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Agricultural sector 40.8 40.1 38.7 36.8 36.1 33.6 
Rice 14.1 14.1 13.8 12.9 12.6 11.6 
Other food crops 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.3 8.9 7.9 
Non-food farm & estate crops 8.1 7.0 6.6 6.5 6.3 6.7 
Forestry 4.5 5.3 4.5 3.6 3.8 3.6 
Livestock and fishery 4.9 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.8 
Industrial sector 24.5 26.3 27.1 27.3 28.4 24.8 
Mining and quarrying 11.1 12.3 11.8 10.9 11.7 12.1 
Manufacturing 9.3 9.6 10.4 11.1 11.4 11.9 
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Construction 3.7 3.5 4.4 4.8 4.7 5.2 
Service sector 34.6 33.6 34.2 35.9 35.5 36.6 
Trade dwelling, & banking 20.2 19.9 20.4 20.9 20.6 20.8 
Transport & communication 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.8 
Services & public administration 10.7 9.9 9.8 11.0 10.8 11.0 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 3.21. (continued) 
Average 
Sector 1978 1979 1980 1966-1980 
Agricultural sector 32.8 32.0 30.7 40.6 
Rice 11.9 11.4 11.8 14.0 
Other food crops 7.3 7.3 6.8 10.1 
Non-food farm & estate crops 6.3 6.2 5.8 8.4 
Forestry 3.7 3.3 2.8 3.7 
Livestock and fishery 3.7 3.7 3.5 4.4 
Industrial sector 30.1 30.2 30.9 24.8 
Mining and quarrying 11.0 10.3 9.3 10.3 
Manufacturing 12.9 13.7 15.3 10.3 
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 
Construction 5.5 5.5 5.7 3.7 
Service sector 37.1 37.7 38.4 34.6 
Trade dwelling, & banking 20.8 21.3 21.4 19.5 
Transport & communication 5.4 5.5 5.5 4.1 
Services & public administration 11.2 10.9 11.5 11.0 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 3.22. Growth rate of sectoral value added and national income constant 1973 price, 
1966-1980^  (percent) 
Sector 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Agricultural sector -1.8 9.0 1.6 3.9 3.6 
Rice -3.6 29.0 8.1 4.1 4.6 
Other food crops -2.6 -0.3 -11.5 -1.2 -0.8 
Non-food farm & estate crops -4.2 1.1 2.6 1.6 0.4 
Forestry- 13.0 31.6 16.2 27.2 20.3 
Livestock and fishery 2.5 -8.1 3.9 3.0 1.0 
Industrial sector 10.2 12.0 17.9 15.4 8.7 
Mining and quarrying 25.5 13.6 18.8 18.1 5.6 
Manufac turing 3.2 7.9 13.7 9.5 11.0 
Electricity, gas, water supply 29.5 3.6 12.7 15.4 9.8 
Construction -13.2 25.0 31.0 25.4 12.5 
Service sector 5.5 8.8 8.0 8.8 9.2 
Trade dwelling, & banking 8.5 10.4 13.2 12.9 9.2 
Transport & communication 2.5 1.1 3.4 5.2 12.7 
Services & public administration 2.3 8.9 1.6 3.1 3.7 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 2.5 9.5 6.6 7.8 6.6 
Gross national product (GNP) 2.8 15.4 6.7 7.8 6.6 
S^ource: Calculated from Table 3.20. 
Table 3.22. (continued) 
Sector 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Agricultural sector 1.6 9.3 3.7 0.0 4.7 1.3 
Rice -4.0 10.9 5.8 -1.7 4.3 0.3 
Other food crops 2.8 11.6 8.5 4.7 2.5 -3.3 
Non-food farm & estate crops 7.2 -2.9 1.3 3.0 3.6 15.6 
Forestry- 7.0 28.6 -8.5 -15.8 13.1 2.5 
Livestock and fishery 2.7 2.7 5.5 6.8 5.6 -8.0 
Industrial sector 20.2 19.3 11.1 5.6 11.1 14.1 
Mining and quarrying 22.3 23.3 3.4 -3.6 15.0 12.4 
Manufacturing 15.1 15.2 16.2 12.3 9.7 13.7 
Electricity, gas, water supply 6.1 16.0 21.7 11.4 12.4 5.8 
Construction 29.8 18.0 22.1 14.0 5.4 20.6 
Service sector 12.6 8.0 9.6 10.1 5.9 12.1 
Trade dwelling, & banking 13.2 9.8 10.6 7.3 5.2 9.8 
Transport & communication 9.0 12.2 12.1 5.1 13.2 24.8 
Services & public administration 12.7 3.1 6.6 18.0 4.6 11.4 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 9.4 11.3 7.6 5.0 6.9 8.8 
Gross national product (GNP) 7.9 10.4 6^  5.4 7.1 8.5 
Table 3.22. (continued) 
Average 
Sector 1978 1979 1980 1966-1980 
Agricultural sector 5.1 3.9 5.2 3.7 
Rice 10.3 2.0 13.3 6.0 
Other food crops -0.7 7.3 1.3 1.3 
Non-food farm & estate crops 0.8 2.9 2.5 2.8 
Forestry 10.7 -4.0 -8.9 9.5 
Livestock and fishery 4.0 7.5 5.0 2.4 
Industrial sector 8.7 7.1 12.5 12.4 
Mining and quarrying -2.0 -0.2 -1.2 10.8 
Manufacturing 16.8 12.9 22.2 12.8 
Electricity, gas, water supply 16.1 20.6 13.6 14.2 
Construction 14.0 6.4 13.6 16.0 
Service sector 8.9 8.4 11.8 9.1 
Trade dwelling, & banking 7.7 9.3 10.6 9.8 
Transport & communication 14.6 14.2 8.9 9.9 
Services & public administration 8.7 4.2 15.7 7.5 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 7.6 6.5 9.9 7.6 
Gross national product (GNP) 7.4 9.2 7.6 
Table 3.23. Sectoral value added and national income at current price, 1966-1980^  (billion Rp) 
Sectors 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Agricultural sector 168.4 457.3 1.069.3 1.339.3 1.575.0 1.646.0 
Rice 43.3 120.0 398.3 394.6 479.0 479.4 
Other food crops 63.5 180.7 327.6 428.1 483.2 481.6 
Non—food farm & estate crops 26.7 64.5 179.6 268.0 296.4 303.0 
Forestry 2.5 6.1 35.0 59.0 102.0 142.0 
Livestock and fishery 22.4 86.0 128.8 189.6 214.4 240.0 
Industrial sector 35.2 102.5 319.3 467.3 599.7 2.341.0 
Mining and quarrying 5.1 22.9 87.1 129.2 172.6 294.0 
Manufacturing 26.5 62.0 178.6 250.7 311.8 307.0 
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.1 3.5 9.0 12.6 15.0 18.0 
Construction 3.5 14.1 44.6 74.8 100.3 128.0 
Service sector 112.3 288.0 708.1 911.7 1,165.5 1.279.0 
Trade dwelling, & banking 67.9 169.5 408.9 551.6 717.2 722.0 
Transport & communication 5.6 18.5 57.4 76.9 95.8 162.0 
Services & public administration 38.8 100.0 241.8 283.2 352.5 395.0 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 315.9 847.8 2.096.7 2,718.3 3.340.2 3.672.0 
Plus: net income from abroad -4.9 —9.6 -28.8 -34.9 -50.3 -66.7 
Gross national product (GNP) 311.0 838.2 2,067.9 2,683.4 3.289.9 3.605.3 
Less : indirect taxes 7.6 31.0 94.0 134.9 188.2 229.0 
Capital consumption 
allowance 17.2 54.7 131.0 176.3 218.8 238.0 
National income 286.2 752.5 1,842.9 2,372.2 2.882.9 3,137.6 
S^ource: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book (various issues); National 
Income Account (various issues). 
Table 3.23. (continued) 
Sectors 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Agricultural sector 1,837.0 2,710.0 3,497.0 4,003.4 4.812.0 5,905.7 
Rice 551.7 950.0 1,065.1 1,282.4 1,793.3 1,875.6 
other food crops 519.3 623.0 1,031.9 1,272.4 1,250.6 1,784.3 
Non-food farm & estate crops 344.0 475.0 577.0 541.9 694.2 1,087.8 
Forestry 173.0 355.0 422.0 413.2 512.8 524.6 
Livestock and fishery 249.0 307.0 402.0 493.5 561.1 633.4 
Industrial sector 1,133.0 1,773.4 3,722.0 8,639.1 5,294.0 6,545.5 
Mining and quarrying 491.0 831.0 2,374.0 2,484.8 2,930.0 3,599.7 
Manufac turing 448.0 650.0 890.0 1,123.7 1,453.3 1,816.9 
Electricity, gas, water supply 20.0 30.4 52.0 69.8 98.1 105.6 
Construction 174.0 262.0 406.0 589.6 812.6 1,023.3 
Service sector 1,594.0 2,270.0 3,489.0 4,371.2 5,360.7 6,567.5 
Trade dwelling, & banking 925.0 1,344.0 2,082.0 2,511.9 3,077.3 3,737.6 
Transport & communication 182.0 257.0 442.0 521.2 662.6 828.6 
Services & public administration 487.0 669.0 965.0 1,337.1 1,620.8 2,001.3 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 4,564.0 6,753.4 10,708.0 12,642.5 15,466.7 19,010.7 
Plus: net income from abroad -159.4 -245.7 -507.1 -555.7 -432.2 -678.5 
Gross national product (GNP) 4,404.6 6,507.7 10,200.9 12,086.8 15,034.5 18,332.2 
Less: indirect taxes 236.0 328.0 447.0 519.2 690.5 845.6 
Capital consumption 
allowance 296.7 439.0 696.0 821.0 1,006.3 1,235.7 
National income 3,871.9 5,740.7 9,057.0 10,746.6 13,337.7 16,250.9 
Table 3.23. (continued) 
Sectors 1978 1979 1980 
Agricultural sector 6,706.0 8.995.7 11.290.3 
Rice 2,216.2 2,785.0 3,693.7 
Other food crops 1,775.2 2,107.0 4,099.1 
Non-food farm & estate crops 1,205.5 1,790.5 1,997.5 
Forestry 653.2 1,048.3 1,141.6 
Livestock and fishery 855.9 1,264.9 1.793.6 
Industrial sector 8.138.4 12.228.9 19.709.3 
Mining and quarrying 4,357.6 6,979.8 11,672.5 
Manufacturing 2,420.4 3,310.6 5,287.9 
Electricity, gas, water supply 118.3 148.8 225.1 
Construction 1,242.1 1,789.7 2,523.8 
Service sector 7.901.6 10,800.8 14.446.1 
Trade dwelling, & banking 4,516.4 6,344.4 8,324.7 
Transport & communication 1,031.6 1,421.5 1,965.3 
Services & public administration 2,353.6 3,034.9 4,138.1 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 22.746.0 32.025.4 45.445.7 
Plus: net income from abroad -866.7 -1,484.4 -2,028.7 
Gross national product (GNP) 21.879.3 30.541.0 43.417.0 
Less: indirect taxes 1,028.9 1,304.8 1,634.6 
Capital consumption 
allowance 1,482.8 2,089.4 2,962.1 
National Income 19.367.6 27.146.8 38.820.3 
Table 3.24. Indonesia's income per capita, 1966-1980^  
GNP at Per capita income Per capita income growth 
Current 1973 Current 1973 Current 1973 
Population price price price price price price 
Year (million) (billion Rp) (rupiah) (rupiah) (%) (%) 
1966 107.6 311.0 3,969.4 2,890 36,890 _ 
1967 110.0 838.2 4,070.6 7,620 37,010 163.7 0.0 
1968 112.4 2,067.9 4,457.9 18,400 39,660 141.5 7.2 
1969 114.9 2,683.4 4,756.7 23,350 41,400 26.9 4.4 
1970 117.5 3,289.9 5,128.3 28,000 43,650 19.9 5.4 
1971 120.1 3,605.3 5,465.0 30,020 45,500 7.2 4.2 
1972 122.3 4,404.6 5,896.2 36,010 48,210 20.0 6.0 
1973 124.5 6,507.7 6,507.7 52,270 52,270 45.2 8.4 
1974 126.7 10,200.9 6,900.0 80,510 54,460 54.0 4.2 
1975 129.0 12,086.8 7,270.5 93,700 56,360 16.4 3.5 
1976 131.3 15,034.5 7,789.8 114,500 59,330 22.2 5.3 
1977 135.0 18,332.2 8,448.2 135,790 62,580 18.6 5.5 
1978 138.8 21,879.3 9,073.3 157,630 65,370 16.1 4.5 
1979 142.8 30,541.0 9,515.7 213,870 66,640 35.7 1.9 
1980 146.8 43,417.0 10,389.5 295,760 70,770 38.3 6.2 
Average 80,020 52,000 44.7 5.0 
S^ource: From Tables 3.10 and 3.23. 
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3^ .1. Investment policy 
Government policy regarding investment was a continuation and an 
intensification of a previous policy enacted in January 1967 under the 
foreign capital investment law and in July 1968 under the domestic 
capital investment law. Those two laws were intended to encourage both 
foreign and domestic investment by facilitating various investment 
allowances, such as a tax holiday, exemption from customs duties on 
imported goods, clearance for capital, etc., aimed mainly at improving 
the profitability of private investments. 
As stated by the authorities, efforts were continued to meet the 
goals of the Five-Year Development Plans, by increasing public participa­
tion in business, thus spreading activity throughout the country, 
increasing job opportunities, and increasing the utility of domestic 
resources, etc. The efforts taken, however, were arbitrary without 
considering social priorities, such as potential for employment creation, 
backward linkage effects, increase in foreign exchange earnings or 
savings, increase in government revenue, etc. [Donges et al., 1980, 
p. 376]. 
In 1974, a list compiling the scale of priorities for capital 
investment was published by the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), 
comprising four categories. The first category included projects with 
high priority, for which excellent investment facilities were provided. 
The second category included lower priority projects with limited facili­
ties. The third category included projects with no facilities, and the 
fourth category included those fields which were closed to new invest­
ment. By late 1974, a guideline was issued under which Indonesian 
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citizens could eventually become majority owners of foreign enterprises 
in Indonesia through management participation. Later, the authority also 
began to pay attention to the weak economic group. Supporting the 
interests of this group became one of the important considerations for 
the authorities when granting approval to domestic or foreign capital 
investments. 
A new priority list (DSP) for both domestic and foreign investments 
was issued in February 1977.^ ® The DSP was subject to a periodic review 
to conform with the plan and the progress of national development. In 
October 1977, the BKPM was designated as the sole government institution 
authorized to evaluate capital investment proposals, approve domestic 
investment and recommend foreign investments for approval by the presi­
dent. According to the authority statements, this decree was to simplify 
the old procedures run by a committee whose membership included represen­
tatives from various ministries. Following the 1968 law, the termination 
of trading activities of foreign companies was to be in effect by 
December 1977. This cessation was achieved by the transferring of owner­
ship to nationally owned companies, shifting activities from trade to 
production, appointing nationally owned companies as trading agents, or 
simply liquidating the companies themselves. 
Following the issuance of the new DSP, in November 1978 the govern­
ment introduced a series of measures designed to improve the competitive­
ness of domestically produced goods in international as well as domestic 
markets. These were expected to boost production and capital invest­
ments. Besides the adjustment of the Rupiah price of foreign exchange, 
the measure included tax concessions, such as exemption from and reduc­
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tion of import duties and sales tax on certain raw material/semi-finished 
goods used by domestic manufacturing industries, reduction in bank 
lending rates, relaxation of terms of credit, and reduction of dividend 
and royalties payable by entrepreneurs. 
In early 1980, besides the issuance of the new DSP, the authority 
took new steps by granting a tax holiday to all activities open for 
investments for a period of 2 years with respect to new investments. An 
extension of not more than 4 years would be granted if the investment was 
considered as a special priority project and located outside Java. With 
regard to domestic investment, the government took measures to support 
the development of small business. In this connection, new large 
investments were not supposed to compete against existing small 
businesses and traditional ventures which were reserved only for the 
economically weak group. In addition, measures were taken also to 
increase the role of small ventures and cooperatives in various fields of 
capital investments. 
3.4JZ. Domestic and foreign Investment 
Since the enactment of the domestic capital investment law in July 
1968, a number of domestic investment projects have been approved and 
implemented. There is no record of how many of those approved for 
investment have actually been implemented, but most of the views assume 
that all of the approved domestic investments were actually implemented 
between 1968 and 1980. The growth of domestic investment was at an 
average of nearly 430 million Rupiahs per year. By the end of 1980, the 
domestic investment totalled 5,578.6 million Rupiahs (Table 3.25). In 
Table 3.25. Approved domestic investment by sector, 1968-1980^ 
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Construction 
Number Investment Number Investment Number Investment Number Investment 
of proj- plan of proj- plan of proj- plan of proj- plan 
Year ects (billion Rp) ects (billion Rp) ects (billion Rp) ects (billion Rp) 
1968/72 177 101.3 6 29.5 1,003 411.5 3 1.7 
1973 115 99.7 4 18.1 448 344.0 3 12.5 
1974 48 40.8 3 2,4 192 170.4 - -
1975 27 26.6 - - 130 199.4 - -
1976 24 47.0 - - 114 175.0 -1 -1.2 
1977 66 144.0 - - 148 401.4 - -
1978 58 159.0 3 18.4 218 531.0 1 2.6 
1979 44 118.0 3 33.0 174 502.0 1 2.0 
1980 54 525.0 3 37.0 99 861.0 1 2.0 
Total 613 1,261.4 22 138.4 2,526 3,595.7 8 19.6 
^Source: Bank of Indonesia, Annual Financial Report (various issues). 
Table 3.25. (continued) 
Trade Other services All sectors 
Number Investment Number Investment Number Investment 
of plan of plan of plan 
Year projects (billion Rp) projects (billion Rp) projects (billion Rp) 
1968/72 76 46.6 71 63.4 1,336 654.0 
1973 30 106.7 30 26.6 630 607.6 
1974 3 2.3 13 14.4 259 230.3 
1975 8 16.6 7 8.3 172 250.9 
1976 21 48.0 -6 7.4 152 276.2 
1977 10 39.3 10 19.9 234 604.6 
1978 6 27.0 13 24.0 299 762.0 
1979 14 16.0 11 17.0 247 688.0 
1980 10 25.0 2 53.0 173 1,505.0 
Total 178 327.5 151 234.0 3,502 5,578.6 
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terms of the Rupiah investment, 22.6 percent of the total was invested in 
the agricultural sector, 2.5 percent in mining, 64.5 percent in manufac­
turing, 0.4 percent in construction, 5.9 percent in trade, and 4.2 per­
cent in the service sector. In terms of the number of projects, there 
were more than 3,500 projects approved between 1968 and 1980. Of the 
total number of projects, 17.5 percent were invested in the agricultural 
sector, 0.6 percent in mining, 72.1 percent in manufacturing, 0.2 percent 
in construction, 5.1 percent in trade, and 4.3 percent in service sector. 
It appears, that on the average more capital per project unit was 
invested in the mining sector and the construction sector than in any of 
the other sectors. For example, projects in the mining sector cost, on 
the average, 6.3 million Rupiahs per project, whereas in the manufac­
turing sector the cost of one project was, on the average, only 1.4 
million Rupiahs. It is not surprising that the cost of a project in 
agriculture, on the average, accounted for almost 2.1 million Rupiahs, 
higher than in the manufacturing sector, since most of the investment 
projects were in forestry which involved thousands of hectares of timber 
forest. The livestock industry and fishery were also attractive sectors 
for domestic investment. 
Most of the domestic investment in the manufacturing sector was 
involved in the textile, chemical, food processing and automobile 
industries. Technical skills in this sector are quite available. These 
industries differ from the mining sector where high technical skills, 
as well as large capital, are required that make this sector unattractive 
for domestic investors. 
The approved foreign investment between 1967 and 1980 amounted to US 
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$9,230.8 million. However, less than 44 percent were actually imple­
mented (Table 3.26). Based on the value of implemented investment, the 
flow of foreign direct investment was about US $288.6 million per year on 
the average in 1966-1980. As for domestic investment, the manufacturing 
industry is also attractive to foreign investors. Foreign investors are 
also interested in the mining industry as well as in agriculture. Based 
on the actual investment, the agriculture sector accounted for 13.0 per­
cent of total foreign investment, with 11.7 percent for the mining 
sector, 64.5 percent for manufacturing, 4.3 percent for construction, 
2.4 percent for trade, 1.4 percent for transport and communication, and 
3.3 percent for the other service sectors. 
Most of the foreign investments in agriculture are involved in 
forestry and fishery, whereas in the mining sector the investment 
projects include oil drilling and the mining of metal ore. Investments 
in manufacturing involve the basic metal and metal product industry, 
chemical and non-metallic minerals, textiles, and the food industry. 
Investment in the industrial sector included the Asahan project with 
a planned investment of US $870 million (in 1975) which was later 
increased by US $842.5 million (in 1979). Asahan is a multi-purpose 
project involving electric generating and aluminum processing plants 
located in Sumatra. In 1979, Indonesia also began to be involved in the 
ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) joint project for fertil­
izer with a US $313 million investment. With these projects, foreign 
investment in manufacturing averaged almost US $190 million per year 
during the 1967-1980 period and was considered very small for Indonesia 
[McCawley, 1981, p. 90]. 
Table 3.26. Foreign Investment by sector, 1967-1980* 
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Construction 
Number Investment Number Investment Number Investment Number Investment 
of plan of plan of plan of plan 
Year projects (million US$) projects (million US$) projects (million US$) projects (million US$) 
1968/72 ( ) 519.7 ( ) 953.7 ( ) 768.9 ( ) 34.5 
1973 (160) 60.0 (17) - (469) 471.7 (56) 14.6 
1974 ( ) 84.2 ( ) 69.0 ( ) 928.2 ( ) 26.8 
1975 3 20.1 - 507.2 17 1,159.2 4 8.6 
1976 3 55.6 - 10.8 25 357.3 1 1.8 
1977 -8 67.2 -4 200.5 -52 360.2 - 3.9 
1978 3 75.5 - 49.9 22 287.6 2 5.4 
1979 -4 109.0 -2 150.0 -15 1,480.1 - 0.5 
1980 -1 173.8 1 3.0 2 635.9 10.9 
Total 
approved 156 843.4 12 1,455.7 468 6,182.2 63 85.2 
Total 
imple­
mented 132 526.9 9 473.5 391 2,607.2 51 51.7 
^Source: Bank of Indonesia, Annual Financial Report (various issues). 
Table 3.26. (continued) 
Transportation and 
Trade communication Other service All sectors 
Number Investment Number Investment Number Investment Number Investment 
of plan of plan of plan of plan 
Year projects (million US$) projects (million US$) projects (million US$) projects (million US$) 
1968/72 9 99.7 21 18.3 55 83.6 797 2,488.4 
1973 9 28.4 21 15.2 55 56.5 797 655.4 
1974 9 43.0 21 3.0 55 122.2 797 1,276.4 
1975 - 21.3 - 20.3 2 9.5 26 1,746.2 
1976 1 12.3 1 4.2 3 27.2 34 470.0 
1977 -4 7.0 -2 5.0 -5 - -75 643.8 
1978 -1 9.7 - 36.5 - 24.7 26 484.3 
1979 -1 3.0 - - -4 45.8 -26 1,788.4 
1980 1 38.6 1 32.5 -3 11.1 1 905.8 
Total 
approved 15 226.1 21 129.6 48 308.6 783 9,230.8 
Total 
imple­ 13 107.9 18 49.7 31 108.4 645 4,039.9 
mented 
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By country origin, most of the proposed investments approved through 
1980 were from Japan, involving US $3,461.8 million (or 38 percent of the 
total) for 201 projects. Other countries with a fairly large amount of 
capital investment were Hong Kong, with US $1,061.1 million (or 11 per­
cent of total) for 124 projects, the United States with US $437.3 million 
(or 5 percent of total) for 78 projects and the Netherlands with US 
$365.8 million (or 4 percent of total) for 42 projects. 
3.5. Production-Investment Submodel 
In this section, a submodel of production and investment is designed 
as a part of the complete model for the Indonesian economy. In this 
submodel, production as well as investment is divided into eight sectors 
of the economy. The production activity is presented first, then the 
investment activity, and finally the entire submodel which includes some 
necessary statistical equations. 
3.5.1. The production 
Output of oil is treated separately in the model, therefore the GDP 
is divided into oil and non-oil. Oil output is assumed equivalent to oil 
export. The oil output is adjusted to determine its value added.^^ 
The non-oil output is divided into eight sectors in the economy. In 
each sector, output is measured by its value added at the 1973 price. 
Following Gupta,output growth in a sector is constrained by either 
lack of demand or lack of supply. There are altogether twelve economic 
activities of eight sectors, of which three are exogenous (E), three are 
supply constrained (S), and six are demand oriented (D). The economic 
activities are the following; 
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Rice (S) 
Other food crops (E) 
Non-food farm and estate crops (S) 
Forestry (E) 
Livestock and fishery (D) 
Mining and quarrying (E) 
Manufacturing (S) 
Electricity, gas, and water supply (D) 
Construction, incl. public works (D) 
Trading, dwelling and banking (D) 
Transport and communication (D) 
Service, incl. public administration (D) 
The activities constrained by supply are those whose growth is 
limited by the supply of material inputs such as land, fertilizer, and 
irrigation facilities. The supply of these inputs is exogenously 
determined. Rice, and non-food farm and estate crops fall into this 
group. The manufacturing sector, on the other hand, is constrained by 
the availability of capital goods and intermediate goods from import, the 
supply of which is determined from another submodel (see Chapter 4). 
The activities/sectors constrained by demand are classified into two 
groups; those whose growth is constrained by demand from final 
consumers, and those whose growth is constrained by demand from 
intermediate users. Falling into the first category are livestock and 
fishery where their domestic demand is directly related to domestic 
income. The second category is estimated by broad demand elasticities 
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derived from national income accounts for those sectors in which their 
detailed contribution to all other sectors are not clearly available. 
Falling into this second category are electricity, construction, trade, 
transport and services. 
The exogenous activities/sectors are those whose growth is deter­
mined either by forces outside the control of the country, by public 
authorities or both. Falling into this category are food crops other 
than rice, forestry, and mining and quarrying. 
The area of irrigated land and the amount of fertilizer used for 
rice production are exogenously determined. The rice output from non-
irrigated land is assumed to grow at a rate of 2.0 percent per year. For 
other food crops, output is determined exogenously and assumed to grow at 
a average rate of 1.3 percent per year. For non-food farm and estate 
crops, the output is a function of the land areas which is determined 
exogenously. For forestry, output is determined by an exogenous growth 
rate of 9.5 percent per year. And finally, the output of the mining 
industry, excluding oil, is determined by a 10.7 percent growth rate. 
3 . 5 T h e  I n v e s t m e n t  
Total investable funds are determined as the sum of total domestic 
savings and foreign savings. The domestic savings are the sum of 
household savings and government savings. The foreign savings on the 
other hand include the public net transfers and the net private inflow 
from abroad. In the basic run, total required investment is endogenously 
determined. In other alternative runs, these funds are first invested 
where investment is considered exogenous, such as in mining, capital 
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replacement, and increase in working capital. In this connection, 
replacement capital is assumed at a level of 1.0 percent of GDP and 
increase in working capital is at 20 percent of GDP. 
The next consideration for investment is the agricultural sector and 
the demand oriented sectors. The amount of investment in these sectors 
is determined based on change in output, marginal investment-output 
ratios (ICORs), and gestation periods. The residual investable funds are 
then invested in the manufacturing industry. 
The following several ICORs are suggested by Gupta^^: 
Food crops 1.86 (1) 
Non-food farm and estate crops 8.20 (1) 
Livestock and fishery 2.56 (1) 
Forestry 0.57 (1) 
Mining 2.1 (2) 
Manufacturing 3.0 (2) 
Electricity 6.0 (1) 
Construction 2.0 (1) 
Trade 1.0 (1) 
Transport 3.5 (2) 
Service 1.25 (1) 
where figures in parentheses indicate gestation period. The required 
sectoral investment can be written in the following general form: 
INVEST = ICOR*(VA+i ~ 
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Where INVEST = sectoral investment 
VA = average sectoral value added between gestation 
period. 
3.5.3. Statistical equations and the submodel 
The following is a set of statistical estimations derived from 
annual data between 1966 and 1980,35 which become output equations of the 
submodel: 
Irrigated rice: 
[3-1] ln(VIRR73) = 3.804 + 1.446 In(HAIRR) + 0.130 In(FERT) 
(6.300) (4.346) (3.467) 
R2 = 0.991 SSE = 0.006 rho = 0.47 
Total food crops: 
[3-2] VFD73 = 171.5 + 0.906 (V1RR73 + VNIR73 + V0FD73) 
(1.811)(15.391) 
r2 = 0.952 SSE = 16329.5 rho = 0.556 
Non-food farm and estate crops; 
[3-3] ln(VEST73) = 4.77 + 0.82 In(HAEST) 
(16.791)(5.09) 
R2 = 0.702 SSE = 0.024 rho = -0.533 
HAEST = 1.034 HAEST_i 
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Livestock and fishery: 
[3-4] VANI73 = VLIV73 +VFIS73 
XANI = XLIV + XFIS 
VANIl = 0.68 (XANI«XCHEF/1000)-(100/PXANI) 
ln(VANl73 - VANIl) = 0.011 + 0.653 ln(GDPN73) 
(0.01) (5.041) 
= 0.718 S SE = 0.414 rho = 0.1 
Manufacturing ; 
[3-5] VMFGl = -160.4 + 0.X50 MCAP „ + 1.531 MINT , 
(1.225)(2.320) (4.722) 
= 0.986 SSE = 799831.7 rho = 0.26 
VMFG = VMFGl-XCHEF/1000 
VMFG73 = VMFG-100/PVMFG 
Trade, dwelling, and banking: 
[3-6] VAGR73 = VFD73 + VEST73 + VANI73 + VF0R73 
ln(VTED73) = -5.686 + 1.571 ln(VAGR73 + VOMN73 + VMFG73) 
(10.767)(24.317) 
R^ = 0.98 SSE = 0.036 rho = -0.16 
Transport and communication: 
[3-7] ln(VTRN73) = -9.009 + 1.786 ln(VAGR73 + V0MN73 + VMFG73 ) 
(7.739)(12.547) 
R^ = 0.929 SSE = 0.099 rho = -0.44 
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Services, including public administration; 
[3-8] ln(VSER73) = -3.196 + 1.197 ln(VAGR73 + V0MN73 + VMFG73) 
(4.268)(13.074) 
R" = 0.934 SSE = 0.038 rho = -0.48 
Electricity, water supply and gas: 
[3-9] ln(VEL73) = -11.587 + 1.736 ln(VAGR73 + V0MN73 + VMFG73 + 
(32.599)(42.353) 
VTRD73 + VTRN73 + VSER73) 
= 0.993 SSE = 0.046 rho = 0.359 
Construction: 
[3-10] ln(VC0N73) = -13.779 + 2.22 ln(VAGR73 + V0MN73 + 
(12.957)(18.110) 
VMFG73 + VTRD73 + VTRH73 + VSER73) 
R^ = 0.965 SSE = 0.096 rho = 0.48 
It is worth noting from the above result that the domestic demand 
for animal husbandry (including fishery) equals value added in that 
sector net of export. In this case, the ratio of value added to output 
is estimated to equal 0.68. In the manufacturing sector, output is 
positively related to both the import of capital goods (2-year lag) and 
the import of intermediate goods (1-year lag). Demand for trade trans­
port and services are dependent on the total output in the agricultural, 
manufacturing and mining sectors; while demand for electricity and 
construction depend on the total output in other sectors of the economy. 
The following equations are to complete the above statistical 
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equations: 
Output of non-irrigated rice: 
[3-11] VNIR73 = 1.02 VNIR73_I 
Output of other food crops: 
[3-12] V0FD73 = 1.013 VOFD73_J^ 
Output of forestry; 
[3-13] VFOR73 = 1.095 VFOR73_J^ 
Output of non-oil mining and quarrying: 
[3-14] VOMN73 = 1.107 V0MN73_J^ 
VMN73 = V0MN73 + V0IL73 
VOIL =0.97 XOIL 
Total non-oil GDP: 
[3-15] GDPN73 = VAGR73 + V0MN73 + VMFG73 + VEL73 + VC0N73 + VTRD73 
+ VTRN73 + VSER73 
Working capital: 
[3-16] WQRCAP = 0.20 (GDPN73 - GDPN73_^) 
Replacement capital: 
[3-17] REPCAP = 0.01 GDPN73 
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Investment in food crops; 
[3-18] INFO = 1.86 (VFD73 - VFD73_^) 
Investment in non-food farm and estate crops: 
[3-19] INEST = 8.20 (VEST73 - VEST73_^) 
Investment in livestock and fishery; 
[3-20] INANI = 2.56 (VANI73 - VANI73_^) 
Investment in forestry: 
[3-21] INFOR = 0.57 (VFOR73 - VF0R73_^) 
Investment in mining (incl. oil): 
[3-22] GMN = EXP (ln(VMN73_j_2/VMN73)/2)_j^ 
INMN = 2.1 VMN73 ((l-HÎMN)^ - l)/2 
Investment in manufacturing: 
[3-23] GMFG = EXP (ln(VMFG73^,/VMFG73)/2) - 1 
INMFG = 3.0 VHFG73 ((l-nîMFG)^ - l)/2 
Investment in electricity: 
[3-24] INEL = 6.0 (VEL73 - VEL73_^) 
Investment in construction: 
[3-25] INCON = 2.0 (VC0N73 - VC0N73_^) 
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Investment in trade: 
[3-26] INTRD = 1.0 (VTRD73 - VTRD73_^) 
Investment in transportation: 
[3-27] GTRN = EXP (ln(VTRN73^^/VTRN73)/2) - 1 
INTRN = 5.5 VTRN73 (1+€TRN)^ - l)/2 
Investment in services: 
[3-28] INSER = 1.25 (VSER73 - VSER73_j^) 
Total investment: 
[3-29] INTOT = (WORCAP + REPCAP + INFD + INEST + INANI 
+ INFOR + INMN + INMFG + INEL + INCON 
+ INTRO + INTRN + INSER) DEF 
Corporate savings: 
[3-30] SAVCOR = 0.01 GDPN73*DEF 
Government domestic savings; 
[3-31] SAVDGOV = GOVDREV - GOVDEXP 
Domestic savings: 
[3-32] SAVDOM = SAVHH + SAVCOR + SAVDGOV 
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Foreign savings; 
[3-33] SAVFOR = (INTOT - SAVDOM)*1000/XCHEF 
Total savings: 
[3-34] SAVTOT = SAVGOV + SAVDOM + SAVFOR-XCHEF/IOOO 
Residual savings: 
[3-35] INRES = SAVTOT - INTOT + INMFG 
INMFG = INRES 
Figure 3.1 provides a useful illustration of the working of the 
submodel in a flowchart form. For example, an attempt to increase rice 
production by increasing the area of irrigated land will increase value 
added in rice production and hence total GDP. The rise in rice 
production indicates an increase in food investment which in fact is the 
capital cost for the required investment. 
The above set of equations requires a two-step solution procedures . 
In the first step, foreign saving is determined endogenously as the gap 
between total required investment and the availability of domestic 
savings, therefore residual investment is zero. Domestic savings consist 
of corporate saving, household saving and government domestic saving. 
The total required investment consists of sectoral investments, 
determined by the marginal capital-output ratios and sectoral value 
added, and other capital requirement such as working capital (assumed to 
be 20 percent of increase in non-oil GDP) and replacement capital 
(assumed to be 1 percent of non-oil GDP). Corporate saving is assumed 
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Figure 3.1. Output-Investment submodel relationships 
146 
to be the replacement capital, while household saving is determined in a 
separate submodel (Chapter 5). Government domestic saving is nothing but 
the difference between government domestic revenue and domestic expendi­
ture. As indicated before, the level of export and import may affect the 
level of sectoral value added and, therefore, GDP. 
In the next step, it is assumed that residual investment may occur 
in the manufacturing sector. In this case, foreign saving is assumed to 
be fixed at the predetermined value (step 1), but there may be changes in 
the level of domestic savings, such as changes in household savings. 
Therefore, investment in the manufacturing sector is not optimum, which 
in turn affects the investment level in other sectors (trade, transport, 
etc.). Changes may also occur in the level of government domestic reve­
nue and the availability of natural resources such as irrigated land, 
fertilizer, etc., as well as a change in government policy. 
As another example, an increase of government expenditure can be 
directed to a certain sector or subsector of the economy, such as the 
rural development program, the development program to increase output in 
small scale manufacturing, and others. A rural development program that 
includes building of village roads, bridges, and irrigation channels has 
been initiated by the Indonesian government since the beginning of the 
Repelita. Such a program increases output in the construction industry 
and therefore total real income. 
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HOTES 
nHAPlER 3 
^These publications include the World Bank Publication [Leiserson, 
1979) which findings are quoted as a reference in this discussion. 
2 
This technique was first used by Widjojo in Java during the 1930 
and 1961 period. Later, Alden Speare followed the same technique to 
project Indonesia's population from 1931 to 1961, and then, on to 1971 
[Leiserson, 1979, Annex 1, pp. 6-7]. 
3 
The Central Bureau of Statistics also continuously tried to update 
Indonesia's population projection. According to the latest result, the 
growth rate of population between 1971 and 1980 was 2.32 percent. 
^General transmigrants were transported to the new area of 
resettlement by the government free of charge and allocated two hectares 
of land, plus a house, tools and rations for twelve months (or eighteen 
months in tidal swamp areas). Spontaneous transmigrants had to arrange 
and pay for their own transport (though assisted in some cases by a cash 
grant for travel and food en route). Special transmigrants were those 
who moved as an entire community (due to flood, or other natural 
disasters) under special cash grants. Voluntary migrants were those who 
moved entirely at their own initiative and at their own expense; they 
could receive independent land in or near a government transmigration 
area. 
^One of the reasons is, that the Intercensal Survey was conducted in 
March in the busy agricultural season that may have affected the survey 
results; another reason is the possibility that new urban areas were not 
included in the surveys. 
^These are sensitive to short-run, temporary, or seasonal labor 
market influences. Besides, it is possible that a response by worker 
households to offset declines in real incomes might be recorded as, 
instead, an increase in labor force participation and employment rates. 
^The total fertility rate gives the average number of children born 
to a woman throughout her reproductive life if subject to the fertility 
conditions prevalent during a specific period, and is a useful summary 
measure of the level of fertility during that period. An estimate of the 
total fertility rate is obtained by multiplying age specific marital 
fertility rates (per 1000 population) by the proportion of women 
currently married by age. 
g 
This method has been widely used in Indonesia. More on this method 
can be seen from publications of the United Nations [1955] and the United 
Nations [1967], 
148 
The 1976 Intercensal Survey on adult mortality, however, had shown 
an expectation of life at birth for females of 47.5 years and for males 
of 42.1 years. On the other hand, the infant mortality data gave an 
equivalent to an expectation of life at birth for females of 52.5 years 
and for males of 49.5 years [Leiserson, 1979, Annex 1, p. 16]. 
10 The economic urgency plan aimed at promoting the development of 
Indonesian Industry. Small, medium, and large scale indigenous 
industrial projects were proposed to produce import substitutes by means 
of capital assistance [Paauw, 1963, p. 215-216]. 
^^See Higgins, 1957, pp. 9-10. Also: during 1952 and 1953 several 
measures were introduced to halt the loss of reserves. The large 
expenditures undertaken in behalf of the economic urgency plan had begun 
to produce serious problems of economic stabilization. In early 1952, 
the Rupiah was devalued from Rp 3.80 to Rp 11.40 per US dollar and was 
held there during 1952-1953. 
12 
The UN undertook to recruit and provide salaries for the experts 
but they signed their contracts with the Indonesian government and did 
not need to report to the UN [Higgins, 1957, p. 41]. The plan's 
substance focused upon a large number of individual projects to be 
completed during the Five Year Plan with a total investment of about Rp 
35 billion after a revision from its original of Rp 30 billion [Paauw, 
1963, p. 219]. 
13 Assistance received from the socialist countries was predominantly 
military aid related to the West Irian campaign. Indonesia began to turn 
to the East after the long years of disappointment with Washington's 
Irian policy, especially its failure to back Indonesia in the UN. 
14 
The execution of the Japanese war reparation projects started in 
1958. The agreement on war reparation involved a total of US $400 
million i.e., US $213 million to be paid out and US $117 million to 
balance Indonesia's trade debt to Japan (Bank Indonesia, Annual Financial 
Report). 
^^The appointment of the bureau director general as minister of 
national planning in 1956 led to political attacks on the bureau's role 
in national planning. In 1958 the regional rebellion broke out following 
the introduction of guided democracy that let to the domination of the 
communist party (PKI), and of guided economy that led to the 
disappointment of the regions over the distribution of the national 
income and development program. 
^^When Indonesia declared its opposition to the proposed federation 
of Malaysia in 1963, Indonesian-American relations again became tense, 
and the Indonesian leaders found themselves under pressure from 
Washington. 
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^^For details of the main provisions of the agreed minutes of April 
24, 1970 and Indonesia's debt refunding see Bitterman, 1972, pp. 160-67. 
18 
For this purpose, Indonesia has to rely on borrowings through 
stand-by arrangements from the IMF. 
19 
"This phenomenon is called repetitive borrowing, and is illustrated 
by numeric examples in Bitterman, 1972, pp. 244-50. 
20 
Throughout the analysis of public borrowings, the IGGI loans are 
distinguished as project aid and program aid. The project aid is tied to 
certain projects proposed by Indonesia, and the program aid can be either 
food aid or foreign exchange credit. The multilateral loan is always in 
the form of project aid. 
Zlgee Steer, 1982, p. 63. 
^^See Payer, 1974. 
23 
There are several agencies involved in the program: (1) the 
extension service of the ministry of agriculture provides farmers with 
information and guidance towards the use of new technology; (2) the Rural 
Development Bank (BRI) provides farmers credit at low interest rates for 
purchase of inputs; (3) the Directorate of Cooperatives organizes the 
farmer groups involved into cooperative units(KUD); (4) PN. Pertani, a 
state enterprise that is responsible for the distribution of inputs, 
primarily seeds, fertilizer and pesticides; (5) the Ministry of Public 
Works provides the irrigation facilities and organizes farmers within 
water management programs; (6) the National Logistic Board (BULOG) 
through its units at the village level (BUUD) carries out the supporting 
rice marketing and price stabilization. 
24 
This means that more than 50 percent of the total areas cultivated 
to rice in outside Java have been under the program. 
25 Productivity differentials among classes of rice field also 
exists. The more developed an area, in the sense that historically it 
has had a high potential rice production, the better its productivity due 
to intensification. This conclusion seems reasonable, since an intensi­
fication program requires a lot of investment both human and non-human, 
and other stuffs that should be developed before the program could be 
successfully implemented. For example, Java is considered as a more 
developed area than Outside Java. 
For more on food crops and intensification programs, see Mears 
(Mears, 1981). 
27 Government regulation of August 23, 1976. 
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28 
Cottage (and household) industry units employing 1-4 workers per 
unit; small industry units employing 5-19 workers; medium industry units 
employing 20-99 workers. 
29 
In 1970 it was 84 percent, and in 1973 it was 76 percent [Chaudry, 
1979, p. 5]. 
30 
The DSP comprises 831 fields of projects; of this total, 453 are 
open to domestic as well as foreign investment and 297 are open to 
domestic investment only. Fields of projects closed for foreign 
investment totalled 378, whereas 81 fields are closed for domestic 
investment. 
31 
In every new domestic investment of more than 625 million Rupiahs, 
at least 10 percent of the initial capital was to be reserved for 
participation by the economically weak groups. In projects with an 
investment value of 625 million Rupiahs or less the participation by the 
economically weak groups was at 10 to 20 percent of the initial capital. 
32 Value added to the output ratio of oil is assumed constant over 
time and has been as big as 0.97 based on the Indonesian Input-Output 
Table of 1975. 
^^Gupta, 1977a, p. 17. 
^^Gupta, 1977a; and Gupta, 1977b. 
35 
Throughout this thesis, figures in parentheses directly under 
regression coefficients refer to the t-ratios; rho refers to coefficient 
of first-order auto-correlation. Each regression equation is estimated 
using single-equation estimation procedures of the following: First, an 
OLS estimation procedure is used. Then, if a first-order auto­
correlation seems to exist, an auto-regressive estimation procedure is 
performed. This procedure includes the transformation of the data 
following the assumption of the existence of a first-order auto­
correlation. The use of the above procedure may improve the coefficient 
of regression estimation. For more on auto-correlation, see Intriligator 
[1978], pp. 159-171 and Johnston [1972], Chapter 8. 
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4. FOBEIGH TRADE, PUBLIC FINAHCE, 
AND MONETARY POLICY 
Three sections are discussed in this chapter, namely Indonesian 
foreign trade, public finance, and monetary policy. Foreign trade deals 
with export and import between Indonesia and the rest of the world, 
public finance deals with the Indonesian fiscal policy and the monetary 
policy section discusses the Indonesian monetary expansion following the 
implementation of the economic development plans. Finally, a submodel 
for the Indonesian economy that includes those three sectors is 
presented. 
4.1. Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments 
Since the stabilization program started in 1967, Indonesia has 
followed a more open economic approach to international relations. As a 
result of the growth oriented approach of the Five-Year Development 
Plans, Indonesia has pursued relatively non-restrictive economic policies 
regarding foreign trade. With the development of the quite substantial 
private foreign investment and the project aid, the size of foreign trade 
(exports and imports) increased considerably and the balance of payments 
improved. The analysis in this section deals with exports, imports, the 
balance of trade, and the balance of payments. 
4.1.1. Exports 
The value of exports from Indonesia amounted to US $714 million in 
1966 and had increased to US $21,573 million in 1980 (Table 4.1), an 
average increase of nearly 31 percent per year. It grew at a low rate, 
averaging 12.9 percent per year during the period 1966-1971. However, it 
Table 4.1. Indonesia's total value of foreign trade and trade Indicators, 1966-1980^ 
Export Imports Balance Growth rate 
(FOB) (FOB) of trade Growth rate Growth rate of trade Export Import 
(millions (millions (millions of exports of Imports surplus as % as % 
Year of US$) of US$) of US$) (%) (Z) (%) of GDP of GDP 
(1) (2) (3)=(l)-(2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1966 714 604 110 _ 19.2 16.3 
1967 770 805 -35 7.8 33.2 -131.8 21.3 22.3 
1968 872 831 41 13.2 3.2 185.4 13.6 12.9 
1969 995 995 0 14.1 19.7 -100.0 11.9 11.9 
1970 1,173 1,116 57 17.9 12.2 - 13.6 13.0 
1971 1,307 1,226 81 11.4 9.9 42.1 14.1 13.3 
1972 1,757 1,445 312 34.4 17.9 385.0 16.5 13.6 
1973 2,957 2,664 293 68.3 84.3 -6.1 18.6 16.8 
1974 6,755 4,632 2,143 128.4 73.9 531.4 26.9 18.4 
1975 6,869 5,468 1,401 1.7 18.0 -34.6 23.8 18.9 
1976 8,615 6,819 1,796 25.4 24.7 28.2 23.8 18.8 
1977 10,761 7,473 3,288 24.9 9.6 83.1 24.1 16.8 
1978 11,020 8,382 2,638 2.4 12.2 -19.8 27.1 20.6 
1979 15,145 9,241 5,904 37.4 10.2 123.8 26.6 16.3 
1980 21,573 12,510 9,063 42.4 35.4 53.5 29.8 17.3 
Average 30.7 26.0 87.7 20.7 16.5 
^Source; Calculated from Tables 3.20, 4.2 and 4.4. Trade includes only goods and services. 
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grew rapidly during 1972-1980, averaging 40.6 percent per year which was 
considered high in terms of the international standard. The value of 
exports accounted for 20.7 percent of the GDP during the period 1966-
1980, an increase from 15.6 percent during the period 1966-1971 to 
24.1 percent during the period 1972-1980. 
Factors contributing to the high growth rate of exports during the 
period 1972-1980 were (1) foreign investment, especially in mineral, 
timber and export industries; (2) improvement in the composition of 
exports in favor of commodities with a better price and quantity progno­
sis; (3) export promotion measures which improve the terms of trade and 
the system of finance and payments; (4) concentration of exports in the 
rapidly growing market, such as the Japanese market; (5) rising prices of 
exports in the world market, especially the oil prices. 
Indonesia is basically an agricultural commodity export country. The 
traditional exports were rubber, and other non-food farm and estate 
products (such as coffee, tea, tobacco, pepper, and palm oil). The 
export growth of these commodities was very sluggish in the beginning, 
amounting only 3.1 percent a year during the period 1966-1971; it 
increased to 24.8 percent a year during the period 1972-1980. However, 
the exports ratio to total exports were decreasing from an average of 
36.4 percent during the period 1966-1971 to an average of 14.7 percent 
during the period 1972-1980. The level of contribution of these tradi­
tional exports was replaced by the growing exports of timber. Timber 
exports which accounted for an average of only 1.4 percent of total 
exports during the period 1966-1971 jumped to 8.9 percent of total export 
in 1970 and have been almost steady since then at an average of 10.9 per­
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cent of total exports during the 1971-1980 period (see Table 4.2). Tin 
also has been a traditional export commodity of Indonesia. Like other 
traditional export commoditiesj its export growth was very sluggish; its 
ratio to total exports had actually dropped from its average level of 
4.7 percent during 1966-1971 to an average of 2.5 percent during 1972-
1980. The net benefits to Indonesia of non-oil mining development had 
been small. Many of the foreign investors in this field (such as copper 
and nickel) had enjoyed a tax holiday under the provisions of the so-
called "first generation mining contract," while Indonesia's share in 
foreign exchange receipt had been very small. 
There has been a slow growth of labor intensive manufacturing. Some 
non-traditional exports have appeared, but the important ones have been 
capital intensive, such as cement, fertilizer, and steel. Up to 1978, 
little had happened in textiles, clothing, electronics, and other labor 
intensive exports. As a percentage of total exports, exports of manufac­
turing had decreased steadily from about 11 percent in 1966/67 to less 
than 2 percent in mid-1978. After that, there was indication of some 
improvement. 
A comparison of the export volume and the unit value series indi­
cates a rise in the volume of crude oil as a result of rising investment, 
well ahead of the big price increases in 1973 and 1974. Cumulative 
foreign investment between 1968 and 1976 is estimated to have totalled 
U.S. $3.8 billion in oil [Rosendale, 1981, p. 173]. Since 1966, new 
production contracts have been within a production-sharing framework 
between the state oil enterprise (Pertamina), and the foreign oil 
investor. These contracts have incorporated less and less favorable 
Table 4.2. Value of exports by commodity, 1966-1980* (million US $) 
Commodity 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Rubber 223.3 168.5 176.5 225.8 253.4 221.9 189.1 391.4 
Other estate products 120.6 109.9 108.5 156.3 130.0 178.9 203.8 242.5 
Timber 3.6 6.3 11.5 28.2 104.3 161.4 228.7 573.6 
Animal products 4.9 6.4 7.6 6.5 13.7 25.5 45.7 78.9 
Other agriculture 7.5 9.2 9.3 3.8 15.1 28.0 28.3 40.1 
Tin 32.1 51.3 38.4 40.6 53.7 51.9 64.2 93.1 
Other mineral (non-oil) 1.3 3.3 5.4 3.7 13.7 18.8 18.2 19.8 
Manufac turing 78.7 87.0 83.3 88.5 82.0 75.9 70.5 110.0 
Non-oil^ 499.0 526.0 569.0 629.0 739.0 792.0 880.0 1.609.0 
Oil and gas 215.0 244.0 303.0 366.0 434.0 515.0 877.0 1,348.0 
Total export 714.0 770.0 872.0 995.0 1,173.0 1.307.0 1.757.0 2,957.0 
^Source; Bank of Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics. 
^The FOB values of non-oil exports are derived from balance of payments series that do not 
contain the breakdown. These values happen to be different from the sum of the components. 
Table 4.2. (continued) 
Commodity 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Rubber 
Other estate products 
Timber 
Animal products 
Other agriculture 
479.2 
361.5 
724.7 
107.9 
49.8 
358.2 
360.9 
500.0 
93.6 
39.3 
530.8 
514.7 
781.8 
134.2 
49.7 
588.3 
1,021.3 
951.2 
219.9 
48.8 
716.5 
918.9 
995.0 
189.1 
59.9 
936.8 
1,005.4 
1,796.7 
233.0 
77.2 
1,165.3 
1,134.7 
1,852.5 
219.7 
96.7 
Tin 
Other mineral (non-oil) 
175.3 
25.5 
103.1 
28.5 
123.1 
42.9 
239.2 
52.0 
286.1 
37.2 
404.4 
47.2 
510.0 
79.0 
Manufacturing 147.3 150.9 152.0 184.2 269.7 552.5 805.0 
Non-oil^  2.199.0 1,817.0 2.534.0 3.511.0 3.659.0 5.579.0 6,079.0 
Oil and gas 4.556.0 5,052.0 6,081.0 7.250.0 7.361.0 9.566.0 15.494.0 
Total export 6.755.0 6.869.0 8.615.0 10.761.0 11.020.0 15.145.0 21.573.0 
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terms for the foreign party. Renegotiations of both contract of work and 
production-sharing agreements were initiated shortly after the price 
increase, with which Indonesia greatly increased its share of profits. 
Indonesia also began to export LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) in August 
1977. Oil exports as a percentage of total exports had steadily 
increased from 30 percent in 1966 to 45.5 percent in 1973, and then 
jumped to an average of 70.5 percent during 1974-1976, before they were 
down to an average of over 67 percent during 1977-1980. 
Indonesian exports, in terms of percentage of total exports, to 
Japan have increased considerably since 1967 and have maintained a level 
of 46.3 percent in the ten year period between 1971 and 1980 (Table 4.3). 
Exports to Singapore have also increased and have maintained a level of 
about 10 percent in the period 1971-1980. Exports to USA indicate an up 
and down situation plus or minus around 19.6 percent between 1966 and 
1980. Exports to European countries and Australia have been down dramat­
ically since 1966. During the 15 year period before 1980, exports to 
European countries decreased by 4.5 fold. Exports to Australia decreased 
from 9.5 percent in 1968 to a low of 0.3 percent in 1974/75, then began 
to increase again to 1.5 percent in 1980. Indonesia has also been able 
to maintain its exports to the rest of the world at a constant average 
level of 12.2 percent of its total exports during the period 1966-1980. 
4.1 J!. Imports of goods 
The value of imports of goods had increased considerably from US 
$604 million in 1966 to US $12,510 million in 1980, an average increase 
Table 4.3. Value of exports and Imports by country of destination^  (percent) 
European 
Singapore Japan USA Countries Australia Others Total 
Year 
Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import 
1966 2.6 0.1 16.6 26.8 22.5 9.3 33.1 33.2 8.1 0.8 17.1 29.8 100.0 100.0 
1967 9.9 2.6 29.2 28.0 16.3 8.0 26.1 32.2 8.3 2.2 10.2 27.0 100.0 100.0 
1968 16.2 4.7 24.6 21.4 16.2 17.2 22.2 29.9 9.5 2.8 11.3 24.0 100.0 100.0 
1969 17.2 5.1 30.0 28.9 15.1 19.8 18.6 24.3 7.2 2.6 11.9 19.3 100.0 100.0 
1970 15.5 5.7 40.8 29.4 13.0 17.8 17.9 25.9 3.3 2.8 9.5 18.4 100.0 100.0 
1971 13.0 6.3 44.6 32.8 11.7 15.8 15.9 25.6 1.3 2.9 13.5 16.6 100.0 100.0 
1972 7.7 6.5 50.7 34.0 14.9 15.6 14.6 21.4 0.8 3.3 11.3 19.2 100.0 100.0 
1973 10.6 4.9 53.2 29.3 14.5 18.8 11.2 19.7 0.5 3.3 10.0 24.0 100.0 100.0 
1974 7.5 6.5 53.4 29.4 21.3 15.9 6.1 23.2 0.3 3.4 11.4 21.6 100.0 100.0 
1975 8.9 7.2 44.1 31.0 26.3 14.0 6.4 24.3 0.3 3.3 14.0 20.2 100.0 100.0 
1976 7.5 9.7 41.7 26.2 28.7 17.4 8.2 23.6 0.4 3.3 13.5 19.8 100.0 100.0 
1977 9.2 8.6 40.2 27.1 27.7 12.5 9.4 23.0 0.6 3.0 12.9 25.8 100.0 100.0 
1978 10.7 6.8 39.2 30.1 25.9 12.4 8.7 23.4 0.9 3.3 15.1 24.0 100.0 100.0 
1979 12.6 7.4 46.1 29.2 20.3 11.6 8.7 18.8 1.2 3.1 11.1 29.9 100.0 100.0 
1980 11.3 8.6 49.3 31.5 19.6 13.0 7.4 16.0 1.5 3.5 10.9 27.4 100.0 100.0 
Av­
er­
10.7 6.0 40.2 29.0 19.6 14.6 14.3 24.3 2.9 2.9 12.2 23.1 100.0 100.0 
age 
S^ource: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (several Issues). 
I^ncluding the Soviet block. 
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of 26.0 percent per year, slightly lower than the average increase of 
exports value (see Table 4.1). In contrast with the growth rate of 
exports, the growth rate of imports was almost steady during the period 
1966-1980. Throughout the period 1966-1980, total imports were almost at 
a stable level. As a percentage of GDP, total Imports averaged 16.5 per­
cent, slightly lower than that of exports. 
The high rate of growth of imports during the Five Year Development 
Planning period was attributed to (1) the industrial sector's increased 
demand for imports of capital goods, raw materials, and intermediate 
products as the result of investment promotion; (2) the household 
sector's increased demand for food, especially rice; and (3) the rising 
prices of fuel oil that has affected the prices of other imports. The 
most rapidly growing component in the total value of imports has been the 
group of imports financed by associated transactions on capital account, 
rather than the group of imports financed with foreign exchange bought 
from the central bank's official holdings of foreign reserves [Rosendale, 
1981, p. 177]. The former type of imports include imports financed by 
inter-governmental loans and grants, supplier credits, and other 
commercial loans. 
Imports of consumption goods as a percentage of total imports showed 
a steady decline throughout the development planning period until 1980 
(Table 4.4). It was 37.2 in 1966, then decreased to 15.1 percent in 
1971, and to 12.4 percent in 1980. The steady decline of the share of 
consumer goods in total imports was due to expansion of import-substitu­
tion industries.^  Imports of rice (and wheat) as a percentage of total 
imports were up and down around 8.1 percent during the planning period 
Table 4.4. Value of imports, 1966-1980^ '^  (million US $) 
Consumption goods Intermediate goods Capital Total imports^  
goods 
Year Rlce^  Other Total Oil Non-oil Total Non-oil Total 
1966 63.0 161.7 224.7 7.8 172.5 180.3 121.7 536.0 604.0 
1967 31.2 201.3 232.5 12.1 225.6 237.7 179.0 737.0 805.0 
1968 134.8 131.7 266.5 14.0 245.7 259.7 189.6 751.0 831.0 
1969 77.2 143.7 220.9 11.1 309.9 321.0 238.8 908.0 995.0 
1970 85.3 165.8 251.1 14.7 361.8 376.5 373.9 1,024.0 1,116.0 
1971 97.0 113.2 210.2 20.4 407.6 428.0 464.6 1,114.0 1,226.0 
1972 52.2 199.6 251.8 30.4 576.3 597.7 712.2 1,282.0 1,445.0 
1973 408.1 240.6 648.7 43.8 929.4 973.2 1,107.3 2,359.0 2,664.0 
1974 390.2 316.8 707.0 183.0 1,399.3 1,582.3 1,552.6 3,427.0 4,632.0 
1975 329.0 348.5 677.5 253.5 1,707.6 1,961.1 2,131.2 4,598.0 5,468.0 
1976 453.5 462.4 915.9 437.7 1,586.4 2,024.1 2,733.1 5,210.0 6,819.0 
1977 688.0 416.6 1,104.6 732.0 1,720.5 2,452.5 2,673.2 5,870.0 7,473.0 
1978 602.0 594.6 1,196.6 579.7 2,084.8 2,664.5 2,829.3 6,780.0 8,382.0 
1979 605.4 576.8 1,182.2 793.3 2,534.9 3,328.2 2,691.9 7,639.0 9,241.0 
1980 696.1 847.3 1,543.4 1,744.0 3,063.6 4,807.6 4,483.4 10,064.0 12,510.0 
S^ource: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (several issues), and Bank of 
Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics (several issues). 
C^IF values. 
'^The FOB values of imports are derived from balance of payments series that do not contain 
the breakdown. These values happen to be different from the sum of the components. 
Includes wheat of the breakdown components. 
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between 1969 and 1977; after that they showed a slight decline at an 
average of 6.5 percent in the period 1978-1980. 
Value of imports of intermediate goods as a percentage of total 
imports showed a slight increase from an average level of 31.9 percent in 
the period 1966-1971 to a new level of 35.2 percent in the period 1971-
1980. This increase was mainly due to an increase in oil imports by 
foreign companies between 1973/74 and 1980. Oil imports as a percentage 
of total imports had increased by an average growth of 45 percent per 
year. The value of non-oil imports, of the other hand, indicated a 
constant share in total imports at 31.9 percent between 1966 and 1975, 
and suddenly dropped to a level of 24.6 percent after that until 1980.^  
The value of imports of capital goods reached its peak in 1972 at 
nearly 50 percent of the total; this showed a considerable increase from 
only 20 percent in 1966. Between 1973 and 1980 its share in total 
imports was up and down around 36.0 percent. These imports include all 
the capital equipment for agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and public 
utilities. 
As with exports, the Indonesian imports came largely from European 
countries (including the Soviet Block) which in 1966 shared 33.2 percent 
of total imports. Japan shared 26.8 percent, and USA 9.3 percent of 
total imports. The rest of the world contributed 29.9 percent of which 
28.3 percent came from other Asian countries. This order had changed 
during the years. In 1980, Japan came first. Between 1966 and 1980, the 
average value of country imports as a percentage of total imports was as 
follows: Japan 29.0, Europe 24.3, USA 14.6, Singapore 6.0, and other 
countries 26.0 percent. 
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4.1.3. Balance of trade and payments 
Indonesia's balance of trade has had a surplus throughout the 
development planning period until 1980 (Table 4.1). The amount of 
surplus was about zero in 1969, the year the Repelita I was started, and 
reached US $9,063 million in 1980. The average growth rate of the 
surplus was 87.7 percent per year throughout the years between 1966 and 
1980. The trade surplus as a percentage of the GDP was, on the average, 
4.2 percent during 1966-1980. 
The Indonesian trade system is basically free, with a few excep­
tions. Exports of certain commodities produced domestically are tempo­
rarily controlled by means of quotas in order to maintain supplies to 
meet domestic demand. Exports of certain products are also prohibited. 
Export of wheat and of wheat products imported under international devel­
opment assistance is banned. Other restrictions include exports of 
products using raw materials subsidized by the government. Exports of 
commodities, except certain manufactured products and handicrafts, and 
petroleum products are subject to an export tax. A large segment of non-
oil export commodities is subject to a 10 percent export tax. A few 
other commodities that face weak international demand are subject to a 
5 percent export tax. 
Indonesia's adoption of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) in 
1973 has eased some of the problems created by the previous tariff 
system. At present, there are 13 basic tariff rates, ranging from zero 
to 100 percent, but when different surcharges and reductions are taken 
into account, there are some different effective duty rates, ranging from 
zero to 270 percent [Business International Asia/Pacific, 1975, pp. 158-
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65]. Imports are grouped into two lists. List 1 contains four groups of 
import categories: most essential items with duties ranging from zero to 
10 percent (includes rice, steel products, fertilizers, and industrial 
equipment); essential items with duties ranging from 20 to 40 percent 
(includes raw materials and spare-parts for industry); less essential 
items with duties ranging from 50 to 70 percent (includes import-
substitute goods); and luxuries with duties ranging up to ICQ percent 
(includes some consumer goods and locally produced goods). List 2 
contains about 30 prohibited items that include completely assembled 
vehicles, radio, and television. In addition, importation of basic food 
items is in charge of BULOG, Indonesia's food logistics board. Imports 
of certain commodities for the national iron stock are reserved for state 
enterprises. Importation of some other commodities (for example cloves 
and fertilizers) are reserved to a few approved importers. 
The tariff structure described above is partly directed to protect 
domestic import-substituting industries, such as automotive, motorcycles, 
a wide range of textiles, and many other manufactured goods. One of the 
reasons, stated by the authorities, is that those industries are not yet 
capable of operating economically, and therefore may not be able to 
compete with foreign products at international prices. The concern of 
many efficiency-oriented economists is that investment in import-
substituting industries is justified with no reference to its efficiency 
of producing the item but with regard to its foreign exchange consumption. 
Specifically, the domestic production of the item, in these highly 
protected industries, costs more to save a unit of foreign exchange than 
if the item were imported. A special case is for those industries that 
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use imported raw materials or intermediate goods, such as the assembly 
automotive industries. The domestic production of the product consumes 
more foreign exchange than if the product were imported fully built. A 
negative value added to the international price by the domestic 
production happens to be the case [Gray, 1982]. 
The terms of trade (Table 4.5), was rather stable in the period 
1966-1971, but then rose sharply afterwards, and by the end of 1980 the 
terms of trade was more than four times of that in 1971. Government 
Investment promotion policy has used a tariff exemption as an incentive 
to induce both foreign and domestic investors to expand imports of 
capital and intermediate goods not domestically produced. This policy 
has had a favorable impact on the expansion of investment activities in 
all sectors of the economy. The importation of capital goods, equipment, 
and industrial raw materials has been associated with increased imported 
technology that has had favorable effects on Indonesian export 
industries. The technology so far introduced has allowed Indonesia to 
compete more effectively against other countries. 
Between 1970 and 1980, Indonesia's balance of payments has been 
positive except in 1971 and 1975 (Table 4.6). This surplus in the 
balance of payments was due to a substantial increase in exports and 
public borrowings. The balance of payments could have become a deficit 
if Indonesia had not received enough foreign aid including grants from 
donor countries. Throughout the years between 1966 and 1980, the average 
surplus in the balance of payments amounted to about US $425 million 
every year. 
Table 4.5. Indonesia's terms of trade Index^  (1966 = 100) 
Exports Imports Terms i 
Year Unit value Unit value trade 
1966 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1967 83.8 104.3 80.3 
1968 75.6 67.1 112.7 
1969 64.9 62.8 103.3 
1970 67.6 72.8 92.9 
1971 67.6 68.5 98.7 
1972 78.4 69.8 112.3 
1973 110.8 73.9 149.9 
1974 248.6 98.9 251.4 
1975 262.2 123.7 212.0 
1976 275.7 127.0 217.1 
1977 308.1 120.5 255.7 
1978 310.8 135.0 230.2 
1979 429.7 133.7 321.4 
1980 640.5 153.6 417.0 
S^ource: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (several issues). 
Table 4.6. Indonesia's balance of payments, 1966-1980^  (million US $) 
Category 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Current account balance -176 -320 -287 -416 -375 -429 -442 -805 
Trade balance 110 -35 41 0 57 81 312 243 
Exports of goods (F.O.B.) 714 770 872 995 1,173 1,307 1,757 2,957 
Imports of goods (F.O.B.) -604 -805 -831 -995 -1,116 -1,226 -1,445 -2,664 
Net services -286 -285 -328 -416 -467 -538 -784 -1.098 
Investment income -47 -63 -78 -116 -153 -199 -384 -592 
Other services -239 -222 -250 -300 -314 -339 -400 -506 
SDR allocation 35 28 30 
Capital movements (net) 174 341 279 346 416 467 805 1.054 
Private 50 100 45 64 103 150 427 498 
Direct Investment -16 -12 -3 31 82 152 223 299 
Others 66 112 48 33 21 -2 204 199 
Public 124 241 234 282 313 317 378 556 
Net error & omissions -9 -30 -4 50 -6 -95 58 76 
Overall balance -11 -9 -12 -20 +35 -57 +421 +325 
S^ource: Bank of Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics (various issues). 
Table 4.6. (continued) 
Category 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Current account balance 26 -1.164 -951 -72 -1434 1.016 2,819 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods (F.O.B.) 
Imports of goods (F.O.B.) 
2,143 
6,775 
-4,632 
1,401 
6,869 
-5,468 
1,796 
8,615 
-6,819 
3.228 
10,761 
-7,473 
2.638 
11,020 
-8,382 
5.904 
15,145 
-9,241 
9.063 
21,573 
-12,510 
Net services 
Investment Income 
Other services 
-2,149 
-1,201 
-948 
-2,565 
-1,339 
-1,226 
-2.747 
-1,163 
-1,584 
-3.360 
-1,635 
-1,725 
-4.072 
-1,961 
-2,111 
-4.952 
-2,326 
-2,626 
-6,309 
-3,018 
-3,291 
SDR allocation 64 M 
Capital movements (net) 
Private 
Direct investment 
Others 
Public 
978 
382 
483 
-101 
596 
285 
-1,493 
475 
-1,968 
1.778 
1.869 
237 
329 
-92 
1.632 
1.325 
-72 
286 
-358 
1.397 
1.720 
333 
275 
58 
1.387 
949 
-611 
231 
-842 
1,560 
1,415 
-630 
159 
-789 
2.045 
Net error & omissions -314 -104 -182 -55 -129 -401 -1.898 
Overall balance +690 -983 +736 +1,198 +157 +1,564 +2,336 
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The surplus in the balance of trade has been accompanied by a 
substantial amount of service payments abroad that caused large deficits 
in the current account (except in 1974, 1979, and 1980). An important 
component of the service payments was the investment income received by 
foreign investors. This income sent abroad has become very large since 
1972 and amounted to about half of the total net services. In 1966 net 
investment income to foreigners amounted to only US $47 million (which 
was only 16 percent of total net services). In 1972 it became US $384 
million (almost 50 percent of total net services), an increase at a 
growth rate of 43 percent a year. During the period 1972-1980, it grew 
at a rate of 33.1 percent and reached an amount of US $3,018 million 
(about 48 percent of total net services). The net capital movement 
accounts showed a large surplus throughout the period 1966-1980, attrib­
utable to the increased inflow of foreign direct investment and public 
external loans. Until 1974, net private inflow showed a positive figure; 
afterwards huge capital flight sometimes outweighed the inflow of direct 
foreign investment capital, especially in 1975, 1979 and 1980 when the 
domestic monetary situation was relatively unfavorable for further 
investment. Direct foreign investment also showed a positive trend until 
1974 when foreign investment reached its highest point at US $483 
million. Between 1966 and 1974, the growth rate of direct foreign 
investment averaged 57 percent per year. After that, during the period 
1975-1980, the growth rate was negative and averaged -16 percent per 
year; with this rate, direct foreign investment reached its level of US 
$159 million in 1980. 
The decline of direct foreign investment and the increase of capital 
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outflow in the private sector forced the government to seek more funds 
from abroad in the form of foreign loans.^  The huge capital outflow 
between 1974 and 1977, however, was mainly due to Pertamina's debt 
service crisis. First, Pertamina, the state oil company, failed to turn 
over part of the foreign oil companies tax contributions to the 
government, and used it instead to fulfill its overseas service 
obligations. Second, Bank Indonesia took over the remaining debt service 
obligations by repayment of Pertamina's overseas debts out of its own 
exchange reserves. Pertamina's debts were rescheduled and were pared to 
US $6.2 billion.4 
Net capital movement in the public sector has increased almost every 
year. During the 1966-1980 period, it increased with a rate of growth 
averaging 29.8 percent per year. The public loans consist of long-term, 
medium-term, and short-term loans, with either concessional or non-con­
cessional commercial terms. As the net public loan increased every year, 
it should be kept in mind that the obligation to pay the service, in the 
form of interest payments, also increased. The Indonesian balance of 
payments was also improved by the allocations of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR). 
Indonesia historically had a very weak currency because it could not 
keep a high level of international reserves, especially in the period 
1966-1971, as shown in Table 4.7. During that period, the total 
international reserves (both official and net bank holdings) averaged US 
$57 million or, in terms of number of months of imports, was equivalent 
to less than one month (about 2 to 3 weeks). The total reserves 
increased afterwards, and during the period 1972-1978 it averaged 3.3 
Table 4.7. Indonesia's International reserves, 1966-1980^  
Official Banks' Total Total reserves 
reserves reserves reserves Ratio of equivalent to 
Year (millions (millions (millions reserves to number of months 
of US $ of US $ of US $ Imports of Imports 
(months) 
1966 99 0 99 0.16 1.9 
1967 90 0 90 0.11 1.3 
1968 78 -10 68 0.08 1.0 
1969 58 18 40 0.04 0.5 
1970 93 60 33 0.03 0.4 
1971 36 -23 13 0.01 0.1 
1972 457 54 511 0.35 4.2 
1973 782 -87 695 0.26 3.1 
1974 1,472 96 1,568 0.34 4.1 
1975 489 -130 359 0.07 0.8 
1976 1,225 37 1,262 0.19 2.3 
1977 2,423 96 2,519 0.34 4.1 
1978 2,580 565 3,145 0.38 4.6 
1979 4,144 1,571 5,715 0.62 7.4 
1980 6,480 3,748 10,228 0.82 0.8 
S^ource: Bank of Indonesia, Annual Financial Report (various issues). 
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months of imports. The total reserves increased again in 1979 and 1980, 
and the average equaled 8.6 months of imports. 
Based on what has been discussed so far, the period 1966-1971 could 
be considered as the period of stabilization. The stabilization program 
implemented by the government included a commitment to balancing the 
budget, to floating the domestic currency, and to welcoming private 
foreign investment [Rosendale, 1981, p. 166]. With regard to the 
exchange rate, between late 1966 and 1968 the exchange rate applicable to 
most exports and imports floated upward by 326 percent (the main rate 
reached was about Rp 326 per US dollar) in a free foreign exchange 
market. The inflationary effects which followed and the increasing 
demand pressures forced the government to adjust upwards by 14 percent 
against the US dollar in April 1970, in line with foreign exchange market 
pressure; that let the price of foreign exchange increase to Rp 378 per 
US dollar. The cost pressures that developed in the middle of the 
following year, and the floating of the US dollar following the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods System, again forced the government to further 
devalue its Rupiah by 9 percent to reach a new price of US dollar to Rp 
415 in August 1971. Since then, the foreign exchange reserve has built 
up and Indonesia has begun to accumulate foreign exchange reserves. 
What Indonesia was actually practicing was the pegging of its Rupiah 
to the US dollar. The reasons were, according to the public statements 
of the authorities, that most of Indonesia's exports were denominated in 
the US dollar and that the US was the main contributor to Indonesia's 
foreign aid in IGGI. The foreign exchange market is free, but the rate 
has been stabilized by the government. 
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With this kind of practice, Indonesia was subject to various 
temporary exogenous shocks including external shocks such as external 
terms of trade.^  To moderate the impact of external terms of trade on 
its domestic prices which rose following the devaluation of November 
1978, Indonesia changed the external standard of the Rupiah to a basket 
of currencies of its trading partners, whose composition and weights are 
not disclosed by the authorities. By changing the standard, the variance 
of the country's real exchange rate could be reduced.^  
The devaluation of November 1978 which brought the new price of 
foreign exchange from Rp 415 to Rp 625 per US dollar seems paradoxical at 
a time of high reserve holdings. One consideration, however, was a 
defense of foreign exchange reserves against an expected decline in 1979. 
Another reason for the devaluation was not balance of payments problems, 
but the increasing need to improve the position of the traded goods 
sectors-l-5that is, to reduce Import competition from goods bypassing 
protective walls, and to facilitate exports.^  
4.2. Public Finance 
In order to present the fiscal policy and performance of the 
Indonesian government during the economic planning period, this section 
discusses government revenues and expenditures. The allocation of 
domestic resources and foreign aid through fiscal measures reflects the 
direction and the degree of its impact on the economy. The discussion 
also deals with the pattern of government expenditures and deficit 
financing. 
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4.2.1. Government revenues 
On the revenue side, efforts were made to increase taxes on 
international trade, particularly custom duty collections, proceeds from 
excise and sales taxes, and direct tax revenues. As foreign aid became 
available, the government was able to balance its budget in 1968. 
Starting in that year routine expenditures have been wholly met from 
routine revenues. 
The pattern of the domestic revenues is seen in Table 4.8. The 
routine revenues can be classified into non-oil revenues and revenue from 
oil taxes on foreign oil companies. The non-oil revenues consist of tax 
revenues and non-tax revenues. The tax revenues are from direct and 
indirect taxes while the non-tax revenues mainly come from state 
enterprises. 
Total routine revenues in 1966 accounted for only Rp 13.1 billion but 
increased to Rp 10,227.0 billion in the 1980/81 fiscal period,^  a rise of 
an average growth rate of 73.6 percent per year. Until the fiscal year 
1971/72, indirect taxes had been the largest source of government routine 
revenues. On the average, between 1966 and 1971/72, they accounted for 
about 59.5 percent of total routine revenues. For the same period, 
direct taxes accounted for 15.5 percent, non-tax revenues for 
3.9 percent, and revenue from taxes on oil companies accounted for 
21.1 percent average. On the average, between 1972/73 and 1980/81, 
revenue from taxes on oil companies increased its contribution to 
54.1 percent of total routine revenues. During the same period, the 
contribution of direct taxes on the average increased only a bit to 
16.7 percent, while indirect taxes decreased sharply to about 
Table 4.8. Government routine revenues* (billion Rp) 
Direct taxes Indirect taxes 
Fiscal Income Corporate Other di­ Total Import Export Other in­ Total 
Year taxes taxes rect taxes 
(4) 
tax tax direct tax 
(8) 
(1) (2) (3) = (l)+(2)+(3) (5) (6) (7) = (5)+(6)+(7) 
1966 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.3 3.7 2.0 4.8 10.5 
1967 3.1 3.4 2.9 9.4 16.9 10.6 13.0 40.5 
1968 9.4 9.5 6.6 25.5 31.3 13.9 35.0 80.2 
1969/70 12.1 15.6 15.4 43.1 57.6 7.5 66.5 131.6 
1970/71 13.4 20.1 18.8 52.3 70.7 25.0 83.7 179.4 
1971/72 17.4 25.4 25.7 68.5 69.4 28.1 93.8 191.3 
1972/73 23.7 30.6 49.0 103.3 73.2 32.7 116.2 222.1 
1973/74 34.4 44.2 81.8 160.4 128.2 68.6 178.5 375.3 
1974/75 43.3 91.2 121.1 255.6 160.6 70.3 243.4 474.3 
1975/76 61.7 128.1 153.1 342.4 173.6 61.6 304.9 540.1 
1976/77 84.2 127.3 215.8 427.3 257.5 61.7 405.9 725.1 
1977/78 104.6 169.5 288.5 562.6 286.9 81.3 512.3 880.5 
1978/79 122.2 226.5 338.9 687.6 295.3 166.2 616.9 1,078.4 
1979/80 148.0 297.0 425.0 870.0 317.0 389.0 674.0 1,380.0 
1980/81 164.0 448.0 598.0 1,210.0 448.0 305.0 928.0 1,681.0 
S^ource; Bank of Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics (various issues). 
Table 4.8. (continued) 
As percentage to 
Total total routine revenues (%) 
Fiscal Non-tax Total non- Revenue routine 
year revenue oil revenues from oil revenues Direct Indirect Non-tax Oil 
taxes taxes revenue revenue Total 
(10) = (12) = 
(9) (4)+(8)+(9) (11) (10)+(11) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
1966 0.8 12.6 0.4 13.1 10.0 80.8 6.2 3.1 100.0 
1967 1.3 51.2 9.0 60.2 16.1 69.2 2.2 11.5 100.0 
1968 4.8 110.5 39.2 149.7 17.8 56.1 3.3 23.1 100.0 
1969/70 3.2 177.9 65.8 243.7 17.7 54.0 1.3 27.0 100.0 
1970/71 13.1 244.8 99.8 344.6 15.2 52.1 3.8 28.9 100.0 
1971/72 27.5 287.3 140.7 428.0 16.0 44.7 6.4 32.9 100.0 
1972/73 34.6 360.0 230.5 590.6 17.5 37.6 5.9 39.0 100.0 
1973/74 49.8 585.5 382.3 967.7 16.6 38.8 5.1 39.5 100.0 
1974/75 66.7 796.6 957.1 1,753.7 14.6 27.0 3.8 54.6 100.0 
1975/76 110.4 993.4 1,248.5 2,241.9 15.3 24.1 4.9 55.7 100.0 
1976/77 118.0 1,270.0 1,636.0 2,906.0 14.7 24.9 4.1 56.3 100.0 
1977/78 143.6 1,586.7 1,948.7 3,535.4 15.9 24.9 4.1 55.1 100.0 
1978/79 192.0 1,958.0 2,309.0 4,267.0 16.1 25.3 4.5 54.1 100.0 
1979/80 187.0 2,437.0 4,260.0 6,697.0 13.0 20.6 2.8 63.6 100.0 
1980/81 316.0 3,207.0 7,020.0 10,227.0 11.8 16.4 3.1 68.6 100.0 
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26.6 percent, and the non-tax revenues stayed almost constant at 
2.6 percent. 
The increase of government tax revenues could have been due to 
several factors, (1) increase in the tax base, due to inflation or real 
growth of the economy; (2) introduction of new taxes, reduction in tax 
exemptions, or an increase in the tax rates; (3) or improvements in the 
tax administration, including enforcement. 
The major source of direct tax revenues are income tax, corporate 
tax, withholding tax, Ipeda (tax on land), and other direct taxes. 
Income tax receipts increased from Rp 0.6 billion in 1966 to Rp 164.0 
billion in 1980. For ensuring a more equitable distribution of the tax 
burden, the limit of non-taxable income of the individual has been 
increased several times during 1966-1980 period.^  Most of the income tax 
is assessed entirely on urban incomes. 
Corporate tax constituted the largest share of direct taxes. It 
amounted to Rp 448.0 billion in 1980. The corporate tax rate is 
20 percent of taxable profits up to Rp 10 million and 25 percent of the 
balance over Rp 10 million, making 45 percent the maximum effective rate. 
The rate applies to locally incorporated companies as well as to branches 
of foreign firms or non-resident firms with a permanent establishment in 
Indonesia. There is no excess profits tax. 
Two special withholding systems have been introduced to accelerate 
and increase tax revenues. Under one, the MPC system, companies (or 
individuals) become tax collectors. Taxes are withheld from earnings of 
both unaffiliated persons and companies. The second system, the MPS 
system, is simply a self-assessment scheme under which individuals and 
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companies make monthly prepayments that apply to income, property, or the 
corporate tax. The MPO and MPS systems were also introduced as a means 
of strengthening coverage of the corporate and income taxes, and for 
speeding up payment by advance collection. 
Another important direct tax is the Ipeda land tax. Land tax 
revenues are derived from agricultural and urban land, agricultural 
estates and forestry, and mining sectors. The improvement revenue from 
land tax was made possible by improved cooperation with local governments 
at "Kabupaten" (county) and lower levels. Ipeda is a central government 
tax collected by and allocated to local governments for financing their 
development activities. Revenue from other direct taxes consists mainly 
of property tax and tax on interest, dividend and royalties. 
Indirect taxes include sales tax, sales tax on import, excises, 
import duties and export tax. The impressive rates of indirect tax 
revenues up to 1969/70 reflect the introduction of new taxes and 
reclassification of import duties. A sales tax on imported goods was 
introduced in 1969. As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, a new 
tariff system based on the Brussell Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) came into 
force in January 1973, a reflection of government policy designed to 
protect domestic import substituting industries. The tariff system has 
achieved a marked improvement in the revenue productivity from imports, 
although some of the improvement may also be due to better 
administration. 
Export taxes rose at about the same rate as total non-oil exports in 
the period 1969/70-1975/76. Although the government reduced the export 
tax rate from 10 percent to 5 percent on a broad range of traditional 
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export commodities in April 1976, export tax receipts still increased 
somewhat. This increase was attributable to a marked rise in exports 
following the measures of April 1976. A substantial increase of export 
tax revenue in 1978/79 and after that was attributable to the higher 
exchange rate following the November 1978 devaluation, to the increase in 
export tax on wood, and the additional tax on export commodities for 
which world market prices had increased strongly. The decline in 
revenues from export tax in 1980/81 was mainly due to export restrictions 
imposed on certain commodities such as logs, coffee and garments. At the 
present time, the bulk of the export tax revenues is derived from timber, 
rubber, tin, palm oil, and coffee. 
Non-tax receipts include various kinds of receipts of government 
departments, the government share in the profit of state-owned 
enterprises and state banks, and the surplus of the budget for the 
previous fiscal year. Non-tax receipts also include the sale of state 
property, royalties (timber royalties being the most important), and also 
receipts from certain government services provided to the public, such as 
SPP (contribution for educational development). 
Revenue from the tax on oil companies has risen from 11.5 percent of 
total domestic revenues in 1967 to 68.6 percent in 1980. The increase 
was particularly rapid after 1973/74, partly as a result of the oil boom. 
Tax revenues in Indonesia seem to be collected based on the target 
system [Booth and McCawley, 1981, p. 136, and Nasution, 1982, pp. 50-51]. 
In this system, tax revenue targets in the budgets largely determine the 
amounts which the administration feel obliged to collect. The target is 
set each year from the top down to lower tax administrative units and is 
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hardly related to the ability of taxpayers to pay or to the economic 
conditions of various regions. Even local tax collectors can negotiate 
tax payments from prospective taxpayers, subject to tax regulations and 
the target. 
It suggests that Indonesia's tax system is less regressive than is 
typically the case in developing countries, but on the other hand the 
system is also considered not very progressive [Booth and McCawley, 1981, 
pp. 137-38]. The first reason is that payment by foreign oil companies, 
the most important source of revenue, does not reflect the domestic 
income or cost structure. Second, the direct taxes on the poor sector, 
such as agriculture, come from the Ipeda land tax and export tax as which 
are not only small, but decrease their contribution to total domestic 
revenues decreasing as well. Third, indirect taxes on the poor mainly 
come from foodstuffs and basic commodities which are exempted from both 
domestic sales tax and import taxes. High income groups, however, pay 
too little of the indirect taxes on consumer durables which already are 
subject to a meager sales tax due to a government protection policy. 
There is also growing evidence that the tax system in Indonesia is unjust 
and negatively affects the distribution of income. 
4.2.2. Government expenditures 
Government expenditures in Indonesia exceeded the government 
domestic revenues by a large amount almost every year. The government 
expenditures accounted for 17.6 percent of GDP on the average between the 
1966 and 1980/81 periods. Between 1966 and 1968, they averaged 
9.5 percent of GDP. After that, their percentage to GDP increased every 
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year from 12.3 percent in 1969/70 to 25.8 percent in 1980/81, an increase 
with a growth rate of 7.1 percent per annum (Table 4.9). 
Public expenditures have two classes, routine expenditures and 
development expenditures.^ *^  Both routine and development expenditures 
increased considerably between 1966 and 1980/81; however, development 
expenditures increased faster than routine expenditures. In 1966, 
routine expenditures accounted for Rp 25.7 billion, or 87.4 percent of 
total expenditure, while in 1980/81 they accounted for Rp 5,800.0 billion 
which was 49.5 percent of total expenditures. As a percentage to GDP, 
routine expenditures increased from 8.1 percent in 1966 to 12.8 percent 
in 1980. This means that routine expenditures increased faster than the 
GDP during 1966-1980/81. Development expenditures, on the other hand, 
increased much faster. Development expenditures accounted for Rp 3.7 
billion in 1966, which was equivalent to only 12.6 percent of total 
expenditures. In 1980/81, they accounted for Rp 5,916.1 billion, or 
50.5 percent of total expenditures. Development expenditures increased 
from 1.2 percent of GDP in 1966 to 13.0 percent in 1980/81. 
The expansion in the government expenditures is attributable to the 
following factors: (1) periodic increases of government employees' 
salaries and allowances in both civil and military services; (2) a heavy 
emphasis on infrastructure building in the field of irrigation, 
transportation, electric power, water supply, etc., both in the form of 
central government development projects and subsidy for regional develop 
ment; (3) a rapid increase in the public sector's external debt servicing 
payments; and (4) a large amount of military and national security ex 
penditures. 
Table 4.9. Government expenditures^  (billion Rp) 
As percentage to As percentage 
total expenditures to GDP 
Fiscal Routine Development Total 
year expenditures expenditures exp enditures routine development routine development Total 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1966 25.7 3.7 29.4 87.4 12.6 8.1 1.2 9.3 
1967 70.0 17.5 87.6 79.9 20.1 8.2 2.1 10.3 
1968 149.7 35.5 185.3 80.8 19.2 7.1 1.7 8.8 
1969/70 216.5 118.1 334.7 64.7 35.3 7.6 4.7 12.3 
1970/71 288.2 169.8 457.9 62.9 37.1 8.6 5.1 13.7 
1971/72 349.1 195.9 545.0 64.1 35.9 9.5 5.3 14.8 
1972/73 438.1 298.2 736.3 59.5 40.5 9.6 6.5 16.1 
1973/74 713.3 451.0 1,164.3 61.3 38.7 10.5 6.7 17.2 
1974/75 1,016.1 961.8 1,977.9 51.4 48.6 9.5 9.0 18.5 
1975/76 1,332.6 1,397.7 2,730.3 48.8 51.2 10.5 11.1 21.6 
1976/77 1,629.8 2,054.5 3,684.2 44.2 44.1 10.5 13.3 23.8 
1977/78 2,148.9 2,156.8 4,305.7 49.9 50.1 11.3 11.3 22.6 
1978/79 2,743.7 2,555.6 5,299.3 51.8 48.2 12.1 11.2 23.3 
1979/80 4,061.8 4,014.2 8,076.0 50.3 49.7 12.7 12.5 25.2 
1980/81 5,800.0 5,916.1 11,716.1 49.5 50.5 12.8 13.0 25.8 
S^ource: Bank of Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics (various issues). 
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In terms of its classification, routine expenditures consist of 
personnel expenditures, material expenditures, subsidy to local govern­
ments, debt service payments, and others. Until 1972/73, almost half of 
the routine expenditures were spent on personnel expenditures. These 
included salaries and pension, rice allowance, and cash allowance for 
foodstuffs. In the period 1973/74-1980/81, personnel expenditures 
decreased to less than 40 percent, on the average, of total routine 
expenditures. Material expenditures are mainly for maintenance purposes 
and for the improvement of public facilities. Subsidy to local govern­
ment includes salaries and allowances for government officials attached 
to local administrations. The recruitment of new physicians, health 
officers and school teachers also increases the central government's 
subsidy to regions. The public contribution to government service in 
education (SPP) was abolished for primary schools in 1977. Since then, 
the service has fully become the central government's responsibility. As 
the government debts (both domestic and foreign) increase every year and 
reach maturity, its debt service payments also increase. The central 
government also subsidizes fuel and some imported foods for domestic 
consumption. This subsidy has increased in large amount since 1973/74 
when prices of oil and some food items in the international market 
increased. 
Capital expenditures have also increased through the expansion of 
public enterprises, the channeling of investment through the banking 
system, and the expansion of fiscal overhead capital. For example, 
during the period 1966-1980/81 about 43 percent of the total increase in 
government revenues (including those from foreign aid) went to develop-
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ment expenditures.^  ^
Development expenditures include departmental/institutional expendi­
tures of central government, as well as regional development expendi­
tures. Development expenditures are also involved in almost all sectors 
of the economy. Financing of development expenditures follow the proce­
dures set by the government on the basis of DUP (project proposal form) 
and DIP (project report form) introduced in 1969. Development expendi­
ture is disbursed in the economic sectors according to the priorities 
determined in the Repelita. From Table 4.10, it is seen that in the 
beginning of the Five-Year Development Plans most of the development 
expenditures have been contributed for physical investment rather than 
for human investment, such as, education, health, housing, and so on. On 
the average, in the period 1969/70-1980/81 more than 20 percent of devel­
opment expenditures went to the the agricultural sector, especially 
irrigation facilities; about 16 percent went to the industrial sector, 
mining and electricity; 19 percent went to transport, communication and 
tourist sectors. Only about 8 percent on the average went to education, 
culture and research. In recent years, however, this sector has been 
given more attention. Expenditures on health, family planning, and other 
things to improve social welfare, such as housing, fresh water supply 
etc. were less than 5 percent of total expenditures. Sixteen percent of 
total expenditures were contributed for regional development, including 
urban and rural development. The remaining 15.5 percent were for nation­
al defense, government participation in business, transmigration, etc. 
Table 4.10. Development expenditures by sector^  (percent) 
Agriculture/ Industry/min­ Transport/ Education/ Health/ Regional/ 
Fiscal irrigation ing/energy communication/ culture/ social urban-rural Others 
year tourist research welfare development 
1969/70 25.4 18.6 28.0 6.8 4.2 5.1 11.9 
1970/71 23.5 14.1 21.2 4.7 3.5 22.4 10.6 
1971/72 24.0 13.2 21.9 6.6 4.6 18.9 10.7 
1972/73 17.8 15.1 23.5 6.0 4.7 19.5 13.4 
1973/74 21.7 17.3 17.5 8.2 3.8 19.1 12.4 
1974/75 31.4 15.6 12.9 6.0 3.3 16.4 14.3 
1975/76 18.4 18.0 22.3 9.4 3.6 16.7 11.6 
1976/77 17.3 20.1 20.9 7.8 3.8 13.9 27.3 
1977/78 17.6 16.8 16.5 11.5 7.4 17.0 13.2 
1978/79 17.6 18.6 16.2 11.5 5.3 16.9 13.9 
1979/80 12.7 18.3 11.6 10.4 6.5 13.7 26.8 
1980/81 15.7 9.3 13.2 11.2 5.2 13.6 31.8 
Average 20.3 16.3 18.8 8.3 4.7 16.1 15.5 
S^ource: Bank of Indonesia, Annual Financial Report (various issues). 
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4i23. Deficit financing 
Budgetary balance is one of important goals of the present 
Indonesian government. The budget was to be balanced in the sense that 
total expenditures would not exceed total revenues from both domestic and 
foreign sources. Regardless of the amount of foreign aid received each 
year, and that total government expenditures were to be financed by 
domestic revenues, the total government deficit was, on the average, 
460.4 billion Rupiahs per year during the period 1966-1980/81 
(Table 4.11). The deficit increased from 16.3 billion Rupiahs in 1966 to 
1,489.1 billion Rupiahs in 1980/81—an increase with a growth rate of 
about 43.3 percent per year. 
Regarding deficit financing, the average amount of deficit of 460.4 
billion Rupiahs during 1966-1980/81 was financed entirely by foreign aid. 
Foreign aid, including grants, is usually in the form of goods and 
services. It is classified as program aid or project aid. Program aid 
can be either food aid or foreign exchange credit, while project aid is 
tied to a certain set of projects proposed by the government of 
Indonesia. 
The Indonesian fiscal system with its balanced budget policy and its 
deficit financing draw attention to some important issues such as the 
following: 
(1) A balanced budget, from the government point of view, is defined 
as one in which total expenditures are met with the sum of routine 
(domestic) revenues and development (foreign) revenues. With this 
definition, there are small changes in cash balance that prevent a large 
amount of borrowing from the domestic banking system or the non-bank 
Table 4.11. Overall budget balance^ (billion Rp) 
Foreign Aid 
Fiscal Domestic Total Total Program Project Total 
year revenues expenditures deficit aid aid aid 
1966 13.1 29.4 16.3 _ _ 
1967 60.2 87.6 27.4 24.7 24.7 49.4 
1968 149.7 185.3 35.6 35.5 35.5 71.0 
1969/70 243.7 334.7 91.0 65.7 25.3 91.0 
1970/71 344.6 457.9 113.3 79.0 41.6 120.6 
1971/72 428.0 545.0 117.0 90.5 45.0 135.0 
1972/73 590.6 736,3 145.7 95.5 62.3 157.8 
1973/74 967.7 1,164.3 196.6 90.0 114.1 204.1 
1974/75 1,753.7 1,977.0 224.2 36.1 195.9 232.0 
1975/76 2,241.4 2,730.3 488.4 20.3 471.4 491.7 
1976/77 2,906.0 3,684.2 778.2 10.2 773.6 783.8 
1977/78 3,535.4 4,305.7 770.3 35.8 737.6 773.4 
1978/79 4,226.1 5,299.3 1,033.2 48.2 987.3 1,035.5 
1979/80 6,696.8 8,076.0 1,379.2 64.8 1,316.3 1,381.1 
1980/81 10,227.0 11,716.1 1,489.1 64.1 1,429.8 1,493.9 
^Source; Bank of Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics (various issues). 
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public. Expenditures are therefore financed by means which either reduce 
domestic purchasing power or add to the real resources of the economy. 
It is argued, therefore, that budgets had no significant impact on 
aggregate demand and thus the inflationary tendencies in the economy. 
From a monetary point of view, the picture may be quite different. 
In this framework, the government budget is disaggregated into foreign 
and domestic transactions; both on the revenue side and the expenditure 
side. This framework of analysis is difficult to apply even in the real 
world.^2 In short, it can be explained that government revenue in the 
form of foreign aid, including grants, does not reduce domestic purchasing 
power any more than government revenue from oil companies and other 
foreign firms and personnel. Only if the government injects this revenue 
into the domestic income flow through domestic expenditure, does it have 
a monetary impact. Besides, foreign aid and grants are usually in the 
form of goods and services produced by the donor countries. Similarly, 
government expenditures abroad do not increase either domestic output or 
employment. Therefore, it is the size of domestic deficit or surplus 
that determines the monetary impact of the government budget. 
(2) The Indonesian budget system creates confusion with regard to 
the concept of government savings and capital formation. To estimate 
government savings, it is necessary to divide both government receipts 
and government expenditures into current and capital items. With this 
classification, it is possible to measure the contribution of the budget 
towards capital formation. With the current classification of routine 
and development expenditures, administrators always find ways to mix the 
two.^^ It should be noted, however, that the classification into current 
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and capital expenditures frequently fail to consider expenditures that 
contribute to human capital formation as a part of capital expenditures. 
The classification of current and capital items must also be applied to 
the revenue side for both domestic and foreign items. 
(3) Apart from the problem of deficit financing, what really matters 
is the size of the government expenditures to finance the development 
plans. The fact that the government deficit is entirely financed by 
foreign aid and the fact that oil revenue is the major source of govern­
ment revenues puts Indonesia in a vulnerable situation. First, Indonesia 
is vulnerable because the amount of foreign aid is quite dependent on the 
political situation between Indonesia and the rest of the World. 
Secondly, how much foreign aid Indonesia will receive in the future is 
also dependent on Indonesia's development performance, and therefore the 
way Indonesia spends the aid is very important. Thirdly, the price of 
oil is not expected to increase in the future. Thus, unless the manage­
ment of domestic revenue mobilization is improved, the future of the 
Indonesian economic development is rather vague. 
4.3. Monetary Policy 
Since 1966, the monetary policy of the new administration has been 
set mainly to continue its control on inflation, including direct control 
on the underlying causes of excessive monetary expansion, and to imple­
ment selective credit programs which direct new credit to economic activ­
ities through the banking system. This section discusses the government 
policy toward banks' credit to finance economic expansion and the impact 
of government monetary policy on the expansion of the money supply. 
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4.3.1. Banking system and credit policy 
In Indonesia, there is now one central bank, which is Bank 
Indonesia, one development bank, and thirteen other national foreign 
exchange banks (five state and nine private banks). Besides, there are 
also ten branches of foreign banks and one joint bank in operation. 
There are seventy-six other commercial private banks which are admitted 
only to transactions in local currency. In addition, there are twenty-
six local development banks, including one privately owned. The state 
banks are the central component of the banking system. With about six-
hundred branches throughout Indonesia, they provide a widespread network 
through which financial development can take place. 
Since 1972, the authorities have permitted the establishment of non-
bank financial institutions, with the purpose of mobilizing both domestic 
and overseas longer-term funds. To finance business investments, these 
institutions have usually taken the form of partnerships between foreign 
and domestic banking interests. In 1977, a stock exchange institution 
was established. The function of this new institution is still very 
limited. 
Beside market oriented operations through the financial sector, the 
banking system's main goal is to carry out a development role. Beginning 
in 1966, the authorities have encouraged the banking system to finance 
business expansion through money creation. The banking system not only 
directed their operations to prime customers and to apply conventional 
procedures, but the system was also expected to foster small enterprises 
and to finance those whose collateral and credit rating were inadequate. 
Since 1966, a variety of instruments have been used to direct credit 
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into specific priority areas. At state banks, the term to maturity 
interest rates are set higher for short-term loans than for longer-term 
loans, whereas at private banks interest rates are unregulated. The 
scale of priorities of the credit uses by the economic sector, economic 
activities and recipients are also determined by the authorities. To 
subsidize the operations of state banks', rediscount facilities at the 
central bank, rediscount financing, rediscount rates and state bank's 
loan rates, are available. 
Credit ceilings were reintroduced in 1966. The purpose was to 
control the domestic component of the monetary base, namely credit to 
government and to the domestic private sector. Bank Indonesia not only 
regulates the availability of credits by means of ceilings, but also 
determines its allocation to various economic sectors by means of 
selective and direct credit control. State banks are required to extend 
credit to various priority sectors at low interest rates, and to curb 
credit extensions in undeslred directions. 
To direct credit creation towards financing small-scale (indigenous) 
entrepreneurs, programs such as a medium-term investment credit scheme, 
small investment credit, working capital credit, insurance credit and 
equity capital for small businesses were implemented by the government. 
Table 4.12 shows the distribution of bank credit to various sectors 
of the economy. The figures reflect the authorities' financing 
priorities as well as a change of priorities over the period. 
Table 4.12. Banks' credit by economic sector^ 
Percentage (%) 
Agriculture Mining Industry Trade 
End of 
year 
Volume 
Service Others Total (billion Rp) 
1966 NA NA NA NA NA NA 100.0 6.3 
1967 NA NA NA NA NA NA 100.0 31.2 
1968 NA NA NA NA NA NA 100.0 126.8 
1969 NA NA NA NA NA NA 100.0 244.3 
1970 NA NA NA NA NA NA 100.0 362.4 
1971 NA NA NA NA NA NA 100.0 495.4 
1972 NA NA NA NA NA NA 100.0 679.5 
1973 8.2 0.7 26.2 40.5 7.5 16.9 100.0 1,058.4 
1974 7.4 0.7 22.8 39.9 7.7 21.5 100.0 1,572.7 
1975 8.0 26.9 26.1 27.9 6.3 4.8 100.0 2,750,0 
1976 7.5 29.1 27.8 24.1 7.3 4.4 100.0 3,566.0 
1977 6.9 27.0 29.4 23.1 8.1 5.6 100.0 3,937.0 
1978 6.4 31.5 30.1 20.7 7.2 4.1 100.0 5,394.0 
1979 7.0 30.2 30.8 21.3 6.7 3.9 100.0 6,268.0 
1980 6.7 23.7 32.5 25.1 6.1 5.9 100.0 7,880.0 
^Source: Bank of Indonesia, Annual Financial Report (various issues). NA = not available. 
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4.3.2. Money supply and monetary Instruments 
Fundamental change in Indonesian monetary policy began in 1966 when 
the government introduced the balanced budget principle. The budget 
deficits which were the principal factor in the perpetuation and acceler­
ation of the inflationary process were eliminated. However, although the 
authorities have adhered to the elimination of budget imbalance, there 
has been a recurrence of inflation, traceable to government budgetary 
policy. Since large portions of government revenue in recent years have 
been from foreign sources, namely revenues from tax on oil companies and 
foreign aid and loans, the balanced budget policy has resulted in 
substantial increases in reserve money. Clearly, any increase in the 
government domestic expenditure financed by foreign revenues would still 
lead to an increase in reserve money that puts an upward pressure on 
prices. 
The adoption of the balanced budget principle did not lead to an end 
to money creation regardless of government revenue from foreign sources. 
Lending to the government was replaced by lending to the public and 
private business sectors. The government policy to develop the business 
sector required a level of investment that could not be met by the sector 
itself. Not only was the business income low, but there was almost no 
financial market where the sector could obtain enough funds. Again, in 
this case, business expansion had developed money creation through the 
banking system. 
The third channel to money creation was through the balance of 
payments. When a country's foreign exchange reserve increases, the 
foreign assets of the central bank increase and so increase the central 
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bank's money creation. Since 1966 until the devaluation of 1971, the 
exchange rate was set and adjusted to clear the market and the country's 
reserves did not rise significantly. However, the fixed exchange rate 
(until November 1978 devaluation) and the international price increase of 
some export commodities (including oil) resulted in substantial monetary 
expansion. Table 4.13 shows the change in money supply and factors 
affecting it. Even though the Pertamina crisis (see Section 4.1) partly 
solved the problem of increasing foreign exchange earnings, and the 
government refrained from spending all the extra revenue by building up 
its deposits with the central bank, monetary expansion of the seventies 
was still in effect. 
Since 1967, the essential ingredients of the monetary policy to 
moderate the rate of growth in money supply have been credit ceiling 
control with selective credit policy which has been discussed above, and 
an administered interest rate regime.Reserve requirement was a 
secondary element. Between 1957 and 1977, banks were required to 
maintain reserves equal to 30 percent of their current Rupiah liabili­
ties. At the beginning of 1978, Bank Indonesia reduced the reserve ratio 
to 15 percent of bank liabilities and the percentage of reserve to be 
deposited at the central bank was reduced to 5 percent. On August 23, 
1971, authorities introduced reserve requirements on the foreign exchange 
liabilities of commercial banks. A minimum of one-third of each bank's 
reserve must be kept on deposit with Bank Indonesia. 
By the end of 1968, the government of Indonesia increased interest 
rates and offered fiscal incentives to holders of time deposits at state 
banks. Guarantees to these deposits were also authorized. A seventy-
Table 4.13. Factors affecting money supply^ (billion Rp) 
Banks * credit Change in 
Net Advance Public Narrow Time & Total 
foreign to enterprises Private money savings liquidity 
Year assets government & entitles sector Other deposits 
1966 -0.3 12.6 0.0 6.0 1.6 19.6 0.3 19.9 
1967 -0.2 23.9 0.0 24.5 -17.0 29.3 1.9 31.2 
1968 16-2 2.9 22.5 45.5 -11.5 62.4 9.8 72.2 
1969 30.7 -25.4 28.8 87.2 -14.4 69.2 37.6 106.8 
1970 15.5 -12.2 -2.5 146.0 -49.8 66.8 30.3 97.1 
1971 10.7 54.5 18.4 99.3 -44.4 70.5 68.0 138.5 
1972 212.3 -50.8 -3.0 183.5 -115.9 153.9 72.2 226.1 
1973 75.3 -33.4 57.8 407.6 -214.8 194.4 98.1 292.5 
1974 364.0 -131.9 294.7 146.9 -208.9 268.5 196.3 464.8 
1975 -588.5 162.0 926.4 298.4 142.6 312.6 213.3 525.9 
1976 345.0 -333.0 399.0 357.0 -115.0 353.0 300-0 653.0 
1977 568.0 -275.0 102.0 284.0 -180.0 403.0 96.0 499.0 
1978 718.0 -264.0 823.0 587.0 -1,187.0 482.0 195.0 677.0 
1979 1,779.0 -826.0 456.0 555.0 -551.0 896.0 517.0 1,413.0 
1980 3,055.0 -1,914.0 483.0 1,178.0 -333.0 1,610.0 859.0 2,469.0 
^Source: Bank of Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics (various Issues). 
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two percent per year interest rate was paid in 1968 for 12-month time 
deposits, 60 percent for 6-month, 48 percent for 3-month and 18 percent 
for less than 3 month. The interest rates have decreased ever since to 
9 percent for 12-month time deposits, 9 percent for 6-month and 3 to 
6 percent for up to 3-month in 1978 and have stayed the same since 
then.^® Savings schemes (Tabanas = development savings schemes and Taska 
= insurance savings schemes) were introduced in mid-1971. Since 1978, 
Tabanas has paid 6 percent per year interest rate on a deposit of over 
200,000 Rupiahs and 15 percent on a deposit up to 200,000 Rupiahs. Taska 
has paid 9 percent per year interest rate. Continuous growth in demand 
deposits was encouraged by the bank's payments on such deposits. The 
interest rate is negotiable with each bank and depends on the total 
amount of deposits. It was around 3 percent per year for a deposit of up 
to 50,000 Rupiahs and around 4 percent for over that amount. Table 4.14 
shows the trend of deposits along with the structure of money supply. 
The impact of monetary expansions on price is shown by the growth of GDP 
deflator with the corresponding growth of real money supply. 
4.4. Trade-FiscalHtfonetary Submodel 
In this section, we develop a submodel that consists of those three 
sectors of the economy discussed above: the foreign trade sector, the 
government fiscal sector, and the monetary sector. In each sector, a set 
of necessary statistical equations is derived and at the end a complete 
submodel is presented. 
Table 4.14. Reserve money and money supply^ 
Currency held by public (C) 
(billion Rp) Deposits 
Banks' Reserve (billion Rp) 
Year Currency Banks Private Total reserve (R) money (RM) 
at banks deposit deposit (billion Rp) (billion Rp) Demand (D) Time (T) 
(4) = 
(1) (2) (3) (l)+(2)+(3) (5) (6)=(4)+(5) (7) (8) 
1966 1.4 0.9 1.0 14.4 3.3 17.7 7.8 0.3 
1967 3.0 6.0 2.3 34.1 11.3 45.5 17.4 2.3 
1968 7.6 10.0 3.4 74.7 21.0 95.7 39.2 12.0 
1969 11.7 22.5 10.0 115.7 44.2 159.9 67.7 49.9 
1970 14.9 23.0 14.6 154.6 52.6 207.2 95.7 80.1 
1971 15.0 35.2 13.3 199.4 63.5 262.9 121.4 148.1 
1972 23.2 74.3 18.1 271.8 115.5 387.3 202.8 220.4 
1973 34.3 80.9 10.6 375.0 125.7 500.7 294.0 318.4 
1974 52.5 196.5 29.3 494.0 278.3 772.5 443.3 514.7 
1975 65.7 315.6 31.4 625.3 412.7 1,038.0 624.8 728.0 
1976 80.0 443.0 29.0 781.0 552.0 1,333.0 822.0 1,028.0 
1977 95.0 528.0 68.0 979.0 691.0 1,670.0 1,027.0 1,125.0 
1978 113.0 438.0 56.0 1,240.0 607.0 1,847.0 1,248.0 1,321.0 
1979 147.0 633.0 97.0 1,552.0 877.0 2,429.0 1,833.0 1,837.0 
1980 192.0 866.0 47.0 2,153.0 1,105.0 3,258.0 2,842.0 2,696.0 
^Source: Bank of Indonesia, Indonesia Financial Statistics (various issues). Figures 
at end of year. 
^Include saving deposits as well as foreign currency deposits held by domestic private sector. 
Table 4.14. (continued) 
Year 
Money supply 
(billion Rp) GDP 
deflator 
(1973=100) 
(11) 
Real 
money 
supply 
(billion Rp) 
(12) 
Ratios 
Narrow (M) 
(9)=(5)+(7) 
Broad (B) 
(10)=(8)+(9) 
C/D 
(13) 
R/D 
(14) 
M/EM 
(15) 
1966 22.2 22.5 8 277.5 1.846 0.423 1.254 
1967 51.5 53.8 25 206.0 1.960 0.649 1.134 
1968 113.9 125.9 44 258.9 1.906 0.536 1.190 
1969 183.4 233.3 56 327.5 1.709 0.653 1.147 
1970 250.3 330.4 64 391.1 1.615 0.550 1.208 
1971 320.8 468.9 68 471.8 1.643 0.523 1.220 
1972 474.6 695.0 75 632.8 1.340 0.570 1.225 
1973 669.0 987.4 100 669.0 1.276 0.428 1.336 
1974 937.5 1,452.2 147 637.8 1.114 0.628 1.214 
1975 1,250.1 1,978.1 166 753.0 1.000 0.661 1.204 
1976 1,603.0 2,631.0 190 843.7 0.950 0.672 1.202 
1977 2,006.0 3,131.0 214 937.4 0.953 0.673 1.201 
1978 2,488.0 3,809.0 237 1,049.8 0.994 0.486 1.347 
1979 3,385.0 5,222.0 307 1,102.6 0.847 0.478 1.394 
1980 4,995.0 7,691.0 383 1,304.2 0.758 0.389 1.533 
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4.4.1. Trade statistical equations 
Total exports are split into oil exports (XOIL) and non-oil exports 
(XNOIL); the former are treated as exogenous, while the latter are endo­
genous. Since most oil production is for export, there is reason to 
believe that domestic production is synchronized with the oil companies' 
decision of how much oil to export. Because of the complexity of the 
process of making such a decision,it is better to have exogenized the 
oil export in this model. 
Total imports are also split into non-oil imports (MNOIL) and import 
by oil companies (MOIL); the former are treated as endogenous, and the 
latter are exogenous. 
In this model, Indonesia is regarded as a small country relatively 
free from trade restrictions. Therefore, it is assumed that at given 
world prices, exports are determined by the supply conditions, and 
imports are determined by the demand conditions. 
The fraction of Indonesia's output which is exported can be written 
as a function of export prices relative to domestic prices and income. 
As the relative price of exports rises, it becomes more profitable to 
divert production from domestic to foreign markets. Therefore, the 
coefficient of relative price of exports (x^) is positive. On the other 
hand, the income coefficient (x^), could be positive or negative, 
depending on the income elasticity of domestic demand for exportable 
goods. If the domestic demand for exportables rises more (less) than 
proportionally as income rises, Xg will be negative (positive) and, 
therefore, less (more) of the output will be exported. Let X and 
denote the volume and price of exports, the following supply equation can 
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be written: 
log(X-Pj^/Y-P) = Xq + log(P^/P) + Xg log(Y-P) 
where Y is nominal income and P is level of domestic prices. The above 
equation is solved for the value of exports as follows; 
log(X-P^) = xg + xi log(P^/P + (l+xg) log(Y-P) 
With this specification, and using annual data for sectoral exports for 
the period 1966-1980 the following estimates were obtained: 
Export of rubber; 
[4-1] PRUB = PXRUB*XCHEF/424.9 
ln(XRUB-XCHEF/1000) = -1.862 + 0.593 ln(PRUB/DEF) + 0.778 In(GDP) 
(7.362) (3.830) (26.684) 
R2 = 0.987 SSE = 0.249 rho = 0.24 
Export of other non-food farm and estate products; 
[4-2] PEST = PXEST-XCHEF/424.9 
ln(XEST-XCHEF/1000) = -3.348 + 0.755 ln(PEST/DEF) + 0.916 In(GDP) 
(11.992) (3.747) (29.181) 
r2 = 0.987 SSE = 0.296 rho = -0.05 
Export of timber: 
[4-3] PTIM = PXTIM-XCHEF/424.9 
ln(XTIM*XCHEF/1000) = -10.46 + 0.675 ln(PTIM/DEF) + 1.679 In(GDP) 
(7.044)(1.567) (9.986) 
= 0.902 SSE = 2.024 rho = 0.72 
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Export of animal products (livestock and fisheries): 
[4-4] PANI = PXMI'XCHEF/424.9 
ln(XANI'XCHEF/1000) = -4.360 + 0.874 ln(PMl/DEF) + 0.910 In(GDP) 
(3.459) (4.464) (6.543) 
R2 = 0.970 SSE = 0.565 rho = 0.19 
Export of other agriculture: 
[4-5] ln(XOAGR-XCHEF/IOOO) = -6.780 + 1.062 In(GDP) 
(6.865) (9.496) 
r2 = 0.883 SSE = 2.654 rho = 0.24 
Export of tin: 
[4-6] PTIN = PXTIN'XCHEF/424.9 
ln(XTIN-XCHEF/1000) = 4.274 + 0.288 ln(PTIN/DEF) + 0.908 In(GDP) 
(7.582)(14.261) (14.261) 
= 0.953 SSE = 0.744 rho = 0.26 
Export of other non-oil minerals: 
[4-7] ln(XOMN-XCHEF/1000) = -3.032 + 0.811 In(GDP) 
(3.635) (8.581) 
R2 = 0.910 SSE = 2.062 rho = 0.34 
Export of manufacturing products: 
[4-8] ln(XMFG-XCHEF/1000) = -3.032 + 0.811 In(GDP) 
(3.635) (8.581) 
R2 = 0.860 SSE = 0.903 rho = 0.61 
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Total export of non-oil: 
[4-9] (XNOIL-XCHEF/1000) = 9.052 + 1.063(XRUB + XEST + XTIM + XAAlI 
(G.992)(145.G82) 
+ XOAGR + XTIN + XOMN + XMFG) XCHEF/1000 
R2 = 0.999 S SE = 17943.5 rho = 0.442 
The above results indicated that only the export of timber had 
income elasticity greater than one. This means that as income increased, 
domestic demand for timber rose proportionally less and therefore more 
was available for export. Other commodities behaved differently with 
regard to income increase; for these commodities, an income increase 
brought about an export increase proportionally less. For most com­
modities, an increase in the relative export price would increase export 
supply. However, in case of other agriculture products, other non-oil 
minerals, and manufacturing products, relative price change did not have 
a significant effect on their value of exports. For these products and 
commodities, their exports were dependent upon domestic demand alone.20 
Total non-oil export (XNOIL) is the sum of all eight sectors of 
exports. A problem has, however, arisen in defining non-oil export, 
because there are at least two sets of data. The one we have used for 
estimating the eight export sectors above are figures published by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), which total differs from the one used 
in the balance of payments calculation published by Bank Indonesia. We 
have decided to resort to regressing the Bank Indonesia's data on the 
CBS's data to obtain an "average" relation between the two. 
The demand for imports is a function of total demand for goods and 
services and the price of imports relative to domestic prices. The level 
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of income is used as a proxy for total demand. Real imports, M, as a 
fraction of real income, Y, can then be written as a function of the 
ratio of import prices, to domestic prices, P, and real income, Y, as 
follows ; 
log(M/Y) =mQ + m^ log(PyP) + mg log(Y) 
The coefficient is negative whereas the coefficient m2 could be 
positive or negative depending on income elasticity demand for imported 
goods. Since imported goods generally tend to have a larger income 
elasticity than domestically produced goods, it would be expected that 
the coefficient m2 be positive. For the estimation purpose, the above 
equation can be written in the following form; 
log(M) = mg + m^ log(Pjjj/P) + (l+mg) log(Y) 
Again, there are several series that can be used to indicate 
imports. Bank Indonesia uses the balance of payments data, and the CBS 
uses letter of credit data or data supplied by the customs. The latter 
allows a breakdown by type of import, while the balance of payments do 
not. The breakdown involves three types of imports, consumption goods, 
intermediate goods and capital goods. Using annual data for these types 
of imports for the period 1966-1980, the following estimates were 
obtained: 
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Import of non-rice (incl. wheat) consumption goods: 
[4-10] MCONI = (MCON-XCHEF/1000) 100/PM 
In(MCONl) = -1.431 - 0.403 ln(PM/DEF) + 0.629 ln(GDPN73) 
(0.948) (3.927) (4.013) 
= 0.933 SSE = 0.365 rho = -0.51 
Import of non-oil intermediate goods; 
[4-11] MINTl = (MINT-XCHEF/IOOO) 100/PM 
In(MINTl) = -3.7 - 0.981 ln(PM/DEF) + 1.081 ln(GDPN73) 
(1.571)(7.976) (4.030) 
R2 = 0.959 SSE = 0.316 rho = -0.33 
Import of capital goods: 
[4-12] MCAPl = (MCAP-XCHEF/IOOO) 100/PM 
In(MCAPl) = -7.715 - 1.096 ln(PM/DEF) + 1.555 ln(GDPN73) 
(2.120) (3.752) (6.102) 
R2 = 0.936 SSE = 0.635 rho = -0.434 
Import of total non-oil: 
[4-13] MNOILl = 18.4 + 1.275 (MCONI + MINTl + MCAPl) + MRICEl + MSERl 
(0.170)(14.994) 
R2 = 0.949 SSE = 118065.9 rho = -0.70 
It is seen from the above results that the import of consumption 
goods has both the lowest price elasticity and income elasticity. Import 
of capital goods has both the highest price elasticity and income 
elasticity. The total non-oil imports include the import of rice 
(including wheat) and the net import of service. 
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4.4.2. Fiscal statistical equations 
The government receipts consist of government domestic revenue and 
foreign aid. The magnitude of foreign aid in every year has been deter­
mined mainly by negotiations between Indonesia and other countries (see 
Chapter 3) and is, therefore, assumed to be exogenous in the model. For 
the reason previously described, both the government routine and develop­
ment expenditures are treated exogenously in the model. 
Government domestic revenue is composed of direct and indirect taxes 
on domestic residents, and a relatively small non-tax revenue. The level 
of income is the most important factor determining revenues, although 
they are also dependent, to some extent, on the targets set by the 
authorities. Due to the lag involved in the assessment of certain taxes, 
nominal taxes are slow in responding to a rise in the price level. That 
is, as long as taxes are based on previous price levels, a high rate of 
inflation will reduce the rate of change of government tax revenue, once 
the effect of the rise in nominal income is taken into account.21 The 
government tax revenue, TX, is specified as a log-linear function of 
nominal income, Y*P, and the rate of inflation, TT; 
log(TX) = to + t]^ log(Y-p) + tg^r 
Where coefficient t^ is expected to be positive and t2 negative. 
We should expect that revenue from taxes on oil companies (REVOIL) 
would move in line with the value of oil exports, though they may not do 
so in strict proportionality.^^ In this case, we hypothesize oil revenue 
to be a log linear function of net oil export. 
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The following estimates were obtained using annual data for the 
period 1966-1980: 
Income tax: 
[4-14] In(TnNC) = -5.735 + 1.048 In(GDP) - 0.278 INFL 
(12.172)(21.221) (2.556) 
r2 = 0.990 SSE = 0.330 rho = 0.03 
Corporate tax: 
[4-15] In(TXCORP) = -7.684 + 1.318 In(GDP) - 0.388 INFL 
(9.016)(14.764) (1.957) 
R2 = 0.978 SSE = 1.278 rho = -0.13 
Other direct tax; 
[4-16] In(TXODIR) = -8.347 + 1.412 In(GDP) - 0.203 INFL 
(12.818)(20.518) (1.434) 
r2 = 0.986 SSE = 0.453 rho = 0.35 
Import tax; 
[4-17] In(TXM) = -1.968 + 0.933 ln(MNOIL-XCHEF/1000) 
(3.698)(12.406) 
R2 = 0.928 SSE = 0.744 rho = -0.56 
Export tax: 
[4-18] In(TXX) = 3.180 + 1.092 ln(XllOIL*XCHEF/1000) 
(7.745)(17.093) 
r2 = 0.957 SSE = 1.191 dw = 2.01 
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Other indirect tax: 
[4-19] In(TXOIND) = -3.555 + 0.991 In(GDP) - 0.369 INFL 
(106.149)(42.992) (7.293) 
= 0.998 SSE = 0.069 rho = 0.07 
Non-tax revenue; 
[4-20] In(TXNON) = -6.57 + 1.168 In(GDP) - 0.468 INFL 
(4.437)(7.463) (1.446) 
r2 = 0.918 SSE = 2.382 rho = 0.328 
Oil-tax revenue: 
[4-21] In(REVOIL) = -1.297 + 1.184 ln(XOIL-MOIL)XCHEF/1000 
(1.516) (8.508) 
= 0.858 SSE = 9.036 rho = 0.29 
4.4.3. Monetary statistical equations 
Under a fractional reserve system, the nominal money supply, MO, is 
determined by changes in reserve money, SM, and the money multiplier, m. 
A rise in reserve money results in a rise in the supply of liquidity as 
banks expand credit with additional reserves. As it is a central bank 
liability, reserve money is largely under control of the central bank. 
This process of money creation by the central bank and credit creation by 
the commercial banks result in the creation of a variety of financial 
instruments, such as cash, C, demand deposits, D, and time deposits, T, 
which are held by the public. We use a narrow definition of money, which 
is the sum of cash held by the public and demand deposits. The supply of 
narrow money can be written according to the following identity: 
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MO = [(C/D + 1)/(C/D + R/D)] RM = m-RM 
In this framework, the money multiplier, m, is a function of the ratios 
of currency to demand deposits, (C/D), and of the banks' reserve to 
demand deposits, (R/D). 
It is expected that the income elasticity of demand for time 
deposits would be higher than the income elasticity of demand deposits, 
which in turn would be higher than the income elasticity of demand for 
currency. Therefore, as Income rises, the public would use more checks 
for transaction purposes, decreasing its desired currency-demand deposits 
ratio. The desired ratio of currency to demand deposits, (C/D)^, can 
23 then be written in the following log-linear form; 
log(C/D)'^ = ag + aj^log(Y) 
Where is expected to be negative. Assuming that the public 
adjusts its ratio to the desired levels according to a partial adjustment 
mechanism, the following equation can be derived: 
log(C/D) = agO; + a^a log(Y) + (l-cv) log(C/D)_^ 
where a. denotes the partial adjustment coefficient which is expected to 
be between zero and one. 
It is difficult however to analyze the variations in the ratio of 
the banks' reserve to demand deposits, (R/D). The ratio is treated, 
24 
therefore, as exogenous to the model determined by the banking sector. 
In this framework, changes in money supply are projected by the 
changes in reserve money. Changes in reserve money are linked to 
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government monetary policy, as well as fiscal policy and the balance of 
payment policy, according to the following identity: 
EM = (GDE - GDR) + (X - M + CA) + ABC + RM_^ 
where GDE = government domestic expenditures 
GDR = government domestic revenue 
X = total export in domestic currency 
M = total import in domestic currency 
CA = net capital inflow in the balance of payment 
ABC = change in the bank and non-bank indebtedness to Bank 
Indonesia 
It is assumed that the public adjusts its real holdings of any form 
of monetary asset to the desired level according to a partial adjustment 
mechanism. The desired demand for the real monetary asset, (MO/P)*^, is a 
function of real income, Y, the rate of inflation, TT , and the interest 
paid on time deposits, R; 
log(MO/P)'^ = dg + d^ log(Y) + + dg log(R) 
With the partial adjustment mechanism specified as follows; 
Alog(MO/P) = ô[log(NO/P)'^ - log(MO/P)_j^] 
we get the equation for real money demand of the following: 
log(MO/P) = d^a + d^Ô log(Y) + d^ÔTT + 
d^Ô log(R) + (l-Ô) log(MO/P)_^ 
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It is expected that d^ to be positive, d2 to be negative, and d^ to be 
negative. The coefficient of adjustment à is expected to be positive 
less than one. 
With this framework, and using annual data for the period 1966-1980, 
the following estimations are established: 
Ratio of currency to demand deposits: 
[4-22] In(MOCD) = -8.550 - 0.946 ln(GDP73) 
(15.877)(15.454) 
= 0.952 SSE = 0.049 rho = 0.20 
Reserve money: 
[4-23] MORES = -2.469 - GOVREV + 0.601 GOVEXP + BPl + MOORED + MORES , 
(0.036) (22.869) 
R^ = 0.997 SSE = 315,852.5 rho = 0.04 
Demand for real money: 
[4-24] ln(MOSUP/DEF) = -2.617 + 0.658 ln(GDP73) - 0.227 INFL 
(1.703) (2.408) (5.729) 
+ 0.523 ln(M0SUP/DEF) 
(3.507) 
R^ = 0.992 SSE = 0.031 rho = 0.01 
The identity given for reserve money, unfortunately, has not been possi­
ble to arrive at an exact form. Data for government domestic expendi­
tures do not exist; what is available as a proxy is the government total 
expenditure. We partially resolve a similar problem for the balance of 
payment by using the corresponding data published by Bank Indonesia (the 
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reserve money data, on the other hand, are calculated by Bank Indonesia 
on the basis of the Bank's records of government cash transactions). In 
this case, we assume that these data are correct. It was also discovered 
that interest on time deposit is not significant in determining money 
supply. 
4.4.4. The complete subaodel 
The following equations will complete the above statistical 
equations: 
Total GDP: 
[4-25] GDP73 = GDPN73 + VOIL73 
GDP = GDP73"DEF 
Direct taxes: 
[4-26] TXDIR = TXINC + TXCOR + TXODIR 
Indirect taxes: 
[4-27] TXIND = TXM + TXX + TXOIND 
Government revenues; 
[4-28] GOVDREV = TXDIR + TXIND + TXNON 
GOVREV = GOVDREV + REVOIL 
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Balance of payments: 
[4-29] OIL = XOIL - MOIL 
SAVFOR = XNOIL - MNOIL + OIL + CAPFLO + FRES 
BP = XNOIL - MNOIL + CAPFLO 
= SAVFOR - FRES 
Inflation rate: 
[4-30] INFL = DEF/DEF_i - 1 
The working of the submodel is shown by a flowchart depicted in 
Figure 4.1. The exchange rate, foreign prices, oil, and government 
expenditures are the main exogenous variables. Real income is determined 
endogenously in the complete model, but its solution mechanism is shown 
separately in the previous submodel (see Chapter 3). If everything is 
held constant, an increase in government expenditure financed by 
monetizing foreign exchange reserves will result in a rise in the money 
supply. To the extent that the rise in money supply exceeds the rise in 
the demand for money, prices will rise and reduce real balances to the 
desired level. Therefore, the price increase is to restore equilibrium 
in the money market. At the same time, the price increase deteriorates 
the real terms of trade that subsequently reduce exports and increase 
imports, and therefore affects the balance of payment. The price 
increase also affects government domestic revenue. The system will 
adjust simultaneously in order to bring about a system equilibrium. 
Demand for 
real money 
Inflation 
rate 
Price 
level 
Foreign 
prices 
Net 
capital 
inflow 
Balance 
of Payment: 
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^ money , 
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Figure 4.1. Trade-Fiscal-Monetary submodel relationships 
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HOTES 
CHAPTER 4 
^Such as processed foodstuffs, finished textiles, consumer durables, 
and other various manufacturing products. 
2 This is partly caused by the expansion of domestic production on 
Intermediate goods as a result of government policy that requires indus­
tries to produce their own need on some intermediate goods or to use 
domestically produced intermediate goods. The major components of im­
ports are still raw materials, such as raw cotton, synthetic fibers and 
cotton and synthetic yarn for the textile industry; cement and steel 
products for the construction industry; fertilizer and insecticides for 
agriculture; and completely-knocked-down components for domestic assembly 
of consumer durables. 
3 Under the free exchange system the government has neither control 
nor has records of private capital flow in and out of the country. One 
can freely transfer foreign exchange without being obliged for prior 
approval from the authorities as long as no such guarantee is required 
from the government or foreign exchange banks. Indonesian residents may 
freely transfer, negotiate, import, and export securities in the Rupiah 
or in foreign exchange [Nasution, 1982, p. 80]. 
^Aside from Pertamina's debts, tanker loan problems plagued 
Indonesia, when Rappaport filed suit for payment of US $1.25 billion for 
providing Indonesia with oil tankers. Rappaport's cloud finally lifted 
when he accepted payment of US $150 million spread over three years 
[Arronson, 1979, p. 296]. 
^In this case, when Indonesia pegged its Rupiah to the US dollar 
which is one of its export currencies, depreciation of the US dollar 
caused an upturn in its import prices (which mostly originated from Asia 
and Europe), while its export prices remain unchanged. Pegging the 
Rupiah to one of its import currencies would not help either; deprecia­
tion of the US dollar may cause reduction in both export and import 
prices, stimulating imports and reducing incentive to exports. 
^Under this system, the exchange rate was fixed daily on the daily 
buying and selling orders of commercial banks for the US dollar. Bank 
Indonesia could intervene in the market, by using its foreign exchange 
equalization fund to balance the buying and selling orders for the US 
dollar, in order to avoid sharp fluctuations of the external value of the 
Rupiah. Therefore, in this system, the exchange rate of the Rupiah in 
terms of the US dollar was determined partly on the basis of the demand 
and supply in the foreign exchange market. 
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Indonesian agricultural and small labor-intensive enterprises need 
the encouragement of an exchange rate that is not totally dominated by 
current world prices for petroleum. The devaluation should aid in devel­
oping significant export markets for those products [Rosendale, 1981, 
p. 171, and Donges et al., 1980, p. 419]. The impact of the devaluation 
itself, however, was partially offset by additional measures. First, the 
effective protection of import-substitute industries was likely to have 
been increased excessively, since tariffs on final products were left 
unchanged while tariffs on imported raw materials and components were 
reduced. Second, certain export commodities were subject to export 
quotas in order to prevent shortages in the domestic market [Donges et 
al., 1980, p. 397]. 
g 
The fiscal year was shifted from the calendar year to one ending on 
March 31, starting in 1969, to ensure better harmony of the flow of 
government revenues and expenditures with the seasonal pattern of econo­
mic activities. 
9 
In 1973, the ceiling of tax-free income had been raised for a tax 
payer from Rp 60,000 to Rp 90,000 and for each dependent from Rp 24,000 
to Rp 40,000 with a maximum number of 5 dependents. In 1975, a tax payer 
with a spouse and 3 children whose income was less than Rp 360,000 was 
exempted from tax. The figure was increased to Rp 402,000 in 1976 to Rp 
450,000 in 1977 to Rp 520,000 in 1978 to Rp 582,000 in 1979, and to Rp 
840,000 in 1980. In addition, the amount of taxable income subject to 
the income tax rate (10 percent was the lowest and 50 percent the 
highest) was also increased almost every year. But, it was not until 
1980 that the lowest income tax rate was reduced from 10 percent to 
5 percent. 
^^The usual classification divides public expenditures into current 
and capital expenditures. The Indonesian development expenditure was 
intended to represent physical expenditures which led to accumulation of 
capital. However, the distinction between current and development 
expenditures is not clear in practice. 
^^See also Nasution [Nasution, 1982, pp. 58-59]. 
12 See Booth [Booth and McCawley, 1981, pp. 143-50] and comment by 
Nasution [Nasution, 1982, pp. 39-41]. 
13 
For example, a certain account that may increase salary expendi­
ture is charged to development expenditure. 
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14 
Rediscount facilities at the central bank are restricted to state 
banks only, occasionally are available for domestic private banks on a 
limited basis and completely closed for foreign banks. For example, for 
the rice intensification program (Bimas) and food related activities, 
Bank Indonesia provides 100 percent of the funds loaned by state banks. 
To encourage state banks to extend credit to the priority sectors, Bank 
Indonesia insures them adequate profits by charging low rediscount rates. 
The government also shares the burden of the state bank's debt. 
^^More of credit ceilings and selective and direct credit control 
can be seen from Nasution [Nasution, 1982, pp. 200-39]. 
^^Small investment credit (KIK), and permanent working capital cre­
dit (KMKP) were established in April 1973. In order to secure the loan 
repayment by the customer, an insurance credit institution was estab­
lished (PT. ASKRINDO). In addition, to help small businessmen in the 
rural areas, mini credit (Kredit Mini) began to be awarded in 1974/75. 
Small trade credit (KCK) was introduced in 1976/77 and designed to free 
small traders, in rural areas particularly, from the clutches of money 
lenders. Loans have also been made available to local governments at 
district municipal levels to finance trade facilities. 
^^The traditional central bank's instruments to implement monetary 
policy, namely the control of the ratio of reserve requirements and open 
market operations had no role in determining the volume of money supply. 
On many occasions, Bank Indonesia has subsidized interest costs of 
time deposits to state banks because the interest paid on such deposits 
exceed the interest earned on the banks' loan. 
19 
How the oil companies in fact make such export decisions is not 
well known. It can be based on current and expected oil prices and other 
non-price considerations such as the results of companies' exploration 
activities, which are subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Moreover, 
the companies decisions are always within the context of maximizing 
profits for their worldwide operations rather than for their operations 
in Indonesia alone. 
20 
Besides, price inelasticity of many traditional export commodities 
are well known. Many manufacturing products, such as apparel, leather 
products, electronic equipment, and others are also subject to foreign 
quotas, where their value of exports are relatively independent of price 
change. It is also well known that some manufacturers (with import 
substitute products a under a positive rate of protection) apply a two 
price policy, one for its exports and another for its domestic consump­
tion. The price to domestic consumers is much higher than the interna­
tional price to offset the loss in the international market. This policy 
is only to show that the company is able to export its products as it 
promised to do. 
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The same procedure was suggested by Aghevli [Aghevli, 1976, 
p. 42]. 
22 
The details of the oil contracts are complex, and during the 
sample period new contracts with differing terms were concluded and a 
major renegotiation of the contract terms was also concluded. 
23 In Indonesia, interest on demand deposits are negotiated, but 
normally demand deposits do not pay interest. 
^^Aghevli insists that in the absence of a comprehensive model of 
the banking sector in Indonesia and adequate statistics, it is difficult 
to analyze the variations in the ratio [Aghevli, 1977, p. 40]. On the 
other hand, Boediono argues that in Indonesia, the fluctuations of 
government spending is the prime mover of the R/D ratio. The level of R 
of the commercial banks is directly related to budget-based activities 
while the loans demand, that affects D, is generally excessive [Boediono, 
1979, p. 72]. 
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5. PRICE ÂGGBEGÂIIOM, UBEMPLOYMEBT, 
AHD IBCOME DISTRIBUTION 
In recent years, within each sector of the Indonesian economy, a 
number of important changes have been occurring, which would be expected 
to affect the level and pattern of demand for labor. This chapter 
discusses the unemployment situation in each sector of the economy. This 
chapter also discusses the well-known negative relationship between the 
unemployment rate and money-wage inflation. In this context, the discus­
sion leads to price aggregation and the determination of the cost of 
living price index. This chapter also tries to answer the question of 
what has been happening to the Indonesian income distribution over the 
past few years of rapid overall economic growth. For this purpose, a 
submodel of income distribution for Indonesia is presented. 
5.1. Price Aggregation 
This section deals with the determination of the cost of living 
index which is derived from sectoral prices of gross product originating. 
First, this section discusses the prices of gross product originating or 
value added price. As the nominal wage rate is assumed to influence this 
price, its relationship with the well known Phillips Curve is also 
discussed. Next, price conversion to the consumers' price is presented, 
followed by the results of price estimation. 
5.1.1. Value-added price and the nominal wage 
The price of production originating within an industry covers only 
those costs and profits which originate within a given industry. This 
type of price is called the "price of gross product originating" or 
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"value-added price." It excludes the cost of raw materials or other 
inputs purchased from outside the industry.^ The value-added price in a 
given industry is simply calculated as the ratio of current value added 
to value-added in constant price. 
In this model of the Indonesian economy, value added prices were 
constructed for eight sectors of the economy by dividing annual estimates 
of current Rupiah gross product originating by annual estimates of 
constant 1973 Rupiah gross product originating. Both the numerator and 
the denominator were taken from the national income accounts. 
Schultze and Tryon [1965] in the Brookings Model hypothesize (1) 
that prices are set by a mark-up on standard or normal costs; (2) that 
deviations of actual costs from standard costs affect prices; and (3) 
that the mark-up is influenced by excess or insufficient demand relative 
to supply. Following this hypothesis, the Indonesian model considers 
that changes in wage rates are permanent changes in cost and therefore 
the labor productivity index is the assumed relevant normal cost. It is 
also assumed that deviation from the normal cost is produced by the 
nominal wage index. With regards to the third hypothesis the change in 
GDP deflator is assumed to influence prices. With these assumptions, the 
sectoral value added prices are estimated with the following form: 
PV = PQ+ p^ LP + PgCWX - LP) + P3 DBF + p^(DEF - DEF_^) 
where PV = Sectoral value added price index 
LP = Sectoral labor productivity index 
HX = Nominal wage index 
DBF = GDP deflator 
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In the above formulation, the trend of the value added price is 
picked up by the trend of the normal cost which is measured by the labor 
productivity as a unit labor cost. The deviation of the actual cost from 
its normal value is represented by the difference between nominal wage 
and labor productivity. As shown in the previous chapter, that GDP 
deflator measures the difference between aggregate supply and demand. 
Its presentation exerts some influential effects on the price equation. 
An interesting feature is that the change in the nominal wage 
happens to be dependent on the unemployment rate. The relationship 
between these variables is assumed to follow the well known Phillips 
Curve. The Phillips Curve makes the rate of change of money wage a 
function of the unemployment rate. To move to the more general model 
that money wage demands do respond to the expectation of price increases, 
price expectation is added to the Phillips Curve: 
AWX/WX = y (APCOL/PCOL) - (U - U*) 
where POOL = Cost of living index 
U = Unemployment rate 
* 
U = Natural unemployment rate 
The Phillips Curve of the above equation shifts up as A PCOL/PCOL 
rises. Each individual Phillips Curve for a given PCOL is a short-run 
curve. The long-run curve, where an equilibrium occurs, is determined by 
combining the price equation determining PCOL with the above equation. 
Specifically, the value of 7 determines the shifting of the Phillips 
Curve. They parameter measures the sensitivity of money wage demands to 
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inflation. As the rate of inflation increases, it is expected that money 
wage demands will become more sensitive to price changes. There has 
never been a study in Indonesia to measure the value of the 7 parameter. 
In this model however, 7 can be regarded as a policy parameter whose 
value can be any number between 0 and 1. In the extreme Keynesian case, 
y equals zero in which case money wage demands do not respond to expecta­
tions of a price increase. In the extreme classical case, 7 equals one, 
a value that is enough to maintain constant real wages during 
2 inflationary periods. 
It is known that zero involuntary unemployment does not mean zero 
actual observed unemployment. Depending on the prevailing wage, some 
people choose to be unemployed to consume their leisure time. The 
percentage of the work force that is unemployed even if there is zero 
involuntary unemployment is often called the "natural rate of 
unemployment." 
5.1.2. Price conversion 
Price conversion means the transformation of prices of gross product 
originating (PV) into prices of industry final demands (PF). For this 
purpose, an input-output relationship is used, the same way as output of 
3 
gross product originating is predicted from the industry final demands. 
The necessary relationship between the two prices can be shown as 
follows: 
PF = [(I - A)-l]%-l.pv 
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where A = a fixed coefficient input-output matrix (with T indicating a 
transpose) 
D"^ = the inverse of a diagonal matrix of the ratio of real gross 
output to real gross product originating for each industry, 
or simply the ratio of output to value-added. 
The model of the Indonesian economy uses the 1975 Input-Output Table 
to determine the input-output coefficient matrix as well as the output to 
the value-added ratio.^ There are eight production sectors used in this 
model; (1) food crops, (2) other agriculture, (3) mining, (4) manufac­
turing and utilities, (5) construction, (6) trade, banking and dwelling, 
(7) transportation and communication, and (8) services and public admin­
istration. The consolidation of the input-output coefficient matrix is 
done by aggregating the original 19 X 19 transaction matrix to obtain an 
8X8 coefficient matrix. The ratio of sector gross output to GDP 
originating by industries is assumed to be constant over time. Both the 
A-coefficient matrix and the ratios are shown in Table 5.1. 
The next step after prices transformation into prices of industry 
final demands is to derive prices for consumer expenditures for the 
Indonesian consumers. Included in these prices are prices on food, on 
housing, on clothing, and on miscellaneous. This model uses a consumer 
price index for Jakarta as a reference (Table 5.2). Specifically 
consumers prices are derived from regressions of these prices on the 
prices of the relevant industry final demands. 
Finally, an expenditure weighted combination of these consumer 
prices yields the overall consumer price index for total consumption 
Table 5.1. Input-output coefficient and the ratio output to value added, 1975* 
Input-Output ^  
coefficient 
Food crops 
Other agri­
cultures 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
and utilities 
Construction 
Trade, banking 
and dwelling 
Transport and 
communication 
Service and 
pub. admin. 
Ratio of out­
put to value-
added 
Trade, Transpor- Services 
Other Manufac- banking tatlon and and public 
Food agrlcul- turlng and Construe- and coramuni- admlnls-
Crops tures Mining utilities tlon dwelling cation tratlon 
18121.60 
1092,26 
0.05 
26122.94 
2826.46 
10990.78 
3883.22 
37.85 
1.078 
2576.92 
218636.67 
875.31 
4533.09 
8043.13 
44341.22 
17845.27 
2042.19 
1.509 
0.00 
102.48 
2095.96 
25434.45 
1750.64 
9823.14 
2685.6 
1026.62 
1.045 
198700.41 
69259.92 
50337.23 
259644.69 
4327.63 
75424.66 
21605.75 
1881.75 
3.137 
2252.76 
56861.98 
403377.70 
32961.98 
2174.12 
142497.36 
60845.94 
1837.94 
2.751 
15905.46 
22400.54 
72.83 
76722.43 
21322.17 
71841.97 
21776.92 
8059.62 
1.313 
466.53 
1686.31 
186.90 
230037.56 
13332.09 
54969.96 
65331.36 
7638.08 
1.597 
3942.40 
4627.41 
0.04 
65775.84 
6210.46 
26128.77 
6761.57 
25096.30 
1 . 1 6 1  
^Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Input-Output Table 1975. 
^Values are multiplied by 10 
Table 5.2. Jakarta consumers price index* (1973 = 100) 
Year Food Housing Clothing Miscellaneous Overall^ 
1966 8.2 7.2 11.9 9.0 8.4 
1967 22.9 25.7 21.4 23.5 21.2 
1968 54.7 41.7 50.0 48.4 52.6 
1969 56.4 56.9 71.0 73.9 59.0 
1970 61.. 6 82.2 77.8 82.1 66.0 
1971 63.2 88.1 85.1 86.3 69.0 
1972 69.7 88.8 85.3 88.6 74.2 
1973 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1974 141.3 121.2 136.7 148.4 139.9 
1975 170.3 152.0 156.7 169.2 167.8 
1976 207.9 190.5 176.6 192.5 203.1 
1977 230.1 223.5 192.3 213.2 225.8 
1978 248.0 240.1 203.8 235.4 243.7 
1979 334.9 314.0 303.2 295.2 327.3 
1980 359.0 369.4 366.5 329.6 357.4 
^Source; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (several issues). 
^Weighted by average monthly per capita expenditure. 
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expenditures, which will be called the cost of living index, PCOL. The 
percentage distribution of expenditures by type of expenditure based on 
average per capita monthly expenditure can be seen in Table 5.3. In this 
model, it is assumed that the percentage distribution is constant over 
time.^ 
5.1.3. The price equations 
The following is the summary of the statistical price equations. 
There are three types of prices; (a) value added prices, (b) prices for 
industry final demand, and (c) consumer prices. 
(a) Value added prices (1973 = 1.0) 
Food crops: 
[5-1] PVFD = -6.796 + 7.769 LPXFD + 0.555 (WX - LPXFD) 
(2.804) (3.159) (8.319) 
r2 = 0.992 SSE = 0.118 rho = 0.20 
Other agriculture: 
[5-2] PVOAG =0.276+0.396 (WX - LPXOAG) + 0.562 DBF 
(1.486) (1.996) (2.829) 
R2 = 0.972 SSE = 1.356 rho = -0.63 
Mining and quarrying; 
[5-3] PVMN = -0.056 + 2.220 (WX - LPXMN) + 4.191 (DEF - DEF ,) 
(0.177) (5.863) (2.418) 
R2 = 0.96 SSE = 6.7 rho = 0.27 
Table 5.3. Average monthly per capita expenditure^ (percent) 
Region Food Housing Clothing Miscellaneous^ 
Rural 
1969/70 78.77 7.56 5.29 8.38 
1976 77.59 7.56 5.10 9.75 
1978 73.09 10.35 4.84 11.72 
1980 73.99 9.58 5.03 11.40 
Urban 
1969/70 71.11 10.47 6.31 12.11 
1976 63.80 16.67 4.75 14.78 
1978 56.67 20.79 4.30 18.24 
1980 59.84 17.40 3.55 19.21 
Indonesia 
1969/70 77.19 8.16 5.50 9.15 
1976 73.79 10.07 5.00 11.21 
1978 68.05 13.56 4.67 13.72 
1980 69.30 12.17 5.14 13.39 
Average 75.50 9.10 5.30 10.10 
^Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (various issues). 
^Including consumer durables. 
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Manufacturing and utilities: 
[5-4] PVMFG = -0.795 + 1.736 LPXMFG + 0.390 (WX - LPXMFG) 
(2.593) (5.143) (3.687) 
R2 = 0.987 SSE = 0.084 rho = -0.30 
Construction: 
[5-5] PVCON = 0.785 + 1.286 (WX - LPXCON) 
(13.065)(24.491) 
R2 = 0.980 SSE = 0.256 rho = -0.30 
Trade, banking and dwelling; 
[5-6] PVTRD = -0.434 + 0.835 LPXTRD +0.248 (WX - LPXTRD) 
(1.390) (2.299) (3.245) 
R2 = 0.999 SSE = 0.012 rho = 0.10 
Transportation and communication: 
[5-7] PVTRD = 0.798 + 1.158 (WX - LPXTRN) 
(7.960)(14.274) 
R2 = 0.944 SSE = 0.235 rho = -0.65 
Services and public administration: 
[5-8] PVSER = -7.955 + 0.516 LPXSER +0.187 (WX - LPXSER) + 0.403 DEF 
(4.855) (5.064) (1.947) (3.643) 
R2 = 0.998 SSE = 0.018 rho = -0.1 
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(b) Prices of industry final demand (1973 = 1.0) 
PFFD 
PFOAG 
PFMN 
PFMFG 
PFCON 
PFTRD 
PFTRN 
PFSER 
- A^-1 (I - A) 
0. 928 PVFD 
0. 663 PVOAG 
0. 957 PVMN 
0. 314 PVMFG 
0. 364 PVCON 
0. 762 PVTRD 
0. 626 PVTRN 
0. 861 PVSER 
(c) Consumer prices (1973 = 1.0) 
Food; 
[5-10] PCFD = -0.114 + 0.959 PFFD + 0.495 PFOAG - 2.080 PFMFG + 
(3.153) (3.882) (2.413) (4.683) 
1.762 PFTRD 
(5.448) 
R2 = 0.977 SSE = 0.030 rho = 0.25 
Clothing: 
[5-11] PCCLOT = -1.173 + 1.279 PFMFG/PFFD + 0.946 PFTRD 
(2.063) (2.110) (25.764) 
r2 = 0.992 SSE = 0.122 rho = 0.03 
Housing: 
[5-12] PCHOUS = 0.107 + 0.510 PCFD + 1.230 PFCON - 0.827 PFTRD 
(1.332) (1.665) (2.561) (1.143) 
r2 = 0.988 SSE = 0.093 rho = 0.24 
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Miscellaneous : 
[5-13] PCMIS = -0.132 + 1.003 PFSER + 0.252 PFTRN/PCFD 
(1.089)(52.391) (1.945) 
r2 = 0.996 SSE = 0.058 rho = 0.26 
Overall cost of living: 
[5-14] PCOL = 0.755 PCFD + 0.091 PCHOUS + 0.053 PCCLOT + 0.101 PCMIS 
Money wage index; 
[5-15] WX = WX_]^[1 + 0.4 (PC0L/PC0L_3^ - 1) - (UNEMP - 0.05)] 
5.2. The Pattern of Employment 
This section deals with the pattern of employment during the period 
of economic development. It discusses the distribution of sectoral 
employment and unemployment. Based on the past population censuses and 
surveys, estimation on labor productivity and employment elasticity is 
made to lead to labor requirement measurement for each sector of the 
economy. 
5.2.1. Sectoral employment and unemployment 
The classical theory of labor surplus was the main preoccupation of 
the literature of the 1950s.& The task was meeting the need for addi­
tional manpower in the non-agricultural sector of a developing economy. 
The agricultural sector was viewed as the source of an unlimited supply 
of labor, where the marginal productivity of labor is zero. The neoclas­
sical literature on labor surplus that developed in the 1960s abandoned 
the assumptions of zero marginal product and unlimited supplies of labor. 
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It focused instead on the divergence in wage rates and marginal products 
between agriculture and non-agriculture which were viewed as evidence of 
a dualistic equilibrium. Yet it again relied on transfers of labor out 
of agriculture for initiating development and emphasized the need to 
restore equilibrium for optimal resource utilization.^ 
However, economists have come to the conclusion that most of the 
discussion during the 1950s and 1960s has been irrelevant because it did 
not address the problem faced by the less developed countries. The real 
issue is not how to fill the need for additional workers in the modern 
sector but rather how and where productive opportunities for employing 
the surplus and unemployed labor can be found.® In this circumstance, 
the concept and measurement of unemployment in LDCs require a special 
treatment. In the rural areas, a clear division between work time and 
leisure time just does not exist. The reward is partly fulfillment of 
social obligations, and partly the pleasure of social activity in itself. 
The need for work inputs is heavy at planting and harvesting times and 
light during the time between. In urban areas, unemployment merges into 
many kinds of underemployment activities. The Harris-Todaro model postu­
lates that urban unemployment is a result of a high wage differential 
between rural and urban areas.^ In such situations, migrants may decide 
to move to areas with higher expected wages even in the face of substan­
tial urban unemployment. 
Following the economic development programs, it appears reasonably 
certain that the increase of the level of investment in Indonesia has 
been accompanied by correspondingly high rates of increased employment.^® 
Based on the 1971 population census and the 1976 labor force surveys. 
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employment rose by about 10 million workers—an average annual increase 
of about 5 percent. Both the absolute numbers of unemployment and the 
rate of unemployment may have risen. The recorded overall rate of unem­
ployment showed a negligible rise from 2.2 percent to 2.3 percent between 
September 1971 and September-December 1976. The rate of urban unemploy­
ment, however, rose from 4.8 percent to 6.4 percent (Table 5.4). The 
1980 census gave a new measure of the overall unemployment rate at 
1.8 percent. Between the 1971 census and the 1980 census, employment 
rose at an average of 2.9 percent per year compared to a labor force 
increase of 2.8 percent per year. This brought about an average annual 
increase of unemployment at a rate of 0.3 percent. 
The relatively small increases in open unemployment may be due to 
the influence of short period changes in the labor force participation 
rate. In Indonesia, it is difficult to distinguish between openly 
unemployed workers and workers who may be temporarily classified as out 
of the labor force. Under these circumstances, open unemployment is 
unlikely to serve as an adequate indicator of the current labor supply 
and the general employment situation [Leiserson, 1979, p. 15]. 
Open unemployment as a problem, however, is still important because 
it shows the concentration of unemployment in a certain group or sector 
of the economy. The incidence of open unemployment is most severe in 
urban areas with a high unemployment rate. However, about two-thirds of 
the total unemployment is recorded as rural workers. During the period 
1971-1980, employment in urban areas grew at an annual average rate of 
5.9 percent while in rural areas employment grew only 2.3 percent. 
Though the labor force grew at a faster rate in urban areas (5.7 percent 
Table 5.4. Employment and unemployment, September 1971-October 1980^ 
Average annual rate of growth 
Sept. 1971 Oct. 1976 Oct. 1980 Sept. Oct. Oct. _ Oct. Sept._ Oct. 
(thousands) (thousands) (thousands) 1971 1976 1976 1980 1971 1980 
Category (percent) (percent) (percent) 
Urban 
Employment 5,796 7,000 9,780 3.8 8.7 5.9 
Unemployment 295 475 312 10.0 -10.0 0.6 
Labor force 6,091 7,475 10,092 4.1 7.8 5.7 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 4.8 6.4 3.1 
Rural 
Employment 33,678 42,842 41,412 4.8 -0.8 2.3 
Unemployment 600 697 606 3.0 -3.4 0.1 
Labor force 34,278 43,539 42,018 4.8 -0.9 2.3 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 1.8 1.6 1.4 
Total 
Employment 39,474 49,842 51,192 4.7 0.7 2.9 
Unemployment 895 1,172 918 5.4 -5.9 0.3 
Labor force 40,369 51,014 52,110 4.7 0.5 2.8 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 2.2 2.3 1.8 
^Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1971; Population Census 1980; 
Intercensal Survey 1976 ; Labor Force Surveys 1976 , 1977, 1978 ; Statistical Yearbook (various 
issues). 
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per year) than in rural areas (average of 2.3 percent per year) during 
the 1971-1980 period, unemployment in the urban areas was also higher 
than in the rural areas. The urban unemployment rate was 3.1 percent in 
1980 (decreased from 4.8 percent in 1971) versus 1.4 percent in rural 
areas (a decrease from 1.8 percent in 1971). 
The most important feature of the unemployment developments in 
Indonesia during recent years is the relative shift from agricultural to 
non-agricultural activities. In the nine years from 1971 to 1980, the 
proportion employed in agriculture declined from 66.0 percent to 
55.5 percent. The proportion of employment in manufacturing, trade and 
services, on the other hand, increased during 1971-1980. It also can be 
seen from Table 5.5 that 44 percent of the employment increase is 
contributed by the urban sector, and the entire employment increase is 
attributable to the non-agricultural sector. During the period 1971-
1976, however, the contribution of the urban sector to the employment 
increase was only 11 percent and 65 percent of the increase was 
attributable to the non-agricultural sector. 
Another important feature is the problem of underemployment. The 
information gathered in the 1980 census indicated that among those who 
were considered as employed workers, 36.9 percent of them for many 
reasons worked less than 35 hours during the previous week: 2.7 percent 
were involuntary underemployed and 34.2 percent were voluntary because of 
disability, attending school, keeping house, etc. Based on the number of 
hours the classification is as follows: 2.8 percent temporarily did not 
work, 3.4 percent worked less than 9 hours, 17.5 percent worked between 
10 and 24 hours, and 13.1 percent worked between 25 and 34 hours 
Table 5.5. Sectoral employment and distribution of employment^ 
Sector 
September 1971 Census October 1976 Survey 
Urban 
(thousands) 
Rural 
(thousands) 
Total Urban 
(thousands) 
Rural 
(thousands) 
Total 
(thousands) (%) (thousands) (%) 
Agricultural 629 25,422 26,052 66.0 749 30,065 30,814 61.8 
Mining, etc. 48 49 97 0.2 23 97 120 0.2 
Manufacturing 682 2,390 3,071 7.8 888 3,291 4,179 8.4 
Electricity, etc. 27 11 38 0.1 21 7 28 0.1 
Construction 299 472 771 2.0 329 520 849 1.7 
Trade, banking. 1,590 2,809 4,399 11.1 2,112 5,141 7,253 14.6 
etc. 
Transportation, 532 422 953 2.4 604 733 1,337 2.7 
etc. 
Services 1,917 2,175 4,092 10.4 2,274 2,987 5,261 10.6 
Total 5,724 33,750 39,474 100.0 7,000 42,841 49,841 100.0 
^Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1971; Population Census 1980; 
Intercensal Survey 1976. 
Table 5.5. (continued) 
October 1980 Census 
Sector Urban Rural Total 
(thousands) (thousands) (thousands) (%) 
Agricultural 1,006 27,416 28,422 55.5 
Mining, etc. 86 288 374 0.7 
Manufacturing 1,364 3,000 4,424 8.6 
Electricity, etc. 43 44 87 0.2 
Construction 518 1,078 1,596 3.1 
Trade, banking, etc. 2,558 4,386 6,944 13.6 
Transportation, etc. 734 756 1,490 2.9 
Services 3,471 4,384 7,855 15.3 
Total 9,780 41,412 51,192 100.0 
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Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the open unemployment figures 
conceal the problem of underemployment. Along with this, it is stated 
that 33 percent of the labor force could be considered underemployed in 
1976,which is approximately 11 million as compared to 5.5 million in 
1971.^^ 
5.2.2. Employment creation policy and labor productivity 
In many LDCs, including Indonesia, most government development 
efforts have not given much weight to employment creation. Instead, 
investment has been concentrated in sectors with high demands for capital 
as compared with labor although capital intensive techniques have been 
used increasingly within each sector. Technology that is introduced 
along with the economic development efforts had been biased by government 
policy toward high capital-intensity production methods which mean low 
labor intensity. This is true in the urban areas that include the urban 
unemployed as well as urban poor. They are usually characterized by (1) 
self-employed persons, (2) unskilled workers, (3) skilled workers who 
operate on a very small scale, and (4) recent migrants. Skepticism about 
the employment absorption capacity of the modern sector is based on the 
rapid growth of urban population, the small share of the modern sector in 
urban employment, and the low employment elasticity of modern sector 
growth. In dealing with the problem of urban unemployed and urban poor, 
the World Bank has proposed a mixture strategy of asset redistribution 
with a more conventional approach of increased labor absorption in the 
producing sector.The asset redistribution approach consists of 
redirecting public policy and expenditures, especially on education. 
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health, and housing so as to benefit the poorer sections of the urban 
population directly, or indirectly to improve their productivity and 
increase the efficiency of labor-intensive techniques relative to 
capital-intensive ones. The second approach has the objective of 
improving the income earning opportunities of the poor by the removal of 
existing factor price distortions in the modern sector.In addition to 
this, a variety of measures are needed to encourage the labor-intensive 
traditional sector partly by developing greater links to the modern 
sector and partly by providing special benefits to small producers. 
The target groups in the rural areas include small farmers, and 
landless laborers and submarginal farmers. The main thrust of the 
strategy is upon increasing the productivity of the rural poor by 
increasing their access to complementary assets, such as land, skills, 
and credit as well as access to employment opportunities in public rural 
development programs. 
The principal public investment efforts in Indonesia in which the 
expansion of employment opportunities has been a major objective are the 
various more or less decentralized social and economic infrastructure 
programs grouped under the general label of Inpres programs (The program 
of transmigration of settlers from Java to newly developed areas in 
Outside Java may also be considered as another similar program). The 
Inpres programs have been, to many writers,considered as the most 
important in their influence on the employment situation. The formal 
history of the works program can be traced to the middle of 1969, when a 
Program Desa (Village Program) was introduced. Each village was given Rp 
100,000 (about US $2,500) annually by the central government for the 
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purchase of materials from outside the village area. Together with the 
voluntary labor from within the town, these inputs were meant to form the 
beginning of a decentralized improvement program. Projects under this 
program typically included attempts at road construction, river dredging, 
irrigation, and reforestation. This program was extended and established 
formally with an instruction of the President in 1970, and is therefore 
known popularly as the Inpres Program. It is impossible to quantify the 
economic impact of the projects under the program, but there is no doubt 
that these projects have increased the demand for labor in the rural 
areas during the 1970s. Employment provided by the programs in construc­
tion activities and in the local production of materials has been roughly 
estimated as reaching a level of some 165 million man-days or about 6 
days of employment per male member of the rural labor force (Key, 1979). 
The more important issue in this case, however, as Key noted, is the 
maintenance of the efficient use of the funds, and the valuation of the 
programs in terms of assets created rather than the increased short-term 
employment that the programs provide. 
Another important public policy for creating employment is the exten­
sion service programs for small-scale industry.^^ The need to provide 
comprehensive technical assistance to cottage industries (household 
industries employing 1-4 workers) led to the formation of the BIPIK 
(Guidance and Development of Small-Scale Industry) Program with the broad 
aim of helping the economically weak segments of the manufacturing 
sector. This broad objective involved the development of an industrial 
extension service that would cater to the special needs of cottage indus­
tries throughout the country. Unlike the previous Inpres Program, the 
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BIPIK programs which were started in 1974/75, together with the small 
credit programs (KIK, KMKP) were directed to promote labor intensive 
industries in urban informal, even though such programs are not disclosed 
for rural areas. 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the relevant element 
for assessing employment creation policy is labor productivity where 
employment elasticity of income, which is defined as percentage change in 
employment over percentage change in income, is the important ingredient. 
For six countries of Asia, Oshima has calculated employment elasticity.^^ 
The average employment creation in agriculture, as income grew, is as low 
as 0.30 compared with that in the industrial sector (which includes 
manufacturing, mining, construction, transportation, and utilities) at 
0.52. Employment creation in the service sector is highly variable from 
one country to another ranging from 0.20 to 0.81. Based on data from the 
1971 and 1980 censuses and the 1976 survey, employment elasticities for 
each sector of the economy were calculated as shown in Table 5.6 along 
with the World Bank estimates. 
Labor productivity is derived, assuming one-factor production 
function, as value added per labor. With employment elasticity 
estimated, the growth of labor productivity is calculated as a function 
of value added growth; 
In(LP) = (1 - EE) ln(VA73) 
where LP = sectoral labor productivity 
VA73 = sectoral value added (at 1973 price) 
EE = sectoral employment elasticity 
Table 5.6. Employment elasticity^ 
Sector 
Oct. 1971 
Mar. 1976^ 
Oct. 1971 
Oct. 1976 
Oct. 1976 
Oct. 1980 
Oct. 1971 
Oct. 1980 
The World Band's 
estimation 
1971-73 1974-79 
Used in 
this model 
1971-85 
Food crops 1.53 0.42 -0.51 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Other agricultures 1.53 0.42 -0.51 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.25 
Mining -1.49 0.22 15.67 2.05 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Manufacturing 0.15 0.32 0.11 0.22 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Electricity, etc. 0.15 0.32 0.11 0.22 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Construction 0.38 0.0 1.27 0.46 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Trade, banking, etc. 0.75 0.93 -0.12 0.46 0.4 0.5 0.7 
Transportation, etc. 0.18 0.50 0.18 0.33 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Services 0.42 0.38 1.06 0.70 1.2 0.6 0.7 
Overall 0.71 0.36 0.08 0.24 0.32 0.37 0.55 
^Source: Calculated from Tables 3.2 and 5.5; value added is at 1973 price. 
^Taken from Gupta, 1977a, Table E-5. 
*^1976 Intercensal survey. 
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The equation for labor productivity, therefore, can be written as 
[5-16] LP = LP_^[l + (1 - EE)(VA73/VA73_i - 1)] 
Employment elasticity has an advantage over the labor-capital ratio in 
that the amount of capital is difficult to measure.On the other hand, 
income has its own weaknesses and employment can include uncertain 
amounts of underemployment. Sectoral labor requirement therefore can be 
obtained from the following relation: 
[5-17] LABOR =XlvA73/LP 
sector 
where LABOR is labor requirement. The unemployment rate (percent 
unemployed) then can be written as 
[5-18] UNEMP = (LFORCE - LABOR)/LFORCE 
5.3. Income Distribution 
This section deals with income distribution in Indonesia. First, an 
overview of income distribution, determinants, and policies is discussed. 
Next, the discussion leads to the income distribution situation in 
Indonesia. A method to measure income inequality is proposed in the next 
section. 
5.3.1. Income distribution detemfnmnts and policies 
Traditionally, economic development has focused on the difference 
between the rich and the poor countries, and on ways the process of 
growth in the poor countries could be accelerated. In recent years, 
however, the gap between the rich and the poor people in less developed 
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countries has become a major concern. This concern with income distribu­
tion, inequality and poverty has been promoted by the realization that 
even though development occurs and per capita incomes grow, the number of 
poor people is also increasing. 
What is now rejected in the theory of development is the casual 
assumption of earlier writers that all would benefit in reasonable 
measure from the fruits of economic development—the so called "trickle 
down" theory of development. The predominant belief today is that 
although there has been substantial growth and development this has made 
little or no difference to the lives of large numbers of the poorest 
members of the population. 
The problem of income distribution usually involves either three 
facets of the same problem or three different, though related, problems, 
namely poverty, inequality and unemployment. Although this trio of 
problems is usually considered as a whole, its members are often treated 
separately. For example many of the poor farmers in Java are trying to 
live from a tiny plot of land, or from laboring on someone else's land. 
Low productivity is their major problem, rather than lack of work. 
Employment creation may also not make a big impact on the distribution of 
income. One of the main reasons for unequal incomes is that the owner­
ship of wealth is usually highly concentrated. On the other hand, the 
ways of redistributing income through taxation do not necessarily do 
anything to create employment. They could even discourage investment and 
thus diminish employment. 
The relationships between poverty and inequality are also close. It 
is possible to redistribute income from rich to middle-income families 
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without altering the position of the poor. Such a change would show as a 
reduction in inequality but it would leave poverty undiminished. Simi­
larly, it would be possible to improve the lot of the poor by taxing the 
middle class, leaving the rich untouched; poverty would be reduced 
leaving the overall distribution of income ambiguous. 
To understand the relationships between poverty, inequality and 
unemployment, a look at the determinants of the distribution of income is 
important. The income distribution in an economy is broadly determined 
by the ownership and the use of income-earning assets and of market and 
political power. The ownership of assets includes material and non-
material assets. Material assets, or wealth, can generate income both 
directly as dividends, rent and interest, and indirectly through the 
ability to realize capital gains. Therefore, a skewed distribution of 
wealth is liable to have a major impact on the overall distribution of 
income. Agricultural land is the most important type of wealth in devel­
oping countries. The ways its ownership is spread or concentrated will 
have a major impact on overall income distribution. The most important 
of the non-material assets is education. A person's education has a 
powerful influence on the type of work he or she can get. If access to 
good education is confined to a small elite, this will make for large 
inequalities. 
Income-earning assets also influence the distribution of income 
through their impact on labor productivity. Included in these assets are 
capital equipment, training and other resources such as know-how. 
Inequalities are created between the urban and rural sector due to 
respective differences in the ease of access to these assets. 
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Access to market power is another important determinant of 
inequality. Market power is a type of asset that determines the ability 
of people to enhance their incomes through the exercise of monopoly 
power. Larger profits associated with monopolies result in a transfer 
from consumers to monopoly-capitalists, thus worsening inequalities. The 
more important thing is that market power is frequently converted into 
political power which can be used to reinforce inequalities. The state 
exerts a major impact on the distribution of national income through its 
taxation, spending, and other policy-making powers. Too often taxes on 
commodities fall heavily on the poor, while government spending is 
concentrated in the urban rich. 
It is also important to note pricing policies and industrial 
protection which worsen the terms of trade of rural people. These raise 
the prices they have to pay to meet their needs relative to the prices 
they receive for their output. 
Two possible strategies which can be adapted in pursuit of equal 
distribution of income and poverty: (1) an approach which emphasizes the 
redistribution of existing wealth and income in favor of the poor, an 
approach which is called static redistribution, and (2) an approach which 
emphasizes an improved distribution of future additions to income and 
wealth, so that most of the benefits of growth henceforth accrue to the 
poor; this approach is called dynamic redistribution or redistribution 
through growth [Chenery et al., 1974, and Killick, 1981]. 
The static approach uses the state's powers of taxation, spending 
and legislation in order to ensure the absence of extreme income dispari­
ties. To achieve major results, it would involve large reductions in the 
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incomes of the rich through high income tax rates, the taxation and/or 
nationalization of property and the reallocation of government services 
in favor of the most needy. The chances of effectively using the tax 
system as a redistributive device depend upon the successful implementa­
tion of a tax structure in which the actual tax burden falls largely on 
the high income group. In terms of actual revenues, income taxes are 
often of secondary importance in most developing countries, including 
Indonesia. The income tax can not touch the majority of the population 
because most people's income is too small for it to be either desirable 
or feasible to tax them beyond a minimum. Some income tax structures are 
indeed highly progressive but there are limitations on what can be 
achieved by highly progressive structures in LDC conditions. First, the 
number of people whose incomes are really large is likely to be small 
relative to the total population. Therefore, the tax may only have a 
limited impact on overall income distribution. Secondly, the wealthy 
group is in a strong position to evade paying the taxes they are legally 
due to pay. Thirdly, highly progressive income and profit taxes can have 
disincentive effects on saving and investment strong enough to retard the 
development of the economy. The greater dependence on indirect taxes, on 
the other hand, can be a major obstacle toward the construction of a 
progressive tax structure because indirect taxes are often regressive. 
If a tax is levied on a consumption good, the amount of tax to be paid is 
the same for both rich and poor purchasers. Indirect taxes are not 
inevitably regressive, however. If they are confined to luxury goods and 
services, they will bear most heavily upon the rich and leave the poor 
largely unaffected. While it is possible to construct a progressive 
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system of indirect taxes, it is difficult in practice. As a conclusion, 
the revealed power of taxation as a redistributive instrument is small. 
Another approach is to use government spending powers. Two types of 
government spending are (1) the provision of goods and services, such as 
education and health, which raise people's effective living standards, 
and (2) the provision of transfer payments, such as pensions and unem­
ployment allowances. Subsidized educational and health services emerge 
as the most important items and this is particularly significant because 
education especially, and health to a lesser extent, raises worker pro­
ductivity, which also promotes the objective of economic growth. Tran­
sfer payments do have significant redistributive potential because they 
can be geared to identified poverty groups, such as the unemployed. 
However, in LDCs, this approach cannot do much either. One of the rea­
sons is that the tax base is very narrow and thus there are severe con­
straints on the amount of revenue that can be raised. Therefore, only 
limited resources can be made available for welfare benefits. In addi­
tion, the fact that the potential numbers who might have a claim to such 
benefits in LDCs is enormous due to the widespread poverty. 
If underdevelopment is the chief reason for poverty, this suggests 
that policies of static redistribution, whether by fiscal or other means, 
will be only partially effective. The concept of redistribution through 
growth is more comprehensive than static redistribution because it is a 
complete strategy of economic development. It is a long-term approach 
that seeks to tackle poverty, inequality, and unemployment by accelera­
ting (or at least maintaining) the growth of the economy in ways which 
ensure that increments to assets and output are more equitably distrib­
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uted, especially to those living in poverty, and at the same time 
generates as much new productive employment as possible. The main 
components of this strategy are the following; 
(1) Sectoral and factoral priorities - Sectoral and factoral 
priorities which favor the development of smallholder agriculture, and 
small-scale traditional activities in the informal urban and rural areas. 
These kinds of activities are labor-intensive in nature, and so both will 
generate more employment. The adoption of more appropriate technologies 
is important to this aspect of the strategy. To encourage the use of 
more labor-intensive techniques of production in a labor abundant 
economy, removal of existing distortion in factor prices is very 
fundamental.20 
(2) Rural development - Rural development goes beyond the above 
priorities by approaching the development of rural economy within the 
framework of regional development. The aim of the strategy is to raise 
output as well as infrastructure availability and other public services. 
This involves the coordination of programs for the improvement of agri­
culture, irrigation, water supply, roads, electricity, and so forth. The 
strategy is often associated with decentralization or a bottom-up 
approach to development activities. As an example, investment in irriga­
tion, which is constructed as part of rural public works program, can not 
only substantially increase the intensity of cropping on otherwise dry 
land but also substantially increase the continuing demand for labor. 
Organizing rural laborers in order to stop leakages out of their wages to 
overseers and contractors is also an important strategy. 
(3) Target groups^l - The strategy is selective in that it concen-
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trates on measures to raise the living conditions of precisely identified 
poverty groups. Included in these groups are subsistence farmers, rural 
landless, urban unemployed, and urban poor. These groups are different 
in nature one to another. The incidence and nature of poverty is also 
likely to be affected by differing regional conditions. A precise knowl­
edge about the nature of these groups is essential before accurately 
devised policies can help. Again, the problem of 'leakage' is given 
particular emphasis in the sense of the spillover of benefits from target 
groups to non-target groups. 
(4) Basic needs and improved access - The strategy emphasizes 
improved access of poverty groups to goods, services, and capital assets 
provided by the state. This includes better access to education, health 
services, clean water and power supply, housing, etc. Training and 
access to information on new technology should be designed to reach the 
poor. Among urban poor, promotion of small firms with improvement in the 
functioning of the capital markets is needed. Access to capital such as 
trade credit or other small credits provides the bulk of the needs of the 
very small (cottage) producers. Land reform that improves the patterns 
of land ownership, combined with a rural development strategy, could 
offer a reasonably rapid relief of rural poverty problems. 
(5) Population restraint - Population restraint is another important 
aspect in countries with rapidly expanding populations. As a component 
of strategy, reduction of natural increase of population is designed to 
reduce the proportion and the numbers in poverty. A population policy 
with the explicit goal of fertility reduction will normally include a 
family planning program intended to make the number of children that 
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parents have conform to the number they want. It is important to note 
that the level of a woman's education is the factor most highly corre­
lated with her fertility. 
5.3.2. Income distribution in Indonesia 
What has been happening to the distribution of income in Indonesia 
over time is not clear. No comparable data in incomes at two different 
points in time are available. Extensive data do exist, however, on the 
level and distribution of consumption expenditures of households over the 
period 1970-1980. These data are compiled within the so called Social 
Economic Surveys (Susenas). These data on consumption cannot provide a 
complete picture of changes in the level and distribution of income, even 
though such information can be used to assess changes in average stan­
dards of living of different groups. This is precisely the method used 
by many observers to estimate the performance of income distribution in 
Indonesia. 
The first study on income distribution in Indonesia is done by Arndt 
[1975] for the eight-year period since 1966. He is impressed that during 
that period the majority of the Indonesian people have benefited, in 
terms of material living standards, from the economic growth, though no 
doubt in unequal degree. It is possible that some of the poorest people 
in rural Java are worse off in terms of per capita real income and food 
consumption, but the majority eat better and enjoy a higher real income 
in terms of a wide range of consumer goods [Arndt, 1975, p. 83]. 
The measures of inequality in Indonesia based on consumption expen­
ditures have been compiled by Hughes and Islam [1981] over the period 
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1964-1976. The study, raises the possibility that the Susenas data are 
sufficiently biased to invalidate any conclusion about inequality. This 
study indicated the fact that the nominal expenditure figures do not take 
into account the variations in prices and price trends across regions, 
sectors and income groups. 
Table 5.7 shows average expenditure levels over the period between 
1964 and 1976. The table shows no substantial changes in the pattern of 
average expenditures during the period 1964-1970. It is different from 
the following period 1970-1976 during which striking changes occurred. 
The most significant aspect of the changes is the substantial increase in 
the average expenditure level for urban Java relative to that for 
Indonesia as a whole. On the other hand, the relative position of rural 
Java to the national average level of expenditure did not change. The 
disparity between urban and rural expenditure levels increased by about 
the same proportion in both regions leaving a substantial decline in the 
relative average expenditure for rural Outside Java. 
Table 5.7 also shows the trends in inequality over the period 1964-
1976. There is no change in inequality in Indonesia as a whole between 
1970 and 1976 but a decrease from that of 1964. In urban areas, inequal­
ity decreased over the period 1964-1970 but increased substantially 
during the following period, 1970-1976. In Java alone, urban inequality 
increased steadily during 1964-1970 while in Outside Java it decreased. 
On the other hand, both rural Java and Outside Java show a steady 
decrease in inequality during the period 1964-1976. Moreover, inequality 
in urban Java is much higher than in rural Java in 1976, while in Outside 
Java the difference in inequality between urban and rural is not so large. 
Table 5.7. Average and distribution of monthly expenditure per capita, 1964-1976^ 
Average monthly expen- Expenditure Index Glnl coefficient for 
dlture per capita (all Indonesla=100) expenditure distribution 
(ruplah) 
Urban Rural All Urban Rural All Urban Rural All 
1964-1965 (old ruplah) 
Java 7,279 4,640 5,045 125.4 79.8 86.7 0.304 0.329 0.337 
Outside Java 9,240 7,040 7,319 158.8 121.0 125.8 0.364 0.334 0.341 
Indonesia 7,880 5,472 5,818 135.4 94.1 100.0 0.344 0.348 0.389 
1967 (new ruplah) 
Java 568 427 445 0.308 0.262 0.288 
1970 
Java 1,714 1,029 1,144 126.8 76.2 84.7 0.332 0.298 0.321 
Outside Java 2,070 1,712 1,759 153.2 126.7 130.2 0.300 0.330 0.328 
Indonesia 1,819 1,272 1,351 134.6 94.2 100.0 0.327 0.339 0.346 
1976 
Java 7,025 3,468 4,113 156.5 77.3 91.6 0.397 0.296 0.357 
Outside Java 6,797 4,772 5,133 151.4 106.3 114.3 0.306 0.298 0.311 
Indonesia 6,942 3,950 4,489 154.6 88.0 100.0 0.368 0.304 0.346 
^Source; Hughes and Islam, 1981, Tables 1 and 2. 
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5.4. A Submodel for Measuring Indonesian Income Inequality 
One of the handicaps have made the problem of measurement of income 
inequality difficult is the lack of relevant data. The problem can be 
attributed to the fact that surveys of family income and expenditure 
which are necessary for studying the personal distribution of income are 
scarce. 
Another problems that has arisen recently deals with the dynamic 
aspects of the distribution of income. Studies of income distribution 
are normally framed in terms of comparative statics. The static frame­
work does not approach the question of the income experience of individ­
uals or groups over time.^^ 
The model of income distribution proposed here follows the Gupta 
Model [Gupta, 1977a, pp. 39-40], which is based on sectoral output. For 
this purpose, an initial sectoral income distribution is essential for 
computing the income distribution model. By combining the necessary 
information derived from Regional Income Account Surveys 1968-1972^^ and 
the 1971 Population Census, Gupta arrived at distribution of average 
sectoral income as shown in Table 5.8. The twenty-six measures of aver­
age income and population reflect the twenty-six provinces throughout 
Indonesia excluding East Timor. 
This submodel of income distribution chooses four different income 
classes, namely (i) Class I, with average per capita monthly income up to 
3,000 Rupiah; (ii) Class II, with average per capita monthly income 
between 3,000 and 5,000 Rupiah; (iii) Class III with average per capita 
monthly income between 5,000 and 8,000 Rupiah; and (iv) Class IV with 
average per capita monthly income over 8,000 Rupiah. 
Table 5.8. Average Income and population by sector, 1971^ 
Agriculture Mining Small scale Industry 
Income Population Income Population Income Population 
659 626,353 - 267 587 9,545 
2,973 803,549 - 64 1,572 764 
3,854 485,212 - 990 2,722 5,087 
3,984 574,310 - 131 6,274 153,416 
4,119 509,653 - 279 7,276 3,300 
4,391 722,864 - 3,531 8,497 1,444 
5,021 203,313 - 209 11,392 3,794 
5,207 243,762 - 590 12,068 2,321 
5,547 3,880,970 - 92 14,318 117,060 
5,586 6,503,136 - 50 15,582 1,659 
5,614 740,693 - 88 16,052 18,167 
6,237 488,716 - 4,628 18,567 24,974 
6,343 160,486 - 7,255 18,654 19,709 
6,586 49,346 - 4,402 19,673 5,940 
6,882 849,640 - 591 21,561 6,558 
7,268 1,691,677 - 84 22,571 4,882 
7,297 410,652 - 3,023 23,976 679 
7,597 936,117 - 3,925 26,042 10,286 
8,652 338,112 - 1,995 28,166 578 
9,541 276,865 228 7,863 34,326 5,122 
10,547 234,757 279 215 38,598 129,682 
10,914 366,091 674 1,960 53,396 2,883 
19,304 166,087 13,782 12,274 75,504 23,622 
74,404 133,057 27,329 26,101 80,201 70,708 
93,090 481,054 157,708 1,754 81,286 2,652 
98,156 11,445 0 0 123,158 1,941 
^Source: Gupta, 1977a , Table 1. Income In Rupiah per capita per month. 
Table 5.8. (continued) 
Large scale Industry Electricity and power Construction Transportation 
Income Population Income Population Income Population Income Population 
118 143,716 172 93 1,467 2,180 1,644 2,219 
899 6,236 825 80 1,486 3,193 3,622 6,709 
1,406 58,463 1,378 656 2,486 1,286 7,396 4,659 
1,728 51,326 3,632 1,038 10,472 121,764 7,631 8,852 
2,116 37,263 3,985 334 10,491 18,165 8,166 11,007 
2,504 688,614 6,812 7,991 12,617 18,247 8,775 12,066 
2,895 19,985 10,565 124 13,234 9,568 9,203 189,054 
3,727 86,142 11,338 71 15,674 151,617 9,378 15,635 
4,494 371,384 12,135 623 15,796 14,498 9,535 131,317 
5,161 387,980 21,975 471 16,461 113,521 11,509 43,105 
5,261 1,115 22,568 444 17,936 5,277 12,838 15,234 
5,506 13,000 24,568 1,261 18,947 13,771 13,107 1,661 
6,432 24,296 31,435 2,564 19,668 6,048 13,448 187,983 
6,710 6,270 35,468 278 20,035 8,682 14,664 64,369 
7,213 14,587 35,918 4,971 22,661 13,602 15,615 19,820 
7,395 34,315 36,057 346 24,034 8,887 17,223 5,376 
9,066 13,265 40,116 86 24,216 23,239 19,569 7,725 
10,307 18,938 41,276 486 25,791 92,141 20,358 138,003 
12,028 7,099 44,334 7,595 26,129 2,741 21,649 7,815 
12,261 2,539 44,255 141 29,459 31,737 26,267 11,327 
12,668 49,327 45,217 138 30,807 7,579 28,282 10,016 
17,735 17,617 53,338 767 31,001 1,273 32,478 8,762 
25,728 9,803 56,903 6,286 32,594 2,433 36,057 1,367 
53,067 1,839 64,553 369 33,801 2,573 40,510 2,979 
0 0 73,333 9 39,432 4,016 57,423 30,296 
0 0 121,095 137 210,058 3,428 140,747 14,098 
Table 5.8. (continued) 
Public administra-
Trade Banking tlon and defense Services 
Income Population Income Population Income Population Income Population 
1,644 48,937 3,156 45 156 10,385 2,987 13,397 
3,622 21,651 13,028 393 2,747 153,858 3,328 11,835 
7,396 131,030 14,574 1,209 3,434 11,009 3,652 136,908 
7,631 72,633 15,895 155 6,577 45,734 3,937 42,267 
8,166 77,020 21,589 127 7,452 30,010 3,996 101,078 
8,775 1,009,978 25,984 217 8,235 494,717 3,997 203,477 
9,203 317,936 27,037 1,212 9,416 33,687 4,062 60,599 
9,378 6,557 27,530 33 10,652 35,174 4,105 58,562 
9,535 812,231 32,729 1,081 11,306 16,120 4,240 692,702 
11,509 78,362 33,105 1,311 12,399 142,520 4,269 935,279 
12,838 110,886 37,335 2,341 12,789 63,685 4,311 15,707 
13,107 1,089,170 38,060 730 13,645 38,711 4,384 26,450 
13,448 56,181 38,191 12,215 14,005 37,478 4,388 91,039 
14,664 40,664 39,865 74 14,534 36,647 4,459 92,073 
15,615 26,076 41,073 1,048 14,536 10,151 4,463 456,558 
17,223 96,427 49,871 465 14,705 360,843 4,525 24,749 
19,569 9,415 62,835 3,646 15,618 11,801 4,570 762,247 
20,358 10,008 68,255 118 16,343 32,635 4,676 59,121 
37,312 10,031 69,987 75 16,516 34,956 4,685 56,807 
38,092 4,906 72,566 33 16,595 18,747 4,767 26,789 
40,555 143,525 78,559 22 22,672 32,511 4,800 710 
42,762 22,368 80,506 122 23,016 61,854 4,945 66,255 
54,771 3,737 83,580 98 25,204 131,496 4,974 49,161 
78,117 7,473 89,833 35 36,285 15,619 5,278 27,421 
119,737 39,362 91,531 49 38,508 15,051 9,914 28,800 
160,695 14,997 121,914 16 100,936 2,800 16,021 19,833 
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From Table 5.8 and based on the above income classification, the 
average income and population per income class for each sector of the 
economy can be derived as shown in Table 5.9. In the above income 
classification, it is assumed that Class I, Class II, and Class III are 
wage earners whereas Class IV is a class of non-wage earners which 
constitute predominantly entrepreneurs. 
For wage earners, the average income in each sector of the economy 
grows at a rate dependent on the growth of real wage of each sector. The 
growth rate of real wage can be determined by calculating the percentage 
increase of real wage divided by the percentage increase of GDP. In this 
case, the 1969 input-output transaction and the 1975 input-output table 
provide the necessary information.^^ The growth rate of the average 
income of non-wage earners, on the other hand, is determined by sectoral 
income per capita which, in turn, is dependent on sectoral labor produc­
tivity. 
The real wage index can be written as follows; 
[5-19] WR = WR_j^(l + EW(GDP73/GDP73_^ - D) 
where EW is sectoral elasticity of real wage rate. In this model, EW is 
assumed to be the same for every sector, and so an average value of EW is 
to be used. The 1969 industrial relationship and the 1975 input-output 
table give a value for EW of approximately 0.46. The sectoral average 
income for wage earners, therefore, can be written as 
Table 5.9. Sectoral average monthly income and population by income class, 1971^ 
Class I Class II Class III Class IV 
Sector 
Average 
income 
(rupiah) 
Population Average 
income 
(rupiah) 
Population Average 
Income 
(rupiah) 
Population Average 
income 
(rupiah) 
Population 
Agriculture 1,959.4 
(2,841.4) 
1,429,902 4,114.9 
(5,967.1) 
2,292,039 5,999.6 
(8,700.1) 
16,158,508 35,392.5 
(51,323.2) 
2,007,468 
Mining and 
quarrying 
75.2 
(109.0) 
42,232 
- - -
- 28,884.2 
(41,885.4) 
40,129 
Manufacturing 
and utili­
ties 
2,031.7 
(2,946.2) 
1,021,828 4,347.7 
(6,304.7) 
458,896 5,691.3 
(8,253.0) 
646,270 32,702.2 
(47,422.0) 
602,315 
Construction 1,672.9 
(2,425.9) 
6,659 - - - - 18,869.4 
(27,362.8) 
674,813 
Trade and 
banking 
2,776.0 
(4,025.5) 
48,937 3,713.8 
(5,385.4) 
21,696 6,290.3 
(9,121.7) 
280,683 15,764.3 
(22,860.1) 
3,937,115 
Transport 1,644.0 
(2,384.0) 
2,219 3,622.0 
(5,252.3) 
6,709 7,550.0 
(10,948.4) 
13,511 17,014.8 
(24,673.4) 
929,015 
Public admin­
istration and 
services 
2,613.6 
(3,790.0) 
177,640 4,332.6 
(6,282.8) 
3,981,382 6,486.3 
(9,405.9) 
103,165 14,131.7 
(20,492.6) 
1,675,836 
^Source: Calculated from Table 5.8 figures in parentheses indicate real 1973 value. 
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[5-20a] Class I: YAl = YAl.^ WR/WR_i 
Class II: YA2 = YA2_j^ WR/WR_i 
Class III; YA3 = YAS.^ WR/WR_i 
On the other hand, the sectoral income per capita is derived from 
labor productivity 
[5-21] YC = LP-DR-PV/PCOL 
where LP = Sectoral labor productivity 
DR = Dependency ratio 
PV = Sectoral value added price 
PCOL = Cost of living index 
The average income for non-wage earners, therefore, can be written as: 
[5-20b] Class IV: YA4 = YA4_]^'YC/YC_]^ 
The average population change for each income class in a certain 
sector is assumed the same as the average sectoral population change 
which is derived from sectoral labor productivity: 
[5-22] PO = VA73/(LP-DR) 
where PO is sectoral population. For each income class, the sectoral 
population becomes 
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[5-23] FOI = POl_i'PO/PO_i POPl = E POl 
sector 
P02 = P02_j^-P0/P0_i 
P03 = P03_i-P0/P0_i 
P04 = P04_i'P0/P0_i 
P0P2 =2 P02 
sector 
P0P3 = 2 P03 
sector 
P0P4 = 2 P04 
sector 
The total population per income class, POPl, P0P2, P0P3, and P0P4 is 
simply the summation of sectoral population in each class over all 
sectors in the economy. 
On the other side, total income for each income class can be deter­
mined once the sectoral average incomes are known. In this circumstance, 
another source of income for laborers may accrue from ownership of new 
assets. This incremental non-wage income will originate from the gains 
of new ownership of assets. In the model, these gains have been treated 
as income from accumulated savings. The ruling market rate of interest 
is used as the rate of return from capital assets. The income of the 
highest income class is treated as a residual as it is determined after 
the lower classes have been paid their labor and non-wage incomes. 
Savings in each class are estimated separately for each income class and 
related to their disposable income. The estimation of the savings rate 
is discussed later in this section. The total income of each income 
class can be written as follows : 
[5-24] Y1 = S (YAl-POl) 
sector 
Y2 = S (YA2-P02) + RS-CSAV2 
sector 
Y3 = 2 (YA3-P03) + RS'CSAV3 
sector 
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Y4 = SAVHH + EXTOT - Y1 - Y2 - Y3 
where CSAV = Class cumulative savings 
SAVHH = Total household savings 
EXTOT = Total household expenditure 
RS = Market rate of interest 
The next step is to calculate disposable income for each class of 
income. The disposable income is simply defined as income net of 
indirect tax plus subsidy. The indirect tax and subsidy in each group of 
income are proportional to expenditure in each group, while subsidy in 
each group is taken exogenously. In addition, the disposable income for 
the highest class is the net of direct taxes. 
[5-25] YDl = Y1 - (TXIND/PC0L)-EX1/EXTOT + GSUBl/PCOL 
YD2 = Y2 - (TXIND/PCOL)•EX2/EXT0T + GSUB2/PC0L 
YD3 = Y3 - (TXIND/PCOL)-EXS/EXTOT + GSUB3/PC0L 
YD4 = Y4 - (TXIND/PCOL)-EXA/EXTOT + (GSUB4 - TXDIR)/PCOL 
The class cumulative savings is then calculated in the following; 
[5-26] CSAV2 = CSAV2_i + APS2-YD2 
CSAV3 = CSAV3_^ + APS3'YD3 
with Class I cumulative savings are assumed to be nil. 
The inequality of distribution of income is, finally, measured by 
Gini coefficient based on class disposable income. The relative 
disposable income for each income class and its respective relative 
population are 
260 
[5-27] YDRl = YDl/YD FORI = (POPl + LFORCE - LABOR)/DR'POP 
YDR2 = YD2/YD P0R2 = P0P2/P0P 
YDR3 = YD3/YD P0R3 = POPS/POP 
YDR4 = YD4/YD P0R4 = P0P4/P0P 
where YD denotes total disposable income over all income classes and POP 
denotes total population. Based on Lorentz Curve, the Gini coefficient 
of inequality is determined as follows 
[5-28] GINI = 1 - PORl-YCUMl - P0R2 (YCUMl + YCUM2) -
where YCUMl = YDRl 
YCUM2 = YCUMl + YDR2 
YCUM3 = YCUM2 + YDR3 
YCUM4 = YCUM3 + YDR4 
In addition, a poverty index, as a measure of the absolute standard 
of living of the poorest is also calculated. Quantitatively, the poverty 
index is the total money transfer needed to raise all people above a 
minimum standard of living expressed as a percentage of their total 
income. Following the ILO, the poverty line is defined as equivalent to 
income per capita measured as 20,000 rupiahs at the 1973 price.^^ 
[5-29] YCMIN = 20,000 
MOPOV = YCMIN(P0P1 + LFORCE - LABOR)/DR - YDl 
POVEX = MOPOV-DR/[YCMIN(POP1 + LFORCE - LABOR)] 
P0R3 (YCUM2 + YCUM3) - P0R4 (YCUM3 + YCUM4) 
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where YCMIN = Minimum standard income 
MOPOV = Total money transferred 
POVEX = Poverty index 
As it is noted earlier, the Indonesian saving behavior is also an 
important element for measuring income inequality. The level of income 
hypothesis is used for measuring the saving behavior of each income 
class. The theories concerning the relation of saving to income is the 
Keynesian hypothesis that the average propensity to save, S/Y, increases 
with the level of income. With this hypothesis, the savings function is 
derived from the household expenditure function: 
C = Cq + C^'Y 
The above household expenditure function is regressed by using household 
income data that resulted from the cost of living survey of 1968/69; 
the household income is used as a proxy of household disposable income. 
The four income classes are set by assuming that each household consists 
of five members. The estimated equation is as follows (in thousands of 
Rupiahs); 
[5-30] C = 1.419 + 0.9156 Y 
(2.717)(52.713) 
R2 = 0.991 SSE = 72.12 rho = -0.2 n = 27 
Weighted by the number of households within an income class, the average 
propensity to save for each income group resulted as follows; 
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[5-31] APSl = -0.0684 
APS 2 = 0.0153 
APS3 = 0.0406 
APS4 = 0.0605 
Furthermore, the average expenditures for each income class, and hence 
the total expenditures, can be estimated. From here, it is easy to arrive 
at household savings which is defined as 
[5-32] SAVHH = GNPNOIL - GOVDREV + REVOIL + GOVSUB - SAVCOR - EXTOT'PCOL 
GNPNOIL = GNP - VOIL 
GNP = GDP + YSER 
where GNPNOIL = Non-oil GNP 
GOVDREV = Government domestic revenue 
REVOIL = Revenue from oil companies 
GOVSUB = Government subsidy 
SAVCOR = Corporate savings 
EXTOT = Household total expenditure 
YSER = Net Income from abroad 
Finally, the relationships between the domestic price level, employ­
ment and Income distribution, and the working of the submodel can be 
summarized with the help of Figure 5.1. Here, the level of prices is 
determined by labor productivity, the unemployment rate and the aggregate 
supply and demand. Sectoral class income is initialized by the results 
of the 1971 survey and its time path (real value) is influenced by 
sectoral labor productivity and population growth. The price level 
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Figure 5.1. Price-employment - income distribution submodel relationships 
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determines the real value of income. Real value of disposable income is 
determined by subtracting direct and indirect taxes and adding subsidy. 
Any additional income from cumulative savings is also included. By 
subtracting household expenditure from gross national product net of 
government domestic revenue and subsidy, less corporate savings, total 
household savings are determined. The Gini coefficient is determined 
from the composition of class disposable incomes and class population. 
In this submodel, any exogenous change related to sectoral value added, 
government revenues (including direct and indirect taxes) and government 
subsidy will have a direct effect on the price level, employment, income 
distribution, and the level of household savings. 
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NOIES 
CHAPTER 5 
Ipor more discussion about this price, see Schultze and Tryon, 1965. 
Also, for more discussion about price equation, see Eckstein and Fromm, 
1968. 
^In this model, Tis assumed to be 0.4, and U* is 5 percent. For 
more discussion on the Phillips Curve, see Branson, 1979, Chapter 18; and 
Hadjimichalakis, 1982, pp. 359-65. Moreover, since labor productivity 
in itself affects the unemployment rate (see next section) a more direct 
price equation is proposed, which relates value added price with labor 
productivity and GDP deflator. In this simpler relation, the Phillips 
curve is not exposed explicitly, but is inherent within the equation. 
The major advantage of this approach is that the model does not need to 
employ the natural unemployment rate concept nor the 7 parameter which is 
considered improper for less developed countries. 
^See Fisher, Klein, and Shinkai, 1965; and Fromm, Klein, and Schink, 
1972. 
^The 1975 Indonesian Input-Output Table is published by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics (BPS). 
^Data on expenditures are made available from the National Social-
Economic Surveys (Susenas). 
^Originated by Lewis' unlimited supplies of labor [Lewis, 1954]. 
^The Fei-Ranis Model of Labor Surplus Economy [Fei and Ranis, 1964]. 
^Yotopulous and Nugent, 1976, pp. 198-99. Two factors are 
responsible for the change: the continuing population explosion and the 
dismal failure of the industrial sector to absorb additional workers. 
The failure lies partly in the policy biases that tend to lower the price 
of capital relative to labor. 
^See Todaro, 1969, and Harris and Todaro, 1970. 
^®ln the 1971 Census, all those who had worked at least one hour in 
two days during the preceding week were classified as employed. This 
definition was modified slightly for the 1976 Labor Force Survey and the 
1980 Census to include, as employed, anyone who had worked at least one 
hour during the preceding week. 
Upor 1976, 45.2 percent of those who were considered as employed 
workers worked less than 35 hours in the previous week; for 1978, the 
figure was 48.6 percent. See more on this in Arndt and Sundrum [1980]. 
12 Quoted by Soelistyo et al., 1979. 
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l^Djojohadikusumo, 1977. 
l^Rao, 1974. 
^^Factor price distortion includes the overvalued exchange rate for 
the import of capital goods, subsidized interest rates, favored invest­
ment tax structure, and regulated wage rates. 
16Among others, Patten et al., 1980. 
l^Chaudry, 1979, pp. 41-56. 
l^Morgan, 1975, pp. 204-5. 
1 Q 
The 1975 Indonesian Input-Output Table produces wrong estimation 
on capital stock [Gray, 1982]. 
20 For more discussion on the scope of government-induced distortion 
in factor markets, see Ahluwalia, 1974b. 
pi 
For more discussion on target groups and the various interventions 
suitable to the groups, see Chenery et al., 1974. 
^^Sundrum, 1973; Arndt, 1975; Sundrum, 1979; Meesook, 1979; Dapice, 
1980; Hughes and Islam, 1981. The Susenas surveys were conducted by The 
Central Bureau of Statistics. Based on data from these surveys, the 
Bureau measures the distribution of per capita expenditures and the level 
of expenditure inequality among the expenditure groups. The Bureau 
version has ten expenditure groups altogether, with rural and urban 
measured separately. 
^^For more discussions on several methods to measure income 
inequality, both the static and dynamic, see Szal and Robinson, 1977. 
Z^See Swasono and Esmara, 1974. 
^^The 1969 Input-Output Transaction is used by Gupta [1977a, 
pp. 108-9] and derived from Kanekoy and Luthan [1973]. The 1971 Input-
Output Table published by the Central Bureau of Statistics and the 1975 
Input-Output Table gave a negative income elasticity of the real wage 
rate which is probably incorrect. 
^^The poverty line of US $50 is for Asia, $250 for Western Europe, 
$90 for Latin America, and $59 for Africa. The poverty line for the 
seriously poor is simply double these amounts [ILO, 1976, pp. 20-22]. 
Z^The 1968/69 cost of living survey, conducted by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics, consists of 28 income groups representing 11 major cities 
throughout Indonesia. The original version of the survey relates house­
hold monthly income and expenditure. 
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6. APPLICATION OF THE INDONESIAN ECONOMIC MODEL 
USING COMPUTER SIMULATION 
In the last three chapters, effort has been made to estimate 
sets of relationships which yield a model of the whole Indonesian 
economy. This chapter is devoted to the next set of questions and 
problems which arise when such a model is available. First, this chapter 
discusses the method used to solve the sets of equations that describe 
the model. Second, it discusses some kinds of tests that need to be 
performed in the validation of an economic model. Third, this chapter 
finally presents the uses of the model through several system simulations 
with the complete model. 
6.1. Method and Structure of Solution 
This section discusses two things: the general Gauss-Seidel 
iterative method to solve the sets of equations of the model simulta­
neously, and the structure of the solution to the system that requires 
recursion of two computer subprograms. 
6.1.1. The Gauss-Seidel Iterative method and the simulation procedure 
The Gauss-Seidel iterative method employed here is to solve a non­
linear system, which describes the system of the Indonesian economy 
model, simultaneously. The relationships between variables (especially 
the endogenous variables), that govern the model can be drawn in a matrix 
of relationships depicted in Figure 6.1. This matrix shows how each row 
variable (endogenous) is determined from column variables which include 
other endogenous, lag-endogenous, and exogenous variables. The star 
marks (*) indicate that such relationships exist. From the position 
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01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 
Natural resources ^ 01 X 
Population & Labor force # 02 X 
M
 i
 
03 X 
APS 0 04 X 
Exchange rate # 05 X 
Foreign prices # 06 X 
Net capital inflow # 07 X 
Government expenditures # 08 X 
Bank's credit to private # 09 X 
Sectoral value added 10 * * X 
Real income 11 * X 
Corp. income/savings 12 * X 
Household savings 13 * X 
Gov. savings/deficit 14 * X 
Domestic savings 15 * * •k 
Foreign savings 16 
Sectoral investment 17 * * 
Residual investment 18 
Total investment 19 
Export & import 20 * * * 
Balance of payments 21 * 
Government revenues 22 * 
Real money demand 23 * 
Change in reserve money 24 * * 
Money supply 25 * 
Price level 26 
Labor productivity 27 * * 
Unemployment rate 28 * 
Sectoral class income 29 * 
HH class income 30 * 
Household income 31 
. 
Figure 6.1. Matrix of relationships between variables of the condensed model ol 
* = relationship exists; X «= no relationship exists, or, if it does 
2 13 14|l5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
* * 
X 
X * 
X * 
* * * X 
* X * * 
X 
A * * X 
* * X 
X * 
* X 
* * X ft 
X * 
It * X 
ft X 
* * X * 
X 
* X 
* X 
* 
* * I X 
i model of the Indonesian economy. (# « exogenous variables; 
If it does, only with lag-endogenous) 
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of the 'marks', it Is seen that the relationships between variables for 
the Indonesian model of the economy do not form a triangular matrix of 
relationships. A. system of equations that forms a triangular matrix of 
relationship is easy to solve by means of simple substitutions. A large 
scale system involving non-linear equations, even though it is a 
triangular type, may need the help of a computer to solve it. 
The Indonesian model of the economy does not have a triangular type of 
matrix of relationship. Since the system has to be solved simulta­
neously, the Gauss-Seidel iterative method is one of several methods that 
will solve the problem.^ In the case of a linear system, one can obtain 
the solution of the system for any set of values of the predetermined 
variables, simply by substituting these values into the system's solution 
expression (the reduced form). This simple solution algorithm can not be 
applied to a non-linear system. 
Like all iterative solution procedures, the Gauss-Seidel method 
requires a set of starting values for each endogenous variable of the 
system. The iterations proceed from these starting values to determine a 
new set of values for each endogenous variable. This new set of 
solutions become the starting values for the next iterations. The 
iterative process continues until the values of the endogenous variables 
2 in successive iterations converge to a pre-set level of tolerance. 
The following algorithm may explain the working of the Gauss-Seidel 
method, as well as the simulation procedures the results of which are 
presented in Section 3. Consider, first, the following general represen­
tation of a non-linear system of equations (for any period t): 
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^It " ^3t ^It 
^2t " ht ^nt' ^ lt'***'\t^ 
L - V^lt' ^2c Vl.t' ^It ^nt) 
where Ys are endogenous variables, while Xs are exogenous variables and 
the lag predetermined endogenous variables. 
For simplicity, the above expressions can be written in the following 
form: 
'2t V • ° 
S2"lf ''2f->V =» 
Then, it can be defined n functions G^(Y) such that 
= Gu(Y^) implies g^(Y^) =0, 1 < i < n, where Y^ = 
^^It' ^ 2t'"*' \t^* 
Step 1 : a) Set a level of tolerance € . It is conventional to set 
the tolerance level at one-tenth of 1 percent (e = O.OOl). 
For a complex system like the present Indonesian model of 
the economy, various levels of es are used, each for every 
set of variables. 
* * 
b) Set a maximum number of iteration k , Usually k is 
set at a level of 50 or 100. 
Step 2: Set t = T, where T is generally the base period. 
Step 3; Put a set of starting values for each endogenous variable in 
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period t. 
o „o „o 
nt :
(Most often the observed or historical values in each period 
t are used for estimating starting values. In this case, the 
starting values also supply, at the same time, the initial 
values of the lag endogenous variables.) 
Step 4: Begin the Gauss-Seidel iterative method. The Gauss-Seidel 
iterations proceed by computing the individual elements from 
the recursion relations. 
for 1 < 1 < n. The solutions become the successive new 
estimates of the vector: 
^t = f^lt' 4t' ^t^' ^ = 1,2,' 
Step 5: Test for convergence: 
a) The iteration continues when 
yk _ 
—— —— > e for i = l,2,...,n 
Then repeat the above procedures from step 4 using the new 
estimates. 
* 
b) The iteration ceases at certain iteration k < k 
when 
k _ k-1 
it it 
< e for 1 = 1,2,...,n. 
yk-l 
it 
Then go to step 6. 
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* 
c) If the system does not converge, then after iteration k , 
go to step 6. 
Step 6: Test for simulation period: 
* * 
a) If t < T , where T is terminal period then set t = T + 1 
and repeat the above procedures from step 3. 
b) If t = T then the procedure goes to step 7. 
Step 7: Stop. 
Even though the Gauss-Seidel iterative method is easy to apply, 
especially for a very large scale system, it is subject to limitations. 
This method is sensitive to the way in which the relationships are 
ordered. It is also sensitive to the way in which the algebraic 
equations are written (normalization). Different ways of ordering the 
equations and different ways each equation is written may cause the 
system to converge rapidly, slowly, or not at all. Unfortunately, there 
is no way of knowing what sort of alternative ordering or normalization 
will work well (Challen and Hagger, 1983, p. 43). 
6.1.2. Structure of simulation program 
The solution to the system of equations is achieved by making use of 
two recursive subprograms. Each subprogram consists of a set of 
equations which is solved simultaneously by using the Gauss-Seidel 
3 
method. The first subprogram, which involves the growth model, consists 
of the output-investment submodel and the trade-fiscal-monetary submodel 
of the Indonesian economy described in Chapters 3 and 4. The second 
subprogram involves the solution to the price-employment-income 
distribution submodel of Chapter 5. The first subprogram is called the 
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growth subprogram and the second Is called the equity subprogram. 
In the simulation process, the relationship between the two 
subprograms is depicted in Figure 6.2. The solution to the whole system 
is therefore recursive in nature. The repetition mechanism can be 
described as follows: The growth subprogram solution is used as a new 
input to the equity subprogram. The next step, the equity subprogram 
solution is fed to the growth subprogram as a new input. This procedure 
is repeated until each variable changes (from iteration to iteration) by 
no more than a level of tolerance. 
From Figure 6.2., it is seen that the solution of the growth 
subprogram, that influences the equity subprogram, consists of: (1) sec­
toral value added at constant 1973 price, (2) GDP deflator, (3) direct 
and indirect taxes, and (4) government domestic revenue. On the other 
hand, the solution to the equity subprogram, that influences the growth 
subprogram, consists of one variable, namely household savings. 
6.2. Validation of the Model 
First, this section discusses the kinds of tests that need to be 
performed in the validation of models. Second, this section presents the 
results of some of the tests to the Indonesian economy model. 
6.2.1. Criteria for model validity 
At least four questions must be answered in model validation, that is 
before the application of the model can be considered. The first 
4 
question to explore is how well the model fits known data. The best way 
to test the fitness of the model is to solve the equations, or subsystem 
of equations. It is possible that they will fit reasonably well, but 
Growth 
Subprogram 
Sectoral value added 
GDP deflator 
Direct & Indirect taxes 
Gov. domestic revenues 
Household savings 
Equity 
Subprogram 
M 
Figure 6.2. The links between the growth and the equity subprograms 
of the Indonesian economy model 
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when all equations in the system are solved simultaneously, a bad fit may 
be obtained due to accumulation of errors. No model is expected to fit 
the data exactly. Especially for complex non-linear systems, there is no 
statistical criteria for judgment, but at least errors can be computed 
and examined. 
Second, the testing of a model involves the forecasting of the model 
against data which were not used in the estimation process. Such a test 
is scarcely ever performed after a model is completed, since many 
researchers may feel uncomfortable when making predictions with a model 
that is not yet thoroughly studied and understood. 
Third, researchers are also interested in testing the structural 
behavior of a model. Knowledge of causal relationships in an economic 
model would give useful insight into the system, not only to see what the 
economy will do, but to know as well why it behaves as it does. 
Fourth, the growth and the stability of a model are also interesting 
things to test. The growth equilibrium of a model can be examined by 
running it for many time periods free of exogenous disturbances. 
Deliberate shocks to the model make it possible to observe its 
characteristic dynamic responses which reveal its degree of stability. 
6.2.2. Tracking performance of the Indonesian economy model 
Most system builders would regard the ability of the model system to 
fit the historical data of its endogenous variables, the system's 
tracking performance, as the most Important of all the validation 
procedures. Notwithstanding a high degree of confidence in the quality 
of its individual equations, the system builder has no way of knowing how 
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the system will perform until such time as an assessment of the within-
sample tracking performance of the whole system is made. 
For the purpose of evaluating the tracking performance of the 
Indonesian economy model, eight endogenous variables are selected. These 
eight variables are within the growth subsystem in which most of the 
equations are statistically estimated (except the investment equations). 
They are (1) non-oil GDP at constant 1973 price (GDPN73), (2) non-oil 
export (XNOIL), (3) non-oil import (MNOIL), (4) government revenues 
(GOVREV), (5) real demand for money (MODEM), (6) nominal money supply 
(MOSUP), (7) reserve money (MORES), and (8) GDP deflator (DEF). The 
comparison of the dynamic simulation solution time paths with the 
corresponding historical time paths, which provides a basis for the 
evaluation of the within-sample tracking performance of the system, can 
be seen in the Table 6.1. The comparison of the simulation solution time 
paths for the eight endogenous variables with the corresponding 
historical time paths is also shown in Figure 6.3 through Figure 6.10. 
It remains to decide precisely how the comparison of the two time 
paths is to be made. One of the simplest ways is to calculate the 
simulation errors, defined as the difference for each endogenous variable 
in each period between the historical value and the simulation value: 
^it = ^it - ^ it 
being the actual value of endogenous variable i in period t, 
being the corresponding simulation value. 
One of several measures^ of tracking performance based on simulation 
errors is root mean squared percentage error (EMSPE), which is defined 
Table 6.1. Comparison between actual and simulation of some endogenous raacroeconomic variables 
Non-Oil GDP Non-Oil Export Non-Oil Import Gov. Revenue 
(GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (GOVREV) 
(billion Rp) (million US $) (million US $) (billion Rp) 
Year Actual Simulation Actual Simulation Actual Simulation Actual Simulation 
1966 3770. 5 3770. 500 499.0 499. 000 825.0 825. 000 13.0 13.000 
1967 3805. 2 3805. 200 526.0 526. 000 1022.0 1022. 000 58.5 58.500 
1968 4302. 7 4479. 711 560.0 775. 772 1079.0 1184. 973 143.7 183.398 
1969 4542. 3 4974. 406 629.0 820. 225 1324.0 1460. 758 243.7 280.912 
1970 4775. 3 5410. 492 739.0 863. 442 1491.0 1474. 995 344.1 356.868 
1971 5189. 0 6501. 367 792.0 931. 090 1652.0 1653. 943 428.0 434.385 
1972 5634. 0 6231. 863 880.0 971. 223 2066.0 1956. 074 590.5 577.415 
1973 6197. 8 6568. 641 1604.0 1293. 673 3457.0 2912. 726 967.8 843.511 
1974 6685. 6 6842. 766 2199.0 1717. 831 5576.0 4246. 277 1753.8 1624.003 
1975 7080. 7 7097. 891 1817.0 2139. 481 7163.0 6113. 027 2241.4 2328.231 
1976 7545. 1 7418. 090 2534.0 2698. 192 7957.0 7337. 395 2906.4 2942.700 
1977 8165. 3 7695. 258 3511.0 3250. 404 9230.0 8289. 848 3536.1 3418.815 
1978 8825. 7 9515. 746 3659.0 3696. 680 10852.0 9135. 129 4267.0 4365.398 
1979 9525. 9 10485. 090 5579.0 4576. 082 12591.0 10112. 780 6697.0 6465.063 
1980 10624. 6 11151. 080 6079.0 6219. 250 16373.0 14775. 640 10227.0 10865.760 
Table 6.1. (Continued) 
Real Money Demand 
(MODEM) 
(billion Rp) 
Money Supply 
(MOSUP) 
(billion Rp) 
Reserve Money 
(MORES) 
(billion Rp) 
GDP Deflator 
(DEF) 
(1973=100) 
Year Actual Simulation Actual Simulation Actual Simulation Actual Simulation 
1966 277.5 277.500 22.2 22.200 17.7 17.700 8 8.0 
1967 206.0 206.000 51.5 51.500 45.5 45.500 25 25.0 
1968 258.9 262.408 113.9 174.522 95.7 144.911 44 66.5 
1969 327.5 360.615 183.4 251.800 159.9 217.681 56 69.8 
1970 391.1 452.063 250.3 321.716 207.2 262.307 64 71.2 
1971 471.8 598.364 320.8 379.103 262.9 297.429 68 63.4 
1972 632.8 648.740 474.6 510.346 387.3 412.686 75 78.7 
1973 669.0 676.910 669.0 637.065 500.7 469.210 100 94.1 
1974 637.8 724.275 937.5 893.602 772.5 737.231 147 123.4 
1975 753.0 805.700 1250.1 1535.874 1038.0 1287.338 166 190.6 
1976 843.7 862.526 1603.0 1918.142 1333.0 1610.591 190 222.4 
1977 937.4 934.844 2006 ..0 2057.714 1670.0 1721.591 214 220.1 
1978 1049.8 1133.738 2488.0 2638.227 1847.0 1897.757 237 232.7 
1979 1102.6 1305.745 3385.0 2870.770 2429.0 2023.258 307 219.9 
1980 1304.2 1470.123 4995.0 5134.715 3258.0 3323.967 383 349.3 
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6.10. Level of prices. ( = actual; = simulation) 
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by: 
RMSPE.. = 100/ L 
where ti is number of sample period. Another measure is Theil's 
inequality coefficient, 
2 / / , „n2 . , _-2, ] 
^ ' ' n t n t 
%ric/ i 2:7 it t: 
Both KMSPE and TIC are calculated for each endogenous variable and both 
have a lower limit of zero, corresponding to perfect tracking 
performance. Since RMSPE is calculated in percent, its upper limit is 
100 while Tic's is one. The following is the calculation results of 
RMSPE and TIC for each of the eight endogenous variables: 
RMSPE: GDPN73: 7.61% MODEM: 6.44% 
XNOIL: 12.51% MOSUP: 10.99% 
MNOIL: 7.24% MORES: 9.96% 
GOVREV: 2.66% DEF: 9.75% 
TIC: GDPN73: 2.170 X 10~^ MODEM: 1.069 X 10~^ 
XNOIL: 5.391 X lO"^ MOSUP: 8.734 X lO"^ 
MNOIL: 1.344 X lO"^ MORES: 7.765 X lO"^ 
GOVREV; 0.694 X 10~^ DEF: 7.272 X lO"^ 
From the above figures, it is seen that the non-oil export variable 
has the highest RMSPE. The next highest is the money supply variable. 
However, based on its TIC, the non-oil export variable has better 
tracking performance than the money supply variable. Variables of 
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reserve money and GDP deflator together with the money supply variable 
have relatively high both RMSPE and TIC while the government revenue 
variable has the smallest both RMSPE and TIC. 
To conclude the discussions, the whole system of equations of the 
Indonesian economy model, based on the tracking performance of each of 
the above selected variables, fits the actual data reasonably well. 
6.3. Simulation of the Model 
This section, first, presents several simulation runs of the model of 
the Indonesian economy starting with the basic run and then followed by 
some alternative runs. The alternative runs Involve disturbances 
that come from exogenous changes. The Impact of each disturbance on 
some endogenous variables Is discussed within each alternative run. 
6.3.1. The basic run 
The basic run simulated the Indonesian economy model as it is. 
Values of exogenous variables are simply their observed historical time 
paths of 1966 through 1980. The simulation period, however, is extended 
to cover the 1981-1985 period. The required annual values of the 
exogenous variables from 1981 to 1985 are estimated with the following 
assumptions;^ 
(1) The area of Irrigated rice (HAIRR) is assumed to grow at a rate 
of 2.0 percent per year. 
(2) Fertilizer supply (FERT) is assumed to grow at a rate of 20.0 
percent per year. 
(3) The area of estate crops (HAEST) is assumed to grow at a rate of 
3.4 percent per year. 
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(4) The export prices (PXs) are assumed to decrease uniformly at a 
rate of about 3.4 percent. 
(5) The export price of oil (PXOIL) is assumed to increase in 1981 
following the world price and then decrease thereafter at a 
rate of 6.7 percent a year. 
(6) The import price (PM) is assumed to Increase at a rate of around 
4.7 percent. 
(7) The value of Indonesian oil export (XOIL) is assumed to increase 
every year but not more than US $18 billion level. 
(8) On the other hand, Indonesia's import of oil (MOIL) is expected 
to increase at a rate of around 17.3 percent per year. 
(9) Import of rice (MRICE) is expected to continue to increase at a 
rate of 5 percent a year. 
(10) Net service import (MSER) is assumed to grow at a rate of 15.0 
percent a year. 
(11) Net service Income (YSER) is expected to increase at a rate of 
16.0-17.0 percent a year. 
(12) Net capital inflow (CAPFLO) is assumed to increase to a level 
of no more than US $2.5 billion a year. 
(13) Government expenditure (GOVEXP) is expected to increase at a 
rate of 20.0 percent per year. 
(14) Total government subsidy (GSUB) is expected to grow to a level 
of no more than 2,000 billion rupiahs. 
(15) Banks' credit (MOCRED) is assumed to be limited at a level of 
between 300 and 500 billion rupiahs. 
(16) Ratio of banks' reserves to demand deposits (MORD) is assumed to 
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be between 0.5 and 0.6. 
(17) Following the devaluation of rupiah in 1983 the effective 
exchange rate (XCHEF) is expected to increase to a level of 
around Rp 1000 per US $. 
(18) The labor force (LFORCE) is assumed to grow at a rate of 2.7 
percent annually. 
(19) The dependency ratio (DR) is assumed to be around 0.36. 
With the above set of assumptions of the exogenous variables for the 
period 1981-1985, the basic run has resulted the simulation time path of 
endogenous variables presented in Table 6.2 through Table 6.12. Tables 
6.2 to 6.7 represent macroeconoraic variables within the growth subsystem, 
while Tables 6.8 to 6.12 represent income distribution variables within 
the equity subsystem. 
Real income continues to grow and reaches an average level of 
Rp 14193.8 billion per year during 1981-1985 (compared to Rp 7270.9 
billion during 1966-1980). Agricultural sectors are also growing during 
this period, but their contribution to GDP continues to decrease 27.5 
percent to an average of (compared to 40.6 percent during 1966-1980). 
Mining sector's contribution to real GDP continues to decrease to 9.02 
percent during the 1981-1985 period (compared to 10.3 percent during 
1966-1980) with non-oil sectors starting to dominate output (Table 6.2). 
The up and down of the real non-oil GDP is caused mainly by the Increase 
and decrease of output in the manufacturing sector which also affects 
other sectors in industry and services. In this model, it is assumed 
that the manufacturing sector is subject to disinvestment due to any 
shortage of available capital. Sectoral investment for the basic run can 
Table 6.2. Sectoral value added at 1973 price (Billion Rp): Basic Run 
Irrigated Non- Other Estate Animal Forest. Total 
Rice Irrigated Food Crops Prod. Prod. Agric. 
Rice 
Year (VIRR73) (VNIR73) (VOFD73) (VEST73) (VANI73) (VFOR73) (VAGR73) 
1966 563.6 
1967 543.2 
1968 667.0 
1969 738.3 
1970 763.8 
1971 821.3 
1972 795.5 
1973 900.8 
1974 905.1 
1975 966.7 
1976 943.7 
1977 974.4 
1978 1088.3 
1979 1101.7 
1980 1184.4 
1981 1248.9 
1982 1316.1 
1983 1386.3 
1984 1459.2 
1985 1537.9 
57.0 645.5 
58.1 628.7 
59.3 639.8 
60.4 649.8 
61.7 658.8 
62.9 666.8 
64.1 674.1 
65.4 680.6 
66.7 686.4 
68.1 691.6 
69.4 696.3 
70.8 700.6 
72.2 704.4 
73.7 707.8 
75.1 710.8 
76.6 713.6 
78.2 716.0 
79.7 718.3 
81.3 720.2 
83.0 722.0 
449.5 282.5 
430.7 289.5 
437.7 245.3 
462.9 262.7 
473.6 280.8 
478.6 318.9 
488.5 311.4 
504.1 332.0 
529.2 349.9 
529.2 371.9 
543.1 394.1 
561.7 413.9 
569.2 521.5 
591.0 570.5 
616.0 604.6 
633.5 679.3 
650.8 655.4 
668.7 736.2 
687.1 858.5 
706.8 819.9 
97.6 2085.0 
110.3 2047.4 
152.5 2244.6 
186.7 2396.1 
214.4 2485.0 
236.9 2610.6 
255.1 2616.1 
269.9 2769.5 
281.9 2835.0 
291.7 2928.4 
299.5 2957.0 
305.9 3034.7 
311.1 3263.0 
315.3 3354.5 
318.8 3496.1 
321.5 3653.5 
323.8 3713.5 
325.6 3880.9 
327.1 4092.5 
328.3 4149.1 
Table 6.2. (Continued) 
Non-011 Manufac- Electrl- Construe- Trade & Transport Services 
Mineral turing city, etc. tion Banking & Commun. &P. Adm. 
Year (VOMN73) (VMFG73) (VEL73) (VCON73) (VTRD73) (VTRN73) (VSER73) 
1966 118.7 318.4 12.9 85.3 646.2 146.6 476.1 
1967 133.5 328.6 16.7 74.0 150.3 487.0 487.0 
1968 149.6 368.5 19.1 123.2 864.8 171.3 538.6 
1969 167.1 447.6 22.8 154.1 990.0 199.7 597.0 
1970 186.1 553.0 26.2 184.2 1102.3 648.0 648.0 
1971 206.9 919.6 35.5 271.7 1390.1 293.8 773.2 
1972 229.4 767.3 33.1 248.5 1318.2 276.5 742.6 
1973 253.9 744.2 36.1 277.6 1408.1 298.1 780.9 
1974 280.6 776.5 38.7 302.5 1481.8 315.9 811.8 
1975 309.7 768.4 41.0 326.6 1550.7 332.6 840.4 
1976 341.3 849.7 44.1 358.7 1637.7 353.9 876.1 
1977 375.6 858.7 46.8 386.7 1713.4 372.6 906.8 
1978 413.0 1354.0 66.0 599.9 2217.0 499.4 1103.5 
1979 453.7 1605.5 77.1 731.4 2488.4 569.5 1205.0 
1980 498.0 1675.5 85.0 828.8 2675.7 618.4 1273.5 
1981 546.2 2156.4 108.4 1131.0 3201.7 758.4 1460.1 
1982 598.6 1779.5 99.0 1007.3 2995.1 703.0 1387.8 
1983 655.6 1647.6 102.3 1049.6 3066.9 722.2 1413.0 
1984 717.6 2281.0 137.1 1526.8 3802.5 922.2 1664.5 
1985 785.1 2071.2 133.6 1476.7 3730.6 902.4 1640.5 
Table 6.2. (Continued) 
Non-Oil Oil & Total 
GDP Gas GDP 
Year (GDPN73) (VOIL73) (GDP73) 
1966 3770.5 
1967 3805.2 
1968 4479.7 
1969 4874.4 
1970 5410.5 
1971 6501.4 
1972 6231.9 
1973 6568.6 
1974 6842.8 
1975 7097.9 
1976 7418.1 
1977 7695.3 
1978 9515.7 
1979 10485.1 
1980 11151.1 
1981 13015.4 
1982 12283.8 
1983 12538.1 
1984 15144.2 
1985 14889.2 
260.6 4031.2 
327.6 4132.4 
222.2 4701.9 
283.0 5257.4 
327.6 5738.1 
355.5 6856.9 
433.4 6665.3 
555.6 7124.2 
583.3 7426.1 
550.1 7648.0 
611,1 8029.2 
705.6 8400.8 
716.7 10232.5 
638.9 11124.0 
544.5 11695.6 
584.6 13600.0 
485.0 12768.8 
631.2 13169.2 
675.3 15819.5 
722.5 15611.7 
w 
Table 6,3. Sectoral Investment at 1973 price (Billion Rp): Basic Run 
Agricul­ Mining Manufact. Construc­ Trade & Transport Services Other Total 
ture SQuarry & Electr. tion Banking & Commun. & P. Adm. Capital Investm. 
Year (INAGR) (INMN) (INMFG 
+1NEL) 
(INCON) (INTRD) (INTRN) (INSER) (RCAP + 
WORCAP) 
(INTOT) 
1966 217.1 86.0 131.1 27.3 55.0 76.1 13.6 44.6 650.9 
1967 463.0 104.6 211.2 104.6 176.9 142.1 72.4 183.6 1458.4 
1968 416.8 149.1 345.1 60.7 121.8 164.4 70.8 141.4 1470.0 
1969 220.3 117.9 378.3 75.4 138.3 163.9 78.0 157.1 1329.2 
1970 207.5 156.5 99.5 69.1 117.1 76.0 64.3 144.7 934.6 
1971 208.7 259.5 252.7 0.2 0.3 34.7 0.2 60.2 816.3 
1972 368.0 211.2 232.0 32.7 52.6 59.5 28.5 99.8 1084.6 
1973 265.9 52.8 128.8 24.3 38.2 113.4 20.5 90.7 734.4 
1974 307.3 92.9 123.5 88.7 133.4 92.5 70.4 163.0 1071.6 
1975 268.6 232.5 131.4 4.3 6.3 106.0 3.3 73.1 825.4 
1976 302.0 186.2 980.5 108.4 151.6 449.8 78.1 180.5 2437.1 
1977 541.9 12.0 952.5 415.6 505.2 429.0 249.0 440.6 3545.9 
1978 297.5 256.3 692.3 106.2 115.2 493.8 54.7 175.1 2096.0 
1979 507.3 40.1 516.6 440.9 437.5 317.2 202.1 408.4 2870.1 
1980 266.8 43.0 606.7 6.7 6.2 157.0 2.8 116.6 1205.8 
1981 339.0 163.8 774.7 232.6 209.7 537.7 94.0 261.1 2612.5 
1982 656.3 324.8 932.6 635.1 520.9 203.3 226.8 488.8 3988.7 
1983 327.0 231.9 720.9 408.6 336.4 447.0 144.3 351.3 2967.6 
Table 6.4. Sectoral export (Million US $): Basic Run 
Rubber Other Timber Animal Other Tin Other Manufac­ Total Oil Total 
Estates Prod. Agric. Mineral turing Non-Oil & Gas Export 
Year (XRUB) (XOEST) (XTM) (XANI) (XOAGR) (XTIN) (XOMN) (XMFG) (XNOIL) (XOIL) (EXTOT) 
1966 223.3 120.6 3.6 4.9 7.5 32.1 1.3 78.7 499.0 215.0 714.0 
1967 168.5 109.9 6.3 6.4 9.2 51.3 3.3 87.0 526.0 244.0 770.0 
1968 193.9 132.7 34.8 10.1 16.3 48.8 8.8 122.9 775.8 303.0 1078.8 
1969 224.6 150.5 38.4 10.2 17.8 54.0 9.8 129.1 820.2 366.0 1186.2 
1970 252.4 173.3 76.3 17.3 16.7 52.2 9.3 118.3 863.4 434.0 1297.4 
1971 260.1 211.5 98.2 23.8 17.4 48.1 9.8 121.7 931.1 515.0 1446.1 
1972 234.8 221.6 123.7 25.5 19.6 77.5 11.4 131.9 971.2 877.0 1848.2 
1973 365.8 277.1 186.8 49.4 25.5 99.4 15.4 162.8 1293.7 1348.0 2641.7 
1974 463.7 364.0 315.0 71.5 35.2 145.2 22.2 209.9 1717.8 4556.0 6273.8 
1975 529.3 400.6 464.7 101.9 55.4 154.1 37.6 299.2 2139.5 5052.0 7191.5 
1976 605.5 550.2 664.9 134.2 70.2 216.1 49.1 363.2 2698.2 6081.0 8779.2 
1977 662.3 925.8 772.7 161.8 73.0 251.3 51.3 374.7 3290.4 7250.0 10540.4 
1978 749.6 949.7 1064.5 224.1 22.4 273.7 52.9 352.0 3696.7 7361.0 11057.7 
1979 924.9 995.9 1691.0 263.3 73.9 300.2 54.2 357.1 4576.1 9566.0 14142.1 
1980 1076.1 1057.3 2880.6 269.4 115.4 405.7 91.7 497.4 6219.3 15494.0 21713.3 
1981 1162.9 1159.3 3447.6 306.2 128.9 445.5 104.2 542.2 7081.2 19234.0 26315.2 
1982 1082.4 1068.9 3279.5 283.2 127.2 427.4 103.3 531.6 6700.6 15871.0 22571.6 
1983 975.1 1009.0 3430.2 287.9 108.3 373.8 90.0 438.0 6489.0 18000.0 24489.0 
1984 1083.8 1149.7 4371.8 344.4 123.0 419.9 104.6 482.0 7793.0 18000.0 25793.0 
1985 994.8 1058.6 3272.3 301.1 92.5 348.3 75.7 382.3 6306.8 18000.0 24306.8 
Table 6.5. Sectoral import (Million US $); Basic Run 
Consumption Goods Intermediate Goods Capital Services Total Total 
Goods Non-Oil Import 
Year Non-Rice Rice Non-Oil Oil (MCAP) (MSER) (MNOIL) (MTOT) 
(MCON) (HRICE) (MINT) (MOIL) 
1966 161.7 63.0 172.5 68.0 121.7 286.0 825.0 802.0 
1967 201.3 31.2 225.6 68.0 179.0 285.0 1022.0 970.0 
1968 198.9 134.8 486.7 80.0 462.4 328.0 1185.0 1265.0 
1969 193.2 77.2 525.6 87.0 531.7 416.0 1460.8 1547.8 
1970 179.9 85.3 492.6 92.0 515.8 467.0 1475.0 1567.0 
1971 197.7 97.0 524.9 112.0 587.6 538.0 1653.9 1765.9 
1972 199.2 52.2 575.6 163.0 644.4 784.0 1956.1 2119.1 
1973 240.6 408.1 734.0 305.0 648.1 1098.0 2912.7 3217.7 
1974 323.8 390.2 1002.2 1205.0 1180.3 2149.0 4246.3 5451.3 
1975 404.3 329.0 1555.0 870.0 1940.2 2565.0 6113.0 6983.0 
1976 475.4 453.5 1950.4 1609.0 2508.6 2747.0 7737.4 8946.4 
1977 500.1 688.0 2015.4 1603.0 2620.8 3360.0 8289.8 9892.8 
1978 474.2 602.0 2045.2 1602.0 2932.6 4072.0 9135.1 10737.1 
1979 605.9 605.4 2146.0 1602.0 3075.1 4952.0 10112.8 11714.8 
1980 737.6 696.1 3253.4 2446.0 4990.1 6309.0 14775.6 17221.6 
1981 804.7 730.9 3740.7 3671.0 6164.6 6939.9 17471.5 21142.5 
1982 764.3 762.5 3687.1 4427.0 5982.5 7633.9 17950.5 22377.5 
1983 694,7 805.8 3100.8 4740.0 4994.2 8397.3 16956.5 21696.5 
1984 753.7 846.1 3578.4 5075.0 6288.6 9237.0 20123.5 25198.5 
1985 654.9 888.4 2714.6 5433.0 4612.3 10160.7 18236.0 23669.0 
Table 6.6, Government revenues (Billion Rp): Basic Run 
Direct Tax Indirect Tax Non-Tax Oil-Tax Total 
Revenue Revenue Gov.Rev. 
Income Corp. Other Total Export Import Other Total 
Tax Tax Tax Tax Tax Tax 
Year (TXINC) (TXCOR) (TXODIR) (TXDIR) (TXX) (TXM) (TXOIMD) (TXIND) (TXNON) (REVOIL) (GOVREV) 
1966 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.3 2.0 3.7 4.8 10.5 0.8 0.4 13.0 
1967 3.1 3.4 2.9 9.4 10.6 16.9 13.0 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 12.1 13.9 16.6 42.6 14.1 22.5 59.1 95.7 11.9 33.2 183.4 
1969 16.5 21.0 23.1 60.6 17.1 35.4 83.8 136.2 18.3 65.8 280.9 
1970 18.5 24.2 26.8 69.6 23.5 50.3 93.3 167.2 20.8 99.3 356.9 
1971 20.8 28.4 30.5 79.7 25.4 57.4 106.7 189.4 24.6 140.7 434.4 
1972 23.9 33.6 38.0 95.6 29.9 74.9 118.8 223.6 27.8 230.5 577.4 
1973 29.4 43.1 51.7 124.1 43.2 119.1 140.9 303.3 33.8 382.3 843.5 
1974 41.6 67.0 81.5 190.1 59.3 169.5 197.3 426.1 50.6 957.2 1624.0 
1975 72.2 135.1 163.9 371.1 68.3 205.3 338.8 612.3 96.8 1248.0 2328.2 
1976 87.2 179.6 214.1 471.9 83.4 233.2 400.5 717.1 117.7 1636.0 2942.7 
1977 92.1 183.3 227.9 503.3 116.5 298.7 424.8 840.0 126.5 1949.0 3418.8 
1978 123.1 265.1 331.2 719.4 175.2 421.2 563.4 1159.8 177.4 2309.0 4365.6 
1979 124.4 267.8 339.4 731.6 238.0 493.3 564.7 1295.9 177.6 4260.0 6465.1 
1980 220.2 550.2 723.4 1493.9 397.8 646.2 970.2 2013.6 338.3 7020.0 10865.8 
1981 241.7 616.5 832.9 1691.1 372.9 779.7 1048.3 2200.9 369.9 8471.9 12733.8 
1982 259.2 678.8 895.8 1834.4 383.7 850.3 1139.0 2372.9 410.0 6562.0 11179.3 
1983 296.3 797.8 1086.0 2180.1 584.7 1153.2 1274.9 3012.9 467.4 9979.8 15640.2 
1984 321.4 874.5 1267.9 2463.8 683.5 1413.5 1336.3 3433.3 490.3 9868.1 16255.4 
1985 248.9 634.6 897.7 1781.1 858.7 1847.6 1053.3 3759.6 369.7 9723.0 15633.5 
Table 6.7. Monetary variables: Basic Run 
Real Money Reserve GDP Inflation 
Money Demand Supply Money Deflator Rate 
(MODEM) (MOSUP) (MORES) (DEF) (INFL) 
Year (Billion Rp) (Billion Rp) (Billion Rp) (1973=100.0) (%) 
1966 277.5 22.2 17.7 8.0 167.0 
1967 206.0 51.5 45.4 25.0 212.5 
1968 262.4 174.5 144.9 66.5 166.0 
1969 360.6 251.8 217.7 69.8 5.0 
1970 452.1 321.7 262.3 71.2 1.9 
1971 598.4 379.1 297.4 63.4 -11.0 
1972 648.7 570.3 412.7 78.7 24.2 
1973 676.9 637.1 469.2 94.1 19.6 
1974 724.3 893.6 737.2 123.4 31.1 
1975 805.7 1535.9 1287.3 190.6 54.5 
1976 862.5 1918.1 1610.6 222.4 16.7 
1977 934.8 2057.7 1721.6 220.1 -1.0 
1978 1133.7 2638.2 1897.8 232.7 5.7 
1979 1305.7 2870.8 2023.3 219.9 -5.5 
1980 1470.1 5134.7 3324.0 349.3 58.9 
1981 1691.5 5789.8 3948.6 342.3 -2.0 
1982 1803.1 6793.1 4764.4 376.8 10.1 
1983 1861.4 7907.8 5757.4 424.8 12.8 
1984 2008.7 8247.1 5853.6 410.6 -3.4 
1985 2079.7 6751.2 4800.6 324.6 -20.9 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Level of prices (1966=1.00); Basic Run 
Consumer Prices 
Food Clothing Housing Miscel.  Cost of GDP 
Living Deflai  
(PCFD) (PCCLOT) (PCHOU) (PCMIS) (POOL) (DEF) 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2.12 2.55 2.48 3.52 2.31 3.13 
9.13 5.82 9.02 9.05 8.93 8.31 
9.87 6.16 9.64 9.64 9.63 8.73 
10.38 6.38 10.00 10.04 10.10 8.90 
9.40 5.99 8.95 9.27 9.16 7.93 
11.53 7.14 11.14 10.95 11.20 9.84 
13.70 8.34 13.34 12.66 13.28 11.76 
15.21 10.53 16.18 13.85 14.91 15.73 
26.94 15.96 27.04 23.10 25.98 23.84 
32.86 18.63 32.40 27.78 31.55 27.81 
31.93 18.45 31.75 27.05 30.71 27.53 
33.78 19.78 33.61 28.50 32.49 29.10 
26.41 18.60 28.84 22.69 25.84 27.50 
39.74 28.51 44.88 33.20 38.95 43.69 
35.97 28.11 42.42 30.23 35.55 42.81 
41.45 30.68 47.68 34.55 40.75 47.13 
54.01 34.83 57.66 44.46 52.36 53.14 
54.41 34.33 56.93 44.78 52.61 51.36 
40.51 27.37 43.56 33.81 39.41 40.60 
Table 6.9.  Sectoral employment (Thousand): Basic Run 
Food Other Mining & Manufact. Construe- Trade & 
Crops Agrlc. Quarry & Electr. tlon Banking 
Year (LBFD) (LBOAG) (LBMN) (LBMFG) (LBCON) (LBTRD) 
1966 22096.8 2087.1 116.6 2383.0 495.1 2763.1 
1967 21820.6 2087.7 120.9 2432.3 453.5 2923.6 
1968 23080.5 2090.8 115.3 2672.7 596.5 2923.9 
1969 23544.8 2135.7 119.5 2821.0 678.0 3697.2 
1970 23757.3 2167.4 122.5 3113.6 751.7 3981.1 
1971 24127.6 2202.0 124.7 3873.8 928.7 4653.7 
1972 24030.9 2213.2 128.6 3534.2 881.5 4483.8 
1973 24638.2 2238.9 133.4 3488.3 941.8 4693.2 
1974 24699.6 2265.8 135.1 3564.5 990.8 4862.6 
1975 25055.9 2280.9 135.0 3551.3 1036.5 5018.3 
1976 24967.1 2301.3 137.7 3727.9 1094.5 5212.2 
1977 25155.4 2321.6 141.0 3751.2 1145.0 5377.8 
1978 25753.2 2372.5 142.3 4582.0 1455.2 6394.8 
1979 25844.1 2403.1 141.3 4970.0 1631.4 6963.6 
1980 26268.9 2427.7 140.0 5081.9 1754.9 7279.6 
1981 26596.7 2463.4 142.2 6719.7 2090.2 8226.4 
1982 26930.7 2461.8 140.9 5184.8 1946.4 7846.3 
1983 27270.1 2498.1 145.5 5000.7 1994.4 7977.1 
1984 27615.5 2546.4 147.8 5802.9 2454.8 9226.4 
1985 27978.4 2540.4 150.1 5535.8 2406.2 9104.6 
Table 6.9. (Continued) 
Transport Services Total Lb. Force Unemgl. 
& Communie. & P. Adra. Employm. Avail. Rate 
Year (LBTRN) (LBSER) (LABOR) (LFORCE) (UNEMP) 
1966 790.1 3405.5 34137.3 36205.8 5.713 
1967 798.0 3459.7 34096.4 37148.9 8.217 
1968 839.1 3708.4 36373.2 38131.0 4.610 
1969 889.8 3981.0 37877.0 39149.1 3.336 
1970 932.7 4213.2 39039.5 40200.1 2.887 
1971 1026.5 4742.8 41679.7 42052.6 0.887 
1972 1002.5 4614.8 40889.4 42928.2 4.749 
1973 1030.9 4782.0 41946.7 43821.7 4.279 
1974 1055.9 4912.9 42487.1 44860.2 5.290 
1975 1076.9 5032.9 43187.7 45792.7 5.689 
1976 1103.6 5180.7 43725.1 46744.3 6.459 
1977 1126.1 5305.7 44323.8 48199.4 8.041 
1978 1254.8 6062.5 48017.4 49699.4 3.384 
1979 1319.8 6442.6 49675.8 51245.6 3.063 
1980 1362.9 6694.0 51009.7 52839.5 3.463 
1981 1471.6 7352.4 54062.5 54266.2 0.375 
1982 1426.4 7092.5 53029.9 55731.4 4.847 
1983 1441.9 7182.6 53510.5 57236.1 6.509 
1984 1578.8 8031.9 57404.4 58781.5 2.343 
1985 1565.2 7951.1 57231.9 60368.6 5.196 
^Unemployment Rate in Percent. 
Table 6.10. Sectoral Income per capita at 1973 price (Thousand Rp): Basic Run 
Agri- Mining & Manufact. Construe- Trade & Transport Services 
culture Quarry & Electr. tion Banking & Communie. & P. Adm. 
Year (YCAGR) (YCMN) (YCMFG) (YCCON) (YCTRD) (YCTRN) (YSER) 
1966 29.0 1093.4 46.7 57.9 78.6 62.3 47.0 
1967 33.0 2311.1 56.0 128.3 86.5 129.1 57.2 
1968 22.1 1430.7 39.1 120.0 58.8 105.5 39.3 
1969 22.4 1947.9 41.7 127.6 59.5 112.1 39.4 
1970 22.5 2351.2 44.8 133.2 60.0 117.1 39.4 
1971 23.4 4600.4 56.2 150.4 64.4 132.6 41.6 
1972 23.8 5878.2 54.2 154.3 64.5 134.7 41.9 
1973 24.8 8040.7 54.6 165.7 66.2 143.8 42.9 
1974 29.6 20976.2 65.9 206.2 78.6 178.3 50.9 
1975 26.7 13059.5 59.0 194.8 70.6 167.3 45.8 
1976 26.1 12008.8 59.7 196.1 69.1 168.1 44.6 
1977 27.0 14991.1 61.3 205.7 71.4 176.4 46.0 
1978 28.5 18230.8 77.8 249.1 77.7 211.7 49.1 
1979 34.7 36024.0 100.2 318.8 95.8 270.6 60.0 
1980 37.5 38831.8 109.8 363.6 103.3 306.6 64.4 
1981 41.5 52113.3 133.5 442.4 117.2 370.5 72.1 
1982 40.1 44052.4 118.3 409.9 110.5 342.9 68.2 
1983 36.3 34365.8 100.8 367.7 97.7 307.2 60.2 
1984 36.3 34797.5 114.3 412.7 100.5 341.0 60.9 
1985 38.3 45300.6 114.6 422.9 105.3 350.5 63.9 
Table 6.11. Class population income and expenditure,^ and household savings: Basic Run 
Population Employed Total Income 
(Thousand) (Billion Rp) 
I II III IV I II III IV 
Year (POPl) (P0P2) (P0P3) (P0P4) (YTl) (YT2) (YT3) (YT4) 
1969 2784.5 5676.7 19859.9 8700.1 90.1 392.4 1947.5 3306.8 
1970 2886.2 5858.9 19995.2 9141.7 97.3 422.2 2047.2 2560.2 
1971 3100.9 6204.7 20025.0 10058.4 114.7 490.1 2248.4 3332.8 
1972 2980.2 6051.4 19828.2 9722.6 107.2 466.3 2178.8 3147.8 
1973 3007.8 6197.4 20371.9 10044.7 110.3 487.6 2274.8 3346.3 
1974 3025.8 6263.4 20207.2 10251.7 112.2 499.0 2305.5 3797.5 
1975 3041.9 6356.1 20411.3 10473.5 115.0 516.5 2381.4 3828.1 
1976 3089.7 6447.0 20364.1 10744.9 119.4 536.0 2433.8 4141.8 
1977 3108.1 6530.4 20470.3 10972.8 121.8 551.5 2490.1 4348.3 
1978 3411.0 7135.7 21039.2 12532.1 149.1 669.9 2842.1 5508.1 
1979 3540.2 7413.1 21175.6 13318.0 161.5 725.8 2986.3 7334.2 
1980 3611.9 7627.2 21535.6 13878.8 169.1 766.2 3121.0 7834.7 
1981 3853.9 8153.0 21975.6 15357.9 194.8 882.8 3432.1 9666.0 
1982 3704.0 7955.1 22081.1 14784.9 180.7 833.7 3350.1 7936.7 
1983 3679.5 8023.4 22318.4 14937.8 179.9 844.6 3408.7 8295.1 
1984 3981.2 8691.6 22831.2 16879.5 214.4 1004.4 3823.2 9857.3 
1985 3921.8 864.2 23022.1 16990.0 207.6 983.9 3809.0 10010.9 
^Income and expenditure are at constant 1973 price. 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
6.11. (Continued) 
Disposable Income Household Expenditure 
(Billion Rp) (Billion Rp) 
I II III IV I II III IV 
(YDl) (YD2) (YD3) (YD4) (EXl) (EX2) (EX3) (EX4) 
86.0 374.9 1862.4 3165.2 
93.9 407.8 1979.1 2388.1 93.9 401.6 1898.7 2243.7 
110.3 471.6 2166.3 2918.5 110.3 464.5 2078.3 2914.6 
102.8 447.7 2093.8 2918.5 102.8 440.8 2008.8 2741.9 
105.4 466.7 2176.8 3086.2 105.4 459.0 2088.4 2899.5 
106.4 473.3 2189.4 3448.9 106.4 466.0 2100.6 3240.3 
111.0 498.8 2301.5 3518.8 111.0 491.1 2208.0 3305.9 
116.1 521.5 2369.6 3841.3 116.1 513.5 2273.4 3608.9 
117.4 531.9 2403.9 3990.4 117.4 523.8 2306.3 3729.0 
143.3 644.1 2735.3 5022.0 143.3 634.2 2624.2 4718.1 
157.7 709.1 2919.4 6805.6 157.7 698.2 2800.9 6396.8 
167.0 757.1 3084.8 7242.1 167.0 745.5 2959.5 6803.9 
192.0 870.1 3383.0 8910.2 192.0 856.8 3246.5 8371.1 
177.5 819.2 3293.1 7216.7 177.5 806.7 3159.4 6780.1 
175.3 823.3 3324.7 7555.3 175.3 810.7 3189.7 7098.2 
208.4 976.5 3719.7 8990.5 208.4 961.6 3568.7 8446.6 
198.6 941.9 3650.6 9027.1 198.6 927.5 3502.4 8480.9 
Table 6.11. (Continued) 
Year 
Total 
Expend. 
(Billion Rp) 
(EXTOT) 
Household 
Savings 
(Billion Rp) 
(SAVHH) 
1969 3378.1 525.6 
1970 4709.8 295.5 
1971 5015.9 356.6 
1972 4954.4 462.3 
1973 5056.8 711.8 
1974 5304.2 975.5 
1975 5870.7 1162.1 
1976 6027.2 1383.8 
1977 6341.4 1830.8 
1978 7747.0 2457.4 
1979 8980.9 2471.7 
1980 11364.7 2866.8 
1981 11071.8 3740.8 
1982 10781.9 3832.6 
1983 12443.3 5756.8 
1984 10681.0 7393.6 
1985 10646.9 10280.5 
H^ousehold savings are in current Rupials. 
Table 6.12. Ginl coefficient and poverty Index: Basic Run 
Gini Money Trans­ Poverty 
Coefficient ferred Index 
Year (Gini) (Billion Rp) 
(MOPOV) 
(PCVEX) 
1969 0.377 77.8 0.475 
1970 0.292 74.9 0.444 
1971 0.315 66.9 0.377 
1972 0.313 67.0 0.394 
1973 0.315 65.5 0.384 
1974 0.335 64.6 0.378 
1975 0.326 60.4 0.352 
1976 0.334 57.5 0.331 
1977 0.337 56.7 0.326 
1978 0.339 46.8 0.246 
1979 0.381 38.9 0.198 
1980 0.377 33.6 0.168 
1981 0.385 22.2 0.103 
1982 0.355 28.3 0.138 
1983 0.362 29.1 0.142 
1984 0.355 12.8 0.058 
1985 0.364 19.3 0.089 
®At 1973 constant price. Poverty line is assumed to be at Rp 20,000 
per year at 1973 price. 
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be seen from Table 6.3. 
Increase in real income affects both exports and imports of non-oil. 
The average non-oil exports increased to 6873.5 million US $ per year 
during 1981-1985 compared to 2067.9 million US $ per year in 1966-1980. 
Non-oil imports also increase to 17132.6 million US $ on average compared 
to 5510.5 million US $ per year in 1966-1980 (Tables 6.4 and 6.5). 
The increase of current income increases government domestic revenue. 
With the increase of oil export over import, revenue from the oil tax 
also increases. Total government revenues from these sources increased 
to an average of Rp 14288.4 billion in 1981-1985 compared to Rp 10865.8 
in 1980 (Table 6.6). This increase in government revenues together with 
the assumed Increase in government expenditures, domestic credit 
situation, and the level of export-import determine the level of money 
supply. 
Real income also affects real money demand. During the period of 
1981-1985, money demand increases to an average of Rp 1888.9 billion 
(compared to Rp 1470.1 billion in 1980). While the level of money supply 
also increases to an average of Rp 7097.8 billion, (compared to Rp 5134.7 
billion in 1980), the GDP price deflator tends to decrease during that 
period (Table 6.7). 
The above macroeconomic variables determine the domestic price 
level, the level of employment, and the income distribution situation in 
Indonesia. The consumer price and cost of living can be seen from Table 
6.8. An average of 55.05 million laborers are employed each year during 
the period 1981-1985. This brings a level of unemployment rate (open) of 
3.84 percent on the average (Table 6.9). With this level of unemployment 
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and the monetary situation, consumer prices tend to increase on the 
average to a level of 3.32 (1973 = 1.0). 
The income distribution situation is shown by the sectoral income per 
capita (Table 6.10), and by the distribution of income among income 
classes (Table 6.11). Both total income and disposable income for each 
income class are predicted. All figures indicate an increasing income 
every year. This model also simulates the level of household 
expenditures for each income class and the level of household savings. 
The level of household savings determines total savings needed for 
investment. During the period of 1981-1985, average household savings 
reach Rp 5287.0 billion per year. 
Finally, Table 6.12 shows the Gini coefficient as indicator of 
inequality. It can be seen that the Gini coefficient has increased every 
year since 1970. This has indicated a worsening of the distribution of 
Income in Indonesia since the beginning of the five-year development 
plans. As more people are employed, the poverty index shows decreasing 
figures. 
6.3.2. Alternative runs 
Ten alternative runs are simulated, each of which is under different 
exogenous changes, which make each run have a different response from 
that of the basic run. From these different responses, several things 
can be seen including the sensitivity of the present model to any 
exogenous change, and more specifically the relationships between growth 
and equity of the economy. Tables 6.13 to 6.32 explain the following 
discussion. 
Table 6.13. Some selected endogenous macroeconoralc indicators^: Alternative Run 
Non-Oil Real Income Non-Oil Export & Government Revenues 
(billion Rp) Import (billion Rp) 
(million US $) 
Year Agricult. Total Export Import Direct Indir Non— Oil Total 
Tax Tax Tax Tax 
(VAGR73) (GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (TXDIR) (TXIND) (TXNON) (REVOIL) (GOVREV) 
1966 2085.0 3770.5 499.0 734.0 1.3 10.5 0.8 0.4 13.0 
1967 2047.4 3805.2 526.0 902.0 9.4 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 2244.6 4479.7 775.8 1185.0 42.6 95.7 11.9 33.2 183.4 
1969 2396.1 4974.4 820.2 1460.8 60.6 136.2 18.3 65.8 280.9 
1970 2485.0 5410.5 863.4 1475.0 69.6 167.2 20.8 99.3 357.9 
1971 2610.5 6499.4 930.9 1653.7 79.7 189.4 24.6 140.7 434.4 
1972 2616.2 6232.3 971.3 1956.3 95.6 223.6 27.8 230.5 577.4 
1973 2769.6 6571.5 1294.0 2913.3 124.1 303.3 33.8 382.3 843.6 
1974 2835.0 6844.7 1718.0 4246.4 190.1 426.1 50.5 957.2 1624.0 
1975 2928.5 7101.5 2140.0 6114.0 371.1 612.3 96.8 1248.0 2328.2 
1976 2956.8 7412.5 2696.8 7333.9 471.7 717.0 117.7 1636.0 2942.3 
1977 3034.6 7694.3 3290.5 8290.5 503.4 840.1 126.5 1949.0 3419.0 
1978 3262.8 9510.5 3695.5 9133.6 719.4 1159.7 177.4 2309.0 4365.5 
1979 3354.4 10482.7 4575.9 10113.1 731.7 1296.0 177.6 4260.0 6465.3 
1980 3495.9 11146.3 6217.7 14714.0 1493.8 2013.5 338.3 7020.0 10865.7 
1981 3652.6 13001.4 7076.1 17465.1 1690.8 2200.7 369.9 8741.9 12733.3 
1982 3712.5 12258.8 6692.2 17939.1 1834.0 2372.7 409.9 6562.0 11178.5 
1983 3878.4 12479.4 6469.4 16933.4 2178.5 3012.2 467.1 9979.8 15637.7 
1984 4090.4 15092.8 7781.2 20115.4 2465.8 3434.1 490.7 9868.1 16258.6 
1985 4146.2 14817.0 6289.6 18220.0 1781.3 3759.7 369.8 9723.0 15633.7 
^Real values are at 1973 price. 
Alternative run I involves an increase of income of wage and nonwage earners in proportion to 
the increase of value added per worker. 
Table 6.13. (Continued) 
Monetary Variables 
(billion Rp) 
Real Money 
Demand 
(MODEM) 
Money 
Supply 
(MOSUP) 
Price 
Deflator 
(1973=100.0) 
(DBF) 
Total Real 
Investment 
(billion Rp) 
(INTOT) 
277.5 22.2 
206.0 51.5 
262.4 174.5 
360.6 251.8 
452.1 321.7 
598.3 379.1 
648.7 510.3 
677.1 637.0 
724.5 893.6 
806.1 1535.9 
862.3 1918.4 
934.7 2057.9 
1133.2 2638.3 
1305.3 2870.7 
1469.4 5134.4 
1690.0 5789.7 
1799.9 6793.0 
1854.3 7908.2 
2000.3 8244.6 
2068.9 6747.7 
8.0 649.8 
25.0 1443.8 
66.5 1450.1 
69.8 2077.6 
71.2 1051.0 
63.4 920.0 
78.7 1139.9 
94.1 700.8 
123.3 1015.6 
190.5 1011.0 
222.5 2656.6 
220.2 3579.4 
232.8 2137.0 
219.9 3183.5 
349.4 1558.8 
342.6 1687.5 
377.4 3654.0 
426.5 3535.0 
412.2 -
326.2 -
Table 6.14. Employment and income distribution indicators^ : Alternative Run 1^  
Employment Class Disposable Income 
(billion Rp) 
Year Total Employed Umempl. Rt. I II III IV 
(thousand) (%) (YDl) (YD2) (YD3) (YD4) 
(LABOR) (UNEMP) 
1966 34137.3 5.713 - - - -
1967 34096.4 8.217 - - - -
1968 36373.2 4.610 - - - -
1969 37877.0 3.249 86.0 374.8 1862.3 3165.0 
1970 39039.3 2.888 92.8 394.9 1913.4 2467.1 
1971 41694.2 0.852 112.7 445.7 2003.3 3289.9 
1972 40897.6 4.730 106.9 437.1 2022.4 2998.1 
1973 41960.1 4.248 109.9 458.4 2135.8 3135.6 
1974 42496.3 5.269 132.3 549.0 2535.9 3005.4 
1975 43203.1 9.999 121.6 511.6 2367.8 3435.4 
1976 43719.9 6.470 123.3 512.4 2333.2 3877.4 
1977 44331.0 8.026 127.2 532.1 2419.4 3968.1 
1978 48016.4 3.386 162.4 629.8 2646.5 5104.9 
1979 49679.8 3.055 217.6 819.0 3308.8 6251.1 
1980 51013.2 3.456 244.6 919.7 3683.8 6408.3 
1981 54051.4 0.396 308.2 1109.7 4191.5 7741.9 
1982 53003.7 4.894 267.1 1015.5 4032.1 6176.3 
1983 53429.0 6.652 228.0 899.2 3665.4 7036.1 
1984 57342.6 2.448 268.7 999.6 3799.2 8785.8 
1985 57134.1 5.358 265.0 1019.2 3966.0 8502.3 
I^ncomes are at constant 1973 price, saving at current price. 
A^lternative Run I involves an increase of income of wage and non-wage earners in proportion to 
the increase of value added per worker. 
Table 6.14. (Continued) 
Average Household Gini Poverty Cost of 
Income Saving Coeff. Index Living 
(thousand Rp) (billion Rp) (1973=1.0) 
(YDA) (HHSAV) (GINI) (POVEX) (PCOL) 
- - -
- 0.075 
-
- -
- 0.174 
— - -
- 0.671 
148.2 940.0 0.377 0.475 0.724 
128.5 372.9 0.307 0.450 0.759 
148.5 429.7 0.342 0.364 0.690 
144.2 512.0 0.325 0.371 0.843 
147.9 668.1 0.321 0.357 1.000 
156.5 885.3 0.268 0.227 1.121 
159.7 1412.4 0.313 0.291 1.952 
168.5 1708.3 0.338 0.289 2.373 
171.5 1882.2 0.333 0.270 2.309 
193.6 2568.2 0.346 0.146 2.442 
233.1 2218.0 0.329 -0.106 1.941 
241.2 3490.7 0.306 -0.219 2.926 
270.6 3945.8 0.300 -0.440 2.673 
237.1 4133.4 0.270 -0.299 3.067 
242.0 5671.8 0.323 -0.118 3.951 
264.7 6762.5 0.341 -0.217 3.969 
263.5 5598.4 0.330 -0.219 2.977 
Table 6.15. Some selected endogenous macroeconomlc indicators^ : Alternative Run 11^  
Non-Oil Real Income Non-Oil Export & Government Revenues 
(billion Rp) Import (billion Rp) 
(million US $) 
Year Agricult. Total Export Import Direct Indlr Non— Oil Total 
Tax Tax Tax Tax 
(VAGR73) (GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (TXDIR) (TXIND) (TXNON (RËV0IL) (GOVREV) 
1966 2085.0 3770.5 499.0 734.0 1.3 10.5 0.8 0.4 13.0 
1967 2047.4 3805.2 526.0 902.0 9.4 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 2244.6 4479.7 775.8 1185.0 42.6 95.7 11.9 33.2 183.4 
1969 2396.1 4974.4 820.2 1460.8 60.6 136.2 18.3 65.8 280.9 
1970 2485.0 5410.5 863.4 1475.0 69.6 167.2 20.8 99.3 356.9 
1971 2610.5 6499.8 930.9 1653.7 79.7 189.4 24.6 140.7 434.4 
1972 2616.1 6230.8 971.2 1956.0 95.6 223.6 27.8 230.5 577.4 
1973 2769.5 6567.4 1293.6 2912.6 124.1 303.3 33.8 382.3 843.5 
1974 2834.9 6841.1 1717.6 4246.0 190.1 426.1 50.6 957.2 1624.0 
1975 2928.3 7096.5 2139.3 6112.8 371.2 612.3 96.8 1248.0 2328.3 
1976 2957.0 7415.8 2697.8 7336.7 471.9 717.1 117.7 1636.0 2942.7 
1977 3034.6 7693.2 3290.0 8289.4 503.3 840.0 126.5 1949.0 3418.9 
1978 3262-9 9512.5 3696.0 9134.3 719.4 1159.8 177.4 2309.0 4365.6 
1979 3354.4 10482.5 4575.5 10112.4 731.6 1296.0 177.6 4260.0 6465.1 
1980 3495.9 11147.0 6218.0 14774.1 1493.8 2013.6 338.3 7020.0 10865.7 
1981 3653.1 13012.0 7080.4 17470.7 1691.2 2200.9 370.0 8471.9 12734.0 
1982 3713.3 12279.2 6699.1 17948.6 1834.4 2372.9 409.9 6502.0 11179.2 
1983 3880.7 12532.7 6487.4 16955.0 2180.1 3012.9 467.4 9979.8 15640.2 
1984 4092.2 15138.5 7791.5 20122.1 2463.9 3433.3 490.4 9868.1 16255.6 
1985 4148.9 14883.3 6305.3 18234.7 1781.1 3759.6 369.7 9723.9 15633.4 
R^eal values are at 1973 price. 
A^lternative Run II involves annual distribution of 10 billion of incomes from the richest class 
to lower classes. 
Table 6.15. (Continued) 
Monetary Variables 
(billion Rp) 
Real Money Money 
Demand Supply 
(MODEM) (MOSUP) 
277.5 22.2 
206.0 51.5 
262.5 174.5 
360.6 254.8 
452.1 321.7 
598.3 379.1 
648.6 510.3 
676.8 637.0 
724.1 893.6 
805.5 1535.8 
862.3 1918.1 
934.5 2057.6 
1133.3 2638.0 
1305.3 2870.5 
1469.5 5134.3 
1690.9 5789.2 
1802.3 6792.5 
1860.5 7907.1 
2007.7 8246.3 
2078.7 6750.4 
Price Total Real 
Deflator Investment 
(1973=100.0) (billion Rp) 
(DBF) (INTOT) 
8,0 649.8 
25.0 1443.8 
66.5 1450.1 
69.8 2078.1 
71.2 1048.6 
63.4 916.1 
78.7 1137.7 
94.1 699.2 
123.4 1025.6 
190.7 1014.5 
222.4 2655.6 
220.2 3580.4 
232.8 2135.4 
219.9 3196.1 
349.4 1583.8 
342.4 1720.4 
376.9 3686.6 
425.0 3552.2 
410.7 -
324.7 -
Table 6.16. Employment and income distribution indicators^ : Alternative Run 11^  
Employment Class Disposable Income 
(billion Rp) 
Year Total Employed Unempl. Rt. I II III IV 
(thousand) (%) (YDl) (YD2) (YD3) (YD4) 
(LABOR) (UNEMP) 
1966 34137.3 5.713 - - - -
1967 34096.4 8.217 - - - -
1968 36373.2 4.610 - - - -
1969 37877.0 3.249 92.6 378.8 1865.0 3151.8 
1970 39039.3 2.888 100.3 411.6 1981.5 2374.9 
1971 41694.5 0.852 117.4 476.4 2169.5 3088.8 
1972 40894.1 4.738 108.5 451.3 2096.2 2907.1 
1973 41949.9 4.271 110.2 469.0 2179.0 3077.0 
1974 42487.9 5.288 110.6 475.9 2191.3 3441.4 
1975 43191.0 5.681 113.5 500.4 2302.8 3514.8 
1976 43726.3 6.456 118.2 522.8 2370.6 3837.6 
1977 44327.5 8.033 119.5 533.3 2405.2 3987.8 
1978 48018.8 3.382 145.3 645.3 2736.3 5018.8 
1979 40677.7 3.050 160.3 710.7 2920.8 6804.4 
1980 51012.6 3.457 168.8 758.3 3085.9 7242.7 
1981 54064.7 0.371 193.8 871.4 3385.1 8911.5 
1982 53033.9 4.480 179.1 820.4 3294.4 7217.1 
1983 53512.9 6.505 176.6 824.2 3325.7 7556.5 
1984 57410.0 2.333 209.6 977.6 3720.9 8992.9 
1985 57232.3 5.195 200.2 943.0 3651.5 9027.6 
I^ncome are at constant 1973 price, saving at current price. 
A^lternative Run II involves annual distribution of 10 billion incomes from the richest class to 
lower classes. 
Table 6.16. (Continued) 
Average Household Glni Poverty Cost of 
Income Saving CoefE. Index Living 
(thousand Rp) (billion Rp) (1973=1.0) 
(YDA) (HHSAV) (GINI) (POVEX) (PCOL) 
— - - - 0.075 
— -
-
- 0.174 
-
-
- 0.672 
148.2 940.4 0.373 0.435 0.724 
128.5 371.0 0.288 0.406 0.759 
148.5 426.4 0.312 0.338 0.090 
144.1 510.1 0.310 0.361 0.843 
147.8 666.5 0.312 0.356 1.000 
156.5 898.4 0.333 0.353 1.122 
159.6 1417.3 0.325 0.388 1.954 
168.5 1706.8 0.333 0.319 2.372 
171.5 1883.7 0.336 0.314 2.310 
193.7 2565.4 0.339 0.236 2.443 
233.1 2249.3 0.380 0.185 1.942 
241.3 3560.8 0.377 0.159 2.927 
270.1 4037.5 0.385 0.095 2.672 
237.4 4223.6 0.355 0.130 3.063 
242.7 5730.2 0.362 0.136 3.935 
265.3 6784.2 0.355 0.052 3.953 
264.4 5640.4 0.364 0.081 2.962 
Table 6.17. Some selected endogenous macroeconoralc indicators^; Alternative Run 
Non-Oil Real Income Non-Oil Export & Government Revenues 
(billion Rp) Import (billion Rp) 
(million US $) 
Year Agricult. Total Export Import Direct Indir Non— Oil Total 
Tax Tax Tax Tax 
(VAGR73) (GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (TXDIR) (TXIND) (TXNON) (REVOIL) (GOVREV) 
1966 2085.0 3770.5 499.0 734.0 1.3 10.5 0.8 0.4 13.0 
1967 2047.4 3805.2 526.0 902.0 9.4 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 2245.5 4481.2 775.9 1185.2 42.6 95.7 11.9 33.2 183.4 
1969 2397.0 2974.3 820.2 1460.6 60.6 136.2 18.3 65.8 280.9 
1970 2485.9 5411.4 863.5 1475.1 69.6 167.2 20.8 99.3 434.4 
1971 2611.5 6499.9 930.9 1653.7 79.7 189.4 24.6 140.7 434.4 
1972 2617.1 6231.7 971.2 1956.1 95.6 223.6 27.8 230.5 577.4 
1973 2770.6 6568.8 1293.7 2912.8 124.1 303.3 33.8 382.3 843.5 
1974 2836.0 6842.3 1717.8 4246.2 190.1 426.1 50.6 957.2 1624.0 
1975 2929.5 7098.3 2139.6 6113.3 371.2 612.3 96.8 1248.0 2328.3 
1976 2958.1 7417.3 2698.0 7337.0 471.8 717.1 117.1 1636.0 2942.7 
1977 3035.8 7695.2 3290.4 8290.0 503.3 840.0 126.5 1949.0 3418.8 
1978 3264.2 9514.7 3696.4 9134.8 719.4 1159.7 177.4 2309.0 4365.6 
1979 3355.8 10484.4 4576.0 10112.7 731.6 1295.9 177.6 4260.0 6465.1 
1980 3497.4 11149.6 6218.6 14775.2 1493.8 2013.5 338.3 7020.0 10865.7 
1981 3654.6 13014.2 7080.9 17471.4 1691.2 2200.9 369.9 8471.9 12733.9 
1982 3714.9 12281.7 6699.9 17949.6 1834.4 2372.9 409.9 6562.0 11179.3 
1983 3882.4 12535.0 6488.0 16955.6 2180.1 3012.9 467.4 9979.8 15640.2 
1984 4094.1 15141.4 7792.3 20123.0 2463.9 3433.3 490.3 9868.1 16255.6 
1985 4150.8 14885.6 6305.9 18235.2 1781.1 2759.6 369.7 9723.0 15633.5 
^Real values are at constant 1973 price. 
^Alternative Run III involves an increase of per year fertilizer supply by 1 percent. 
Table 6.17. (Continued) 
Monetary Variables 
(billion Rp) 
Real Money Money Price Total Real 
Demand Supply Deflator Investment 
(1973=100.0) (billion Rp) 
(MODEM) (MOSUP) (DEF) (INTOT) 
277.5 22.2 8.0 649.8 
206.0 51.5 25.0 1443.8 
262.5 174.5 66.5 1450.1 
360.6 251.8 69.8 2077.8 
452.1 321.7 71.2 1049.2 
598.3 379.1 63.4 916.6 
648.7 510.4 78.7 1138.3 
676.9 637.1 94.1 699.7 
724.2 893.6 123.4 1025.9 
805.7 1535.9 190.6 1014.7 
862.5 1918.1 222.4 2656.0 
934.8 2057.7 220.1 3580.6 
1133.6 2638.2 232.7 2135.6 
1305.6 2870.7 219.9 3196.4 
1469.9 5134.7 349.3 1583.9 
1691.3 5789.7 342.3 1720.4 
1802.8 6793.0 376.8 3686.8 
1861.0 7907.6 424.9 3551.3 
2008.2 8246.9 410.7 -
2079.1 6750.9 324.7 -
3 b 
Table 6.18. Employment and income distribution indicators ; Alternative Run III 
Employment Class Disposable Income 
(billion Rp) 
Year Total Employed Unempl. Rt. I II III IV 
(thousand) (%) 
(LABOR) (UNEMP) (YDl) (YD2) (YD3) (YD4) 
1966 34137.3 5.713 - - - -
1967 34096.4 8.217 - - - -
1968 36380.2 4.592 - - - -
1969 37878.9 3.245 86.0 374.8 1862.3 3165.0 
1970 39044.5 2.875 93.9 407.9 1979.2 2388.1 
1971 41699.0 0.841 110.4 472.3 2166.8 3102.6 
1972 40900.0 4.725 102.9 447.9 2094.2 2919.1 
1973 41957.0 4.255 105.4 466.3 2177.4 3087.5 
1974 42494.5 5.274 106.4 473.4 2189.9 3450.7 
1975 43199.4 5.663 111.0 499.0 2302.2 3521.0 
1976 43733.1 6.442 116.1 521.6 2370.1 3842.9 
1977 44336.5 8.014 117.5 532.2 2404.8 3993.3 
1978 48027.7 3.363 143.3 644.3 2736.0 5024.2 
1979 49686.5 3.042 157.9 709.4 2920.3 6810.8 
1980 51022.4 3.439 167.2 757.5 3085.9 7248.5 
1981 54073.9 3.543 192.1 870.5 3385.0 8917.2 
1982 53044.3 4.822 177.6 819.6 3294.4 7222.6 
1983 53523.8 6.486 175.4 823.6 3325.9 7561.3 
1984 57420.3 2.316 208.5 977.0 3721.2 8997.9 
1985 57243.2 5.177 198.7 942.2 3651.6 9032.8 
^Incomes are at constant 1973 price. 
^Alternative Run III involves an increase of per year fertilizer supply by 1 percent. 
Table 6.18. (Continued) 
Average Household Gini Poverty 
Income Saving Coeff. Index 
(thousand Rp) (billion Rp) 
(YDA) (HHSAV) (GINI) (POVEX) 
— — 
- - -
-
- - -
148.2 940.2 0.377 0.475 
128.5 371.5 0.292 0.444 
151.6 426.8 0.315 0.377 
144.2 510.6 0.313 0.394 
147.8 667.0 0.315 0.383 
156.5 898.9 0.335 0.378 
159.6 1417.6 0.326 0.352 
168.5 1707.4 0.334 0.331 
171.5 1884.1 0.337 0.325 
193.7 2565.7 0.339 0.246 
233.2 2250.0 0.381 0.198 
241.3 3561.0 0.377 0.167 
270.8 4037.5 0.385 0.103 
237.4 4224.0 0.355 0.137 
242.7 5730.7 0.362 0.142 
265.4 6784.8 0.355 0.058 
264.4 5641.5 0.364 0.088 
Cost of 
Living 
(1973=1.0) 
(PCOL) 
0.075 
0.174 
0.672 
0.724 
0.759 
0.690 
0.843 
1.000 
1.122 
1.953 
2.372 
2.309 
2.442 
1.942 
2.926 
2.671 
3.062 
3.934 
3.952 
2.962 
3 b 
Table 6.19. Some selected endogenous macroeconomlc indicators ; Alternative Run IV 
Non-011 Real Income Non-Oil Export & Government Revenues 
(billion Rp) & Import (billion Rp) 
(million US $) 
Year Agricult. Total Export Import Direct Indir. Non- Oil Total 
Tax Tax Tax Tax 
(VAGR730 (GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (TXDIR) (TXIND) (TXNON) (REVOIL) (GOVREV) 
1966 2085.0 3770.5 499.0 734.0 1.3 10.5 0.8 0.4 13.0 
1967 2047.4 3805.2 526.0 902.0 9.4 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 2244.6 4477.6 775.6 1184.6 42.6 95.7 11.9 33.2 183.4 
1969 2396.0 4968.8 819.9 1460.0 60.5 136.2 18.3 65.8 280.9 
1970 2484.6 5400.6 862.8 1474.0 69.6 167.1 20.8 99.3 356.8 
1971 2609.9 6479.7 929.7 1651.8 79.7 189.4 24.6 140.7 434.3 
1972 2615.5 6211.8 970.1 1954.6 95.6 223.6 27.8 230.5 577.5 
1973 2768.6 6541.8 1291.4 2909.5 124.1 303.3 33.8 382.3 843.5 
1974 3844.9 6812.9 1714.7 4242.5 190.2 426.2 50.6 957.2 1624.2 
1975 2927.1 7062.6 2135.1 6105.9 371.3 612.4 96.8 1248.0 2328.5 
1976 2955.6 7379.0 2692.2 7328.0 472.1 717.2 117.8 1636.0 2943.1 
1977 3033.1 7650.7 3281.6 8278.1 503.5 840.1 126.6 1949.0 3419.2 
1978 3261.0 9463.6 3686.5 9123.1 719.6 1159.9 177.5 2309.0 4365.9 
1979 3352.5 10431.7 4564.0 10101.7 731.8 1296.0 177.6 4260.0 6465.5 
1980 3493.7 11088.8 6207.5 14747.9 1495.1 2014.2 338.6 7020.0 10867.9 
1981 3650.8 12950.8 7063.4 17449.5 1691.6 2201.1 370.0 8471.9 12734.6 
1982 3710.9 12215.9 6679.8 17925.6 1834.3 2372.8 409.9 6562.0 11179.0 
1983 3878.0 12467.9 6469.4 16936.5 2180.7 3013.1 467.5 9979.8 15641.1 
1984 4089.1 15061.7 7769.7 20100.9 2462.4 3433.5 490.4 9868.1 16256.4 
1985 4145.2 14816.5 6289.6 18220.3 1781.4 3759.8 369.8 9723.0 15633.9 
^Real values are at constant 1973 price. 
A^lternative l{un IV involves an increase of 10 billion rupiah investment per year for rural 
development program. 
Table 6.19. (Continued) 
Monetary Variables 
(billion Rp) 
Real Money 
Demand 
(MODEM) 
Money 
Supply 
(MOSUP) 
Price 
Deflator 
(1973=100.0) 
(DEF) 
277.5 22.2 8.0 
206,0 51.5 25.0 
262.3 174.5 66.5 
360.3 251.8 69.9 
451.3 321.7 71.3 
506.6 379.1 63.5 
646.5 510.2 78.9 
674.0 636.7 94.5 
720.7 893.1 123.9 
801.2 1534.8 191.6 
857.2 1916.4 223.6 
928.6 2055.4 221.3 
1126.0 2634.0 233.9 
1296.9 2865.8 221.0 
1459.8 5122.6 350.9 
1680.0 5778.0 343.9 
1790.3 6780.7 378.7 
1848.0 7894.4 427.2 
1994.2 8232.2 412.8 
2065.5 6737.2 326.2 
Total Real 
Investment 
(billion Rp) 
(INTOT) 
649.8 
1443.8 
1450.1 
2069.3 
1047.8 
914.9 
1136.7 
698.3 
1024.9 
1012.9 
2653.9 
3578.5 
2133.2 
3195.0 
1582.4 
1719.3 
3684.9 
3549.5 
3 b 
Table 6,20. Employment and income distribution indicators : Alternative Run IV 
Employment Class Disposable Income 
(billion Rp) 
Year Total Employed Unempl. Rt. I II III IV 
(thousand) (%) 
(LABOR) (UNEMP) (ÏD1) (YD2) (YD3) (YD4) 
1966 34137.3 5.713 - - - -
1967 34096.4 8.217 - - - -
1968 36363.7 4.635 - - - -
1969 37858.0 3.298 86.0 374.8 1862.1 3164.7 
1970 39010.6 2.959 93.8 407.5 1977.9 2378.3 
1971 41650.4 0.957 110.2 471.4 2164.0 3085.7 
1972 40848.2 4.845 102.7 447.0 2091.3 2902.8 
1973 41890.0 4.408 105.1 465.0 2173.4 3067.1 
1974 42423.2 5.432 106.0 472.0 2185.5 3428.4 
1975 43114.1 5.850 110.6 497.2 2296.8 3494.4 
1976 43644.8 6.631 115.6 519.7 2364.5 3813.7 
1977 44236.2 8.223 116.9 529.9 2398.1 3960.0 
1978 47927.1 3.566 142.8 641.9 2729.4 4986.1 
1979 49585.9 3.239 157.3 707.0 2913.8 6767.9 
1980 50912.5 3.647 166.5 754.7 3078.4 7198.2 
1981 53965.2 0.555 191.5 867.8 3377.9 8862.1 
1982 52929.6 5.027 177.0 816.7 3286.5 7170.6 
1983 53405.7 6.692 174.8 820.6 3317.6 7507.2 
1984 57294.1 2.530 207.8 973.7 3712.3 8934.4 
1985 57129.8 5.365 198.1 939.4 3643.6 8977.2 
^Incomes are in constant 1973 price. 
A^lternative Run IV involves an Increase of 10 billion rupiah investment per year for rural 
development program. 
Table 6.20. (Continued) 
Average Household Glni Poverty Cost of 
Dispos. Saving Goaf f Index Living 
Income 
(1973=1.0) ( thousand Rp) (billion Rp) 
(YDA) (HHSAV) (GINI) (POVEX) (PCOL) 
- - 0.075 
_ 
- 0.173 
- - 0.669 
148.2 933.8 0.377 0.475 0.722 
128.3 370.4 0.291 0.444 0.757 
148.1 425.4 0.314 0.378 0.688 
143.7 509.2 0.312 0.395 0.841 
147.3 665.6 0.314 0.384 1.000 
155.9 897.6 0.334 0.379 1.123 
159.0 1415.0 0.325 0.354 1.956 
167.8 1704.2 0.334 0.333 2.376 
170.7 1880.7 0.336 0.327 2.314 
192.9 2561.5 0.339 0.248 2.446 
232.3 2246.5 0.380 0.199 1.946 
240.3 3556.9 0.377 0.169 2.933 
269.9 4034.2 0.385 0.105 2.680 
236.5 4218.8 0.355 0.139 3.071 
241.8 5724.2 0.362 0.144 3.946 
264.3 6775.8 0.355 0.060 3.962 
263.5 5634.4 0.364 0.090 2.967 
Table 6.21. Some selected endogenous macroeconoraic indicators^ : Alternative Run V 
Non-Oil Real Income Non-Oil Export Government Revenues 
& Import 
(billion Hp) (million US $) (billion Rp) 
Year Agricult. Total Export Import Direct Indir. Non- Oil Total 
Tax Tax Tax 
(VAGR73) (GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (TXDIR) (TXIND) (TXNON) (REVOIL) (GOVREV) 
1966 2085.0 3770.5 499.0 734.0 1.3 10.5 0.8 0.4 13.0 
1967 2047.4 3805.2 526.0 902.0 9.4 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 2244.6 4479.7 775.4 1182.9 42.9 95.6 11.9 33.2 183.6 
1969 2396.1 4974.4 819.7 1457.9 61.0 136.0 18.3 65.8 281.1 
1970 2485.0 5410.5 862.7 1471.8 70.0 166.9 20.8 99.3 357.1 
1971 2610.6 6501.5 930.2 1650.1 80.2 189.1 24.5 140.7 434.5 
1972 2616.6 6231.7 970.2 1952.0 96.2 223.3 27.7 230.5 577.7 
1973 2769.5 6568.9 1292.2 2907.0 124.9 302.9 33.7 332.3 843.8 
1974 2834.9 6843.9 1715.8 4239.0 191.4 425.6 50.4 957.2 1624.6 
1975 2928.4 7098.6 2136.9 6102.0 373.6 611.5 96.5 1248.0 2329.6 
1976 2957.0 7418.5 2694.1 7321.1 474.8 716.0 117.3 1636.0 2944.1 
1977 3034.6 7697.5 3285.3 8271.0 506.2 838.6 126.0 1949.0 3419.8 
1978 3262.8 9516.4 3689.6 9113.0 723.2 1157.8 176.7 2309.0 4366.6 
1979 3354.3 10486.4 4566.5 10088.4 735.2 1293.8 176.8 4260.0 6465.9 
1980 3495.8 11151.0 6231.2 14716.1 1506.6 2012.5 337.9 7020.0 10877.0 
1981 3652.9 13016.4 7061.2 17412.0 1697.9 2196.2 368.0 8471.9 12734.0 
1982 3713.2 12284.0 6681.4 17898.7 1842.4 2368.2 407.9 6562.0 11180.4 
1983 3880.4 12534.9 6469.7 16913.9 2190.0 3007.8 465.2 9979.9 15642.8 
1984 4091.9 15143.0 7768.8 20070.2 2474.3 3427.7 487.9 9868.1 16257.9 
1985 4148.4 14885.0 6284.4 18188.6 1787.0 3754.5 367.6 9723.0 15632.1 
R^eal values are at constant 1973 price. 
A^lternative .(tun V involves an increase of per year direct tax by 1 percent. 
Table 6.21. (Continued) 
Monetary Variables 
(billion Rp) 
Real Money 
Demand 
(MODEM) 
Money 
Supply 
(MOSUP) 
Price 
Deflator 
(1973=100.0) 
(DBF) 
Total Real 
Investment 
(billion Rp) 
(INTOT) 
277.5 22.2 
206.0 51.5 
262.4 174.2 
360.6 251.3 
452.1 320.9 
598.4 378.1 
648.7 509.0 
676.9 635.3 
724.3 891.3 
805.8 1532.0 
862.6 1912.6 
935.0 2051.0 
1133.9 2629.0 
1305.9 2860.2 
1470.2 5105.8 
1691.7 5762.2 
1803.2 6764.5 
1861.2 7876.4 
2008.4 8211.7 
2079.2 6717.7 
8.0 649.8 
25.0 1443.0 
66.4 1450.1 
69.7 2080.6 
71.0 1049.3 
63.2 916.9 
78.5 1138.9 
93.8 700.1 
123.1 1026.6 
190.1 1015.9 
221.7 2657.2 
219.4 3581.3 
231.9 2135.9 
219.0 3196.4 
347.3 1584.9 
340.6 1718.9 
375.1 3685.8 
423.2 3551.4 
408.9 -
323.1 -
Table 6.22. Employment and income distribution indicators^: Alternative Run V 
Employment Class Disposable Income 
(billion Rp) 
Year Total Employed Unempl. Rt. I 11 III IV 
(thousand) (%) 
(LABOR) (UMEMP) (YDl) (YD2) (YD3) (YD4) 
1966 34137.3 5.713 - - - -
1967 34096.4 8.217 - - - -
1968 36373.2 4.610 - - - -
1969 37877.0 3.249 86.0 374.9 1862.6 3165.5 
1970 39039.3 2.888 93.9 407.8 1979.1 2387.2 
1971 41698.6 0.842 110.4 472.4 2094.3 2918.5 
1972 40895.6 4.735 102.9 447.9 2177.5 3086.7 
1973 41952.8 4.265 105.4 466.3 2177.5 3086.7 
1974 42491.2 5.281 106.4 473.5 2190.1 3449.8 
1975 43195.1 5.673 111.0 499.0 2302.3 3519.7 
1976 43731.0 6.446 116.2 521.7 2370.5 3842.1 
1977 44338.3 8.011 117.6 532.4 2405.4 3994.2 
1978 48026.4 3.366 143.4 644.4 2736.3 5024.1 
1979 49688.0 3.039 152.9 709.6 2920.9 6814.2 
1980 51020.0 3.443 167.1 757.5 3685.9 7247.6 
1981 54074.4 2.973 192.1 870.7 3385.5 8925.5 
1982 53041.9 4.826 177.6 819.8 3294.8 7224.1 
1983 53516.2 6.499 175.4 823.6 3325.7 7559.9 
1984 57416.1 2.323 208.5 977.2 3721.4 8998.2 
1985 57234.2 5.192 198.6 942.1 3651.1 9034.5 
^Incomes are at 1973 constant price. 
^Alternative Run V involves an increase of per year direct tax by 1 percent. 
Table 6.22. (Continued) 
Average Household 
Dispos. Saving 
Income 
(thousandKp) (billion Rp) 
(YDA) (HHSAV) 
Gini 
Coeff. 
(GINI) 
Poverty 
Index 
(POVEX) 
- ~ 
— - -
148.3 942.3 0.377 0.475 
128.5 371.6 0.292 0.494 
148.5 427.1 0.315 0.377 
144.2 511.1 0.313 0.394 
147.8 667.4 0.315 0.383 
156.5 899.8 0.335 0.378 
159.6 1419.3 0.326 0.352 
168.5 1709.2 0.334 0.331 
171.5 1885.2 0.337 0.325 
193.7 2566.3 0.339 0.246 
233.2 2250.0 0.381 0.198 
241.3 3563.9 0.377 0.167 
271.0 4033.1 0.385 0.103 
237.5 4221.4 0.355 0.137 
242.7 5730.9 0.362 0.142 
265.4 6784.5 0.355 0.058 
264.5 5635.6 0.364 0.088 
w M 
00 
Table 6.23. Some selected endogenous raacroeconomlc Indicators^: Alternative Run VI^. 
Non-011 Real Income Non-Oil Export Government Revenues 
& Import 
(billion Rp) (million US $) (billion Rp) 
Year Agrlcult. Total Export Import Direct Indlr. Non- Oil Total 
Tax Tax Tax Tax 
(VAGR73) (GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (TXDIR) (TXIND) (TXNON) (REVOIL) (GOVREV) 
1966 2085.0 3770.5 499.0 734.0 1.3 10.5 0.8 0.4 13.0 
1967 2047.4 3805.2 526.0 902.0 9.4 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 2244.7 4479.7 776.8 1190.0 42.8 95.9 12.0 33.2 183.9 
1969 2396.2 4974.4 822.0 1469.7 61.1 136.8 18.5 65.8 282.1 
1970 2485.0 5410.5 866.1 1486.6 70.4 168.0 21.1 99.3 358.7 
1971 2610.3 6490.1 933.8 1667.8 80.7 190.5 24.9 140.7 436.8 
1972 2616.1 6228.9 975.4 1973.7 97.0 224.9 28.1 230.5 580.5 
1973 2769.6 6565.9 1301.2 2941.7 126.4 305.3 34.4 382.3 848.4 
1974 2835.1 6840.6 1729.3 4288.3 193.9 429.0 51.4 957.2 1631.6 
1975 2928.6 7098.1 2153.0 6168.6 377.2 616.5 98.2 1248.0 2339.9 
1976 2957.4 7420.1 2718.1 7416.2 480.4 722.5 119.7 1636.0 2958.6 
1977 3035.2 7699.5 3317.9 8387.0 514.1 846.8 128.9 1949.0 3438.8 
1978 3264.1 9523.9 3730.9 9241.8 735.2 1169.0 180.9 2309.0 4394.0 
1979 3356.2 10497.8 4635.1 10257.9 752.1 1307.7 182.0 4260.0 6501.9 
1980 3497.6 11168.2 6338.8 14918.1 1535.6 2033.7 346.7 7020.0 10936.0 
1981 3655.4 13043.2 7173.1 17686.7 1729.4 2218.4 377.3 8471.9 12797.1 
1982 3716.0 12314.3 6794.9 18190.9 1880.2 2394.0 419.0 6562.0 11255.2 
1983 3885.1 12588.8 6595.6 17180.8 2239.2 3038.4 478.6 9979.9 15736.1 
1984 4097.5 15198.4 7939.1 20432.0 2540.6 3464.0 503.8 9868.1 16376.5 
1985 4155.8 14959.5 6479.2 18590.4 1867.3 3797.3 385.5 9723.0 15773.0 
®Real values are at constant 1973 price. 
'^Alternative Run VI Involves an Increase of per year government expenditures by 1 percent. 
Table 6.23. (Continued) 
Monetary Variables 
(bi l l ion Rp) 
Total  Real  Price 
Real  Money Money Deflator  Investment 
Demand Supply (1973=100.0) (bi l l ion Rp) 
(MODEM) (MOSUP) (DEF) (INTOT) 
277.5 22.2 8.0 649.8 
206.0 51.5 95.0 1443.8 
262.4 175.2 66,8 1450.1 
360.6 253.4 70.3 2064.0 
452.1 324.6 71.8 1049.2 
597.7 383.1 64.1 916.9 
648.2 515.9 79.6 1139.7 
676.4 646.1 95.5 703.4 
723.9 906.9 125.3 1031.3 
805.5 1554.6 193.0 1020.0 
862.5 1944.3 225.4 2663.4 
935.2 2091.0 223.6 3591.4 
1134.5 2681.8 236.4 2149.9 
1307.2 2932.0 224.3 3212.9 
1472.4 5202.4 353.3 1604.3 
1695.2 5885.5 347.2 1743.1 
1807.9 6923.0 383.9 3714.9 
1868.8 8669.9 431.8 3578.1 
2017.3 8447.8 418.8 -
2090.6 7001.6 334.9 -
w 
w 
o 
a b 
Table 6.24. Employment and income distribution indicators : Alternative Run VI 
Employment Class Disposable Income 
(billion Rp) 
Year Total Employed 
(thousand) 
Unempl. Rt. 
(%) 
I II III IV 
(LABOR) (UMEMP) (YDl) (YD2) (YDS) (YD4) 
1966 34137.3 5.713 - - - -
1967 34096.4 8.217 - - - -
1968 36373.2 4.610 - - - -
1969 37877.0 3.249 85.9 374.6 1861.2 3163.1 
1970 39039.3 2.888 93.8 407.6 1977.9 2381.3 
1971 41676.1 0.895 110.2 471.3 2163.5 3088.1 
1972 40892.4 6.684 102.8 447.4 2092.3 2909.9 
1973 41950.0 4.271 105.3 465.9 2175.7 3077.5 
1974 42490.2 7.212 106.3 473.1 2188.6 3438.6 
1975 43198.2 5.666 111.0 498.7 2300.8 3510.8 
1976 43738.1 6.431 116.1 521.6 2369.3 3833.5 
1977 44344.3 7.998 117.5 532.2 2404.2 3981.9 
1978 48042.2 3.334 143.4 644.5 2735.9 5011.6 
1979 49707.6 3.001 158.0 709.9 2920.9 6777.6 
1980 51051.3 3.384 167.3 758.1 3086.3 7220.0 
1981 54115.6 0.278 192.4 871.8 3387.3 8889.1 
1982 53093.4 4.734 178.0 821.2 3297.3 7199.9 
1983 53605.5 6.343 176.1 826.5 3332.1 7554.7 
1984 57345.8 2.182 209.2 980.1 3727.5 8983.3 
1985 57345.8 5.007 199.7 946.6 3661.7 8982.1 
^Incomes are at constant 1973 price. 
^Alternative Run VI involves an increase of between government expenditures by 1 percent. 
Table 6.24. (Continued) 
Average Household Glni Poverty Cost of 
Dispos. Saving Coeff Index Living 
Income (1973=1.0) 
( thousand Rp) (billion Rp) 
(PCOL) (YDA) (HHSAV) (GINI) (POVEX) 
-
- 0.074 
— - 0.171 
- - 0.664 
148.2 929.0 0.377 0.475 0.718 
128.3 371.5 0.291 0.444 0.718 
148.1 427.1 0.314 0.378 0.686 
143.9 511.8 0.313 0.395 0.839 
147.5 670.7 0.314 0.384 1.000 
156.1 906.0 0.334 0.378 1.126 
159.3 1425.2 0.325 0.353 1.949 
168.3 1718.7 0.334 0.331 2.369 
171.2 1901.4 0.336 0.326 2.313 
193.4 2590.7 0.339 0.246 2.446 
232.4 2290.6 0.379 0.198 1.964 
240.6 3618.1 0.376 0.167 2.926 
270.1 4100.5 0.384 0.103 2.687 
236.8 4301.6 0.354 0.137 3.086 
242.4 5827.3 0.361 0.141 3.955 
264.9 6915.7 0.354 0.056 3.988 
263.3 5814.2 0.362 0.086 3.042 
Table 6.25. Some selected endogenous macroeconoraic indicators^: Alternative Run VII 
Non-Oil Real Income Non-Oil Export Government Revenue 
& Import 
(billion Rp) (million Rp) (billion Rp) 
Year Agricult. Total Export Import Direct Indir. Non— Oil Total 
Tax Tax Tax Tax 
(VAGR73) (GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (TXDIR) (TXIND) (TXNON) (REVOIL) (GOVREV) 
1966 2085.0 3770.5 499.0 734.6 1.3 10.5 0.8 0.4 12.0 
1967 2047.4 3805.2 526.0 903.3 9.4 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 2244.6 4479.7 775.7 1184.8 42.6 95.7 11.9 33.2 183.4 
1969 2396.1 4974.4 820.0 1460.4 60.5 136.2 18.3 65.8 280.8 
1970 2485.0 5410.5 863.1 1474.3 69.5 167.1 20.8 99.3 356.7 
1971 2610.7 6503.6 930.8 1653.3 79.6 189.3 24.5 140.7 434.1 
1972 2616.1 6232.3 970.9 1955.0 95.4 223.5 27.7 230.5 577.2 
1973 2769.5 6569.7 1292.3 2911.2 123.7 303.0 33.7 382.3 842.7 
1974 2834.9 6843.4 1715.9 4243.2 189.5 425.7 50.4 957.2 1622.9 
1975 2928.4 7098.7 2137.9 6109.6 370.4 611.9 96.6 1248.0 2326.9 
1976 2957.0 7418.1 2696.1 7333.4 470.9 716.6 117.5 1636.0 2941.1 
1977 3034.6 7695.6 3287.4 8285.9 502.1 839.4 126.2 1949.0 3416.8 
1978 3263.0 9515.5 3692.9 9129.1 717.6 1158.9 177.0 2309.0 4362.6 
1979 3354.4 10484.8 4571.0 10105.9 729.7 1295.1 177.2 4260.0 6462.0 
1980 3496.0 11150.1 6210.6 14771.5 1490.7 2012.4 337.7 7020.0 10860.8 
1981 3653.0 13013.8 7075.3 17464.8 1688.6 2200.0 369.5 8471.9 12730.1 
1982 3713.3 12282.3 6695.2 17994.3 1831.8 2372.1 409.4 6562.0 11175.3 
1983 3880.7 12535.7 6482.7 16951.1 2176.5 3011.8 466.7 9979.8 15634.9 
1984 4092.2 15142.0 7784.6 20113.9 2459.2 3432.0 489.5 9869.1 16248.8 
1985 4148.8 14886.2 6297.4 18225.5 1776.4 3758.1 368.9 9723.0 15626.3 
^Real values are at constant 1973 price. 
^Alternative Run VII provides an increase of annual rice import by 1 percent. 
Table 6.25. (Continued) 
Monetary Variables Price Total Real 
(billion Rp) Deflator Investment 
(1973=100.0) (billion Rp) 
(DBF) (INTOT) 
Real Money Money 
Demand Supply 
(MODEM) (MOSUP) 
277.5 22.2 8.0 649.8 
206.0 51.5 25.0 1443.8 
262.4 174.4 66.5 1450.1 
360.6 251.6 69.8 2083.6 
452.1 321.3 71.1 1049.5 
598.5 378.6 63.3 917.1 
648.8 509.9 78.6 1138.8 
677.0 635.3 93.8 699.1 
724.4 891.4 123.1 1025.5 
805.8 1533.6 190.3 1014.8 
862.6 1915.4 222.1 2656.5 
934.9 2053.9 219.7 3580.4 
1133.8 2633.3 232.3 2135.3 
1305.7 2865.3 219.4 3195.7 
1470.0 5129.6 348.9 1583.9 
1691.3 5783.6 342.0 1720.7 
1802.8 6785.6 376.4 3687.0 
1861.1 7897.8 424.4 3551.5 
2008.3 8235.2 410.1 -
2079.3 6737.4 324.0 
Table 6.26. Employment and income distribution indicators^: Alternative Run VII^ 
Employment Class Disposable Income 
(billion Rp) 
Year Total Employed Unempl. Rt. I II III IV 
(thousand) (%) (YDl) (YD2) (YD3) (YD4) 
(LABOR) (UNEMP) 
1966 34137.3 5.713 - - - -
1967 34096.4 8.217 - - - -
1968 36373.2 4.610 - - - -
1969 37877.0 3.249 86.0 374.9 1862.6 3165.5 
1970 39039.3 2.888 93.9 407.8 1979.1 2388.8 
1971 41702.3 0.833 110.5 472.6 2167.7 3107.0 
1972 40895.5 4.735 102.9 448.0 2094.5 2920.9 
1973 41953.9 4.262 105.4 466.3 2177.5 3088.6 
1974 42491.8 5.280 106.4 473.5 2190.3 3453.2 
1975 43194.6 5.674 111.1 499.0 2302.4 3522.7 
1976 43729.1 6.450 116.1 521.7 2370.4 3844.6 
1977 44331.2 8.025 117.5 532.2 2405.0 3995.2 
1978 48022.0 3.375 143.3 644.4 2736.3 5027.3 
1979 49680.5 3.054 157.8 709.4 2920.4 6813.7 
1980 51015.6 3.452 167.1 757.5 3085.9 7249.4 
1981 54066.5 0.368 192.0 870.5 3384.9 8916.6 
1982 53037.2 4.834 177.6 819.6 3294.4 7224.2 
1983 53516.2 6.499 175.4 823.6 3325.9 7562.4 
1984 57412.3 2.323 208.5 977.1 3721.3 9000.4 
1985 57235.4 5.190 198.7 942.2 3651.6 9036.8 
^Incomes are at constant 1973 price. 
^Alternative Run VII provides an increase of annual rice import by 1 percent. 
Table 6.26. (Continued) 
Average Household Gini Poverty Cost of 
Dlsp. Income Saving Coef f Index Living 
(thousand Rp) (billion Rp) (1973=1.0) 
(YDA) (HHSAV) (GINI) (PCVEX) (PCOL) 
__ 
- - 0.075 
— 
- 0.174 
- - 0.674 
148.3 944.5 0.377 0.475 0.727 
128.5 371.8 0.292 0.444 0.761 
148.6 427.3 0.315 0.377 0.692 
144.2 511.0 0.313 0.394 0.845 
147.8 666.4 0.315 0.383 1.000 
156.6 898.3 0.335 0.378 1.122 
159.7 1417.7 0,326 0.352 1.957 
168.6 1708.1 0.334 0.331 2.377 
171.6 1883.7 0.337 0.325 2.312 
193.6 2565.2 0.340 0.246 2.446 
233.2 2248.1 0.381 0.198 1.943 
241.3 3561.0 0.377 0.167 2.933 
270.8 4038.2 0.385 0.103 2.677 
237.5 4224.5 0.355 0.137 3.068 
242.8 5731.2 0.362 0.142 3.942 
265.5 6785.2 0.355 0.058 3.960 
264.5 5637.4 0.364 0.088 2.964 
Table 6.27. Some selected endogenous macroeconoralc indicators^; Alternative Run VIII^ 
Non-011 Real Income Non-011 Export Government Revenue 
fit Import 
(billion Rp) (million US $) (billion Rp) 
Year Agrlcult. Total Export Import Direct Indir. Non- Oil Total 
Tax Tax Tax Tax 
(VAGR73) (GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (TXDIR) (TXIND) (TXNON) (REVOIL) (GOVREV) 
1966 2085.0 3770.5 499.0 734.0 1.3 10.5 0.8 0.4 13.0 
1967 2047.4 3805.2 526.0 902.0 9.4 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 2244.7 4479.7 775.8 1185.0 42.6 95.7 11.9 33.2 183.4 
1969 2396.1 4974.4 820.2 1460.8 60.6 136.2 18.3 65.8 280.9 
1970 2485.0 5410.5 863.4 1475.0 69.6 167.2 20.8 99.3 356.9 
1971 2610.6 6501.4 931.1 1653.9 79.7 189.4 24.6 140.7 434.4 
1972 2616.1 6231.9 971.2 1956.1 95.6 223.6 27.8 230.5 577.4 
1973 2769.5 6568.6 1293.7 2912.7 124.1 303.3 33.8 382.3 843.5 
1974 2835.0 6842.8 1717.8 4246.3 190.1 426.1 50.6 957.2 1624.0 
1975 2928.4 7097.9 2139.5 6113.0 371.1 612.3 96.8 1248.0 2328.2 
1976 2957.0 7418.1 2698.2 7337.4 471.9 717.1 117.7 1636.0 2942.7 
1977 3034.7 7695.3 3290.4 8289.8 503.3 840.0 126.5 1949.0 3418.8 
1978 3263.0 9515.7 3696.7 9135.1 719.4 1159.8 177.4 2309.0 4365.6 
1979 3362.3 10502.2 2969.5 8204.0 861.1 1842.1 205.3 6248.1 9156.6 
1980 3470.9 11030.9 3799.7 8503.5 981.8 2304.9 233.9 10757.4 14278.0 
1981 3701.0 15113.9 3852.2 10214.1 1398.2 2817.7 353.0 12973.9 17707.3 
1982 3731.6 13165.8 3905.5 12527.5 1562.7 2838.3 322.4 9898.0 14456.9 
1983 3965.7 14665.4 5968.5 15843.3 2100.7 3262.3 452.4 11506.6 17322.0 
1984 4191.2 17732.4 7121.5 18642.3 2341.1 3727.6 468.8 11385.4 17922.9 
1985 4366.7 17595.3 10480.3 27580.9 4984.1 5403.7 913.2 11217.2 22518.2 
^Real  values are at  constant  1973 price.  
^Alternative Run VIII provides a devaluation of 60 percent in late 1978. 
Table 6.2 7. (Continued) 
Monetary Variables Price 
(billion Rp) Deflator 
(1973=100.0) 
(DEF) 
Real Money Money 
Demand Supply 
(MODEM) (MOSUP) 
277.5 22.2 8.0 
206.0 51.5 25.0 
262.5 174.5 66.5 
360.6 251.8 69.8 
452.1 321.7 71.2 
598.4 379.1 63.4 
648.7 510.3 78.7 
676.9 637.1 94.1 
724.3 893.6 123.4 
805.7 1535.9 190.6 
862.5 1918.1 222.4 
934.8 2057.7 220.1 
1133.7 2628.2 232.7 
1307.1 3248.5 248.5 
1460.9 3808.6 260.7 
1853.0 5068.1 273.5 
1976.3 5670.2 286.9 
2155.4 7665.5 355.6 
2396.5 8137.0 339.6 
2534.3 9747.6 384.6 
Total Real 
Investment 
(billion Rp) 
(INTOT) 
649.8 
1443.8 
1450.1 
2080.4 
1049.6 
916.3 
1138.6 
699.4 w 
1026.4 
1015.1 
2656.8 
3581.2 
2136.4 
5570.8 
3176.2 
3175.5 
5785.1 
4158.3 
Table 6.28. Employment and income distribution indicators^: Alternative Run VIII^ 
Employment Class Disposable Income 
(billion Rp) 
Year Total Employed Unempl. Rt. I II III IV 
(thousand) (%) (YDl) (YD2) (YD3) (YD4) 
(LABOR) (UNEMP) 
1966 34137.3 5.713 - - - -
1967 34096.4 8.217 ~ - - -
1968 36373.2 4.610 - - - -
1969 37877.0 3.249 86.0 374.9 1862.4 3165.2 
1970 39039.5 2.887 93.9 407.8 1979.1 2388.1 
1971 41679.7 0.887 110.3 471.8 2166.3 3102.3 
1972 40889.4 4.749 102.8 447.7 2093.8 2918.5 
1973 41946.7 4.279 195.4 466.1 2176.8 3086.2 
1974 42487.1 5.290 106.4 473.3 2189.4 3448.9 
1975 43187.7 5.689 111.0 498.8 2301.5 3518.8 
1976 43725.1 6.459 116.1 521,5 2369.6 3841.3 
1977 44323.8 8.041 117.4 531.9 2403.9 3990.4 
1978 48017.4 3.384 143.3 644.1 2735.3 5022.0 
1979 49705.8 3.005 154.5 695.2 2861.8 6168.9 
1980 50842.3 3.780 121.9 554.5 2281.9 7141.8 
1981 56741.6 0.0 178.1 808.2 2997.5 6844.5 
1982 53977.3 3.147 185.3 856.3 3367.1 8225.9 
1983 56225.5 1.766 204.2 952.5 3641.8 9265.2 
1984 60331.9 0.0 241.1 1129.2 4077.0 11007.9 
1985 60291.2 0.128 234.5 1115.1 4086.3 9108.1 
^Incomes are at constant 1973 price. 
^Alternative Run VIII provides a devaluation of 60 percent in late 1978. 
Table 6.28. (Continued) 
Average Household Gini Poverty Cost of 
Disp. Income Saving Coef f Index Living 
(thousand Rp) (billion Rp) (1973=1.0) 
(YDA) (HHSAV) (GINI) (POVEX) (PCOL) 
— - - 0.075 
— - 0.174 
_ 
- - 0.673 
148.3 942.1 0.377 0.475 0.725 
128.5 371.8 0.292 0.444 0.760 
148.5 426.6 0.315 0.377 0.690 
144.2 510.9 0.313 0.394 0.843 
147.8 666.7 0.315 0.384 1.000 
156.4 899.5 0.335 0.378 1.123 
159.6 1418.2 0.326 0.352 1.956 
168.5 1708.6 0.334 0.331 2.376 
171.5 1885.0 0.337 0.326 2.312 
193.6 2567.1 0.339 0.246 2.446 
217.3 3031.3 0.364 0.215 2.314 
217.2 3671.3 0.354 0.311 2.504 
209.6 4442.0 0.340 0.214 2.710 
256.2 3742.9 0.372 0.118 2.932 
274.0 5814.0 0.370 0.062 3.173 
299.5 6850.7 0.362 -0.030 3.183 
264.7 13273.7 0.324 -0.018 3.716 
Table 6.29. Some selected endogenous macroeconomlc indicators^; Alternative Run IX 
Non-Oil Real Income Non-011 Real Export Government Revenues 
& Import 
(billion Rp) (million US $) (billion Rp) 
Year Agricult . Total Export Import Direct Indir. Non- Oil Total 
Tax Tax Tax Tax 
(VAGR73) (GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (TXDIR) (TXIND) (TXNON) (REVOIL) (GOVREV) 
1966 2085.0 3770.5 699.0 734.0 1.3 10.5 0.8 0.4 13.0 
1967 2047.4 3805.2 526.0 902.0 9.4 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 2244.6 4479.7 775.8 1185.0 42.6 95.7 11.9 33.2 183.4 
1969 2396.1 4974.4 820.2 1460.8 60. 6 136.2 18.3 65.8 280.9 
1970 2485.0 5410.5 863.4 1475.0 69.6 167.2 20.8 99.3 356.9 
1971 2610.2 6488.6 930.1 1652.2 79.6 189.4 24.6 140.7 434.3 
1972 2616.0 6228.7 971.2 1956.5 95.6 223.6 27.8 230.5 577.5 
1973 2769.4 6565.5 1293.5 2912.7 124.2 393.3 33.8 382.3 843.6 
1974 2834.9 6841.9 1717.9 4246.6 190.2 426.1 50.6 957.2 1624.1 
1975 2928.3 7096.0 2139.3 6112.7 371.1 612.3 96.8 1248.0 2328.3 
1976 2956.4 7401.7 2694.8 7330.1 471.6 716.9 117.7 1636.0 2942.2 
1977 3034.3 7685.1 3288.8 8288.5 503.5 840.1 126.6 1949.0 3419.2 
1978 3262.2 9494.8 3692.2 9129.2 719.3 1159.7 177.4 2309.0 4365.4 
1979 3353.5 10459.9 4570.3 10107.1 731.6 1295.9 177.6 4260.0 6465.1 
1980 3494.1 11099.2 6194.8 14758.4 1491.7 2012.5 337.9 7020.0 10862.1 
1981 3650.4 12940.9 7059.7 17448.0 1691.6 2201.1 370.0 8471.9 12734.6 
1982 3708.7 12158.7 6659.7 17897.8 1832.8 2372.2 409.6 6562.0 11176.6 
1983 1870.3 12289.6 6408.6 16863.9 2175.1 3010.7 466.5 9979.8 15632.1 
1984 4083.7 14922.4 7741.5 20088.0 2472.1 3436.7 491.8 9868. 1 16268.6 
1985 4136.6 14573.9 6230.2 18163.1 1781.2 3759.7 369.8 9723.0 15633.6 
^Real values are at constant 1973 price. 
^Alternative Riin IX involves a smaller employment elasticity in food sector. 
Table 6.29. (Continued) 
Monetary Variables 
(billion Rp) 
Price Total Real 
Year Real Money Money Deflator Investment 
Demand Supply (1973=100.0) (billion Rp) 
(MODEM) (MOSUP) (DElO (1NÏ0T) 
1966 277.5 22.2 8.0 649.8 
1967 206.0 51.5 25.0 1443.8 
1968 262.4 174.5 66.5 1450.1 
1969 360.6 251.8 69.8 2061.8 
1970 452.1 321.7 71.2 1049.5 
1971 597.6 379.2 63.4 916.8 
1972 648.1 510.3 78.7 1141.9 
1973 676.4 636.9 94.2 700.5 
1974 723.9 893.4 123.4 1005.1 
1975 805.4 1535.6 190.7 1007.2 
1976 861.2 1918.2 222.7 2650.7 
1977 933.3 2057.5 220.4 3562.5 
1978 1131.3 2637.6 233.2 2097.9 
1979 1302.3 2869.8 220.4 3138.5 
1980 1463.8 5135.6 350.8 1489.8 
1981 1681.6 5788.7 344.2 1592.6 
1982 1785.9 6790.4 380.2 3566.5 
1983 1829.1 7905.8 432.2 3466.6 
1984 1971.9 8232.2 417.5 -
1985 2062.2 6733.1 331.3 -
M 
'fable 6.30. Employment and income distribution indicators^: Alternative Run IX^ 
Employment Class Disposable Income 
(billion Rp) 
Year Total Employed 
(thousand) 
Unempl. Rt. 
(%) 
I II III IV 
(LABOR) (UNEMP) (YDl) (YU2) (YU3) (YD4) 
1966 34137.3 5.713 — — — — 
1967 34199.1 8.625 - - - -
1968 35990.4 5.948 - - - -
1969 37309.2 4.931 85.9 374.6 1861.4 3163.4 
1970 38392.2 4.709 93.7 407.2 1973.5 2394.0 
1971 40879.6 2.869 109.7 469.9 2147.8 3114.5 
1972 40137.3 6.953 102.5 446.6 2080.9 2936.3 
1973 40950.8 7.011 104.4 463.0 2145.0 3120.6 
1974 41470.9 8. 172 104.9 467.9 2146.4 3484.2 
1975 42027.0 8.960 109.6 494.1 2254.4 3568.1 
1976 42568.8 9.809 114.6 516.2 2322.3 3881.1 
1977 43107.9 11.811 115.7 727.9 2349.1 4040.8 
1978 46540.9 6.787 140.5 633.9 2648.9 5079.6 
1979 48157.2 6.413 154.5 697.0 2821.4 7057.7 
1980 49274.8 7.234 163.1 742.5 2967.2 7548.9 
1981 52164.2 4.030 186.8 850.7 3236.7 9408.8 
1982 50902.8 9.486 171.2 795.6 3128.0 7396.3 
1983 51037.2 12.146 166.9 7 9 1 . 0  3128.9 7659.3 
1984 54855.2 7.158 199.4 942.4 3497.6 9092.2 
1985 54377.7 11.017 187.2 897.5 3390.3 8187.3 
^Incomes are at constant 1973 price. 
^Alternative Run IX involves a smaller employment elasticity in food sector. 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
(Continued) 
Average Household GINI Poverty 
Dispos. Saving Coeff. Index 
Income 
(thousand) (billion Rp) 
(YDA) (HHSAV) (GINI) (POVEX) 
_ 
148.2 928.2 0.377 0.476 
128.8 371.7 0.293 0.444 
149.1 427.0 0.317 0.378 
144.9 513.8 0.315 0.395 
149.2 667.8 0.318 0.385 
157.7 871.5 0.339 0.382 
161.7 1406.9 0.331 0.354 
170.4 1699.2 0.339 0.333 
173.7 1855.0 0.342 0.329 
196.4 2500.0 0.345 0.250 
240.7 2106.9 0.391 0.203 
250.5 3297.5 0.389 0.172 
284.3 3682.2 0 . 3 9 9  0.110 
244.1 3892.0 0.366 0.146 
248.6 5424.8 0.373 0.156 
271.4 6431.6 0.364 0.070 
272.1 5299.6 0.376 0.108 
3 b Table 6.31. Some selected endogenous macroeconomic indicators : Alternative Run X 
Non-Oil Real Income Non-Oil Real Export Government Revenues 
& Import 
(billion Rp) (million US $) (billion Rp) 
Year Agricult Total Export Import Direct Indir. Non— Oil Total 
Tax Tax Tax Tax 
(VAGR73) (GDPN73) (XNOIL) (MNOIL) (TXDIK) (TXIND) ( T X N O N )  (REVOIL) (GOVRliV) 
1966 2085.0 3770.5 499.0 734.0 1.3 10.5 0.8 0.4 13.0 
1967 2047.4 3805.2 526.0 902.0 9.4 40.5 1.3 7.3 58.5 
1968 2244.6 4479.7 775.8 1185.0 42.6 95.7 11.9 33.2 183.4 
1969 2396.1 4974.4 820.2 1460.8 60.6 136.2 18.3 65.8 280.9 
1970 2485.0 5410.5 863.4 1475.0 69.6 167.2 20.8 99.3 356.9 
1971 2610.5 6499.6 930.9 1653.7 79.7 189.4 24.6 140.7 434.3 
1972 2616.1 6231.2 971.2 1956.1 95.6 223.6 27.8 230.5 577.4 
1973 2769.5 6568.2 1293.7 2912.7 124.1 303.3 33.8 382.3 843.5 
1974 2834.9 6841.9 1717.7 4246.2 190.1 426.1 50.6 957.2 1624.0 
1975 2928.4 7097.6 2139.5 6113.1 371.1 612.3 96.8 1248.0 2328.3 
1976 2957.4 7417.8 2720.1 7424.8 481.4 723.2 119.9 1636.0 2960.5 
1977 3035.2 7694.4 3327.6 8424.3 518.5 849.5 129.9 1949.0 3446.9 
1978 3265.6 9551.8 3757.7 9317.0 745.5 1175.0 183.1 2309.0 4412.6 
1979 3357.7 10528.2 4660.8 10312.1 758.9 1311.7 183.5 4260.0 6514.1 
1980 3500.5 11243.6 6395.7 14940.3 1544.0 2037.7 348.4 7020.0 10950.0 
1981 3657.3 13104.2 7169.1 17657.6 1719.5 2213.9 375.4 8471.9 12780.7 
1982 3719.5 12417.0 6803.5 18166.7 1867.0 2388.4 416.6 6562.0 11235.0 
1983 3908.6 13141.7 6771.2 17377.6 2247.8 3042.1 480.2 9979.8 15749.9 
1984 40796.9 15241.2 7843.7 20201.9 2476.7 3438.5 492.7 9868.1 16275.9 
1985 4183.3 15671.0 6631.3 18707.2 1854.8 3791.8 383.2 9723.0 15752.7 
^Real values are at constant 1973 price. 
^Alternative Run X Involves rescheduling of public debt beginning in 1 9 7 6 .  
Table 6.31. (Continued) 
Monetary Variables 
(billion Rp) 
Price Total Real 
Year Real Money Money Deflator Investment 
Demand Supply (1973=100.0) (billion Rp) 
(MODEM) (MOSUP) (DEF) (INTOÏ) 
1966 277.5 22.2 8.0 649.8 
1967 206.0 51.5 25.0 1443.8 
1968 262.4 174.5 66.5 1450.1 
1969 360.6 251.8 69.8 2078.0 
1970 452.1 321.7 71.2 1049.2 
1971 598.3 379.1 63.4 916.7 
1972 648.6 510.3 78.7 1138.3 
1973 676.8 637.0 94.1 699.7 
1974 724.2 893.6 123.4 1025.9 
1975 805.6 1535.8 190.6 1014.5 
1976 862.5 1947.8 225.8 2702.5 
1977 934.7 2104.8 225.2 3634.8 
1978 1136.3 2707.1 238.2 2209.7 
1979 1310.6 2951.8 225.2 3250.3 
1980 1480.7 5196.4 351.0 1639.7 
1981 1705.1 5870.3 344.3 1767.4 
1982 1823.1 6891.5 378.0 3738.8 
1983 1928.3 8015.7 415.7 3620.7 
1984 2054.4 8416.5 409.7 -
1985 2173.2 6926.8 318.7 — 
Table 6.32. Employment and income distribution indicators^: Alternative Hun 
Employment Class Disposable Income 
(billion Rp) 
Year Total Employed Unempl. Rt. I II III IV 
(thousand ) (%) 
(LABOR) (UNEMP) (YD!) (YD2) (YD3) (Y04) 
1966 34137.3 6.059 _ _ 
1967 34096.4 8.953 - - - -
1968 36373.2 4.833 - - - -
1969 37877.0 3.311 86.0 374.8 1862.3 3165.0 
1970 39039.3 2.973 93.9 407.8 1978.9 2387.6 
1 9 7 1  41694.8 0.858 110.4 472.2 2166.6 3102.8 
1972 40895.0 4.972 102.9 447.8 2094.0 2918.8 
1973 41951.7 4.458 105.4 466.2 2177.2 3087.1 
1974 42489.9 5.579 106.4 483.4 2189.7 3450.5 
1975 43193.5 4.018 111.0 498.9 2301.9 3520.6 
1976 43729.7 6.894 116.1 521.7 2370.2 3820.4 
1977 44327.3 8.730 117.5 532.3 2405.2 3973.7 
1978 48080.0 3.368 143.9 646.9 2743.3 5026.1 
1979 49745.8 3.015 158.4 712.1 2927.2 6767.7 
1980 51161.7 3.279 168.4 762.9 3098.8 7258.8 
1981 54195.0 0.131 193.3 875.9 3397.7 8938.7 
1982 53248.0 4.664 179.5 827.9 3314.1 7289.0 
1983 54463.4 5.091 184.4 861.2 3416.1 7987.0 
1984 57627.9 2.002 210.2 982.6 3731.0 9070.2 
1985 58433.0 3.313 209.9 989.1 3757.6 9579.6 
^Incomes are at constant 1973 price. 
^Alternative Run X involves rescheduling of public debt beginning in 1976. 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1 9 8 5  
(Continued) 
Average 
Dispos. 
Income 
(thousand Rp) 
(YDA) 
Household 
Saving 
(billion Rp) 
(HHSAV) 
GINI 
Coeff. 
(GINI) 
Poverty 
Index 
(POVEX) 
Cost of 
Living 
(1973=1.0) 
(PCOL) 
- - - - 0.075 
-
-
- - 0.174 
- - - - 0.672 
148.2 940.3 0.377 0.475 0.724 
128.5 371.5 0.292 0.444 0.759 
148.5 426.9 0.315 0.377 0.690 
144.2 510.6 0.313 0.195 0.843 
147.8 667.0 0.315 0.384 1.000 
156.5 898.9 0.335 0.379 1.122 
159.6 1417.3 0.326 0.353 1.953 
168.3 1736.0 0.333 0.332 2.416 
171.1 1928.6 0.336 0.327 2.374 
193.8 2639.0 0.338 0.244 2.514 
232.2 2326.7 0.378 0. 196 2.013 
228.3 3654.5 0.376 0. 164 2.953 
271.1 4104.9 0.384 0.100 2.701 
238.5 4301.3 0.355 0. 133 3.084 
250.1 5890.1 0.363 0. 121 3.847 
266.2 6815.2 0.355 0.056 3.942 
272.6 5828.7 0.364 0.064 2.92U 
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(1) Alternative Run I: This alternative run provides a dynamic 
income redistribution policy. It is assumed that the wage and non-wage 
incomes in each sector are raised in proportion to the increase value 
added per labor.^ This essentially means a heavy shift of income from 
the higher to the lower income class. The response of the system is 
depicted in Table 6.13 and Table 6.14 for some selected endogenous 
variables. 
It can be seen from Table 6.14, that total disposable income of 
Class-I increases from Rp 118.1 to Rp 136.4 billion per year during 
1969-1980, and from Rp 190.3 to Rp 267.4 billion per year during 1981-
1985. Class-II total disposable income increases from Rp 525.3 to Rp 
548.7 billion per year during 1969-1980 and from Rp 886.2 to Rp 1008.6 
billion per year during 1981-1985. Similarly, Class-Ill total disposable 
income increases from Rp 2356.9 to Rp 2436.0 billion per year during 
1969-1980 and from Rp 3474.4 to Rp 3930.8 billion per year during 1981-
1985. Class-IV total disposable income, on the other hand, decreases 
from Rp 4044.6 to Rp 3925.5 billion per year during 1969-1980 and from Rp 
8339.9 to Rp 7648.5 billion per year during 1981-1985. 
However, as a result, total household savings has gone down from an 
average of Rp 1434.3 billion per year to Rp 1424.0 billion during 1969-
1980 and from Rp 5287.0 to Rp 5222.4 billion per year during 1981-1985, a 
decrease of more than Rp 10 billion during 1969-1980 or of more than Rp 
60 billion during 1981-1985. This means less funds available for 
investment. The immediate result is the lower sectoral output. Non-oil 
GDP drops from its average level of Rp 9825.2 billion per year during 
1971-1985 to Rp 9809.7 billion. Non-oil exports also drop by around Rp 
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4.4 billion on the average every year, when at the same time non-oil 
imports drop by Rp 4.6 billion. There is almost no change in the 
government revenue. Since government expenditures are also assumed not 
to change, both export and import change by almost the same amount, it 
can be expected that money supply does not change so much. Money demand 
drops, on the other hand, by Rp 2.1 billion every year on the average 
during 1971-1985. Employment drops by around 14,000 persons per year 
during 1971-1985. With the shift of income from the richest group, Che 
Gini coefficient drops from its level of 0.387 during 1971-1985 to 0.319. 
This means that income distribution improves. The poverty index drops 
because Class-I income increases. During the period 1979-1985 this index 
drops to negative. This indicates that the poverty line of Rp 20,000 has 
been reached. 
(2) Alternative Run II: This alternative provides transfer of 
income by taxing the richest class Rp 10 billion per year beginning in 
1971. The receipts are distributed among the three lower income classes, 
Rp 5 billion for Class-I. Rp 3 billion for Class-II. and Rp 2 billion 
for Class-Ill. Class-I total disposable income increases to Rp 142.6 
billion per year compared to Rp 139.3 billion per year in the basic run. 
Class-II total disposable income also increases by Rp 2.2 billion per 
year, while Class-Ill increases by Rp 1.5 billion. Class-IV total 
disposable income decreases by Rp 4.5 billion per year on the average. 
Household savings decreases from an average of Rp 2567.4 billion per year 
to Rp 2565.4 billion. The Gini coefficient decreases with an average of 
0.343 compared to 0.387 in the basic run. The poverty index decreases at 
an average of 0.253 compared to 0.271 in the basic run. The distribution 
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of Income policy also affects the decrease of output (GDPN73) to Rp 
9822.2 billion per year on the average compared to Rp 9825.2 billion. 
The rest of the results of the run can be seen from Table 6.15 and Table 
6 . 1 6 .  
(3) Alternative Run III: This alternative involves an annual 
increase of fertilizer supply for irrigated rice production by 1 percent 
from its present level. With this additional supply, value added of rice 
production increases by Rp lc21 billion. Total agricultural value added, 
therefore, increases also by the same amount. Since an increase of 
output in this sector will increase output in other sectors, total non-
oil GDP is expected to increase also. However, it must be remembered 
that the increase in fertilizer availability is not without cost because 
more investment in rice production must accompany it. As a result, funds 
available for investment in other sectors decrease. The final result is 
a drop of non-oil real GDP by Rp 810 million per year (Table 6.17). 
There is little drop in government revenues, however. The increase in 
the agricultural sector output creates new employment, despite the 
decrease of output in other sectors. New employment for 9.700 is created 
on the average each year. Total disposable income also increases in each 
income class. However, since most of the poor live in the agricultural 
sector, most of the income increase goes to consumption. As a result, 
total household saving decreases by Rp 1.6 billion every year on the 
average. This decrease in the availability of funds is consistent 
with the drop in total GDP. Since income in each class increases and at 
the same time employment also increases, the Gini coefficient tends to 
remain the same. The poverty index drops from its average level of 0.271 
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to 0.270 (Table 6.18). 
(4) Alternative Run IV; This alternative run involves an additional 
10 billion rupiahs investment per year for the rural development program. 
This program consists mainly of construction projects in rural areas, 
such as agricultural roads, dams, and irrigation buildings, electricity 
and water supply, etc. An ICOR of 2.5 is assumed for the rural 
development program, and in this model system this program is included in 
a construction sector of industry. The immediate impact of this program 
is an increase of output in the construction industry in the first 10 
years between 1966 and 1975. In the second 10 years between 1976 and 
1985, output in the construction industry decreases. On the average, 
total non-oil GDP (real) decreases by over Rp 38 billion every year. 
This may happen, because the shift of investment in the rural development 
program has suffered other sectors which have lower ICOR. Since the 
output of the construction industry as a whole is also affected by output 
of other sectors, then sooner or later its own output suffers from the 
shift of investment. The change in the real income has affected other 
macroeconomic variables as shown in Table 6.19. The rural development 
program has created employment with 1.4 million jobs during the first 8 
years within the construction sector. After that, this sector has lost 
7.9 thousand jobs per year. As a whole, however, the program has 
resulted in additional unemployment to the economy of over 64,000 per 
year between 1966 and 1985. Average disposable income (real) has also 
decreased by Rp 700 per person per year. All classes of income have 
suffered from the decrease in real GDP. Household savings have 
decreased, on the average, by Rp 5.5 billion (current price) every year. 
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The Ginl coefficient also indicates a decreasing sign, which means that 
the rich group has suffered more than the poor. The poverty index, on 
the other hand, increases; this means that the poor group gets poorer 
(Table 6.20). 
(5) Alternative Run V; This alternative run provides an annual 
g 
increase of direct taxes by one percent of the present level. It is 
assumed that the increase may come from an increase of income tax, 
corporate tax, or other direct taxes. The immediate impact of the policy 
is the increase of government revenue from direct taxes by Rp 73.8 
billion during the period 1966-1985 or about Rp 3.7 billion every year on 
the average. However, government revenues as a whole only increase by Rp 
1.2 billion every year on the average. Real GDP drops a little bit 
following the direct tax policy (Table 6.21). As we know, most of the 
direct tax increase comes from the rich and non-wage earners. The direct 
impact of the direct tax increase is a decrease in their current value of 
savings. However, the increase in government revenues have had a 
monetary impact as money supply has decreased. Since there is almost no 
change in money demand, the price level has dropped; this in turn 
Increased the real income of every income class. Total household 
disposable income has increased by Rp 5.2 billion per year. The decrease 
in sectoral value added has decreased the employment level by 2800 jobs, 
on the average, per year. The Gini coefficient hardly changes and the 
poverty index decreases a bit since real income of the poor increases 
(Table 6.22). 
(6) Alternative Run VI: This alternative run involves an increase 
of annual government expenditures by one percent above the present level. 
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This increase results in an additional money supply of Rp 56.33 billion, 
on the average, every year. The impact of the increase in government 
expenditures also resulted in an increase of real income. Non-oil GDP 
goes up by Rp 12.93 billion, on the average, per year. With this 
increase, the levels of exports, imports, and money demand are also 
expected to increase. Government revenues also increase by Rp 35.03 
billion. As the result of all of these changes, the domestic price level 
also increases as can be seen in Tables 6.23 and 6.24. Employment has 
increased by around 18,700 jobs per year on the average. Increase in 
total real GDP resulted in an increase in total income for wage earners 
by Rp 3.5 billion every year. On the other hand, non-wage earners have 
been hurt, not only because sectoral value added has increased at a 
lesser rate than real GDP, but with the increase in employment, the 
average disposable income has dropped from an average of Rp 195,400.0 per 
person per year to Rp 194,990.0. Since wage earners' income has 
increased while non-wage earners' decreased, income distribution is 
expected to improve. The Gini coefficient has dropped from an average of 
0.345 to 0.344. The poverty index has also decreased from an average of 
0.271 to 0.270. 
(7) Alternative Run VII: This alternative run involves an annual 
increase of rice imports by one percent from the present level. With 
this policy, total non-oil imports have decreased, however, by Rp 2.0 
million US $. This can happen because the an increase in rice imports 
may be followed by a decrease in other imports, including intermediate 
and capital goods. In fact, the decrease in total imports is caused by 
the decrease in current value of GDP. The main reason behind this is 
355 
the drop in the domestic level of prices. These lower prices have also 
affected the consumption-saving pattern and resulted in the fall of the 
level of household savings, which means less investment and less real 
GDP. At the same time, the fall of the price level itself is justified 
because money supply has dropped, following 3,2 million US $ drop in non-
oil exports and 2.3 billion rupiah drop in government revenues (Table 
6.25). Employment has decreased by around 4600 jobs per year on the 
average. Since real income has also decreased, average disposable income 
has almost no sign of change. The Gini coefficient also remains 
constant, while the poverty index increases due to more unemployment 
(Table 6.26). 
(8) Alternative Run VIII: This alternative run involves a 
devaluation of rupiah by the end of 1978 from an official rate of Rp 
9 
415.0 per US $ to Rp 1000.0. The actual devaluation done by the 
authorities was to increase the rate to Rp 625.0. It was not until 1983, 
however, that the rupiah was depreciated to Rp 1000.0. Therefore, in 
this run, changes are expected to happen between 1979 and 1982. The 
immediate impact of this policy has been an increase in rupiah exports 
(non-oil) by Rp 994.9 billion on the average per year between 1979 and 
1985. In dollar terms, however, non-oil exports have decreased by 
685.5 million US $ on the average per year. Non-oil imports have also 
decreased by 2875.0 million US $ in an average year between 1979 and 
1985. Increase in the rupiah total savings has caused an Increase of 
investment, and therefore, of real output (non-oil) by Rp 677.0 billion 
each year between 1979-1985. The impact has been an addition to 
government revenues of Rp 2865.4 billion each year during the same 
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period. With the increase of rupiah capital inflow, all of these have 
resulted in an increase in the supply of money immediately after the 
devaluation, that is, during 1979-1982. Consequently, prices 
increased sharply during the 1980-1982 period (Table 6.27). With 
sectoral output increases, employment has also increased by 570.7 
thousand jobs during 1979-1985. Total disposable income has also 
increased by Rp 1328.8 billion each year during the same period. As can 
be seen from Table 6.28, the Gini coefficient has increased during the 
period 1979-1985, indicating a worsening distribution of income. The 
poverty index has increased at the beginning due to increase in the price 
level but has decreased later along with the increase in employment. 
(9) Alternative Run IX: This alternative involves a reduction of 
employment elasticity in the food sector from 0.40 to 0.25. This means a 
reduction in the capability of the food sector to absorb employment. 
As a result, between 1966 and 1985, overall unemployment goes up as 
employment level in the food sector drops by an average of 1.18 million 
jobs every year. The increase in labor productivity in the food sector 
and overall unemployment rate have resulted in the decline of overall 
domestic price level (Tables 6.29 and 6.30). The reduction in total 
income that follows not only has affected the food sector, but other 
sectors as well. This involves many wage earners in every income class. 
All of those facts have influenced the pattern of household consumption 
and savings. Between 1970 and 1985, current savings decrease by Rp. 
142.0 billion per year, on the average. The reduction in domestic 
savings causes a reduction in investment and, therefore, real output. 
This happens not only in the food sector, but other sectors as well. 
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Since most wage earners are hurt, the income distribution pattern shows a 
higher inequality of income. The poverty index also increases as a 
result of increasing unemployment. 
(10) Alternative Run X: This alternative provides a possibility of 
rescheduling public debt. The rescheduling of the debt produces an 
additional net transfer of US $ 100.0 million to the economy every year 
starting in 1976. The increase of money supply that follows has resulted 
in an additional net import of non-oil of US $ 123.0 million per year 
during 1976-1985. During the same period, total investment also 
increases by Rp. 55.8 billion per year. During the years 1978-1985, this 
additional investment pushes real output up by Rp. 234.5 billion per year 
(Table 6.31). With an increase in sectoral income, the pattern of 
household income is also expected to change. Both real total income and 
disposable income increase in all income classes. Household savings are 
also improved by an additional Rp. 92.9 billion per year between 1978 and 
1985. There is not much improvement in the distribution of income among 
income classes, since the policy has benefited all classes of Income. 
The improvement on employment and income of the poor has resulted in a 
lower poverty index (Table 6.32). 
6.4. Growth-Equity Relationships of the Indonesian Economy 
This section presents the relationships betweeen output growth and 
equity of the Indonesian economy. The relationships that exist are 
illustrated based on the findings in the previous section. 
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6.4.1. Growth-equity relationships 
The Indonesian model of the economy has been able to produce 
relationships between growth and equity. Three types of relationships 
exist; (1) growth and distribution of income (income equity), (2) growth 
and employment, and (3) growth and poverty. The relationships between 
growth and equity are illustrated not only to include the Basic Run of 
the model, but also the whole alternative runs discussed before. For 
this purpose. Table 6.33 summarizes the necessary findings presented in 
the previous section. 
(1) Growth and income equity; 
a. The relationship between growth of output and income 
distribution of the Indonesian economy is depicted in Figure 6.11, based 
on the results of the Basic Run (see also Tables 6.1 to 6.11). The 
output growth is measured in annual real per capita GDP, while the income 
equity is measured by l-Gini coefficient. The figure shows, that as 
income increases from year-to-year between 1970 and 1985, income 
distribution continues to deteriorate. This negative relation between 
growth and income equity concludes that the Indonesian economy is still 
in its early stage of development. It is seen also, that as annual real 
income per capita reaches over 90,000 rupiahs, the curve starts leveling 
off within a critical region. Beyond this critical region, that is when 
the annual real income per capita improves, income distribution may also 
improve. Even though the current Indonesian real income per capita 
projected by the model is indeed within that region, it is hard to 
predict whether the current economic policy will eventually produce 
better income distribution in the following years. It is also difficult 
Table 6.33. Summary of alternatives of growth-equity indicators 
Basic Run Alternative Kun I 
Indicator 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 
GDP73® 5738.1 7848.0 11695-6 15611.7 5738.1 7451.6 11690.9 15539.5 
GDP growth^ - 6.16 7.61 7.21 - 6.17 7.60 7.18 
GINI coeff. 0.292 0.326 0.377 0.364 0.307 0.313 0.306 0.330 
Poverty index 0.444 0.352 0.168 0.089 0.450 0.391 0.140 0.020 
Empl. rate^ - 2.08 2.75 2.63 - 2.086 2.748 2.617 
Income per 
capita 
48.82 59.30 79.68 93.10 48.82 57.77 79.65 92.67 
^In billion rupiahs. 
''Based on iy70. 
"^In thousand rupiahs of 1973. 
Table 6.33. (Continued) 
Alternative Run II Alternative Run III 
Indicator 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 
GUP73^  5718.1 7646.6 11691.5 15605.8 5738.1 7648.4 11694.1 15608.1 
GDP growth^  - 5.16 7.60 7.21 - 6.16 7.60 7.21 
GINI coeff. 0.288 0.325 0.377 0.364 0.292 0.326 0.377 0.364 
Poverty index 0.406 0.338 0.159 0.081 0.444 0.352 0.167 0.088 
Empl. rate^  - 2.078 2.747 2.627 - 2.08 2.749 2.629 
Income per 
capita 
48.82 59.28 79.65 93.06 48.82 59.29 79.67 93.08 
Table 6.33. (Continued) 
Alternative Run IV Alternative Run V 
Indicator 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 
GDP73® 5729.2 7612.8 11633.3 15539.0 5738.1 7648.7 11695.6 15607.6 
GDP growth^ - 6.  10 7.  57 7.  19 - 6.  17 7.  61 6.  90 
INI coeff .  0.291 0.  325 0.  377 0.  364 0.292 0.  326 0.  377 0.  364 
Poverty index 0.444 0.  354 0.  169 0.  090 0.444 0.  352 0.  167 0.  088 
Empl.  rate^ - 2.  058 2.  735 2.  621 - 2.  082 2.  750 2.  629 
Income per 48.73 59 .02 79 .26 92 .  66 48.82 59 .30 79 .68 93 .07 
capita 
Table 6.33. (Continued) 
Alternative Run VI Alternative Run VII 
Indicator 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 
GDP73^ 5738.1 7648.2 11712.7 15682.0 5738.1 7648.8 11694.1 15607.9 
GDP growth^ - 6. 16 7. 62 7. 24 — 6. 17 7. 61 7. 21 
GINI coeff. 0.291 0. 325 0. 376 0. 362 0.292 0. 326 0. 377 0. 364 
Poverty index 0.444 0. 353 0. 167 0. 086 0.444 0. 353 0. 168 0. 089 
Empl. rate^ - 2. 084 2. 757 2. 643 - 2. 082 2. 749 2. 629 
Income per 48.82 59 .29 79 .80 93 .52 48.82 59 .30 79 .67 93 .08 
capita 
Table 6.33. (Continued) 
Alternative Run VIII Alternative Run IX 
Indicator 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 
GDP73^ 5738.1 7648.0 10976.2 16803.4 5738.1 7646.1 11643.7 15296.4 
GDP growth^ - 6. 17 6. 99 8. 12 - 6. 15 7. 56 7. 08 
GINI coeff. 0.292 0. 326 0. 385 0. 367 0.293 0. 331 0. 389 0. 376 
Poverty index 0.444 0. 352 0. 190 0. 028 0.444 0. 354 0. 172 0. 108 
Empl. rate^ - 2. 078 2. 474 2. 797 - 1. 86 2. 56 2. 40 
Income per 48.82 59 .29 74 .78 100 .20 48.82 59 .28 79 .33 91 .22 
capita 
Table 6.33. (Continued) 
Alternative Run X 
Indicator 1970 1975 1980 1985 
DP73* 5738.1 
GDP growth^ -
GINI coeff. 0.292 
Poverty index 0.444 
Empl. rate^ -
Income per 48.82 
capita 
7647.7 
6 . 1 6  
0.326 
0.353 
2.08 
59.29 
11788.1 
7.70 
0.376 
0. 164 
2.78 
80.86 
16393.5 
7.51 
0.364 
0.064 
2.76 
97.76 
50 60 70 80 
Annual real (1973) GDP per capita (Rp thousand) 
Figure 6.11. Growth-equity relationship of the Indonesian economy 
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to see whether output growth will remain the same, decrease, or increase, 
if the government pursues a new policy towards better income distribution. 
If the U-shaped hypothesis is really correct, and the Indonesian economy 
is currently within the so-called critical region, improving the growth 
of real output will bring broader opportunities to employ better income 
distribution policy. If this is really the case, a positive relation 
between growth and income equity may be seen in the following years. 
b. The relationship between growth and income equity for each 
Alternative Run I to X (A1 to AlO) and the Basic Run, similar to the one 
presented before, can be seen in Figure 6.12. This figure, however, does 
not use accurate scales on both axes. From this figure, comparison 
between alternatives of growth and income equity relationships can be 
drawn. At the beginning of the years, for example, both the Alternative 
Run I (Al) and the Basic Run (BR) provide policies that sacrifice income 
equity for better growth. A comparison of the two runs, however, shows 
that Al sacrifices income equity more than BR does. In the later years, 
the situation changes; income equity of Al improves so dramatically that 
it outweighs the distribution of income performance of all other 
alternatives. In terms of output growth, BR performs better than Al 
does. 
Among the existing alternatives in the early development, A.2 
provides the best policy towards better output growth. AlO seems to 
provide the best policy for both better income equity and output growth. 
Increasing the government expenditures, (A6) seems to be able to bring a 
moderately better performance. 
0.70 
•d 0.65 
0.60 
50 75 100 
Annual real (1973) GDP per capita (Rp thousand) 
Figure 6.12. Alternatives of growth-equity relationships, (o: 1970, Û: 1985) 
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(2) Growth and employment: 
The relationship between growth and employment of the Indonesian 
economy can also be illustrated in a similar way as seen in Figure 6.13. 
In this figure, the growth of the economy is measured by the rate of 
growth of the real GDP, and the employment is measured by the annual 
rate of employment. Both measurements use 1970 as the base year. As far 
as we can see for all alternatives, employment is positively related with 
growth. It is seen that devaluation (A8) and rescheduling debt (AlO) may 
be the best way, among the existing alternatives, to improve employment 
and growth. In a point of time, such as 1985, they both have a better 
rate of growth and employment rate. Alternative A9 (low employment 
elasticity in the food sector), on the other hand, provides the worst 
performance in terms of employment rate. Again, alternative A6 is worth 
noting when compared with the Basic Run. 
(3) Growth and poverty: 
The relationship between growth and poverty of the Indonesian 
economy is illustrated in Figure 5,14. The growth of the economy is 
measured in terras of annual real GDP per capita, and the poverty is 
measured by poverty index. It is seen that growth and poverty have a 
negative relationship. This means, that as annual real income per capita 
increases, poverty diminishes. It is surprising that the current 
Indonesian economic policy (BR) has followed a policy that brings the 
worst performance in terms of poverty reduction. Alternatives A1 
(dynamic income distribution), A2 (transfer of income from richest), and 
A8 (devaluation of Rupiah) can be considered as alternatives that may 
alleviate poverty. 
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Finally, the above presentation shows that problems of Income 
distribution, employment, and poverty are independent of each other. 
This conclusion might strengthen the previous hypothesis which says that 
income distribution, employment, and poverty are three different but 
related problems. 
6.4.2. Time trade-off between growth and equity 
The earlier presentation also shows, that a comparison between any 
two alternative policies may produce a possible time trade-off between 
growth and Income equity. To see the time trade-off, it is suggested 
that three different time periods be studied: the early stage of 
development, the critical region, and the take-off stage. At present, 
however, in the case of the Indonesian economy, such a study is 
Impossible. This is because our projection to 1985 concludes that the 
the Indonesian economy is still in its early stage of development. 
However, as pointed out earlier, we may assume that a critical stage of 
development has just started. This means that in the coming years, an 
improving Income equity will soon develop as real output grows bigger. 
In other words, we assume that in the coming years the Indonesian economy 
will be in the take-off stage. 
Under the above assumption, our study indicates that there are at 
least two possible time trade-offs that exist. The first possibility is 
shown in Figure 6.15. It is assumed that in 1970, alternative A had 
better income equity but lower real output than alternative B. As time 
goes on, however, and both alternatives enter the critical stage, say in 
1985, alternative A reaches a higher real output but a lower income 
Real income per capita 
Figure 6.15. Possibility I of time trade-off between growth and equity 
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equity than alternative B does. This is to say that alternative A has 
followed a policy that sacrifices income equity for better growth, while 
alternative B has followed an opposite policy. With these types of 
alternative policies, it is most likely that in the coming years (until 
1990 or 2000?), as the take-off stage develops, alternative A. will reach 
better growth and better income equity. 
The second possibility is shown in Figure 6.16. In this case, in 
the early stage of development, alternative A has again a better income 
equity, while B has a better output growth. In the critical stage, 
however, the situation chanages. Alternative B achieves more advantage 
in its growth performance, while A is better in terms of its income 
distribution performance. In the future, when the take-off stage has 
been reached, alternative B will most likely have more advantage than 
alternative A, with higher output growth and better income distribution. 
Again, in the case of the Indonesian economy it is hard to tell when the 
take-off stage will really start. 
To close the discussion, it is certain that comparisons between 
possible alternative policies are important for decision makers to bring 
about the best possible economic development performance. In this 
circumstance, the present model of the Indonesian economy has been able 
to fulfill its purpose to provide as many alternative policies of 
development as possible. 
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Figure 6.16. Possibility II of time trade-off between growth and equity 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 6 
Another iterative method to solve a non-linear system is the Newton-
Raphson method. Detailed explanation and application of these two 
methods can be seen in Carnahan et al. [1969] and Challen and Hagger 
[1983]. 
2 
To avoid the complexity of the computer program dealing with the use 
of the level of tolerance in relation to^the problem of convergence, step 
la can be eliminated, but in exchange, k is set at high level, say 100. 
3 For this purpose, a computer program is established. This program 
is written ini a FORTRAN (WATFIV) language and run on a NAS/6 machine 
which is similar to IBM-370 or IBM-375. 
l^  
The fitness to historical data refers to the tracking performance of 
the system that includes the ability of the system to predict correctly 
the turning-points in the historical time paths of the endogenous 
variables. 
^One such measure is root mean squared error (RMSE). In many 
instances, a unit free measure is preferable, therefore RMSPE is used in 
this validation. 
^The Basic Run is made by first determining the appropriate foreign 
savings. The required foreign savings are determined by assuming that a 
certain amount of investment in the manufacturing sector is required to 
establish the actual growth of the economy. The resulting foreign 
savings is then fixed during the entire runs. In exchange, investment in 
the manufacturing sector is assumed to be residual; its amount is 
determined by domestic savings. 
^From equation [5-19], this alternative run implies 
YAl (I,J+1) = YAK I,J) • YC(I,J+1)/YC(I,J) 
YA2 (I,J+1) = YA2(I,J) • YC(I,J+1)/YC(I,J) 
YA3 (I,J+1) = YA3(I,J) • YC(I,J+1)/YC(I,J) 
YA4 (I,J+1) = YA4(I,J) • YC(I,J+1)/YC(I,J) 
for each sector I and period J. 
8 
Since direct tax is an endogenous variable, an increase of the tax 
comes from an increase of the tax parameter. 
376 
9 The market rate of foreign exchange by 1978 had gone up to around Rp 
560.0 per US $, after maintaining its position at around Rp 428.0 (the 
official rate was Rp 415.0) since 1972. 
^^Another alternative that may be suggested Involves the possibility 
of population increase, and therefore, labor force. As far as the 
Phillips curve is concerned, this alternative will bring a similar result 
to Alternative Run IX. 
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9. APPENDIX. VARIABLES OF THE MODEL OF THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY 
Parameters and Exogenous Variables 
APS Average Propensity to Save 
APSl, APS2, etc. APS of Income Class I, II, etc. 
CAPFLO Net Capital Flow (Million US $) 
DR Dependency Ratio 
EE Sectoral Employment Elasticity of Income 
EW Real Wage Elasticity of Income 
FERT Fertilizer Supply (10^ Ton) 
GOVDEXP Government Domestic Expenditure (Billion Rp) 
GOVEXP Total Government Expenditure (Billion Rp) 
GSUB Total Government Subsidy (Billion Rp) 
GSUBl, SGUB2, etc. GSUB of Income Class I, II, etc. (Billion Rp) 
HAEST Plantation Area of Non-food Farm and Estate Crops 
(Million Hectare) 
HAIRR Cultivated Area of Irrigated Rice (Million Hectare) 
LFORCE Total Labor Force (Persons) 
MOCRED Change of Bank's Credit to Private and Non-government 
(Billion Rp) 
MOIL Total Import of Oil (Million US $) 
MORD Ratio of Reserve Money to Demand Deposits 
MRICE Total Import of Rice (Million US $) 
MRICEl, MSERl The Corresponding Import at Constant (1973) Price 
(Billion Rp) 
MSER Net Import of Services (Million US $) 
OIL Net Export of Oil (Million US $) 
PM Overall Import Price Index (1973 = 100) 
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PXANI Export Price Index of Animal Products 
(1973 Dollar = 100) 
PXEST Export Price Index of Non-food Farm and Estate Crops 
(1973 Dollar = 100) 
PXRUB Export Price Index of Rubber (1973 Dollar = 100) 
PXTIM Export Price Index of Timber (1973 Dollar = 100) 
PXTIN Export Price Index of Tin (1973 Dollar = 100) 
PXOIL Export Price Index of Oil (1973 Dollar = 100) 
RS Market Rate of Interest 
XCHEF Effective (Market) Exchange Rate (Rp/US $) 
XOIL Total Oil Export (Million US $) 
YSER Net Service Income from Abroad (Billion Rp) 
Endogenous Variables 
BP Balance of Payments (Million US $) 
BPl Balance of Payments (Billion Rp) 
CSAV2, CSAV3 Cumulative Household Real (1973) Savings of Income 
Class II and Class III 
DEF GDP Deflator (1973 = 100) 
EXTOT Total Household Real (1973) Expenditure (Billion 
Rp) 
Exl, EX2, etc. Household Real (1973) Expenditure of Income Class I, 
Class II, etc. 
ERES Change in International Reserve (Million US $) 
GDP Gross Domestic Products (Billion Rp) 
GDP73, GDPN73 Corresponding GDP at 1973 Price (Billion Rp) 
GDPN Non-oil Gross Domestic Products 
GINI Gini Coefficient 
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GMFG 
GMN 
GNP 
INANI 
INCON 
INEL 
INEST 
INFD 
INFL 
INFOR 
INMFG 
INMN 
INRES 
INSER 
INTOT 
INTRO 
INTRN 
LABOR 
LP 
LPXCON 
Growth Rate of Real (1973) Value Added of 
Manufacturing Sector 
Growth Rate of Real (1973) Value Added of 
Transportation Sector 
Gross National Products (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Investment in Animal Production 
(Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Investment in Construction Sector 
(Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Investment in Electricity and Supply 
Sector (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Investment in Non-Food Farm and Estate 
Crops Sector (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Investment in Food Sector (Billion Rp) 
Inflation Rate 
Real (1973) Investment in Forestry (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Investment in Manufacturing Sector 
(Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Investment in Mining and Quarrying Sector 
(Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Residual Investment (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Investment in Service Sector (Billion Rp) 
Total Real (1973) Investment (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Investment in Trade Sector (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Investment in Transportation Sector 
(Billion Rp) 
Total Labor Requirement (Persons) 
Sectoral Real (1973) Labor Productivity (Billion 
Rp) 
Index of Labor Productivity in Construction Sector 
(1973 = 1.0) 
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LPXFD Index of Labor Productivity in Food Sector (1973 = 
1 .0 )  
LPXMFG Index of Labor Productivity in Manufacturing Sector 
(1973 = 1.0) 
LPXMN Index of Labor Productivity in Mining Sector (1973 = 
1 . 0 )  
LPXOAG Index of Labor Productivity in Other Agricultures 
(1973 = 1.0) 
LPXSER Index of Labor Productivity in Service Sector (1973 = 
1 . 0 )  
LPXTRD Index of Labor Productivity in Trade Sector (1973 = 
1 . 0 )  
LPXTRN Index of Labor Productivity in Transportation Sector 
(1973 = 1.0) 
MCAP Import of Capital Goods (Million US $) 
MCAPl, MCONl, etc. The Corresponding Import at Constant (1973) Price 
(Billion Rp) 
Import of Non-Rice (Incl. Wheat) Consumption Goods 
(Million US $) 
Import of Non-oil Intermediate Goods (Million US $) 
Ratio of Currency to Demand Deposits 
Real (1973) Money Transferred to Alleviate Poverty 
(Billion Rp) 
Reserve Money (Billion Rp) 
Nominal Money Supply (Billion Rp) 
Export Price Index of Animal Products (1973 Rupiah = 
100) 
Consumer Price Index of Clothing (1973 = 1.0) 
Overall Cost of Living Index (1973 = 1.0) 
Consumer Price Index of Housing (1973 = 1.0) 
Export Price Index of Non-food Farm and Estate Crops 
(1973 Rupiah = 100) 
MCON 
MINT 
MOCD 
MOPOV 
MORES 
MOSUP 
PANI 
PCCLOT 
PCOL 
PCHOUS 
PEST 
40.0 
PFCON 
PFFO 
PFMFG 
PFMN 
PFDAG 
PFSER 
PFTRD 
PFTRN 
PC 
POl, P02, etc. 
POP • 
POPl, P0P2, etc. 
PORl, P0R2, etc. 
POVEX 
PRUB 
PTIM 
PTIN 
PV 
PVCON 
Price Index of Industry Final Demand in Construction 
Sector (1973 - 1.0) 
Price Index of Industry Final Demand in Food Sector 
(1973 = 1.0) 
Price Index of Industry Final Demand in Manufacturing 
(Incl. Electricity) Sector (1973 = 1.0) 
Price Index of Industry Final Demand in Mining Sector 
(1973 = 1.0) 
Price Index of Industry Final Demand in Other 
Agricultures (1973 = 1.0) 
Price Index of Industry Final Demand in Service 
Sector (1973 = 1.0) 
Price Index of Industry Final Demand in Trade Sector 
(19737 = 1.0) 
Price Index of Industry Final Demand in 
Transportation Sector (1973 = 1.0) 
Sectoral Population (Persons) 
Sectoral Population of Income Class I, Class II, etc. 
(Persons) 
Total Population (Persons) 
Total Population of Income Class I, Class II, etc. 
(Persons) 
Relative Population of Income Class I, Class II, etc. 
Poverty Index 
Export Price Index of Rubber (1973 Rupiah = 100) 
Export Price Index of Timber (1973 Rupiah = 100) 
Export Price Index of Tin (1973 Rupiah = 100) 
Sectoral Value Added Price Index (1973 = 1.0) 
Value Added Price Index in Construction Sector (1973 
=  1 . 0 )  
PVFD Value Added Price Index in Food Sector (1973 = 1.0) 
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PVMFG Value Added Price Index in Manufacturing (Incl. 
Electricity) Sector (1973 = 1.0) 
PVMN Value Added Price Index in Mining Sector (1973 = 1.0) 
PVOAG Value Added Price Index in Other Agricultures (1973 = 
1 . 0 )  
PVTRD Value Added Price Index in Trade Sector (1973 = 1.0) 
PVTRN Value Added Price Index in Transportation Sector 
(1973 = 1.0) 
PVSER Value Added Price Index in Service Sector (1973 = 
1 . 0 )  
REPCAP Real (1973) Replacement Capital (Billion Rp) 
REVOIL Government Revenue From Oil! Companies (Billion Rp) 
SAVCOR Corporate Savings (Billin Rp) 
SAVDGON Government Domestic Savings (Billion Rp) 
SAVDOM Total Domestic Savings (Billion Rp) 
SAVFOR Foreign Savings (Million US $) 
SAVHH Real (1973) Household Savings (Billion Rp) 
SAVHMl Current Household Savings (Billion Rp) 
SAVTOT Total Savings (Billion Rp) 
TXCORP Corporate Tax Revenue (Billion Rp) 
TXDIR Direct Tax Revenue (Billion Rp) 
TXINC Income Tax Revenue (Billion Rp) 
TXIND Indirect Tax Revenue (Billion Rp) 
TXM Import Tax Revenue (Billion Rp) 
TXNON Non-tax Revenue (Billion Rp) 
TXODIR Other Direct Tax Revenue (Billion Rp) 
TXOIND Other Indirect Tax Revenue (Billion Rp) 
TXX Export Tax Revenue (Billion Rp) 
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UNEMP 
VA73 
VANIl 
VANI73 
VAGR73 
VC0N73 
VEL73 
VEST73 
VFD73 
VFIS73 
VFOR73 
VIRR73 
VLIV73 
VMF6 
VMF61 
VMF673 
VMN73 
VNIR73 
VOFD73 
Percent Unemployment 
Sectoral Real (1973) Value Added (Billion Rp) 
A Part of Real (1973) Value Added of Animal Products 
Which is Exported 
Real (1973) Value Added of Animal Products (Billion 
Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Agricultural Sector 
(Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Construction Sector 
(Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added or Electricity and Supply 
Sector (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Non-food Farm and Estate 
Crops (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Food Sector (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Fishery (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Forestry (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Irrigated Rice Production 
(Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Livestock Production 
(Billion Rp) 
Current Value Added of Manufacturing Sector (Billion 
Rp) 
Current Value Added of Manufacturing Sector (Million 
US $) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Manufacturing Sector 
(Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Mining Sector (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Non-lrrlgated Rice 
Production (Billion Rp) 
Real (1973) Value Added of Other Food Crops (Billion 
Rp) 
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VOIL73 Real (1973) Value Added of Oil Production (Billion 
Rp) 
VOMN73 Real (1973) Value Added of Other Mineral Production 
(Billion Rp) 
VSER73 Real (1973) Value Added of Service Sector (Billion 
Rp) 
VTRD73 Real (1973) Value Added of Trade Sector (Billion Rp) 
VTRN73 Real (1973) Value Added of Transportation Sector 
(Billion Rp) 
WORCAP Working Capital (Billion Rp) 
WR Real Wage Index 
WX Nominal Wage Index (1973 = 1.0) 
XANI Export of Animal Products (Million US $) 
XEST Export of Non-food Farm and Estate Crops (Million US 
$ )  
XFIS Export of Fisheries (Million US $) 
XLIV Export of Livestock (Million US $) 
XMFG Export of Manufacturing Products (Million US $) 
XNOIL Total Non-oil Exports (Million US $) 
XOAGR Export of Other Agricultural Products (Million US $) 
XDMN Export of Other Minerals (Million US $) 
XRUB Export of Rubber (Million US $) 
XTIM Export of Timber (Million US $) 
XTIN Export of Tin (Million US $) 
Yl, Y2, etc. Total Real (1973) Income of Income Class I, Class II, 
etc. (Billion Rp) 
Yal, YA2, etc. Average Real (1973) Income of Income Class I, Class 
II, etc. (Thousand Rp) 
YC Sectoral Real (1973) Income Per Capita (Thousand Rp) 
YCUMl, YCUM2, etc. Cumulative Real (1973) Income of Class I, Class II, 
etc-, (Billion Rp) 
YCMIN Minimum Real (1973) Income Per Capita (Thousand Rp) 
YDl, YD2, etc. Real (1973) Disposable Income of Class I, Class II, 
etc. (Billion Rp) 
YDRl, YDR2, etc. Relative Real (1973) Disposable Income of Class I, 
Class II, etc. 
